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ABSTRACT 
 
This research explores the relationship between the configurations that international 
construction majors (ICMs) adopt and the effectiveness with which they develop their core 
competencies. Its significance lies with the fact that - due to the project-based, diversified and 
internationalized nature of ICMs - findings from this research not only contribute to our 
knowledge regarding the strategic management of large construction organizations, but also to 
our knowledge regarding the management of project-based organizations (PBOs) in general, 
and production-oriented multi-national corporations (MNCs). In addition, it expands the 
boundaries of core competence theory’s application towards a novel context, other than the 
production-oriented industries in which it has been traditionally examined. 
In this research, theory was critically reviewed to define and describe core 
competencies within the context of multi business unit (BU) organizations - such as ICMs. 
Drawing from ‘cybernetics’, ‘management control’ and mainstream strategic management 
theories, five corporate-level activities were brought forward as effectively shaping core 
competence development. Implementing a qualitative multiple case study strategy in the 
tradition of critical realism, four ICMs - and one shadow case which was ultimately not 
included - were studied through collection and analysis of documentary and semi-structured 
interview data. Their cross-case comparison - and discussion of findings in light of the extant 
literature - showed that the divisionalization inherent in diversified configurations can 
influence negatively the effectiveness with which ICMs develop their core competencies. In 
contrast, in the presence of ‘lateral links’ between distinct, yet related, BUs: i) standardization 
of processes (particularly regarding project-team integration and organizational learning 
mechanisms integrated with reporting processes), ii) standardization of skills and iii) 
standardization of norms, positively influence the effectiveness with which core competencies 
are developed. In addition - and perhaps most importantly - particular ‘structural’ and 
‘functioning’ organizational characteristics were identified, which enable core competencies 
to effectively emerge.  
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Chapter 1: Setting the Context 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 Certain companies exhibit superior performance compared with their peers and 
have had greater success in setting and pursuing their intended strategies. This 
phenomenon has been of great interest for strategic management researchers and 
practitioners (e.g. Penrose, 1959, 1995; Rumelt, 1974; Mintzberg, 1978; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Porter, 1985; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). It is this phenomenon that this 
research explores, within the context of construction.  
The first straight-forward conceptualization of the way a company sets and 
pursues its intended strategies was brought forward by Mintzberg (1978). The strategy 
process (Figure 1.1) labels strategy as ‘intended’, ‘deliberate’ - where intentions  that  
existed  previously  were  realized  -  and  ‘emergent’ - where patterns develop in the 
absence of intentions or despite them - forming a conceptual framework through which 
how a firm’s ‘realized’ strategy comes to be can be explained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the 1990s it became widely accepted that a firm’s superior performance 
and greater success in pursuing its intended strategies lies in its ability to ‘align’ its 
organizational resources with the requirements of the industry environment it operates 
in (Powell, 1992; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1993; Kay, 1993; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; 
Teece et al., 1997). Close alignment, yet flexibility to change - as the requirements of 
alignment change - form part of developing and sustaining competitiveness in a 
INTENDED 
STRATEGY 
Unrealized 
Strategy Emergent Strategy 
REALIZED 
STRATEGY 
Adapted from Mintzberg (1978) 
Deliberate Strategy 
Fig 1.1: The Strategy Process 
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constantly changing marketplace (Peters and Waterman, 1982). This point of view was 
embraced by construction strategy researchers - particularly Langford and Male (1991; 
2001), Male and Stocks (1991) and Chinowsky and Meredith (2000), who applied 
mainstream strategic management theory principles to address the competitiveness of 
organizations operating in the construction industry.  
Although strategic management can be separated into two major streams, one 
focusing on ‘external analysis of competition’ - including the ‘competitive interactions 
of firms’ - and the other focusing on the ‘internal works of organisations’, researchers 
(De Wit and Meyer, 1994; Grant, 1994; Sanchez and Heene, 1997 and in construction: 
Langford and Male, 2001 and Chinowsky and Meredith, 2000) agree that neither of 
them in isolation provides a framework to understand an organization’s ability to align 
its resources with the requirements of its complete environment. Within this notion of 
market-company alignment, Prahalad and Hamel (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1994) brought forward core competence theory. 
 
1.2 Core Competence Theory 
 
The theory’s proponents (Hamel et al., 1989; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1994; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Sanchez et al., 1996; and in 
construction Chinowsky and Meredith, 2000 and Haan et al., 2002) postulate that an 
organization’s superior performance is based on a collection of desired skills which are 
part of the organization’s collective learning and/or on collective aptitudes that add-up 
to the organization’s culture. These they call ‘core competencies’1. Core competence 
theory emphasises the importance of ‘proactive organizational development’ by 
proposing an organization must start building on its strengths ‘now’ to develop the core 
competencies necessary to be successful in its markets in the future. It is the idea of 
focusing on what an organization does best that resides at the centre of core competence 
theory’s notion of proactively aligning organizational resources and (potential) future 
market requirements (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994 and in 
construction: Chinowsky and Meredith, 2000). The further the organization moves 
away from what it does best, the more likely it will fail to meet its objectives.  
   
                                               
1
 The use of the term ‘core competence’ in industry and academia often results in confusion, since it is 
being used in a variety of different contexts and derived from different meanings (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1994; Lahti, 1999). Even though the concept of core competence will be described, explained and defined 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the researcher felt that a brief introduction of the term at this stage would 
benefit the reader in understanding the arguments presented in this chapter.  
 3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core competence theory promotes the notion that ‘competing for future opportunities’ is 
more  important  than  ‘competing  for  present  opportunities’.  In light of this, the goal 
for organizations should be to develop an independent point of view about future 
opportunities and how to exploit them (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). Underlying the 
theory’s philosophy is the ‘core competence development’ process (Figure 1.2). This 
starts with an organization’s leadership identifying and understanding its existing core 
competencies, in tandem with developing a foresight of desirable core competencies for 
markets in which it may choose to compete. This exercise can provide the organization 
with direction regarding its development, as it highlights the skills and collective 
aptitudes it needs to develop. Leadership should then steer the organization towards that 
direction, by exhibiting the strategic intent (SI) to do so (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; 
1991). Subsequently, leadership needs to create a ‘roadmap’ for the implementation of 
its strategic plan, referred to in core competence theory as ‘strategic architecture’ (SA) 
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1991; 1993). Having done that, core competence theorists 
advocate that the organization can develop its core competencies quicker and more cost 
 Figure 1.2: The Core Competence Development Strategy Process 
 
Examining 
Dynamics of 
Competition 
 
Identifying 
Potential 
Future 
Opportunities 
 
Crafting 
Strategic 
Architecture 
 
Identifying 
Existing Core 
Competencies  
Stretching and 
Leveraging 
Resources and 
Core 
Competencies 
 
Exhibiting 
Strategic 
Intent 
Stage 1: Determining Intended Strategy Stage 2: Executing Strategy Core 
Competence 
Development 
Strategy 
Process 
        Source: Author Generated 
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effectively than competitors by ‘stretching and leveraging’ the resources and core 
competencies it already possesses2. 
Core competence theory postulates that organizations following this ‘exhibiting 
strategic intent’ to ‘stretching and leveraging’ process, and the principle of ‘focusing on 
what their organization does best’, will pursue intended strategies with greater success 
than competitors who do not (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; 1991; 1993; 1994; Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990; Sanchez and Heene, 1997). At the same time, the theory’s proponents 
not only recognize, but also emphasize, that integration of ‘intra-organizational’ and 
‘inter-organizational’ competitive dynamics is required for effective core competence 
development, embracing what Mintzberg (1978) had referred to as ‘integrating 
emerging with intended strategies’. 
Before presenting further the research that has been undertaken in core 
competence theory in order to highlight the knowledge gaps that exist in the field and 
better position this research within them, its theoretical origins will be reviewed, in 
order for the reader to better understand its open-ended, yet integrative nature. 
 
1.3 Theories Implicit in Core Competence Theory 
 
Core competence theory is rooted in a number of theoretical perspectives that 
have been proposed to explain the issues behind superior organizational performance, 
differences in the success rate with which organizations set and pursue their intended 
strategies, and the effectiveness with which they can (pro-actively) align their resources 
with the changing requirements of the market/industry environment they operate in. 
The following theories are the most clearly implicit in core competence theory. 
� Organization Theory; 
� The Market-Power View (MPV) of the Firm; 
� The Resource Base View (RBV) of the Firm; 
� The Behavioural Theory of the Firm; 
� Evolutionary Economics; 
� Organizational Learning. 
 
                                               
2
 According to Hamel and Prahalad (1994), the essence of stretching and leveraging resources and core 
competencies following the exhibiting of strategic intent is to ‘do more with less’. Although it is 
reasonable to be sceptical about the practical application of ‘doing more with less’ in real life, it is 
mentioned here to show the focus on efficiency and creativity that is implicit in core competence theory. 
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Each will be briefly reviewed here so that core competence theory can be 
positioned within the wider field of strategic management, its theoretical background 
can be better understood and its ‘integrative’ nature demonstrated. 
 
1.3.1 Organization Theory 
 
Traditionally, the issue of how organizations ‘structure’ to align themselves with 
the requirements of their industry environment has been the focus of organization 
theory3. Scott (2004) and Hatch (2006) identified two major sources of thought that 
formed the pre-history of organization theory, one sociological and one managerial. 
They argue the sociological source is represented in the works of Emile Durkheim, Max 
Weber and Karl Marx - who focused on the changing shapes and roles of formal 
organizations in society and the influences of industrialization on the nature of work and 
its consequences for workers - and the managerial source is represented by the work of 
Frederic Taylor, Henry Fayol and Chester Barnard - who were industry practitioners 
and focused on the potential problems faced by managers of public and private sector 
organizations.  
 Absent from both of these early approaches was attention to organizations as of 
interest in their own right (Scott, 2004). Barnard (1938) and Selznick (1948) were 
among the first scholars to focus primary attention on the organization as the unit of 
interest. Both viewed organizations not only as technical systems, but also as ‘adaptive’ 
social systems attempting to survive in their environment. In the 1950s, organizations 
emerged as a recognized field of social scientific study, with March and Simon (1958) 
focusing attention on decisions and decision makers in organizations, Merton (1949), 
emphasizing the unintended consequences of purposive action and Blau (1955), who 
focused on the dilemmas of ‘bureaucracies’ - as formal structures designed to solve one 
problem give rise to others. When the theory of ‘open systems’ (von Bertalanffy, 1956) 
was first introduced, organization theorists started paying attention to the environment 
within which organizations operated, as opposed to paying attention solely on 
organizational actors and processes. This gave rise to innovative theoretical models, 
affording new insights into the determinants of organizational structure. Scott (2004) 
has grouped them in the following six areas: 
                                               
3
 When applied to construction organizations, organization theory can be confusing and conflicting, 
perhaps because its theoretical thrust has come predominantly from the analysis of ‘manufacturing’ or 
‘service’ companies (Male, 1991; Lansley, 1994).  
 
 6
� Contingency Theory: recognizing that, although all organizations are dependent 
on their environment for resources and technical information, these environments 
vary in complexity and uncertainty, and therefore, organizational structures are 
expected to differ (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Galbraith, 1973). Those organizations whose structures are best adapted to their 
specific environments are expected to perform best. Burns and Stalker (1961) 
argued that if a stable, routine and fairly predictable market environment 
prevailed, companies could reap advantages from ‘mechanistic’ functional 
organizational forms, whereas in the case of rapidly changing technological and 
market conditions, flexible and organic organizational management is required to 
successfully link functions. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) found that 
environmental conditions surrounding an organization in simple and stable 
environments relied upon coordination mechanisms of direct supervision and 
standardization, whereas organizations in more dynamic and complex 
environments favoured mutual adjustment as a means of coordination. Galbraith 
(1973) was the first to explain the role of mutual adjustment devices such as ‘task 
forces’ and ‘matrix forms’ in the formal organizational structure; 
� Transaction-Cost Theory: in which Williamson (1975) built on Coase’s (1937) 
insight that organizations arise to deal with transaction costs that markets are ill-
equipped to handle. He blended organization theory with economic theory to 
propose the ‘transaction cost’ approach as a way of determining a firm’s 
boundaries, with respect to the extent it decides to ‘internalize’ activities that it 
can procure from the market4; 
� Resource-Dependence Theory: building on Emerson’s (1962) formulation of 
‘power-dependence’ relations, this framework recognizes that organizations must 
exchange resources to survive, but such exchanges, if imbalanced, give rise to 
power differences (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978); 
� Network Theory: This was applied during the 1970s and 1980s to the study of 
relations among organizations. Building on the work of White et al. (1976), 
scholars moved to develop measures and methods appropriate to examining 
networks of organizations. An organization’s location in a network of relations, as 
                                               
4
 Due to its direct applicability to construction, the ‘transaction cost’ approach has enjoyed a number of 
successful applications in the field (e.g. Gunnarson and Levitt, 1982; Reve and Levitt, 1984; Stinchcombe 
and Heimer, 1985; and Winch 1989). One particularly powerful illustration of the approach can be given 
by considering the issue regarding at what stage does it make sense for an organization to subcontract 
work, rather than to undertake the work directly (internally). 
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well as the structure of the network itself, were recognized to affect organizational 
behaviour and outcomes5; 
� Organization Ecology: Building on the work of Hawley (1950), Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) argued that previous theories exaggerated the extent to which it is 
possible for individual organizations to undergo fundamental change. They 
therefore argued that those interested in change should shift their attention from a 
focus on single organizations to ‘populations’ of organizations of the same type; 
� Institutional Theory: This stresses the importance of the ‘structural’ features of 
environments organizations operate in. Building on the work of Berger and 
Luckmann (1967)6, institutional theorists (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer 
and Scott, 1983) argue that not only their technical, but also their institutional 
environment (i.e. regulative, normative and cultural/cognitive features) need to be 
considered. 
 
As noted in Section 1.2, core competence theory proponents not only recognize, 
but also emphasize, that integration of intra- and inter-organizational dynamics is 
required for effective core competence development. The notion of (proactively) 
aligning organizational resources with the requirements of (potential) future market 
environments, resides at the centre of core competence theory. Therefore, the ideas of 
aligning organizational structure with market environment requirements explicit in 
organization theory are of great relevance to core competence theory. 
 
1.3.2 The Market Power View (MPV) of the Firm 
 
 In the tradition of industrial organization economics, Caves and Porter (1977) 
developed the argument that an industry’s structural forces impede firms from freely 
changing their competitive position and are seen as substantially independent of a firm’s 
actions (mobility barriers). This provided an explanation of why profit rates differ 
systematically among the groups making up an industry. Later, Porter (1980) took the 
analysis a step further, suggesting the concept of mobility barriers alone is inadequate to 
explain performance differences among firms of the same strategic group. He argued 
                                               
5
 Because network theory emphasizes the ‘relational’ aspects of environments, its development aided the 
study of resource dependence connections (Pfeffer, 1987). 
6
 In ‘The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge’, Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) contend reality is socially constructed and should be understood in terms of an ongoing 
dialectic process, composed of the three moments of ‘externalization’, ‘objectivation’ and 
‘internalization’ of the knowledge of individuals. 
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that the profitability - and hence the prospects for growth - of a firm, depend on how the 
firm is positioned in an industry with respect to the ‘Five Competitive Forces’ (Figure 
1.3) operating in its environment.  
 By introducing further the ‘Value Chain’ concept (Figure 1.4), Porter (1985) 
related internal company structure in specific ways back into the structure of the 
marketplace, linking the MPV of the firm with the internal functions and activities that a 
company performs. The value chain distinguishes between ‘primary’ and ‘support’  
activities  and  can  aid  value  analysis  in  order  to  assist  management  in identifying 
where value is added and the optimum  way  to  exploit  it.  Assuming  that  each  
business   unit  of a company represents a separate value chain, Porter (1985) 
distinguished between three broad types of interrelationships among a company’s 
distinct business units (BUs): 
�  ‘Tangible interrelationships’: arising from opportunities to share activities among 
related BUs, due to common buyers, technologies and other factors; 
� ‘Intangible interrelationships’: involving the transference of management know-
how among separate BUs, stemming from the fact that businesses that cannot 
share activities may nevertheless be similar in generic terms, such as type of 
buyer, type of purchase by buyers, type of relationships with clients and type of 
production processes. 
� ‘Competitor interrelationships’: stemming from the existence of rivals that 
actually or potentially compete with a company in more than one industry. 
 
Porter (1985) advocated that companies should actively manage and exploit 
these interrelationships by setting-up and maintaining a ‘horizontal organization’ that 
would link their distinct - although perhaps related - BUs. 
The MPV of the firm examines how organizations set or adopt strategies to 
position themselves within the industry they compete, such that they will enjoy superior 
competitiveness over ‘worse’ positioned competitors. In contrast, core competence 
theory advocates that organisations which are ‘leaders’ in their industry can cooperate 
and collaborate with other organisations through alliances, joint ventures and 
knowledge sharing agreements, and succeed in actually ‘shaping’ the landscape of the 
industry in which they compete. 
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Core competence theory acknowledges the ideas within the MPV of the firm and 
their contribution to the wider field of strategic management. It does this, first, by 
recognizing the strong influence industry characteristics exert on the type of core 
competencies that organisations need to develop to be successful. Second, it does this 
by emphasizing that the development and deployment of core competencies through 
organisation-specific activities is about adding value, the same philosophy behind 
Porter’s (1985) ‘Value Chain’ concept. The most important relationship between the 
two theories, however, is based on the concept of ‘interrelationships’ between distinct 
business units (BUs) and the ‘horizontal organization’ set-up to exploit them. Hamel 
and Prahalad (1994) implicitly acknowledge that multi-BU organisations are more 
advantageously structured to develop and deploy their core competencies than single-
BU organisations. They advocate that core competencies needed to access future 
opportunities may be spread across a number of BUs and it is up to the organisation to 
bring them together at the appropriate time and place, highlighting thus the importance 
of a ‘horizontal organisation’ for effective inter-BU coordination.  
 
1.3.3 The Resource Based View (RBV) of the Firm 
 
The RBV of the firm emerged largely from the works of Selznick (1957) and 
Penrose (1959). Penrose (1959:15) was the first to define the firm as a pool of 
resources, whose ‘general purpose is to organize the use of its own resources together 
with other resources acquired outside the firm for the production and sale of goods and 
services for a profit’. Penrose also described the firm as a collection of resources bound 
together in an ‘administrative framework’, the boundaries of which are determined by 
the area of ‘administrative coordination’ and ‘authoritative communication’. She further 
advocated, ‘the firm’s rate of growth is limited by the growth of knowledge within it, 
but a firm’s size by the extent to which administrative effectiveness can continue to 
reach its expanding boundaries’ (Penrose, 1995:24).  
According to the RBV of the firm, the long-term competitiveness of a company 
depends on the resources it has obtained and developed that differentiate it from its 
competitors, as well as its ability to use them towards achieving its goals and meeting 
its objectives (Rangone, 1999). The RBV of the firm is therefore an approach to look 
internally for sources of superior organizational performance (Mahoney and Panadian, 
1992; Peteraf, 1993). The approach taken is one whereby the strategy process revolves 
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around identification, development/acquisition and exploitation of ‘idiosyncratic’, ‘path 
dependent’ and ‘company-specific’ resources (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). 
The RBV of the firm does not consider all resources but focuses only on 
‘critical’ or ‘strategic’ ones, which are the basis of the company’s superior performance 
(Cool and Schendel, 1988; Barney, 1991; Rangone, 1999). It has been argued (Barney, 
1991; Collis, 1994; Collis and Montgomery, 1995; Foss and Foss, 2005) that for 
resources to yield ‘sustainable competitive advantage’ they must be: 
� Valuable: exploiting opportunities and/or neutralizing threats; 
� Rare: among current and potential competitors; 
� Imperfectly Imitable: not easily copied by competition; 
� Non-Substitutable: not easily substituted; 
� Durable: not easy to destroy; 
� Appropriable: allowing their owner to appropriate the benefits acquired from 
them. 
 
The strongest association between the RBV of the firm and core competence 
theory lies in the relationship between resources and core competencies themselves, a 
complex relationship which will be better understood through the theoretical models 
developed at a later stage of this thesis7. In addition, core competence theory adopts a 
notion inherent in the RBV of the firm: it is the efficiency and effectiveness with which 
each company utilizes its resources that ultimately shape its future. Finally, core 
competence theory’s tenet of ‘focusing on what the organization does best’ is drawn 
from the RBV of the firm and the work of Wernerfelt (1984; 1995), who advocated 
companies should pursue opportunities where success is dependent on types of 
resources that are supplementary or complementary to the resources they already 
possess. 
 
1.3.4 Evolutionary Economics  
 
The theory of evolutionary economics was first introduced by Nelson and 
Winter (1982) and has its roots in the work of Schumpeter (1942). This theory attributes 
superior organizational performance to the organization-specific routines that a 
company has developed and retained through its history of operation. Routines are 
organisation-specific, as is each company’s unique evolutionary path (Teece et al. 1997; 
                                               
7
 Viz. Chapter 3, sections 3.1-3.2.6 
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Eisenhardt et al. 2000). Nelson and Winter (1982) use the term ‘organizational routines’ 
to include characteristics of firms ranging from well-specified technical routines for 
producing things and procedures for hiring and firing, ordering new inventory, to 
policies regarding investment, R&D, advertising and business strategies about 
diversification. In evolutionary economic theory, routines represent an organization’s 
collective learning assimilation and cultural position, especially regarding informal 
routines that end up becoming organizational norms.   
Routines may change over time, but in the short run they function as carriers of 
knowledge and experience. In the words of Nelson and Winter (1982: 14): ‘routines 
play a role that genes play in biological evolutionary theory. They are a persistent 
feature of an organism and determine its possible behaviour (though actual behaviour is 
determined also by the environment), they are heritable in the sense that tomorrow’s 
organisms generated from today’s (for example, the building of a new plant), have 
many of the same characteristics and they are selectable in the sense that organisms with 
certain routines may do better than others and, if so, their relative importance in the 
population (industry) is augmented over time’. In addition, they argued that the idea 
organizations ‘remember’ a routine by exercising it is similar to how an individual 
remembers skills by exercising them. 
Following the footsteps of Schumpeter (1942), Nelson and Winter (1982) built 
the concept of ‘organizational capability’8, which can be defined as ‘a high level routine 
(or collection of routines, particularly formal ones) that, together with its implementing 
input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision options for 
producing significant outputs of a particular type’ (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003: 999). Grant 
(1996b) argued that, if knowledge resides in specialized form among individual 
organizational members, then the ‘essence’ of organizational capability is the 
‘integration’ of individuals’ specialized knowledge. 
Core competence theory embraces Schumpeter’s (1942) and Nelson and 
Winter’s (1982) evolutionary approach, where the competitive dynamics of an industry 
are driven by the actions of the companies belonging to that industry. This is the 
opposite direction of causality than the one postulated by the industrial organization 
economics’ paradigm of structure-conduct-performance (Porter, 1980). Adopting this 
direction of causality, core competence theory recognizes not only that firms in an 
industry compete for both markets and critical resources, but also, and at the same time, 
must cooperate in many ways to create new resources and develop new markets that 
                                               
8
 Further described in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2 
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may benefit all firms in that industry (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 
1994; Sanchez and Heene, 1996). Thus, the theoretical lens of core competence theory 
allows better insights into inter-firm dynamics than has been accessible through prior 
strategy theory and can also link those to issues related to intra-organizational dynamics 
and more specifically the routinization of activities. 
 
1.3.5 The Behavioural Theory of the Firm 
 
 Also implicit in core competence theory is the theory of organizational 
behaviour. Its foundations were laid by organization theory scholars Simon and March 
(Simon 1952; March and Simon, 1958), who modelled human behaviour to better 
understand how decisions are made in complex organizations. The resulting behavioural 
theory of the firm was consolidated and formalized in the work of Cyert and March 
(1963), who made detailed observations of the procedures by which firms make 
decisions and used these observations as a basis to develop a theory of ‘decision 
making’ within organizations. Organizational behaviour views the firm as a ‘coalition 
of individuals’, some of them organized into ‘sub-coalitions’.  
 The same authors have further suggested a business is constrained by the 
uncertainty of its environment, the problems of maintaining a viable coalition and the 
limitations on its capacity as a system for assembling, storing and utilizing information. 
As a result, behavioural theory characterizes the firm as an ‘adaptively rational system’, 
which it assumes to have the following properties: 
� There exist a number of states of the system. At any time, the system operates 
better under certain states than other possible states; 
� There exists an external source of disturbance or shock to the system, which 
cannot be controlled;  
� There exist a number of decision variables internal to the system, which are 
manipulated according to some decision rules; 
� Each combination of external shocks and decision variables in the system changes 
the state of the system. Thus, given an existing state, an external shock and a 
decision, the next state is determined;  
� Any decision rule that leads to a preferred state at one point is more likely to be 
used in the future than it was in the past. Any decision rule that leads to a non-
preferred state at one point is less likely to be used in the future than it was in the 
past. 
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It can be argued on the basis of the above criteria that a company is an adaptive 
institution that learns from experience. The resolution of conflict, uncertainty 
avoidance, problematic research and organizational learning are central phenomena with 
which the model of Cyert and March (1963) deals. 
Core competence theory explicitly recognizes the firm as a proactively adaptive 
institution, which learns from its experience. In addition, it acknowledges the influence 
the way decisions are made in organizations have in the successful pursuit and 
realisation of strategies, by emphasizing an alignment between organizational objectives 
and the objectives of individual employees has to be achieved during the process of 
exhibiting strategic intent (SI) and crafting strategic architecture (SA) (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1989; 1994). 
 
1.3.6 Organizational Learning 
 
 The first integrated theory of organizational learning was presented by Argyris 
and Schön (1978)9. They argued that organizational learning occurs in a ‘double-loop’ 
process, during which existing perspectives, interpretation frameworks and decision-
making procedures are questioned and reconstructed. Argyris and Schön (1978) 
recognized that organizational learning is often difficult to achieve and the use of 
organizational development programs is often required to overcome this difficulty. 
Building on their work, Nonaka (1991, 1994) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argued 
double-loop learning need not be a special task, but a daily (in other words ‘routine’) 
activity of organizations.  
 Focusing on ‘knowledge creation’, Nonaka (1991; 1994) proposed a model that 
hinges on a dynamic interaction between ‘tacit’ and ‘explicit’ knowledge. He identified 
four ‘modes’ of dynamic knowledge interaction: i) socialization (tacit to tacit), ii) 
externalization (tacit to explicit), iii) combination (explicit to explicit) and iv) 
internalization (explicit to tacit). He argued that organizational knowledge creation 
occurs when all four modes are organizationally managed. Subsequently, he described 
                                               
9
 It is worth mentioning that the importance of knowledge and organizational learning has been widely 
recognized in the strategic management literature. Penrose (1959) was one of the first academics to stress 
the importance of ‘managing knowledge’. Nelson and Winter (1982) had recognized that knowledge is 
captured through the ‘routinization’ of activities, which leads to routines representing the organization’s 
collective learning assimilation and cultural position in the long run. Organizational learning is also a 
concept implicit in the work of Cyert and March (1963; 1995), who perceived the firm as an adaptive 
institution that learns from its experience.  
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knowledge creation as a ‘spiral process’. In his ‘spiral of organizational knowledge 
creation’  (Figure 1.5),  the  process  starts  by  ‘socialization’,  usually  through  the 
building of a ‘team’ or ‘field’ of interaction, which facilitates the sharing of members’ 
experiences and perspectives. Then, ‘externalization’ is triggered through dialogue. In 
search of more solid and sharable specifications, concepts formed by teams, existing 
data and external knowledge are combined. Often, this mode of ‘combination’ is 
facilitated by the documentation of existing knowledge. Experimentation through trial 
and error then leads to internalization through a process of ‘learning by doing’. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Examining ‘individual’ learning within groups, Lave and Wenger (1991) argued 
that it should not be viewed as simply the transmission of abstract and de-contextualized 
knowledge from one individual to another. They proposed ‘situated learning’ as 
learning that takes place in the same context in which knowledge is applied and used the 
term ‘communities of practice’ to describe situated learning through practice and 
participation. They described communities of practice as groups, who share an interest, 
a craft and/or a profession and argued it is through the process of sharing information 
and experiences within the group that community members learn from each other and 
develop themselves personally and professionally. Finally, they explained that 
communities of practice can evolve naturally because of the members’ common interest 
 
 
Source:  Nonaka (1991) 
Figure 1.5: The Spiral of Organizational Knowledge Creation 
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in a particular domain, or they can be created specifically with the goal of gaining 
knowledge related to a particular field. 
Wenger (1998) and Wenger and Snyder (2000) recognized that communities of 
practice are not easy to build and sustain within organizations, as their organic and often 
informal nature makes them resistant to supervision and interference. They observed, 
however, that a number of organizations have managed to overcome this problem by 
bringing the right people together and providing an infrastructure in which communities 
can operate. More recently, Wenger et al. (2002) have been examining learning as 
‘social participation’, where community members continuously create shared identity 
through engaging in and contributing to the practices of their communities10. 
Drawing from Argyris and Schön (1978), Lipschitz et al. (2002) stressed that 
learning ‘by’ organizations is distinct from learning ‘in’ organizations and requires the 
existence of organizational learning mechanisms (OLMs). Learning ‘by’ organizations 
occurs when learning ‘in’ organizations by individuals occurs within the context of 
OLMs that ensure the people get the information they need and that the products of their 
reflection are stored and disseminated organization-wide. Along those lines, individual-
level learning produces individual insights and changes in habits, skills and actions, 
whereas organizational-level learning produces changes in norms, standard operating 
procedures, structures and cultures. 
Lipschitz et al.  (2002) proposed that the mere existence of OLMs is not 
sufficient for effective organizational learning. This also depends on i) cultural, ii) 
psychological, iii) policy and iv) contextual facets. Subsequently, they described OLMs 
as observable organizational subsystems in which organizational members can interact 
for the purpose of learning. They distinguished four types of OLMs: 
� Integrated: to the extent that organizational members who possess information are 
the same as those who apply this new knowledge; 
� Non-integrated: to the extent that learning is carried out by different individuals; 
� Dual-purpose: to the extent that learning takes place in conjunction with task 
performance; 
� Designated: to the extent that task performance and learning are carried out at 
separate times and different places. 
 
                                               
10
 It should be recognized here that the ideas of Berger and Luckmann (1967) resonate powerfully in the 
field of organizational learning and particularly in the work of Lave and Wenger (1991), Wenger (1998), 
Wenger and Snyder (2000) and Wenger et al. (2002).  
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They concluded that by relating ‘individual-level’ with ‘organizational-level’ learning, 
OLMs warrant the attribution of a learning capacity to organisations. 
 Core competence theory, with its explicit notion of ‘proactive organizational 
development’, draws heavily from ideas developed in the field of organizational 
learning. In addition, the importance of ‘double loop learning’ is evident in the core 
competence theory’s key texts (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994), 
where the importance for companies to question their existing practices and 
continuously try to find new solutions that will differentiate them from competition and 
add value to their products/services is strongly emphasized. Organizational knowledge 
and learning are also embedded in the characteristics of core competencies 
themselves11, which have been described by the proponents of core competence theory 
as being part of the ‘collective learning’ of an organization.  
 
1.4 The Integrative Nature of Core Competence Theory 
 
The six theories briefly reviewed in sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.6 are implicit in core 
competence theory. It is exactly this integrative nature of the theory that makes possible 
the ‘conceptual’ as well as ‘practical’ integration of the many insights that have already 
been developed by prior theory but which remain unconnected in the fragmented 
domains of the strategic management field. This integrative nature provides a theoretical 
lens that permits analysis of contemporary ‘inter-organizational’ (competitive, 
cooperative) as well as ‘intra-organizational’ dynamic phenomena that have been 
difficult to represent and research in prior strategy perspectives. The core competence 
theory’s position within the wider field of strategic management is shown in Figure 1.6. 
The advantage of core competence theory’s integrative nature is that it can 
facilitate under a single theoretical umbrella the conceptualization of the firm as an 
‘activity-based’ organization12 (Porter, 1985),  as  a ‘pool of resources’ (Penrose, 1959; 
1995), as  a ‘collection of organizational capabilities based on organizational routines’ 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), as an ‘adaptively rational system’ (Barnard, 1938; Cyert and  
                                               
11
 A relationship explained in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
12
 The conceptualization of the firm as an ‘activity-based’ organization deserves some additional 
clarification. Heavily influenced by Giddens’ (1979; 1984) approach to the reproduction of the social 
practices of social systems - of which organizations are a subset - some researchers (Whittington, 1996; 
2006; Johnson et al., 2003) have advocated that strategy research should shift its focus towards the 
examination of routines through which organizational actors conduct day to day activities, and their 
relationship with their organization’s performance. Although their point of view is not at odds with the 
core competence theory approach, the term ‘activity-based’ is used here to refer to activities of a higher 
order of abstraction, closer to the strategic-level activities such as the ones Porter (1985) proposed as 
constituting his value chain model.  
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March, 1963; 1992) and as a ‘knowledge-based’ and ‘learning’ organization 
(Nonaka, 1991; 1994), recognizing that all five conceptualizations evolve through time. 
It can be argued that it is exactly this integrative nature that makes it the most 
appropriate theoretical foundation to examine both inter- and intra-organizational issues 
related to the effectiveness of developing competitiveness of organizations and issues of 
relative success in setting and pursuing intended strategies. 
Although encompassing numerous domains of the strategic management field, the 
theory’s 21 year-old history is relatively short. As a result, only a limited amount of 
research has been carried out, which means that gaps in our knowledge still exist 
regarding ‘whether’ and ‘how’ its principles apply in practice. The purpose of the next 
sections is to highlight these gaps, so as to better position this research within a core 
competence theory and strategic management context, explaining its purpose and 
potential contributions to knowledge. 
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Dynamic 
Capabilities 
Evolutionary 
Theory 
Resource -
Based View 
Industry 
Structure Strategic 
Groups 
Re - 
engineering 
Game Theory 
 19
1.5 Current Gaps in Core Competence Theory  
  
Following a critical review of existing core competence theory literature, the 
prevalent ‘themes’ studied were identified and the works undertaken by various authors 
were grouped into one ‘Theory-based’ and two ‘Industry-focused’ categories (Table 
1.1)13. From this critical review the following emerged: 
First, efforts have been made to define core competencies and describe them 
within an organizational context (e.g. Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Prahalad, 1993; 
Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Tampoe, 1994; Sanchez and Heene, 1997, Lahti, 1999; 
Duysters and Hagedoon, 2000; Drejer, 2000 and Scarbrough, 2002). However, none of 
these efforts has been descriptive enough to assist in adequately understanding what 
core competencies actually are, as well as how they relate to the ‘structural’, 
‘functioning’ and ‘agency’ characteristics of the organization that possesses them.  
 Second, two partially overlapping research streams have evolved to address the 
issue of core competence development - both from the context of production-oriented 
multinational corporations (MNCs). The one stream built on the similarities between 
core competence development and Mintzberg’s (1978) strategy process to describe the 
former as consisting of sequential activities organizations should pursue (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1994; Band and Scanlan, 1995; Sanchez and Heene, 1997; Hamilton et al., 
1998; Javidan, 1998; Dufort and Matais, 1999; Clark, 2000; Drejer, 2000; Scarbrough, 
2002 - and viz. Section 1.2, Figure 1.214). The other stream (Hamel et al., 1989; Hamel, 
1991; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Band and Scanlan, 1995; Lei et al., 1997; Dufort and 
Matais, 1999) started from the notion that core competencies represent the collective 
learning and/or collective aptitudes that add-up to organizational culture, to approach 
core competence development from the point of view of organizational learning 
(Argyris and Schön, 1978)15.  
Both streams represent valid attempts to describe core competence development 
in practice. However, it could be argued that they fall short in providing a clear 
                                               
13
 The work of certain authors appears under more than one theme in the table, when their work 
transcends any single category. 
14
 According to the work of these authors, core competence development and the strategy process, exhibit 
the strongest similarities in Stage 1, where i) a future direction/orientation needs to be chosen and ii) 
strategic decisions about ‘what’ the company should be doing are taken. Their differences become clearer 
in Stage 2, where a) the focus of Mintzberg’s strategy process is on managing the relationship between 
the organization and its environment and ii) the focus of the core competence development process is on 
achieving organizational transformation through proactive organizational development. 
15
 Within an organizational context, a further ‘link’ between the two has been provided by Band and 
Scanlan (1995), who argued that core competence development is the most effective means of 
‘controlling’ the strategy process, as it links business strategy with organizational learning. 
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Table 1.1: Core Competence Theory Literature - Themes Studied 
Themes 
Studied 
Author/Year Topic Industry Focus vs. 
Theory-based 
Works 
 
 
 
 
Defining Core 
Competencies and 
Describing their 
Development 
 
 
 
1. Prahalad (1993) 
2. Post (1997) 
3. Hamel and Prahalad (1994) 
1. Technological core competencies are the basis of core competencies and leadership should harmonize ‘business’ with 
‘technology’ development strategies. Core competencies result when organizations harmonize multiple technologies; 
2. Defines core competencies; 
3. Describes sequential stages of core competence development. 
Production-Oriented 
Industries 
1. Duysters and Hagedoon (2000) 1. Core competence development equals technology development. Other Industries 
1.Prahalad and Hamel (1990) 
4. Tampoe (1994) 
5. Sanchez and Heene (1997) 
6. Lahti (1999) 
7. Drejer (2000) 
8. Scarbrough (2002) 
1. Description and definition of core competencies in a MNC context; 
4. Proposed a core competence identification method; 
5. Describes core competence development largely re-iterating Hamel and Prahalad (1994); 
6. Lahti (1999) distinguished individual-level core competencies from organizational-level core competencies and argued 
the importance of their alignment for core competence development; 
7. Defined core competencies and was the first to explicitly recognize their development is linked with i) transformation 
in structure, ii) people , iii)  technology and iv) culture; 
8. Distinguishes intra-organizational cooperative competencies recognizing they are path-dependent; 
Theoretical Works 
 
Technology-
oriented Core 
Competencies and 
their Development 
1. Hamel, Doz and Prahalad 
(1989) 
1. Description of ‘technology-oriented’ core competencies and their development, through inter-partner learning between 
MNCs; 
Production-Oriented 
Industries 
1. Duysters and Hagedorn (2000) 1. Core competence development equals technology development. Other Industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core 
Competencies and 
their Development 
in the Context of 
MNCs 
1. Hamel, Doz and Prahalad 
(1989) 
2. Hamel (1991) 
3. Very  (1993) 
4. Hamel and Prahalad (1994) 
5. Bergenherouwen, Hom and 
Mooijman (1996) 
6. Lei, Hill and Bettis (1997) 
7. Haffez, Zhang and Malak 
(2002) 
1. Description of ‘technology-oriented’ core competencies and their development, through inter-partner learning between 
MNCs; 
2. Inter-partner learning between MNCs to develop skills and knowledge linked to core competencies; 
3. Stressed the importance of managerial relatedness between BUs of diversified MNCs for skills/knowledge constituting 
core competencies to be transferred across BUs; 
4. Described and defined core competencies and their development in the context of diversified MNCs; 
5. Identical to 4. 
6. Innovation equals core competence development in MNCs; 
7. Developed a core competence identification methods in MNCs; 
Production-Oriented 
Industries 
1. Hamel and Prahalad (1991) 
2. Very (1993) 
3. Clark (2000) 
1. Focus on ‘internal workings’ of organizations (MNCs), to improve product functionalities - develop this as a core 
competence - and make the functionalities recognizable to clients; 
2. Stressed the importance of managerial relatedness between BUs of diversified MNCs for skills/knowledge constituting 
core competencies to be transferred 
3. Re-iterates Hamel and Prahalad’s (1994) core competence development process; 
Other Industries 
 
1. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) 
2. Markides and Williamson 
(1994) 
1. Description and definition of core competencies in a MNC context; 
2. Related diversification contributes to MNCs being able to learn faster and develop core competencies quicker and 
cheaper than competitors; 
Theoretical Works 
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Table 1.1: Core Competence Theory Literature - Themes Studied (Continued) 
Themes 
Studied 
Author/Year Topic Industry Focus vs. 
Theory-based Works 
 
 
Core 
Competence 
Development 
and the Strategic 
Management of 
Organizations 
1. Hamel and Prahalad (1993) 
2. Hamel and Prahalad (1994) 
3. Hamilton, Eskin and Michaels    
(1998) 
4. Javidan (1998) 
5. Dufort and Matais (1999) 
1. Described the strategy of stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies; 
2. Described core competence stretch and leverage as a part of core competence development for MNCs. 
3. Highlight the importance of identifying skill-gaps for ‘stretch’ to effectively occur; 
4. Operationalized the concept of strategic intent; 
5. Identical to 4; 
Production-Oriented 
Industries 
 
1. Clark (2000) 1. Re-iterates Hamel and Prahalad’s (1994) core competence development process; Other Industries 
1. Band and Scanlan (1995) 
2. Sanchez and Heene (1997) 
3. Drejer (2000) 
4. Scarbrough (2002) 
1. Pursuing core competence development is an effective means for ‘controlling’ the strategy process, as it links business 
strategy with organizational learning; 
2. Describes core competence development largely re-iterating Hamel and Prahalad (1994); 
3. Defined core competencies and was the first to explicitly recognize their development is linked with i) transformation in 
structure, ii) people , iii)  technology and iv) culture; 
4. Distinguishes intra-organizational cooperative competencies recognizing they are path-dependent; 
Theoretical Works 
 
Core 
Competence 
Development 
and 
Organizational 
Learning 
1. Coyne, Hall and Clifford 
(1996) 
2. Gilgeous and Parveen (2001) 
1. Describe core competence development as a function of organizational learning; 
2. Stress the importance of organizational learning for core competence development; 
Production-Oriented 
Industries 
1. Whitehill (1997) 1. Knowledge-based’ strategy complements core competence development; Other Industries 
1. Band and Scanlan (1995) 1. Pursuing core competence development is an effective means for ‘controlling’ the strategy process, as it links business 
strategy with organizational learning; 
Theoretical Works 
 
Core 
Competence 
Development 
and 
Organizational 
Structural 
Forms 
1. Ritter and Gemünden (2004) 1. Argued intra-organizational networking, promotes technological competence development. 
 
Production-Oriented 
Industries 
 
1.Fairtlough (1994) 
2.Sanchez (1997) 
3.Drejer (2000) 
 
1. Intra-organizational networks facilitating ‘idea-exchange’, foster the development of core competencies; 
2. Suggests core competence theory should be the basis for designing a firm that would be an adaptive system in complex 
environments; 
3. Defined core competencies and was the first to explicitly recognize their development is linked with i) transformation in 
structure, ii) people , iii)  technology and iv) culture; 
Theoretical Works 
 
 
 
 
Human 
Resource 
Management 
Practices and 
ILCC 
Development 
1. Gratton (1996) 
2. Higgins (1996) 
1. Human resource management instruments can be used to develop employees whose individual-level core competencies 
are part of their organization’s core competencies by aligning individual with organizational objectives) 
2. Identical to 1; 
Production-Oriented 
Industries 
 
1. Capelli and Heffer (1996) 1. Argued that human resource management frameworks to help managers develop their individual-level core 
competencies; 
Other Industries 
1. Hagan (1996) 
2. Lahti (1999) 
3. Drejer (2000) 
1. Human resource management instruments should be used to develop individual-level core competencies, which can in 
turn support organizational-level core competencies; 
2. Lahti (1999) distinguished individual-level core competencies from organizational-level core competencies and argued 
the importance of their alignment for core competence development; 
Defined core competencies and was the first to explicitly recognize their development is linked with i) transformation in 
structure, ii) people , iii)  technology and iv) culture; 
Theoretical Works 
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explanation as to what core competence development entails in practice and for 
different types of organizations. This shortfall is exacerbated by the pre-existing lack of 
understanding as to what core competencies actually are. Theory (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1994) acknowledges that core competence development is a corporate responsibility and 
that it should be undertaken by a cohort of BU heads working horizontally across the 
organization. In light of this, the shortfalls of both ‘core competence development’ 
research streams will be discussed here in turn. 
In the first stream, organizational agents are responsible for steering efforts from 
‘identifying’ to ‘stretching and leveraging’ existing core competencies. Existing theory 
however, does not identify specific corporate-level activities they should focus upon in 
order to achieve this effectively. In addition, it does not identify the ‘structural’ and 
‘functioning’ characteristics that can better facilitate their efforts, regarding: 
� Appropriately and effectively developing intended strategies; 
� Stretching and leveraging their resources and core competencies across 
organizational units; 
� Effectively integrating ‘emerging’ with ‘intended’ strategies when necessary. 
 
In relation to the second stream, another issue becomes apparent. From the 
description of core competencies as the collective learning of the organization and/or 
collective aptitudes that add-up to organizational culture (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994), it 
follows that, during core competence development, organizations will have to 
reconfigure their structures, functions and re-negotiate their organizational norms as a 
function of organizational learning. The research undertaken so far however, does not 
provide insights as to the particular organizational characteristics that enable effective 
transformation of structure, functions and norms, towards core competence 
development. Consequently, a gap in our knowledge exists regarding the relationship 
between the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics of organizations on the one 
hand and the effectiveness with which they can develop their core competencies as a 
function of learning on the other16. 
                                               
16
 Giddens’ (1979; 1984) theory of ‘structuration’ is very useful to understand the dynamics of this 
process at a theoretical level. The theory of structuration, outlined by Anthony Giddens (1984) in ‘The 
Constitution of Society’ (first introduced in ‘Central Problems of Social Theory’ (1979)) holds that all 
human action is performed within the context of pre-existing social structure which is governed by a set 
of norms and/or laws which are distinct from those of other social structures. Along those lines, all human 
action is at least partly pre-determined based on the varying contextual rules under which it forms. At the 
same time, the theory recognizes that structure and rules are not permanent and external, but sustained 
and modified by human action through reflexive feedback. In Giddens’ terms, core competence 
development involves reconfiguration of ‘social practices’ and ‘structural properties’. 
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 Following this section’s review, a better description/definition of core 
competencies, as well as an identification of the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ 
organizational characteristics that enable organizational agents to effectively develop 
core competencies, are pertinent to the advancement of core competence theory. The 
latter is the dominant theme around which this research revolves. That is: ‘exploring the 
relationship between the configurations that organizations adopt and the effectiveness 
with which they develop their core competencies’. 
The choice of the term ‘configuration’ (Mintzberg, 1979; 1983; 1989) is not 
arbitrary, as it simultaneously captures both ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ dimensions of 
organizations, while including descriptions of their ‘agency’ characteristics and linking 
them with the level of uncertainty and complexity of their environment. Therefore, the 
term can facilitate a better examination, explanation and understanding of the 
interdependency between ‘structure’ and ‘function’, during the transformation process 
that organizations go through when developing their core competencies17. 
Core competencies and their development have been mostly examined in a 
production-industry context (such as electronics, automotive, pharmaceuticals, 
petrochemicals) and for the case of multinational corporations (MNCs). Consequently, 
it can be argued that core competence theory research is production-industry laden and 
undertaken mainly within the context of MNCs. This calls for research across different 
industries and organizational contexts to be undertaken, to also test for the theory’s 
overall validity. In light of this, it was decided that this research would study multi-
business-unit (BU) organizations operating within the construction industry. 
 
1.6 ‘Construction’ as the Industry Context Studied 
 
The choice of construction was not arbitrary but based on the following reasons: 
First, the construction industry is an important and large part of each nation’s - and 
consequently the global - economy (Crosthwaite, 2000; Hillebrandt, 2000; Ive and 
                                               
17
 The work of Giddens is also relevant here. Giddens (1979: 60) described the structure of social 
systems, of which organizations are a sub-set, as ‘a pattern of social relationships with properties that can 
be understood in terms of ‘rules’ and ‘resources’ recursively implicated in their reproduction’. He 
described ‘functions’ as the way these patterns actually operate as ‘systems’, defining systems as 
‘reproduced relations between actors or collectivities organized as regular social practices’. According to 
Giddens, a fundamental property of social systems is that of the ‘duality of structure’. By duality of 
structure, Giddens means that the structural properties of social systems are both the ‘medium’ and the 
‘outcome’ of the practices that constitute those systems. Applying Giddens’ ideas in the context of this 
research, it can be understood that the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics of organizations are 
interdependent and therefore they should both be considered when issues related to their reproduction 
(such as issues related to core competence development) are examined. 
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Gruneberg, 2000), as it constitutes normally between 7% and 15% of a nation’s GDP 
(Male, 1991). Its importance is not only related to its size but also to its role in 
economic development, as it produces all the facilities and is directly - or indirectly - 
responsible for the procurement (sometimes also production) of the machinery needed 
for the production of goods and services (Linder, 1994; Crosthwaite, 2000). Due to 
construction’s nature, different actors and roles involved in the production of the built 
environment are integrated on a project-basis (Langford and Male, 2001; Ive and 
Gruneberg, 2000; Morris, 2004). Consequently, findings from the construction context 
can be of interest and have a wide appeal to economic actors involved in the 
construction industry and beyond. 
Second, even though the concepts of strategic management are not new to this 
industry18, there is scant research related to core competencies and their development in 
the construction strategic management field. Lampel (2001) identified core 
competencies related to the execution of large projects by engineering-procurement-
construction (EPC) organizations. He did not however investigate issues related to their 
development by EPC organizations. Haan et al. (2002) showed that core competence 
theory has validity when applied to construction companies and advocated that, its 
application represents a shift of focus towards the strategic relevance of a firm’s 
resources. Adams (2004) used core competence theory to demonstrate that speculative 
house-builders, who develop core competencies related to ‘brown-field’ development, 
will be market leaders in their field. Finally, Chinowsky (2001, 2001) and Chinowsky 
and Meredith (2000) linked organizational learning, continuous improvement, 
leadership and the effective collaboration of project teams with the effective core 
                                               
18
 In addition to the works of Langford and Male (1991; 2001), Male and Stocks (1991) and Chinowsky 
and Meredith (2000), some significant works are the following: Stokes (1977), who addressed corporate 
planning; Smyth (1985), who examined the behaviour of property companies in the British construction 
industry; Ramsay (1989), who highlighted the importance of strategic management for the case of large 
construction groups; Hillebrandt (1989), who addressed the challenges diversification creates to 
construction organizations; Lansley (1994), who drew from organization theory to analyze construction 
organizations; Ive (1995) and Ive and Gruneberg (2000), who argued that vertical integration in 
construction aligns the opportunity, means and motives to make cost-reducing and value-adding 
innovations to co-exist; and Smyth (2000), who proposed a number of marketing and selling strategies for 
construction and professional service firms. In the domain of international construction, of significance 
are the works of Seymour (1989), who investigated the relationship between international contracting and 
Forward Direct Investment (FDI); Seymour and Enderwick (1989), who were the first to use the 
theoretical perspective of the ‘multinational enterprise’ to analyze international construction 
organizations; Shirazi et al. (1996), who proposed different options construction organizations operating 
in the international construction market are faced with regarding the ‘structures’ they adopt, this 
depending on the forces acting on them from that market; Strassmann and Wells (1988), who examined 
through country-focused, author-specific chapters, the national contexts which created firms that were 
(apparently) more successful in winning contracts abroad and Langford and Rowland (1995) and 
Mawhiney (2001), who highlighted the specific challenges contracting organizations face when they 
internationalize. 
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competencies development of engineering and construction organizations. They did not 
however provide any empirical data on how this can be effectively achieved in practice. 
As a result, the choice of construction as the industry context studied also contributes to 
the creation of knowledge that will expand the boundaries of the construction strategic 
management field. 
 
1.6.1 The Organizational Context in the Study 
 
Within construction, some organizations have developed to the scale and scope 
of large, diversified and internationalized multi business unit (BU) organizations, such 
as the MNCs studied in mainstream strategic management and core competence theory 
research. It is such organizations that this research studies, as they are the most 
comparable to the production-oriented MNCs. As a result, findings from construction 
industry MNCs can be comparable to findings from production-oriented MNCs and 
(potentially) applicable to them. 
 Large construction MNCs operate in more than one market and undertake work 
across most of the spectrum of type of work, complexity and geographical location, and 
to some extent, size of work (Mawhinney, 1991; Hillebrandt, 2000). Some have become 
leading service providers in a number of construction markets within their country, e.g. 
Balfour Beatty in the UK with respect to civil engineering and PFI, Bechtel in the US 
with respect to construction and project/program management and Vinci in France with 
respect to construction and concessions. Others have managed to successfully compete 
in a number of geographical regions around the world (e.g. Skanska, Vinci and 
Bechtel). Such organizations will be referred to in this research as ‘international 
construction majors’ (ICMs). ICMs are increasingly involved in the development, 
operation and maintenance of the built environment (Ive and Gruneberg, 2000; 
Flanagan et al., 2007). Hence, from a ‘strategic management of construction companies’ 
point of view, the importance of studying these organizations can be argued to be 
greater than ever, and can contribute to our knowledge regarding the strategic 
management of construction organizations.  
It should be noted that although ICMs exhibit similarities with MNCs in other 
industries, they also exhibit some stark differences. These stem primarily from the fact 
that ICMs are project-based organizations, undertaking large numbers of projects 
simultaneously. At the same time, the ICMs’ project-based nature offers the opportunity 
to use project-based management theoretical concepts when examining their behaviour, 
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particularly in relation to how they learn - and by extension develop their core 
competencies19. The benefits of this are dual. First, the use of project-based 
management knowledge contributes to a better conceptualizing and understanding of 
ICMs (viz. Chapter 2, Sections 2.7 and 2.8). Second, findings from the ICMs’ context 
can contribute to our knowledge regarding the management of project-based 
organizations (PBOs) in general. 
 
1.7 The Research Question  
 
Having introduced the ‘industry’ and ‘organizational’ context within which this 
study is positioned, this research can be described as an exploratory study to understand 
the relationship between the organizational configurations that international 
construction majors (ICMs) adopt and the effectiveness with which they develop their 
core competencies. 
It should be clarified that this research focuses on ‘organizational level’ core 
competencies (OLCCs), not ‘individual level’ core competencies (ILCCs), except 
insofar as how the latter influences the development of the former. Therefore, core 
competencies refer to OLCCs except where indicated otherwise. In addition, this 
research focuses on the intra-organizational dynamics of the ‘execution’ stage of core 
competence development (i.e. Stage 2 of Figure 1.2). Consequently, it does not address 
issues related to the external analysis of competition and construction industry 
environment dynamics, nor the identification of the core competencies ICMs possess.  
In light of the above, it can be understood that issues related to the effectiveness 
with which organizations in general - and ICMs in particular - develop their core 
competencies, call for an investigation of their behaviour as well as how this relates to 
the organizational configurations they have chosen to adopt, as manifested in corporate-
level activities. Through these behaviours and activities personal and organizational 
competencies arise and are developed into core competencies. Building on the analogy 
between Mintzberg’s ‘strategy process’ and the ‘core competence development strategy 
process’, a framework of corporate-level activities was developed (viz. Chapter 4), 
drawing from ‘cybernetics’ (Beer, 1959) and ‘management control’ (Berry et al., 
                                               
19
 Research in project-based organizations has contributed to this domain, by investigating and 
indentifying mechanisms through which knowledge captured at projects may be codified and re-used at 
following projects (Brady and Davies, 2000; Lipschitz et al., 2001; Prencipe and Tell, 2004; Davies and 
Brady, 2005).  
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1995)20. This provided the basis for collecting, analyzing and interpreting empirical 
data, in order to address the following research question: 
 
‘How do the configurations that ICMs adopt influence the effectiveness with which they 
execute a core competence development strategy?’ 
 
1.8 Research Methods 
 
 To address the research question, this academic undertaking adopted an 
epistemological approach of ‘critical realism’ and conducted a multiple case-study 
through a qualitative research strategy. Four ICMs were studied - and one ‘shadow’ case 
that was ultimately not included. The selection criteria stipulated that ICMs studied 
should: 
� Have been in the list of ‘ENR’s 225 Top International or Top Global Contractors’ 
for the last five years in a row; 
� Follow a strategy of related diversification within the construction industry21; 
� Be internationalized in at least two geographical regions of the world; 
� Have - at the time that this research began - an annual turnover in excess of 
$1billion. 
 
Both ‘documentary’ and ‘semi-structured interview’ data was collected and 
analyzed22. Findings on each ICM are presented in four case-study chapters (viz. 
Chapters 6-9)23. Subsequently, exploratory findings emerge from a cross-case 
comparison and a discussion in light of the extant literature (viz. Chapter 10). 
Ultimately, conclusions are drawn from the research as a whole, contributions to 
knowledge discussed and topics for future research outlined (viz. Chapter 11). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20
 It is argued here that both theories are appropriate to examine the behaviour of purposive organizations 
- such as ICMs - and that both fit well with the concepts of the ‘strategy process’ and the ‘core 
competence development’ process (viz. Chapter 4). 
21
 As this is described in. Chapter 2, Section 2.4 
22
 The research methodology followed will be extensively described in Chapter 5 of this Thesis. 
23
 The names of the companies and company-specific technologies have been changed because of issues 
of confidentiality. 
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1.9 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
 This research aims to contribute to our knowledge regarding the ‘gaps’ 
identified from the theory reviewed in this chapter so far, by: 
� Developing a universally accepted definition of core competencies, while 
describing their relationship with resources, capabilities, competencies and non-
core competencies within an organization-specific context; 
� Developing a framework that can describe core competence development as a 
collection of corporate strategy activities; 
� Evaluate the practical application of core competence theory principles outside the 
context of production-oriented MNCs; 
� Identifying ‘causal links’ in the relationship between the configurations that ICMs 
adopt and: 
- The development of corporate strategies with optimal potential of effective 
implementation; 
- The effectiveness with which they integrate emerging with intended strategies 
when necessary; 
- The effectiveness with which they stretch and leverage their resources and core 
competencies; 
- The effectiveness with which they learn, reconfigure their social practices and 
structural properties, and renegotiate their organizational norms; 
- The effectiveness with which they develop their management and 
organizational leadership. 
 
To fulfil these aims, the research has set the following objectives: 
� Describe in theory the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics of 
international construction majors (ICMs), drawing from mainstream strategic 
management literature, organization theory and project-based management 
concepts; 
� Develop a model to explain the relationship between resources, capabilities, 
competencies and core competencies, distinguishing between those referring to 
individuals and those referring to organizations while positioning them within an 
organizational context, such as the one of the ICMs studied in this research; 
� Integrate aspects of ‘cybernetics’ and ‘management control’ theories under the 
umbrella of core competence theory, to propose a number of generic, corporate-
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level activities that would enable to identify for the case of ICMs, which 
organizational routines effectively shape group strategy;  
� Compare and contrast empirical data gathered from different organizational 
contexts to identify similarities and differences between them, and better explain 
the causal links between company activities and their results; 
 
Due to the multi-BU and project-based nature of ICMs, it is argued here that 
findings from the ICM context will also be applicable - following contextual sensitivity 
and modifications - and contribute to our knowledge regarding the management of 
MNCs and PBOs. 
 
1.10 Thesis Outline 
 
 The research outline is presented on Figure 1.7. The thesis consists of 11 
Chapters. In Chapter 1 the topic of this thesis is introduced and the scope of research 
defined. Chapter 2 starts by describing what the term ‘configuration’ refers to and 
continues by describing the characteristics of the construction industry, the international 
construction market and the participants in the production of the built environment.  It  
then moves on to describe ICMs as well as their typical structures and strategies - 
focusing on diversification and internationalization - with the objective to highlight the 
issues such organizations face for intra-organizational (inter-BU) coordination. Project-
based management concepts are used where necessary. The chapter resolves any 
confusion that may exist regarding the complexity of the issues ICMs face for effective 
intra-organizational integration and coordination. 
In Chapter 3, resources, capabilities (‘operational’ and ‘dynamic’), competencies 
and core competencies are distinguished, described and defined. A theoretical model is 
developed to help position and describe core competencies within the context of multi-
BU organizations in general and ICMs in particular. Issues related to the manifestation 
and deployment of core competencies are highlighted. The chapter resolves the 
confusion that existed among academics and practitioners alike, regarding ‘what’ core 
competencies are and ‘how’ they can be positioned within an organizational context. 
Building on the theoretical developments from Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 
draws from ‘cybernetics’ and ‘management control’  theories, to propose five generic, 
corporate-level activities  through which organisational  agents could effectively control  
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core competence development. Subsequently, these activities are linked back to this 
research’s question. The chapter develops a framework which interrelates core 
competence development activities and allows the behaviour of ICMs to be 
examined in light of them. 
 Chapter 5 clarifies for the reader the methodology through which this 
research was undertaken. Chapters 6 to 9 present the four cases of the ICMs studied. 
All case study chapters have an identical structure, to allow for better comparability 
of findings. The purpose of the case studies is explanatory and contributes to 
demonstrating how the theoretical concepts developed earlier in this thesis apply to 
the case of each ICM. 
Chapter 10 compares and contrasts cases in light of the extant literature and 
frameworks developed for the purpose of this research. This cross-case analysis 
allows generalizations to be made. These are evaluated, and suggestions are made as 
to the potential links between ‘configuration’ and ‘effective core competence 
development’ for the case of ICMs. Then, a number of organizational characteristics 
are proposed as enabling effective core competence development in ICMs. 
Generalizations from the context of ICMs to the context of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and project-based organizations (PBOs) are proposed and 
discussed. Chapter 11 draws conclusions from the research as whole, discusses the 
contributions of this research to knowledge and outlines topics for future research. 
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Chapter 2: The International Construction Majors (ICMs) in Theory 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 As noted in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.6.1), international construction majors 
(ICMs) were chosen as the organizational context to be studied. In light of this, the 
purpose of this chapter is to describe - in theory - ICMs as organizations. To do this, the 
chapter will: first, briefly review the work of Mintzberg to describe what the term 
‘configuration’ entails - as it is ‘the relationship between the configurations that ICMs 
adopt and the effectiveness with which they develop their core competencies’ that this 
research studies; second, describe the characteristics of the construction industry and the 
international construction market; third, describe diversification and internationalization 
as corporate strategies; fourth, describe - in theory - the structural and functioning 
characteristics of ICMs; fifth, highlight issues they face regarding intra-organizational 
resource coordination.  
 The construction industry is project-based. Consequently, a description of the 
organizational characteristics of ICMs should draw upon the project-based management 
literature in addition to management literature per se. In light of this, project-based 
management concepts are used to enhance the discussion wherever possible. 
 
2.2 Mintzberg’s Configurations 
  
 This research explores the relationship between the configurations that ICMs 
adopt and the effectiveness with which they develop their core competencies (viz. 
Chapter 1, Section 1.7). In light of this, this section reviews the work of Mintzberg and 
describes to a greater extent what the use of the term configuration entails. The 
terminology discussed in this section provides a very useful collection of terms that is 
being used to describe the intra-organizational dynamics of ICMs throughout the thesis. 
  In Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.5), it was also explained that the choice of the term 
‘configuration’ in this research is not arbitrary, as it simultaneously captures both 
‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ dimensions of organizations, while including descriptions 
of their ‘agency’ characteristics and linking them with the level of uncertainty and 
complexity of their environment. It is in line with the ‘contingency’ approach adopted 
in this research, which recognizes that there is no best structural form, but seeks to 
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identify the particular structural form that is most appropriate under a specific set of 
conditions (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973). 
The work of Mintzberg (1979, 1983; 1989) rests on the branch of organization 
theory knows as ‘contingency theory’ (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1). Drawing from 
Burns and Stalker (1961) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Mintzberg described market 
environments as having four dimensions: i) stability (stable vs. dynamic), ii) complexity 
(complex vs. simple), iii) market diversity (integrated vs. diversified) and iv) hostility 
(munificent vs. hostile). He stressed that it is not the environment per se that is 
important, but the organization’s ability to cope with it, predict it, comprehend it, deal 
with its diversity and respond quickly to it.  
At the same time, he described organizations as consisting of five parts (Figure 
2.1): 
� The Operating Core: encompassing those organizational members who perform 
the basic work related directly to the production of products/services; 
�  The Strategic Apex: charged with ensuring that the organization serves its 
mission in an effective way and also serves the needs of those people who 
control or otherwise have power over the organization; 
� The Middle Line: joining the strategic apex with the operating core through a 
chain of middle-line managers with formal authority; 
� The Techno-structure: encompassing ‘analysts’ who may design, plan and 
change the work of others, but do not do the work themselves; 
� The Support Staff: encompassing all specialized individuals (or units) of an 
organization that exist to provide support to the organization outside the 
operating work flow. 
 
Building on the work of March and Simon (1958) and Galbraith (1973), 
Mintzberg proposed five ‘coordinating mechanisms’ as the fundamental ways through 
which organizations blend the contribution of each of their organizational parts to 
implement their work: i) mutual adjustment, ii) direct supervision, iii)   standardization   
of   work   processes, iv)  standardization  of  work outputs and v) standardization of 
worker skills. He argued that beyond some minimum size, organizations seem to rely on 
‘standardization’ where they can. When they cannot, they use direct supervision or 
mutual adjustment, those two being partly interchangeable. 
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Mintzberg (1979; 1983; 1989) also discussed the issue of centralization vs. 
decentralization, albeit exclusively in terms of ‘power over decisions’ made in the 
organization, presenting centralization as the tightest means of coordinating decision 
making. He distinguished between three different types of decentralization: 
� Vertical decentralization: as the dispersal of formal power down the 
organizational chain of authority, from the strategic apex to the middle line; 
� Horizontal decentralization: as the extent to which non-managers control 
decision processes; 
� Decentralization: related to the physical dispersal of services. 
 
He argued organizations decentralize either because decisions cannot be 
understood at one centralized unit, or because decentralization allows the organization 
to respond quickly to local conditions.  
Mintzberg’s central theoretical argument is that, depending on the 
environmental conditions an organization faces, it has to adopt a specific configuration 
that aligns its internal degree of centralization and type of coordination mechanisms 
with the requirements of the market environment, while elevating the appropriate part of 
the organization to emerge as ‘key’. Mintzberg (1979) initially identified five types of 
‘pure’ organizational configurations: i) ‘entrepreneurial’, ii) ‘machine’, iii) 
‘professional’, iv) ‘diversified’ and v) ‘innovative’, later (Mintzberg, 1989) adding two 
Fig 2.1: Mintzberg’s Five Organizational Parts 
Adapted from Mintzberg, (1989) 
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more vi) ‘missionary’ and vii) ‘political’. The type of decentralization, key 
organizational part and coordinating mechanism corresponding to each configuration 
are shown on Table 2.1. 
 
Mintzberg however acknowledged that in reality, most organizations exhibit 
characteristics that correspond to a combination of pure configuration forms and this is 
why it is better to refer to organizations as ‘combinations of organizational 
configurations’. In trying to describe how combinations of configurations emerge, he 
argued that each configuration exerts a force towards a specific direction (Figure 2.2) 
and that when a single force dominates, the organization is drawn towards the 
associated configuration. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Configurations, Coordinating Mechanisms, Organizational Parts    
                   and Decentralization 
CONFIGURATION COORDINATING 
MECHANISMS 
KEY ORGANIZATIONAL 
PART 
TYPE OF 
DECENTRALIZATION 
Entrepreneurial Direct Supervision Strategic Apex Vertical and Horizontal 
Centralization 
Machine Standardization of Work 
Processes 
Techno-structure Limited Horizontal 
Decentralization 
Professional Standardization of Skills Operating Core Horizontal Decentralization 
Diversified Standardization of 
Outputs 
Middle Line Limited Vertical 
Decentralization 
Innovative Mutual Adjustment Support Staff Selected Decentralization 
Missionary Standardization of 
Norms 
- Decentralization 
Political Internal Competition - Centralization 
Figure 2.2: An Integrating Pentagon of Forces and Forms 
 
Adapted from Mintzberg (1989) 
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Mintzberg (1989) also identified two more forces not associated with any 
particular configuration, but being present in most organizations: 
� ‘Cooperation’, which is represented by ‘ideology’ and is responsible for pulling 
the organization together. 
� ‘Competition’, which is represented by ‘politics’ and is responsible for pulling 
the organization apart. 
In reality, few organizations stay constantly in one configuration or structural 
arrangement. A significant change in strategy direction - such as the case of core 
competence development1 - may force an organization to ‘convert’ from one 
combination of configurations to another and develop a new organizational structure 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Mintzberg, 1979; 1983; 1989; Peters and Waterman, 
1984; 2002).  
 Having described the organizational characteristics the terms ‘configuration’ 
refers to, the chapter will now proceed to describe - in theory - the configurations of 
ICMs, starting from a description of their industry/market environment and proceeding 
to describe their internal characteristics. 
 
2.3 The Construction Industry and the International Construction Market 
 
As noted in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.6), construction is this research’s industry 
context. Langford and Male (2001) divide the construction industry in four sectors: i) 
building, ii) civil engineering, iii) repair and maintenance and iv) material 
manufacturing, with each being sub-divided into separate market segments, such that, 
e.g., building is composed of housing, industrial and commercial markets. Morris 
(2004: 1350) describes the construction industry as ‘a conglomeration of sectors, 
ranging from house building, commercial property, institutional building (schools, 
hospitals, prisons, etc.) and other structures generally in the building sector; railways, 
roads, sewers, water containment, and other large civil engineering work (tunnels, 
bridges, etc.); and power, oil and gas, water treatment plants, food processing, pulp and 
paper, and other ‘process engineering’ sectors’. He argues that though they do indeed 
share many characteristics, there are significant differences between process 
engineering on the one hand and the civil and building sectors on the other, especially in 
the way projects are managed. In particular, he argues that in building and civil 
                                                             
1
 Viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.2. 
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engineering, there is not a tradition in project management - as a formal discipline, 
function, or even role - actively managing the integration of design and construction in 
the same way as there is in process engineering. 
Irrespective of sector, a number of actors and roles are involved in the 
construction process and the production of the built environment, collectively referred 
to here as ‘construction industry participants’. Construction industry participants can be 
divided into ‘clients’ (government/public and private), ‘main contractors’, 
‘subcontractors’, ‘designers’ (architects, civil, structural and building services 
engineers) and other participants, such as financiers2, material producers and merchants, 
each representing a role that needs to be played for the production of a built asset. The 
horizontal fragmentation in both design and the building processes, most evident in the 
‘building’ and ‘civil engineering’ sectors (Morris, 2004), helps explain the existence of 
another group of construction industry participants (mainly in the form of professional 
practices) who play the role of ‘coordinators’. This group encompasses project 
management, construction management, design management and management 
contracting organizations (Ive and Gruneberg, 2000; Morris, 2004). 
The nature of the construction industry is such that the relationships between 
participants are mainly influenced by the manner in which they are ‘contracted’ to work 
together (when, under what terms and conditions and how) on a project-basis. This 
highlights for the case of construction the importance of the supply chain configuration 
and the way suppliers are engaged, procured and contracted (Male, 1991; Langford and 
Murray, 2004; Lowe, 2004; Morris, 2004). Supply chain configurations therefore, 
depend on the procurement route chosen by industry clients. Clients may decide to 
procure work related to different stages of the project’s lifecycle (e.g. ‘design’ and 
‘construction’) independently. Alternatively, they might choose turnkey solutions, such 
as ‘design and build’. In addition, clients may choose different contractual agreements 
depending on the level of risk they wish to take on board, such as ‘lump-sum’ or ‘cost-
plus-fee’ agreements. Some clients may procure services through competitive bidding 
based on the lowest cost; others may include ‘quality’ specification as criteria for 
contract award. On occasions, clients may choose to enter into partnering agreements 
with suppliers and service providers, to economize on the transaction costs involved in 
formulating and evaluating their supply base on a project-basis. In the last twenty years 
or so, governments have allowed greater participation of the private sector in the ‘client’ 
                                                             
2
 Those are usually banks or other financial institutions, which lend the actors involved directly with the 
production of the built environment, either in the form of corporate finance, or project finance. 
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role, with such devices as PFI and PPP in the UK3, other European countries and some 
states in the US (Hillebrandt, 2000; Ive and Gruneberg, 2000). 
 
2.3.1 The International Construction Market 
 
The characteristics of the construction industry are influenced by the fact that 
construction services - as in fact most activities involved in the production of the built 
environment - can be procured internationally. One could argue therefore for the 
existence of an ‘international construction market’4.  
International construction is a subject that has received the attention of many 
researchers (Strassman and Wells, 1988; Male, 1991; Linder, 1994; Langford and 
Rowland, 1995; Mawhinney, 2001; Crosthwaite, 2000; Langford and Male, 2001; 
Dikmen and Birgonul, 2006). General theories such as those of Porter (1980, 1985) and 
Dunning (1973, 1980, 1988) have been applied to international construction in an effort 
to explain the comparative forces acting on incumbent firms (Male, 1991; Pheng et al., 
2004). Researchers (Strassman and Wells, 1988; Male, 1991) have found the 
international construction environment to have the following characteristics: 
� A fragmented industry structure; 
� Geographic dispersion; 
� Decreasing demand with an accompanying ‘buyer’s’ market; 
� Prevalence of ‘soft loans’ (e.g. Export Credit Guarantee Department), in order to 
secure work; 
� Requirements for agents with local knowledge and contacts; 
� Risks, including: differing climatic conditions, exchange rate fluctuations and 
profit repatriation.  
 
International competition in construction exists in many forms (Langford and 
Male, 2001). At one end of the spectrum it can take the form of ‘multi-domestic’ 
international competition, largely independent within each country. At this end of the 
spectrum, the international construction industry is essentially a collection of domestic 
industries, where companies compete locally. At the other end of the spectrum, large 
                                                             
3
 Since the launch of PFI in 1992 by the UK government, contractors, usually in a consortium, are asked 
to bid in competition to finance, build and operate a facility, transferring it to Government ownership at 
the end of a period of years (Hilllebrandt, 2000). 
4
 It should be emphasized however, that construction is of a ‘local’ nature, since, as an activity, it is 
undertaken in the local context of the built asset. 
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construction groups often find themselves in a dual position of ‘international’ and 
‘multi-domestic’ competition. Companies such as Bechtel and Fluor compete for ‘oil 
and gas’ and ‘mining’ projects both at home and abroad. Similarly, companies like 
Balfour Beatty, Skanska and Vinci compete both at home and internationally for large 
civil engineering and PFI projects.  
Although the international construction market is generally considered as 
fragmented, ‘project type’ and ‘location’ have an impact on the extent to which the 
industry is, in reality, fragmented (Langford and Rowland, 1995). Large, complex and 
high value contracts require, among other things, managerial expertise, technical know-
how and financial stability as prerequisites. As project size and complexity increase 
technologically or organizationally, or both, ‘relational’ and ‘knowledge-based’ rather 
than ‘skill-based’ competitive assets become increasingly important and fragmentation 
reduces dramatically such that competition occurs between a much smaller number of 
firms (Male, 1991; Chinowsky and Meredith, 2000; Pryke and Smyth, 2006). Viewing 
international construction from that perspective, there are few organizations globally 
that are capable of undertaking big complex projects on an international basis5.   
The segmentation of the construction industry provides the opportunity for main 
contractors to focus on one sector (e.g. civil engineering) or to diversify and compete in 
several sectors (e.g. building and civil engineering). In addition, the introduction of new 
procurement routes by governments (e.g. PFI) and the outsourcing of construction-
related activities by large construction clients, provide the opportunity for large 
construction groups to integrate under a single organizational hierarchy more than one 
role involved in the production of the built environment (Ive and Gruneberg, 2000). For 
example, a company like Carillion, through its involvement with PFI projects, has 
integrated the roles of the ‘client’, ‘builder’ and often ‘operator’ of built assets. In 
addition, the nature of the international construction market allows construction 
companies to ‘internationalize’ and compete simultaneously in a number of countries. 
The issue of whether a company will diversify and/or internationalize, is a corporate 
strategy decision that will affect its organizational structure (Chandler, 1962; Peters and 
Waterman, 1984; 2002) and functions. ICMs were introduced in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 
                                                             
5
 Such organizations will most likely be among the leaders in the industry and constitute ideal examples 
of international construction majors (ICMs) that this research intends to study. The reason for this is that 
it is such organizations that will have developed multi-BU structures, spread out in a number of countries.  
Hence, it is in these organizations that core competence theory recognizes the scope for intra-
organizational coordination and collaboration exists and where core competence development can be 
more effectively examined. 
 
40 
 
1.6.1) as diversified and internationalized organizations operating within the 
construction industry. Consequently, ‘diversification’ and ‘internationalization’ as 
strategies need to be described, in order for the behaviour and configurations of ICMs to 
be better understood. 
  
2.4 Diversification 
 
‘Diversification’ is the process by which firms extend the range of their business 
operations outside those in which they are currently engaged (Rumelt, 1974; Wernerfelt, 
1984, 1994 and in construction: Hillebrandt and Cannon, 1989). It is a risky process, 
which explains why it has been so widely examined (e.g. Pekar, 1985; Kogut, 1988; 
Porter, 1990; Wernerfelt, 1984; 1994 and Markides and Williamson, 1994) and why 
researchers have spent so much time and effort identifying key diversification success 
factors (Very, 1993). Diversification can be classified as ‘related’ or ‘unrelated’, with 
respect to the firm’s existing activities. The most extensively used method in strategic 
management research for measuring a firm’s diversification in terms of ‘relatedness’ is 
that of Rumelt’s (1974) ‘strategic categories’6 (e.g. Rumelt, 1982; Schmalensee, 1985; 
Markides and Williamson, 1994). Nayyar (1992) distinguished between ‘potential’ and 
‘actual’ relatedness, stressing the role of managerial action in actualizing the latent 
economic potential of related diversification. 
Diversification into a new market can happen either through ‘acquisition’ of a 
company already active in that market, ‘organic development’ of necessary skills, 
‘organizational learning’ through joint ventures and strategic partnering agreements, or 
any combination of the above. In the case of construction where companies are project-
based businesses, the role of projects as a vehicle for diversification is particularly 
relevant here. Applying and building on the ideas of Penrose (1959; 1995) and 
Wernerfelt (1984; 1994) in a project-based management context, Brady and Davies 
(2004) and Davies and Hobday (2005) argue that in order to move into new 
                                                             
6
 Rumelt (1974) used a broad sample of large American firms to show that companies that had followed a 
strategy of related diversification by building on some particular strength, skill or resource associated 
with their original dominant activity were better performers compared with their counterparts. He 
classified organizations pursuing a strategy of related diversification to ‘dominant-constrained’ and 
‘related-constrained’. The difference between the two is that the ‘dominant-constrained’ category refers to 
companies which conduct a single business (e.g. only electrical subcontracting), while the ‘related-
constrained’ refers to companies which operate in a number of related businesses with close relationships 
between them, but perhaps different technologies (e.g. M&E subcontracting with road construction). His 
findings are echoed in core competence theory, where it is argued that companies will outperform others 
by focusing on what they do best (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.2). 
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technologies and market positions, organizations can establish strategic projects to 
pursue one of three paths of diversification (Figure 2.3): 
� Into new markets with new products based on a new technology base; 
� Into a new market base with new products using an existing technology base; 
� In existing markets with new products based on a new technology base. 
 
Davies and Hobday (2005) describe that the initial step along one of these base-
moving paths often begins with a project assigned to the unique task of gaining   
knowledge and experience that can inform senior management as to the viability of 
diversifying towards a specific direction. The ideas of Brady and Davies (2004) and 
Davies and Hobday (2005) regarding ‘projects’ as a vehicle for diversification find 
significant application in construction, where companies often use projects to form 
alliances, gain knowledge, enter new markets and offer new services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2.4.1 Vertical and Horizontal Integration  
 
As already explained, diversification can take place towards different directions. 
In construction (Hillebrandt and Cannon, 1989) - similarly to all other industries - 
related diversification can take the form of: 
� ‘Vertical integration’, which can be either: 
  
 
Traditional 
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new 
existing 
existing new 
Technology 
base 
Market  base 
Figure 2.3: Base-Moving Project Paths 
Source: Davies and Hobday (2005) 
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- Backward integration: the acquisition or development of businesses whose 
products/services are inputs to the firm’s own main operations (e.g. a 
construction contractor integrating backwards activities like engineering, 
and materials supply). 
- Forward integration: the extension of the firm’s activities to those of the 
normal purchaser of its products/services (e.g. a construction contractor 
integrating forward to activities such as facilities management);  
� Horizontal integration: entrance into other markets at the same stage of 
production (e.g. a ‘civil engineering’ contractor diversifying to ‘building’ 
contracting).  
 
Davies and Lam (2001) argue that through vertical integration a company can 
achieve the continuous workflow that is so important in order to be able to achieve 
economies of scale and scope7. Ive (1995) argues that by integrating under a common 
ownership of the roles of the ‘client’, ‘designer’ and ‘operator’ of built assets, the 
‘opportunity’, ‘means’ and ‘motive’ to make cost reducing and value adding 
innovations coexist. Ive and Gruneberg (2000) argue that common ownership of roles is 
a necessary prerequisite for achieving activity co-ordination that is necessary for 
materializing economies of scope. 
In horizontal integration, there is the potential for ‘managerial economies of 
scope’ to arise between the different divisions or business units (BUs) of a company 
(Ansoff, 1964; 1988). In addition, horizontal integration allows the exploitation of both 
tangible and intangible interrelationships between a company’s units (Porter,1985)8, 
which is relevant to core competence theory. Hillebrandt et al. (1989) suggest that 
horizontal integration can lead to economies of scale because of increasing market-share 
and thus market power. They further suggest that horizontal diversification can reduce 
risk, spreading across sectors the portfolio of projects managed by a company at any 
moment in time. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
7
 Zoiopoulos (2003) found evidence to suggest that economies of scale exist in construction and therefore 
there is scope for their exploitation, recognizing however that success in exploiting them depends on 
whether the internal market of the firm is more efficient in allocating resources than the external market. 
8
 Viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2. 
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2.5 Internationalization  
 
In addition to diversifying, a company may choose to engage in activities in a 
different country or region, following a strategy of internationalization.  
Internationalization is a strategy whereby a company expands its operations across 
national boundaries, spreading its geographical base. The motives behind 
‘internationalization’ have been extensively examined in international economics 
(Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1980; 1988; 1989). In construction, Male (1991) examined the 
issue of competitive advantage in the international construction industry, Langford and 
Rowland (1995) examined issues related to the management of overseas construction 
contracting and Pheng et al. (2004) built on the work of Dunning (1980; 1988; 1989) to 
develop a model that could be used to estimate the performance of international 
contractors in Singapore9.  
In reality, the provision of ‘international construction services’ happens in any, 
or a combination, of the following situations, when a construction company: 
� Offers construction services abroad to a local client/institution 
(government/private); 
� Follows a client (government/private) to another country to provide its services 
in the country where the client is investing; 
� Performs work in a foreign country as an agent of an international development 
institution (e.g. the World Bank, EBRD, USAID); 
� As part of a consortium/SPV, will raise finance to develop, design, construct and 
either operate or sell a built asset in a foreign country. 
 
The decision to internationalize and enter a foreign market requires evaluation of 
aspects concerning the socio-cultural, economic and political environments that affect 
corporate performance (Porter, 1980; 1985, Langford and Rowland, 1995; Dikmen and 
Birgonul, 2006). Howes and Tah (2003) pointed out different internationalization 
strategies may be utilized by different companies according to their specific corporate 
objectives. In any case, internationalized construction companies will have to face 
additional risks than non-internationalized ones (Langford and Rowland, 1995; 
Langford and Male, 2001; Orr, 2006), related to:  
                                                             
9
 When combined with horizontal integration, internationalization allows firms to exploit 
interrelationships between different segments, geographic areas or related industries (Porter, 1985; and in 
construction Hilllebrandt and Cannon, 1989; Langford and Rowland, 1995).  
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� ‘Exchange rates and controls’: included in the purchase of offshore services, 
import of project materials and procurement, the remitting of expatriate staff of 
any savings from salaries paid locally and the remitting of the contractor from its 
external earnings of a contribution to home overheads and of its profit; 
� The uniqueness of the regional/local, cultural, political and social context; 
� ‘Operating conditions’: arising from the uniqueness of each local construction 
industry. 
 
In a non construction-specific context, Johanson and Vahlne (1977; 2003) 
observed that an internationalizing firm gradually acquires, integrates and uses 
knowledge about foreign markets and operations. They distinguished between two 
dimensions of internationalization: 
� Increasing involvement of a firm in an individual foreign country; 
� Successive establishment of operations in individual markets. 
 
They argued that, for both dimensions, lack of foreign market knowledge is the 
basic obstacle for internationalization and that this can be overcome mainly through 
‘experiential learning’10 from operations abroad. Furthermore, they argued that 
establishment and performance of a certain kind of operation or activity in a country 
requires both ‘general’ and ‘market-specific’ knowledge. Market-specific knowledge 
can be gained mainly through experience in the market, whereas knowledge of the 
operation can often be transferred from one country to another. It is the diffusion of this 
general knowledge which facilitates general growth; that is, the establishment of 
technically similar activities in dissimilar business environments. Finally, they argued 
that the better the market-specific knowledge, the more valuable are the resources and 
the stronger is the commitment to the market11.  
                                                             
10
 Since then, ‘experiential learning’ has become a critical concept in internationalization research (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988; Erramilli, 1991; Barkema et al., 1996; Erikson et al, 1997; Delios and Beamish, 2000; 
Luo and Peng, 2001). These studies have found that performance is closely related to experiential 
learning. 
11
 What is presented in this section does not intend to suggest that construction companies wishing to 
enter and grow in different geographic locations of the same country/region face issues that are 
completely unrelated to the issues that internationalized construction companies face. Take for example 
two cases of construction firms, a US firm wishing to expand its operations from the state of Florida to 
the state of Texas and a French firm wishing to enter the Algerian market. Not only the latter, but also the 
former, will have to go through a process of ‘experiential learning’ and obtain ‘market-specific’ 
knowledge that will allow it to operate effectively in the uniqueness of the local cultural, political, 
legal/regulatory and social context. Similarly to the French firm, the US firm will also have to mobilize 
resources and rely on the knowledge of its employees to successfully pursue and execute projects. This 
example goes to show that there are clear similarities in the actions construction companies have to take if 
45 
 
2.6 The Structure of Diversified and Internationalized Construction  
       Companies 
 
Strategies for diversification and internationalization affect organizational 
structure. The ICMs this research studies are diversified and internationalized 
organizations operating in a number of countries and sectors, often undertaking more 
than one role involved in the production of the built environment. This means that they 
operate simultaneously in heterogeneous task environments. Thompson (1967:70) 
proposed that: ‘organisations facing heterogeneous task environments seek to identify 
homogeneous segments and establish ‘structural’ units to deal with each’12.  
Large diversified and internationalized construction groups are usually 
structured in distinct - yet often related - business units (BUs), which focus on projects 
within a specific sector of the construction industry (e.g. building, civil engineering or 
process engineering)13, or projects situated in a specific geographic location (e.g. 
domestic vs. international), or a combination of the two. Each BU can have an 
organizational form of its own, of a unique type and with a unique culture. To deal with 
risks arising from diversification and internationalization more effectively, ICMs often 
decentralize decision-making to BUs, market- or region/country-focused (Male, 1991). 
In construction, a regionalized structure in particular is recognized as being able to bring 
managers in closer contact with the marketplace: the less centralization, the greater the 
autonomy and decision-making authority of regional senior managers (Male, 1991; 
Langford and Male, 2001)14. Male (1991) identified two issues construction 
organizations decentralizing decision-making face: 
� The corporate-centre is managing a ‘loose-tight’ organizational structure, where 
there is considerable autonomy for the senior managements of regional 
subsidiaries but where the centre has to retain a degree of control in order to 
maintain an overall corporate direction; 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
they wish to pursue and execute projects in different geographic locations, which may be within or 
outside their country of origin. 
12
 Chandler (1962), who examined the evolution of large corporations from the United States (US), 
reached the conclusion that companies being driven by market growth to develop greater diversity in their 
markets were able to manage their new strategies by adopting a multidivisional organisational structure 
(M-Form). He showed how the management processes created, allowed companies to apply their 
resources more efficiently to opportunities created by ‘changing markets’ and ‘developing technologies’. 
13
 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) described market-based grouping as a way for a company to set-up 
relatively self-contained units to deal with particular workflows. Mintzberg brought forward three criteria 
for ‘market-based’ grouping: i) product/service, ii) client and iii) region. 
14
 Robbins (1983; 1990) argued that decentralization is also an identification of trust the organization is 
prepared to place in individuals for making decisions.  
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� ‘Procedural inappropriateness’, i.e. the centre attempting to apply uniform 
systems and procedures across all regional units regardless of the size and 
circumstances facing the unit. The consequences for the smaller regional units, 
is that they are being swamped with systems and procedures more appropriate to 
larger units. 
 
Sometimes, ICMs are configured as divisional silos defined by procurement 
routes, services offered, or regions, to minimize transaction costs, although international 
operations may constitute a separate silo (Male, 1991; Langford and Male, 2001; 
Smyth, 2006). On occasions, projects exist outside of the organization’s mainstream 
structure, an experience found in some international divisions of construction 
companies. In such cases however, support is not always focused and consistent (Smyth 
and Stockerl, 1998).  
In project-based organizations, such as the case of construction companies, 
market-based units reflect the way projects are grouped. In the case of ICMs, 
divisions/BUs correspond to market/client-focused project groupings and/or portfolio 
groupings (Artto and Dietrich, 2002; 2004; Crawford et al., 2006). Appropriate project-
grouping assists in providing greater: 
� ‘Comparability’ between projects, enabled because of some standardization of 
language, which assists in: 
o Ensuring understanding among project participants belonging to the same 
company who work in different projects. 
o Moving individuals between projects without them having to learn new 
terminology. 
o Drawing lessons learned from similar projects, by facilitating knowledge 
management and transfer; 
� ‘Visibility’: as there is clearer focus on which projects fall under the same 
category; 
� ‘Control’: as appropriate project grouping allows better control focus. 
 
How market-based project grouping leads to the creation of organizational units in 
construction can be better understood with the help of Figure 2.4. The figure shows a 
diversified  and  internationalized  construction  organization whose ‘units’ demonstrate  
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Adapted from Langford and Male (2001) 
Figure 2.4: A Model of Organizational Structure for a Diversified and Internationalized Construction Firm 
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‘groupings’ based on market-sector (‘construction’ and ‘residential development’ BUs) 
as well as regional (‘international’ BU) criteria. Within each ‘market-sector’ unit, 
projects are grouped on a regional basis, reflecting the importance of a regionalized 
structure in being able to bring managers closer to their markets (Male, 1991). 
Flanagan (1994) argued that successful construction companies in the 
international construction market have followed the rule of ‘thinking globally but acting 
locally’, because construction is generally a ‘local’ activity. ICMs who operate in 
numerous countries, often set-up ‘national’ subsidiaries, which become local centres of 
coordination for the projects they undertake. Through this, they can be closer and adapt 
quicker to changes in their market. Along those lines, ICMs may share characteristics 
with what organization theory scholars (e.g. Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1990; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Malnight, 1995; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; 
Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) have described as the ‘multinational corporation’ 
(MNC)15. In the MNC, each national subsidiary may be embedded in different historical 
circumstances (Stopford and Turner, 1985). From a ‘contingency’ point of view 
therefore, one can expect that the internal structure of MNCs is not homogeneous 
throughout the organisation, but is ‘systematically’ differentiated so as to comply with 
the different ‘environmental’ and ‘resource’ contingencies faced by the different 
national subsidiaries (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989). Ghoshal 
and Nohria (1993) envisioned MNC structures in terms of four patterns: 
� Structural uniformity: where there is little variance in how the different 
subsidiaries are managed, and a common ‘company way’ is adopted for the 
governance of the organization; 
� Differentiated fit: where different governance modes are adopted to fit each 
subsidiary’s local context; 
� Integrated variety: where the logic of differentiated fit is adopted but overlaid by 
a dominant overall integrative mechanism - whether through strong 
centralisation, formalisation, or normative integration; 
� Ad-hoc variation: where there is neither a dominant integrative mechanism nor 
an explicit pattern for differentiation to match local contexts. 
 
                                                             
15
 The philosophy behind the MNC is similar to Chandler’s M-Form, where national subsidiaries 
correspond to the M-Form’s market-focused operating divisions. To some extent, the MNC must be 
responsive to the different ‘contingencies’ presented by the different environments in which its national 
subsidiaries operate. 
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Parsons (1960) suggested that organizations operate at three levels: a ‘technical 
core’, a buffering and coordinating middle ‘managerial’ level and a top ‘institutional’ 
level, concerned with ensuring the organization is effectively embedded in its milieu to 
ensure its long-term survival. Although theory reviewed in this section helps in 
understanding how ICMs structure at the ‘institutional’ level, it does not contribute to 
our understanding about their structure at the managerial and technical level. 
Consequently, it is not adequate to describe issues that organizations operating in 
project-based environments - such as ICMs - face regarding project resources allocation 
and management, and providing an interface between each project and the rest of the 
organization (Hamilton, 1999). 
 
2.7 Project-Based Structures 
 
As noted in Section 2.3, construction is a project-based industry where 
relationships between participants are determined by the manner in which they are 
contracted to work on a project-basis. Construction companies therefore, have to 
conduct project resources coordination, and provide an interface between each project 
and the rest of the organization (Hamilton, 1999). In theory, Meredith et al. (2003) 
distinguish between the following project accommodation options: 
� ‘Functional’: where the project is allocated within a functional department, 
which may be within the organizational structure (if the structure is 
functionally organized); 
� ‘Project’: where the project exists outside of the organization’s mainstream 
structure.  It can be effective for projects requiring a ‘focused’ relatively small 
full time team16 or for commencing diversification; 
� ‘Matrix’: which aims to harness multiple inputs from across the organization, 
by mobilizing employees across organizational units and geographic locations 
on a project basis; 
� ‘Inverted Matrix’: which aims to overcome the problem of lack of authority for 
the project manager vertically, whilst retaining the ability to access a mix of 
skills horizontally - used by organizations that regularly conduct project work 
(Figure 2.5).  
                                                             
16Such as the experience found in some international divisions (Smyth and Stockerl, 1998). 
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Building on the work of Galbraith (1973) and Larson and Gobeli (1987; 1989), 
Hobday (2000) described six organizational forms ranging from the pure functional (A)  
to  the  pure  project  form  (F),  as  shown  on  Figure  2.6.  In the ‘project-based 
organization’ matrix (type F), project managers/directors have higher status regarding 
resource coordination - the equivalent of functional directors in the ‘functional’ matrix 
(type A) - and direct control over business function, personnel and other resources. 
Types B, C, D and E represent sequential stages of increasing project manager/director 
status regarding resource coordination. Hobday (2000) found the project-based 
organization to be weaker in performing routine tasks, achieving economies of scale, 
coordinating cross-project resources, facilitating company-wide technical development 
and promoting organizational-wide learning. In addition, he stated that the project-based 
organization can work potentially against the wider interests of corporate strategy and 
business coordination. As a solution, he proposed the deployment of coordinators across 
functional lines cutting across project interests and incentives as a strategy that can 
stimulate organizational learning and technical leadership, highlighting the importance 
of some coordination mechanisms across project lines. 
The theoretical concepts discussed so far have been useful in describing the 
organizational structure that diversified and internationalized construction organizations 
develop. However, they have not adequately addressed the issues ICMs face regarding 
intra-organizational coordination and how these could be. This is an area which links to 
core competence theory and the issues this research explores (viz. Chapter 1, Section 
1.5) and will be the subject of the following section. 
Figure 2.5 Inverted Matrix 
Resources Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 
A 
B 
C 
D 
Adapted from Meredith and Mantel (1999) 
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2.8 Intra-Organizational Coordination 
 
Diversification and internationalization raise issues of intra-organizational 
integration and coordination. Organizations like ICMs increasingly confront the need 
for ‘leveraging’ the resources and capabilities (viz. Chapter 1, Sections 1.2 and 1.3.4) of 
their distinct units. However, because of ‘tacitness’ of knowledge and causal ambiguity 
(Lipmann and Rumelt, 1982), effective resource exchange and knowledge transfer can 
be difficult to achieve.  
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The fact that the interest in this research lies on the intra-organizational 
dynamics of multi-BU organizations, such as ICMs, highlights the importance of 
relations between individuals and/or groups of agents who often do not exist in the same 
‘localities’17 and are therefore faced by different ‘contextualities’. Giddens (1984) 
argues that this issue points the direction of focus towards the ‘lateral’ aspect of the 
structuring of organizations and is linked to the reproduction of organizational social 
practices across space/time. Large, diversified and internationalized construction 
organizations tend to favour the market-basis for grouping in order to encourage mutual 
adjustment and direct supervision as coordination mechanisms in the lower hierarchical 
tiers of the organization (Shirazi et al., 1996). This enables them to manage important 
workflow interdependencies, at the expense however of process and scale 
specialization. As Mintzberg (1979; 1983; 1989) explained, with the necessary mutual 
adjustment and direct supervision contained inside each market-based unit, the 
organization as a whole needs to rely less on formalization for coordination and so tends 
to emerge as less bureaucratic. However, with less focus on coordination across 
markets, there is less scope for process specialization. This means that although the 
market-based structure is less formalized, it is less able to do a repetitive or specialized 
task well. Consequently, the market-based structure offers less scope for ‘replicating’ 
effective routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and effectively harnessing the tacit 
knowledge of individual employees (Grant, 1996a,b) across different organizational 
‘localities’18.  
As noted in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.3.2), companies pursuing a strategy of 
related diversification can create value by exploiting ‘interrelationships’ that exist 
between their BUs (Porter, 1985). Tsai (2000) suggested that it takes the existence of 
active social networks realized by people working together across business units (BUs) 
for real value to be extracted from related diversification. Markides (2002) argued that 
managerial relationships between related BUs need to be managed and renewed if they 
are not to decay. In a project-based management context - such as the one ICMs operate 
in - these issues relate to the coordination of portfolios and networks of portfolios of 
                                                             
17
 Giddens (1984: 118) describes ‘localities’ as referring to the use of space to provide the settings on 
interaction, the settings of interaction in turn being essential to specifying its contextuality’. 
18
 In Giddens’ (1984) terms, pursuing related diversification and/or internationalization involves the 
reproduction of (organizational) social practices across time and space. This is an issue of great 
significance to core competence development, as it is related to how resources and core competencies are 
stretched and leveraged across distinct, yet related organizational units, an issue that will be further 
explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.4 and Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.4). 
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projects (Artto and Dietrich, 2002; 2004) grouped under market-based units (Crawford 
et al., 2006) (Figure 2.7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exploiting interrelationships requires BUs to share activities in their value 
chains with other BUs, or to be able to transfer know-how with other units, while 
remaining a separate entity that acts independently in other value activities and 
maintains profit responsibility. To do this, Porter (1985) advocates that corporate 
strategy must focus on establishing and maintaining a ‘horizontal organization’ that 
facilitates systematic mechanisms for inter-BU coordination. He describes the 
‘horizontal organization’ as consisting of: 
� A horizontal structure: the organizational devices that cut across BUs, such as 
inter-divisional task forces and market-focus committees; 
� Horizontal systems: management systems with an inter-BU dimension in areas 
such as planning, control, incentives and capital budgeting; 
� Horizontal human resource practices: that facilitate BU cooperation, such as 
employee rotation, management forums and training; 
Figure 2.7: Horizontal Organization of Project-Based Firms 
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� Horizontal conflict resolution processes: among BUs, distinguished from 
horizontal structure and systems. 
 
On the same subject, and building on the work of Galbraith (1973), Mintzberg 
(1979; 1989) proposed a continuum of ‘liaison devices’, through which an organization 
can create lateral linkages across organizational units (Figure 2.8)19.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within a multi-BU organization pursuing a strategy of related diversification, the 
purpose of these liaison devices is to support the role of managerial action in actively 
managing interrelationships between BUs (Nayyar, 1992; Tsai, 2000; Markides, 2002). 
Drawing from the ‘contingency’, ‘network’ and ‘relational’ branches of 
organization theory (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1), scholars (e.g. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 
1990; Malnight, 1995; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai, 2000; 
Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Brass et al., 2004) have proposed that the structure of 
MNCs can be conceptualised as a ‘network’ arrangement consisting of a set of 
‘relational’ ties (both formal and informal) linking together dispersed organisational 
units20.  Moving towards a more ‘network-based’ structure, horizontal linkages between 
                                                             
19
 Galbraith (1973) argued that the efficacy of informal lateral links between BUs can be substantially 
improved by designing them into the formal organization. 
20
 The traditional approach to managing MNCs builds on the notion that each national market is different 
and that the best strategy for operating internationally is through autonomous BUs in major world 
 Figure 2.8: A Continuum of Liaison Devices 
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dispersed operating units can be established through an array of organizational 
mechanisms. Whereas ‘decentralized’ firms focus operations within autonomous BUs, 
network-based firms emphasize an integrated strategy and organization associated with 
a gradual introduction of interdependence across operations. 
The work of organization theory scholars highlights the importance of employee 
networks across BUs, as well as the ‘structural’ mechanisms to facilitate these21. 
Ghoshal et al. (1994) showed that a high level of networking among managers in the 
different units of the company will have a positive effect on social interactions across 
BUs. Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) found that inter-BU ‘social interaction’ and ‘trust’ were 
significant determinants of resource exchange/coordination. They also found that a 
‘shared’ vision between BUs had a positive effect on ‘trustworthiness’ between them. 
They found that ‘social capital’ developed in inter-BU networks, facilitates ‘value 
creation’ and suggested from their findings that investing in the creation of ‘social 
capital’ inside a firm eventually creates value. Social capital within multi-BU 
organizations - such as ICMs - could create the motivational disposition in BUs to both 
‘share’ and ‘acquire’ knowledge from other BUs to apply it in their own context (Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 2000). 
In a project-based management context, Prencipe and Tell (2001) argued that, 
project-based firms often lack the organisational mechanisms for the knowledge 
acquired in one project to be transferred and used by other projects, mainly for two 
reasons: first, the unique and temporary nature of projects - and the temporary 
constellation of people projects entail. New human encounters and relationships take 
place whenever a new project is started, which may increase the barriers to learning 
from the previous experience of others; second, projects may be characterized by 
relatively long life-cycles, requiring similar project activities to be retrieved and 
repeated after long-time intervals. 
Market-based structures that diversified and internationalized organizations 
develop to deal with the complexity of their environment often lead to divisionalization 
(Mintzberg, 1979; 1989). This can negatively affect inter-BU resource exchange, a 
particularly important issue for organizations that want to deploy and develop their core 
                                                                                                                                                                    
markets, with little flows of exchanges among them. The work of these scholars called for a move 
towards a more network-based structure.  
21
 Wenger and Snyder (2000) argued that in companies organized in team-based structures - such as all 
project-based business and the ICMs this research studies - communities of practice can assist employees 
of a functional/discipline expertise to maintain cross-BU relations with peers. 
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competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Along those lines, investigating the 
relationship between the configurations that ICMs adopt and the effectiveness with 
which they develop their core competencies can go a long way in identifying intra-
organizational mechanisms through which these organizations can overcome the 
coordination problems of their (potentially) divisionalized structure and improve their 
competitiveness. 
 
2.9 The Configurations of ICMs and the Effectiveness with which they Develop  
      their Core Competencies 
 
 In Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.6.1), it was explained why ICMs constitute an 
appropriate organizational context within which the relationship between 
‘organizational configuration’ and ‘effective core competence development’ can be 
examined. 
 This chapter has so far described ICMs - and the industry context they operate in 
- in theory, establishing their similarities with MNCs and PBOs. It becomes clearer 
therefore that - on top of contributing to our knowledge of strategic management of 
construction organizations - any findings from the context of ICMs: 
� Are comparable to findings from production-oriented MNCs; 
� Can be applicable - following contextual modifications - to production-oriented 
MNCs; 
� Can contribute to our knowledge of the management of PBOs. 
 
Consequently, it becomes clearer at this stage, how the study of ICMs is appropriate for 
the exploratory purpose of this study, as it allows comparing conclusions drawn and 
making generalizations across organizational and industry contexts. 
 This Chapter has described the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics of 
ICMs in theory, particularly emphasizing issues related to their intra-organizational 
integration and coordination. Therefore, it has contributed to developing an 
understanding of intra-organizational dynamics at ICMs. The purpose of the next 
chapter is to develop a better understanding of ‘core competencies’ and position them 
within an organizational context such as the one of the ICMs. 
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Chapter 3: Core Competencies in Organizations 
 
‘The beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms’ 
 
Socrates 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
 
 In Chapter 2, the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics of international 
construction majors (ICMs) and the issues they face regarding intra-organizational 
coordination were discussed. The purpose of Chapter 3 is first, to introduce and describe 
the hierarchical relationship between resources, capabilities, competencies and non-core 
competencies; second, to distinguish between core competencies referring to individuals 
and those referring to organizations; third, to critically review existing theory and 
propose a new model deconstructing and describing core competencies; fourth, to fuse 
the theory reviewed in Chapter 2 with that reviewed and developed in this chapter in 
order to position and describe core competencies within the context of a multi-business 
unit (BU) organization , such as that of the ICMs this research studies.  
 
3.2 Defining the Terms 
 
Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.2) noted the term ‘core competence’ in industry and 
academia often results in confusion, since it is being used in a variety of contexts and 
derived from different meanings (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Lahti, 1999) with no 
universally agreed definition and description of core competence characteristics. In 
addition, the terms capabilities, competencies, core competencies and critical/strategic 
resources are often used interchangeably to mean the same thing. In light of this, the 
primary objective of this chapter is to resolve this confusion by developing a definition 
of core competencies fit for these research purposes, and clarifying their relationships 
with resources, capabilities and competencies, while distinguishing between those 
referring to individuals and those referring to organizations1. 
The most comprehensive model to date linking resources, capabilities, 
competencies and core competencies, is the one proposed by Javidan (1998). Javidan 
used the ‘Competencies Hierarchy’ (Figure 3.1) to explain that each ‘level’ results from  
                                               
1
 Viz.Chapter 1, Section 1.9. 
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the integration of the elements at the lower level. The model presents ‘resources’ as the 
building blocks of capabilities, competencies and core competencies. ‘Capabilities’ are 
the second level in the hierarchy and refer to the corporation’s ability to exploit its 
resources. An ‘organizational competence’, the third layer in the hierarchy, still retains 
the same relationship with resources that capabilities do and on top of that represents an 
organizational state whereby the activity it relates to is consistently performed with 
results superior to competition. ‘Core competencies’, the highest level in the  hierarchy,  
represent  an  intra-organizational  coordination  and integration of resources, 
capabilities and competencies that exist in distinct, yet related business units (BUs) of 
the same organization. Javidan used this model to argue that the higher the level in the 
hierarchy, the greater its complexity (hence the greater the difficulty for competitors to 
imitate) and the greater the value added. This scheme will be critiqued later in this 
chapter (viz. Section 3.3). 
The ‘Competencies Hierarchy’ demonstrates that resources, capabilities, 
competencies and core competencies are interdependent. As a result, to better 
understand the nature of core competencies, it is imperative to better understand 
resources, capabilities and competencies, as well as the interrelationships between them 
and with non-core competencies. In light of this, the following four sections (3.2.1 to 
3.2.5) and their subsections will analyze each of those terms.  
 
 
 
 
Increasing 
Figure 3.1: The Competencies Hierarchy 
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3.2.1 Resources 
 
    As mentioned in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.3.3), Penrose (1959: 15) was the first 
to define the firm as a ‘pool’ of resources ‘whose general purpose is to organize the use 
of its own resources together with other resources acquired outside the firm for the 
production and sale of goods and services for a profit’. Barney (1991; p.101) defined 
resources as including ‘all assets, organizational processes, attributes, information, 
knowledge controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement 
strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness’, clearly demonstrating the broad 
application of the term. He classified resources into three categories: 
� ‘Physical Capital Resources’ (e.g. physical technology, plant, equipment, 
location, access to raw materials); 
� ‘Human Capital Resources’ (e.g. knowledge2, training, experience, judgment, 
intelligence, relationships and individual insight); 
� ‘Organizational Capital Resources’ (e.g. formal reporting structure, formal and 
informal planning, controlling and coordinating systems as well as informal 
relations among groups within a firm and those in its environment).  
  
In addition, resources are often referred to in literature as ‘strategic’ or ‘critical’, 
when they are considered as being a source of sustainable competitive advantage for the 
firm that possesses them and exploits them (Barney, 1991; 2001; Collis, 1994; Collis 
and Montgomery, 1995; Foss and Foss, 2005). 
 
3.2.2 Capabilities 
 
The concept of ‘organizational capability’ was first introduced in Chapter 1 (viz. 
Section 1.3.4). Building on the work of Schumpeter (1942), Nelson and Winter (1982) 
developed the concept of organizational capability on the concept of the ‘organizational 
routine’. Later, using the concept of organizational routines, Helfat and Peteraf (2003: 
999) described an organizational capability as ‘a high level routine (or collection of 
routines, particularly formal ones) that, together with its implementing input flows, 
                                               
2
 As noted in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.3.6), the importance of ‘knowledge’ has been widely recognized in 
the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; 1995). Grant (1996a,b) viewed the primary role of 
the organization as knowledge ‘application’ and ‘integration’. He viewed knowledge as residing with the 
‘individual’ and argued that this was the most important resource of the firm. 
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confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision options for producing 
significant outputs of a particular type’.  
 Organizational capabilities exist in the form of company-specific routines, 
processes, and culture built up over time (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995). Linking capabilities with resources, Helfat and Peteraf (2003: 999) 
defined an organizational capability as ‘the ability of an organization to perform a 
coordinated set of tasks utilizing organizational resources, for the purpose of achieving 
a particular end result’. This definition suggests that capabilities are higher level 
resources of an ‘intangible’ nature (Hall, 1992; 1993) and go beyond the categories 
identified by Barney (1991), in that they are ‘functionally-geared’ towards the 
implementation of a specific activity3.  
Nelson and Winter (1982) proposed that an organization’s capabilities require 
the exercise of skills of individuals who are aware of their firm’s resources and may 
involve a large component of ‘tacit’ knowledge4. They argued that this characteristic of 
organizational capabilities sets the limits on the extent to which the capabilities 
themselves can be articulated and therefore ‘replicated’ across different organizational 
contexts. Organizational capabilities also depend on the way individuals or 
organizations have learned to work with each other. Developing and maintaining those 
ways requires the establishment and maintenance of relationships between all groups 
involved in critical processes for product/service delivery, both inside and outside the 
firm5. 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993: 35) distinguished between resources and 
capabilities, by stating that ‘capabilities refer to a firm's capacity to deploy resources, 
usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end. They are 
information-based processes that are firm-specific and are developed over time through 
complex interactions among the firm's resources. They can abstractly be thought of as 
'intermediate goods' generated by the firm to provide enhanced productivity of its 
resources, as well as strategic flexibility and protection for its final product or service’.  
                                               
3
 It can be argued that there is some theoretical overlap between ‘organizational capital resources’ 
(Barney, 1991) and ‘organizational routines’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982), the building blocks of 
organizational capabilities. 
4
 As noted in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.3.4) Grant (1996b) argued that the essence of organizational 
capability is the ‘integration’ of individuals’ specialized knowledge. Within that context, he attributed 
superior performance to how productive firms are in utilizing the knowledge ‘stored’ within individual 
employees, which in turn depends upon the ability of firms to ‘access’ and ‘harness’ the specialized 
knowledge of its members. He found the structure of the organization to be an important factor and 
argued that ‘networks’ of individuals are well suited to the transfer and integrate knowledge. 
5
 An issue identified in Chapter 2, Sections 2.6 and 2.8 as particularly important to the management of 
interrelationships between BUs of a diversified organization. 
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Building on this distinction, Makadok (2001) argued that a capability is embedded in 
the organization’s processes and because of this embededness, a capability cannot be 
easily transferred from one organization to another without also transferring ownership 
of the organization itself, or some reasonably self-contained subunit of the organization, 
within which the capability is contained. 
The arguments developed in the previous paragraph assist in understanding that 
capabilities emerge from the co-evolution of ‘human’ and ‘organizational’ capital 
resources into what Helfat and Peteraf (2003) referred to as ‘higher order’ routines. 
Therefore, though distinct, they are interdependent. The value of organizational 
capabilities depends on the ease with which resources and organizational routines 
constituting them can be imitated or substituted (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995; Makadok, 2001; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Hence, it can be argued 
that ‘critical’ or ‘strategic’ capabilities exhibit characteristics similar to the ones Barney 
(1991) has attributed to ‘critical’ or ‘strategic’ resources, as those have been described 
in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.3.3). 
 
 3.2.2.1 Operational vs. Dynamic Capabilities 
 
Moving from a stationary position to a position of organizational change, 
capabilities can be distinguished between those that are ‘operational’ and those that are 
‘dynamic’. There is a broad consensus in the literature that dynamic capabilities contrast 
with operational capabilities by being concerned with change and that dynamic 
capabilities govern the rate of change of ordinary capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; 
Winter, 2003). Winter described operational capabilities as those that permit a firm to 
‘make a living’ in the short term and dynamic capabilities as those that operate to 
‘extend’, ‘modify’ or ‘create’ operational capabilities. Within that context, Teece et al. 
(1997) described the organizational routines related to dynamic capabilities as ‘patterns 
of learning’.  
Providing a clearer link between the evolutionary perspective of ‘dynamic’ 
capabilities and the positional approach put forward by the market-power view (MPV) 
of the firm, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) describe dynamic capabilities as comprising 
organizational routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations as markets 
emerge, collide, split, evolve and die. In addition, Teece et al. (1997) argued that 
dynamic capabilities can be deployed to ‘alter’ managerial and organizational processes, 
gear evolutionary paths and hence alter market positions.  It becomes clear therefore 
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that dynamic capabilities represent the ‘backbone’ of an organization’s ability to 
successfully adapt to changing environments and integrate emerging with intended 
strategies (Mintzberg, 1978;1979).  
Since dynamic capabilities consist of routines which are themselves an 
organization’s patterns for learning (Teece et al., 1997; Zolo and Winter, 2002), it could 
be argued that they enable explicit organizational learning and tacit adjustment to take 
place, which can then lead to ‘reconfigurations’ of business processes and eventually of 
market positions6. Hence, it could be argued that dynamic capabilities can be deployed 
towards the co-development of ‘human’ and ‘organizational’ capital resources and lead 
to the development of organizational capabilities. This argument supports the widely 
accepted notion that organizational learning is the main way in which organizations 
interact with, and are changed by, their environment (Penrose, 1959; Cyert and March, 
1964; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1991; Nonaka, 
1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi; 1995). 
 
3.2.2.2 Project Capability 
 
It was not until the 1990s that the importance of an additional set of 
organizational capabilities - relevant to project-based firms such as ICMs - located at 
the project level, was recognized (Davies and Brady, 2000; Brady and Davies, 2004; 
Davies and Hobday, 2005)7. Davies and Hobday (2005: 62-63) define ‘project 
capabilities’, from a supplier’s perspective, as ‘the appropriate knowledge, experience 
and skills necessary to perform pre-bid, bid, project and post-project activities’. They 
argue that project capability is essential both to the ‘operational effectiveness’ and 
‘strategic positioning’ of the project-based firm. In other words, it is essential to the 
development and deployment of operational as well as dynamic capabilities. An 
interesting issue that the works of Davies and Hobday (2005) highlights, is that in 
project-based firms, projects are temporary organizations during the life-cycles of which 
both the operational as well as the dynamic capabilities of the firms are exercised. So in 
essence, the project-based firm has the inherent potential to extend, modify and create 
capabilities as it operates8. 
                                               
6
 Or, in Giddens’s (1979; 1984) terms, reconfigurations of ‘social practices’ and ‘structural properties’ 
7
 Davies and Hobday (2005) site the work of Morris (1994), Amsden and Hikino (1994) and Cusumano 
and Nobeoka (1998), as having contributed to theory developed in that field. 
8
 This point also links back to the work of Davies and Hobday (2005) - viz. Chapter 2, Section 2.4 - who 
described that project-based firms, such as ICMs, often use projects to diversify from their traditional 
capability base to a new technology base, capability base or both. 
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3.2.2.3 Capability Evolution and Development 
 
In an attempt to explain how capabilities evolve (and can be developed) over 
time, Helfat and Peteraf (2003) introduced the concept of the ‘Capability Life-Cycle’ 
(Figure 3.2). They distinguished three stages of capability evolution: ‘founding’, 
‘development’ and ‘maturity’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the founding stage, an organized group/team with some type of leadership 
will work towards a central objective, the achievement of which entails the creation of a 
new capability (Levinthal and Myatt, 1994). It is evident that due to ‘path dependency’ 
(Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), resources ‘inherited’ at any moment 
in time set the stage for further capability development. The notion of path dependency 
recognizes that history matters and thus, that a firm’s previous repertoire of resources 
and routines, (its history) constrains its future behaviour and its specific options within 
its overall path direction (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Due to 
‘path dependency’ issues, each company will start the process of capability 
development with different types of resources and capabilities in its arsenal. 
Furthermore, particular individuals may play a role in capability development (Helfat 
and Peteraf, 2003)9. 
                                               
9
 Teams with similar objectives but different initial configurations make different choices. For example, 
consider two construction companies that want to grow their capacity as general contractors. The 
leadership of one company might decide to acquire another company that is active in general contracting, 
the leadership of the other might decide to hire executives or promote middle management to positions of 
greater responsibility and invest in bidding for more work that would increase its turnover and market 
share. Both actions have the same objective but are different, the choice between them depending on the 
perception each company’s senior management team has on what is the right thing to do for their 
business. 
Figure 3.2: Stages of the Initial Capability Life-Cycle 
Level of 
Capability  
Founding and 
Development 
 
Maturity 
          Source: Helfat and Peteraf (2003) 
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 Therefore, ‘choices’ regarding capability development will vary from company 
to company, mostly because of the differences between decision-makers with respect to 
their: 
� Human Capital (their knowledge, skills and experience); 
� Social capital (their social ties within and outside the team)10. 
 
 During the ‘development’ stage, the organization (or team within the 
organization) is set around capability development. ‘Capability’ develops through team 
searches and knowledge that is being acquired. Whether the team decides to ‘imitate’ or 
‘develop’ a capability, organizational learning is required. This involves a team 
performing an activity and learning the capability through experience. This follows 
because ‘learning’ and ‘adjustment’ are often a process of trial, feedback and evaluation 
(Teece, 1988; Teece et al., 1997; Chang, 1996).  
In the ‘maturity’ stage, how well the capability is maintained depends on how 
often and how consistently an organization exercises it11. A capability has reached 
maturity when it has reached a state of being implemented through ‘a regular and 
predictable pattern of routines’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece et al., 1997). Once a 
capability reaches maturity, the organization is presented with the following options for 
managing it (Figure 3.3): 
� Recombination 
� Redeployment 
� Replication 
� Renewal 
� Retrenchment 
 
The ability to replicate indicates that a firm has the foundations in place for 
routine development across organizational settings in addition to ‘capability 
development’ through organizational learning and improvement12. At the same time, it 
has to be recognized that in reality tacit capabilities can evolve but then it is luck or the  
 
                                               
10
 The social capital and ties that the individual team members bring with them are important at this stage 
for obtaining resources.  
11
 In a project-based context, Davies and Brady (2000) argued that the greatest challenge that maintaining 
capability represents is learning from project to project, as there is a constant risk that learning will be 
dissipated and lost to future projects and the same mistakes will be repeated. 
12
 In Giddens’ (1984) terms, it indicates it has the ability to replicate its social practices across time/place, 
in addition to re-configuration and improvement of these social practices. 
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intuitive negotiation within the culture and organizational norms that steer things in a 
valuable way. Davies and Brady (2000) examined capability development for the case 
of project-based businesses. They argued that opportunities for learning exist, especially 
for firms that undertake similar categories of projects (e.g. turnkey, design and build, 
build-operate-transfer for the case of construction firms), which involve repeated cycles 
of activity as, when projects are repeated, recognizable patterns of organizational 
behaviour tend to occur. Brady and Davies (2004) went on to propose a model of 
‘project capability building’, consisting of two interactive levels of learning. The first 
level consists of three bottom-up, ‘project-led’ phases of learning that occur when a firm 
moves into a new technology or market base: 
� An exploratory vanguard project phase to capture lessons learned; 
� A project-to-project phase to disseminate lessons learned across projects; 
� A ‘project-to-organization’ phase when the organization builds on lessons learned 
to develop capabilities it can apply to deliver many projects. 
 
The second level is that of ‘business-led’ learning (within which the project-led 
learning is embedded) that occurs when top-down strategic decisions are taken to create 
and exploit company-wide resources and capabilities required to perform increasingly 
predictable and routine project activities.  
The work of Prencipe and Tell (2001) is also relevant here. Drawing from Zolo 
and Winter (2002) while their work was still in print, they developed a framework to 
Figure 3.3: Branches of the Capability Life-Cycle 
Level of 
Capability 
per Unit of 
Activity 
Retirement 
Renewal, 
Redeployment, 
Recombination 
Replication 
Retrenchment 
 Source: Helfat and Peteraf (2003) 
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analyze the learning abilities of project-based firms13. They proposed that mechanisms 
for inter-project learning draw upon learning processes and can be found at various 
levels of the project-based firm. Subsequently, they studied whether and how project-
based firms are able to capitalize on knowledge that is acquired during the execution of 
one project and, by transferring it to other projects or parts of the organization. They 
concluded that personal relationships, possibly developed through participation in 
formal and informal networks, contribute to knowledge being more effectively deployed 
across projects. 
 Having described resources and capabilities and established their relationship 
and distinguishing features, the next section introduces the concept of ‘competence’. 
 
3.2.3 The Concept of Competence 
 
A number of efforts have been made to define the concept of competence both in 
reference to individuals and to organizations. At the level of the individual, Boyatzis 
(1982: 21) defined competence as ‘an underlying characteristic of a person, which 
results in effective and/or superior performance in a job’. He also explained that those 
underlying characteristics might be motives, traits, skills, aspects of one’s self-image or 
social role, or a body of knowledge that an individual uses, further adding that the 
existence and possession of such characteristics may or may not be known to the 
individual. At the level of the organization, McGrath et al. (1995: 251) defined 
competence as ‘the degree to which a firm or its sub-units can reliably and consistently 
meet or exceed objectives’. They further showed that an important correlation exists 
between organizational competence and the ‘comprehension’ of the organization’s 
management team of the objectives related to their efforts, as well as the ‘deftness’ of 
the organizational environment in which they operate. Building on the work of Weick 
and Roberts (1993), McGrath et al. (1995) described ‘comprehension’ as that 
organizational state that results from the process by which those individuals or teams 
pursuing an initiative come to adequately understand what combinations of resources 
                                               
13
 Zolo and Winter (2002) investigated the mechanisms through which organizations develop ‘dynamic 
capabilities’. They addressed the role of i) experience accumulation, ii) knowledge articulation and iii) 
knowledge codification processes in the evolution of dynamic capabilities, as well as operational routines. 
They argued that ‘dynamic capabilities’ are shaped by the co-evolution of these thee learning mechanism. 
They also argued that regarding codification, there is a need for some supporting structure. Significant 
departures from the guidance should not be entirely at the discretion of the task team, but should be 
subject to review and approval by a body that can assess the case in the light of the longer term interest in 
capability-building.  
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will allow them to achieve objectives14. In addition, they described ‘deftness’ as 
involving the creation of working relationships that allow those responsible for the 
initiative to execute effectively in light of comprehension.  In particular, McGrath et al. 
(1995) advocated that ‘deftness’ allows an organization to perform - in the face of 
complexity - beyond the ability of any individual in the organization to grasp15.  
  
 3.2.3.1 Capability vs. Competence 
 
There is not much agreement about the definitions of capabilities and 
competencies and the differences between them are not obvious from the literature 
developed in the field (Boyatzis, 1982; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 
1994; Teece et al., 1994; McGrath et al., 1995; Sanchez and Heene, 1997, Chinowsky et 
al., 2000). The terms are often used interchangeably, creating confusion both to scholars 
and practitioners. The confusion is worsened by the fact that those terms are almost 
never used in isolation but are always preceded by different adjectives (e.g. dynamic, 
functional, threshold, operational, organizational, strategic and core). However, there is 
a difference between the two, which can be understood if the words ‘capability’ and 
‘competence’ are examined through a number of lenses (Zoiopoulos et al., 2006). First, 
we see that the Oxford English Dictionary defines the terms as follows: 
� ‘Capability’ as the power or ability to do something; 
� ‘Competence’ as having the necessary ability or knowledge to do something 
successfully.  
 
Based now on the common origin of the words ‘competence’ and ‘competition’, 
it can be observed that the word capability has as a constituent the word ‘ability’, 
whereas the word competence has the word ‘petition’, which, combined with ‘com’ - 
meaning ‘comes with’ - suggests that a ‘competence’ is something which comes 
through the intentional realization of a process towards specific objectives. In strategic 
management theory however, capabilities are also linked with the achievement of a 
particular end result. The definitions, in combination with the brief etymological 
                                               
14
 McGrath et al. (1995) stressed that processes by which seldom-occurring events are treated (March, 
Sproull and Tamuz, 1991), by which newcomers are socialized (Burgelman, 1988) and by which the 
kinds of information regarded as legitimate are decided (Daft and Lengel, 1986) are examples of 
processes through which comprehension is either fostered or inhibited. 
15
 Weick and Roberts (1993) describe ‘group deftness’ as the emergence of a ‘collective mind’ in which 
activities performed by a group are interrelated so that desirable outcomes may be achieved and 
undesirable outcomes avoided.  
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analysis of the words ‘capability’ and ‘competence’, suggest that the difference between 
capabilities and competencies does not only lie in the fact that competence comes from 
the intentional process towards the realization of specific objectives, but that it is also 
related to the success of the end result. Along those lines, what truly makes the 
difference between a competence and a capability is the ‘consistency’ in successfully 
achieving that end result (Boyatzis, 1982; McGrath et al. 1996)16.  
Although distinct, both capabilities and competencies exhibit ‘equifinality’ 
(Eisenhardt et al. 2000, Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), in that similar capabilities and 
competencies required in addressing market demands can be obtained by different 
competitors through various ways. It is the competence (McGrath et al., 1995), 
however, with which they are being developed and deployed that distinguishes one 
competitor from another. In the words of Helfat and Peteraf (2003: 999): ‘Simply 
because a capability may have reached a threshold level of reliability, does not imply 
that the capability has attained the highest possible level of functionality. Organizations 
may differ in the efficiency or effectiveness of a particular type of capability. To say 
that an organization has a capability means only that it has reached a minimum level of 
functionality that permits repeated, reliable performance of an activity. Some versions 
of capability are better than others’. 
 
3.2.4    From Resources, to Capabilities, to Competencies 
 
Coyne (1986) was the first to argue that superior performance of organizations is 
based on ‘capability differentials’ they possess over their competitors, with respect to 
how they coordinate their critical resources. Building on the work of Coyne (1986), Hall 
(1992, 1993) distinguished four types of capability differentials:  
� ‘Functional Capability Differential’: relating to the ability of the organization to 
do specific things and resulting from the knowledge, skills and experience of 
employees and others in the value chain such as suppliers and distributors; 
� ‘Cultural Capability Differential’: applying to the organization as a whole and 
incorporating the habits, attitudes beliefs and values, which permeate the 
individuals and groups which comprise the organization; 
                                               
16
 Boyatzis (1982), who examined competencies at the level of the individual, advocates they have 
characteristics that are causally related to effective and or superior performance in a job. This means that 
there is evidence that indicates that possession of such characteristics precedes competence and is 
responsible for effective and/or superior performance in that job. A capability is (a person’s) generic 
knowledge or skill which is essential to perform a job but is not causally related to superior job 
performance. 
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� ‘Positional Capability Differential’: resulting from past actions which have 
created for example a certain reputation with customers and/or certain 
configuration of the value chain; 
� ‘Regulatory Capability Differential’: resulting from the possession of legal 
entities such as intellectual property rights, contracts and trade secrets. 
 
Hall (1992; 1993) further explained that the last two are based on physical capital 
resources, whereas the first two are based on human and organizational capital 
resources17 and that they form part of an organization’s competencies. Hall (1992) 
referred to Barney’s (1991) physical capital resources as ‘tangible’ resources and to 
‘human’ and ‘organizational capital resources’ as ‘intangible’ resources. Along those 
lines, he described organizational competencies as ‘intangible’, ‘people dependent’ 
organizational resources and further stated that ‘competencies include the know-how of 
employees (as well as suppliers, advisers and distributors) and the collective attributes 
which add up to organizational culture’ (Hall, 1993: 609). Subsequently, he linked 
competencies with capability differentials, people dependent skills and intangible 
organizational resources (Figure 3.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17
 From Barney (1991), viz. Section 3.2.1. 
Figure 3.4: Resources, Skills and Organizational Competencies 
Intangible Organizational 
Resources 
� Human Capital 
� Organizational Capital 
 
 
 
Assets 
Competencies 
 
‘Include the know-how of 
employees (as well as suppliers, 
advisers and distributors) and the 
collective attributes which ad-up 
to organizational culture’ (Hall, 
1993: 609). 
People-dependent 
 
� Functional Capability 
Differential 
� Cultural Capability 
Differential 
 
People-independent 
 
� Positional Capability 
Differential 
� Regulatory Capability 
Diferential 
 
Created from Hall (1992, 1993) 
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 This line of argument assists in understanding that organizational-level 
competencies are supported by ‘functional’ and ‘cultural’ capability differentials over 
competitors, which in turn are constituted of bundles of ‘human’ and ‘organizational 
capital’ resources, which represent the collective learning of the organization (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad 1994). So, it follows from Hall (1992, 1993) that 
competencies are based on people-dependent intangible resources that support a 
company’s functional and cultural capability differential over its competitors (Figure 
3.5). Therefore, ‘human capital’ and ‘organizational capital’ resources (Barney, 1991) 
are the building blocks of organizational level competencies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
Later, Gorman and Thomas (1997) complemented Hall’s argument by pointing out that 
competencies are actually ‘value-adding combinations’ of resources and capabilities, 
concluding therefore that a competence is much more valuable than a capability and 
more difficult for competitors to detect or replicate18.   
 
                                               
18
 Similarly to ‘capabilities’, ‘competencies’ are value adding co-ordinations of resources (and 
capabilities) of an ‘intangible’ nature that go beyond the categories identified by Barney (1991; 2001) in 
that they are functionally-geared towards the implementation of a specific activity. 
Figure 3.5: Competencies, Capability Differentials and Resources 
Competencies 
People-Dependent Intangible 
Resources 
 
� Human Capital Resources 
(knowledge/skills of 
individuals) 
� Organizational Capital 
Resources (Barney, 1991) 
(organization-specific routines) 
� Functional Capability 
Differentials 
� Cultural Capability 
Differentials 
Source: Author Generated 
 71
In his attempt to describe and explain ‘competence development’, Hall (1992; 
1993) argued that competitiveness could be achieved to the extent and speed that 
companies could build and exploit functional and cultural capability differentials. This 
means that sustainable competitive advantage depends on the ‘effectiveness’ with which 
companies (ICMs in this research) are deploying their dynamic capabilities (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Teece et al., 1997; Helfat et al., 2003; Winter, 2003) to develop their 
human and organizational capital resources.  
 This section has built on the theory reviewed in the previous sections to examine 
the relationships between resources, capabilities and competencies. As noted in Chapter 
1 (viz. section 1.7), this research is interested in examining issues related to 
organizational level core competence (OLCC) development, not individual level core 
competence (ILCC) development, except insofar as how the latter influences the 
development of the former. Before describing the distinguishing features of ‘core 
competencies’ and positioning them within an organizational context, the following 
section briefly distinguishes between ‘individual-level core competencies’ (ILCCs) and 
‘organizational-level’ core competencies (OLCCs). 
  
3.2.5   The Level of the Individual and the Level of the Organization 
 
          At the level of the individual, the focus is on human capital resources as those 
have been defined by Barney (1991). At the level of the organization, the terms refer to 
social constructs (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Giddens, 1984; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Hall, 1992; 1993) and the focus is essentially on the combination and integration of 
‘human’ and ‘organizational capital resources’ in the form of ‘bundles of human skills, 
knowledge and attributes and organizational processes’ respectively. 
          ILCCs relate to the work of Boyatzis (1982), Holmes and Joyce (1993), Iles 
(1993), Spenser and Spenser (1993) and Stewart and Page (1992) on job and managerial 
competencies along with training and development. With respect to ILCCs, there have 
been two major conceptualizations (Lahti, 1999). The first, resulted mainly from the 
work of the McBer consultancy in the US in the 1970s, in an ‘American Management 
Association’ initiative to determine the performance characteristics which differentiate 
superior managers from average managers. The research was recorded and published by 
Boyatzis (1982) in ‘The Competent Manager’. The second was brought forward by the 
work of the Management Charter Initiative in the late 1980s in the United Kingdom, 
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while establishing a national system for certifying or accrediting competence in relation 
to managerial education. 
 OLCCs relate to the work of Bettis and Prahalad (1986), Coyne (1986; Hamel 
and Prahalad (1989; 1994), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Hall (1992; 1993), Prahalad 
(1993), Markides and Williamson (1994), Coyne et al., 1997; Sanchez and Heene 
(1997) and in construction Chinowsky, (2000), Lampel (2001) and Haan et al., (2003). 
They refer to the organization as a whole and have been described by the core 
competence theory’s main proponents (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.2) as a collection of 
desired skills, which are part of the collective learning of the organization and/or 
collective aptitudes that add-up to organizational culture. 
Since core competencies are the collective learning of the organization, 
especially that related to the coordination of diverse production skills and the 
integration of multiple streams of technology (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), it can be 
understood that the skills and competencies of individuals are an inextricable part of an 
organization’s core competencies. In addition to often being tacit, the ILCCs employees 
have developed, have evolved along with the core competencies of the company they 
belong to, being shaped by them and shaping them at the same time19. This argument 
goes to show that, although not the same, ILCCs and OLCCs are interdependent. 
Having distinguished between core competencies referring to individuals 
(ILCCs) and core competencies referring to organizations (OLCCs), further separating 
ILCCs to firm-specific and profession-specific, the purpose of the next section is to 
distinguish ‘organizational-level’ core competencies from non-core competencies. From 
this point onwards, the terms ‘core competencies’ will be used to refer to OLCCs, 
except when indicated otherwise. 
 
3.2.6 Core Competencies  
 
To grasp the distinguishing features of core competencies, one must consider 
their ‘integrative’ and ‘coordinating’ nature (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hall, 1992; 
1993; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994 and Markides and Williamson, 1994). Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990) and Hamel and Prahalad (1994) described core competencies as the 
collective learning in the organization, especially that related to the ‘coordination’ of 
                                               
19
 Penrose (1959; 1995) referred to such individuals as ‘inherited managers’, who she described as 
individuals with years of experience within their firm, holding senior positions, whose experience lies in 
their knowledge of their firm’s specific resources (and core competencies) and the potential of using them 
in different ways.  
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diverse production skills and ‘integration’ of multiple streams of technology. In other 
words, they argued that core competencies manifest themselves through the integration 
and coordination of skills (potentially competencies) that exist within and are spread 
across the distinct, yet related units of the organizations they belong to. Hall (1992; 
1993) went a step further and described core competencies as ‘social constructs’ 
constituting of skills of individuals and organizational routines through which those 
skills are being deployed. These descriptions recognize the importance of the skills 
(potentially competencies) of individuals in managing intra-organizational integration 
and coordination through company-specific organizational routines. Markides and 
Williamson’s (1994: 155) definition of core competencies as ‘the pool of experience, 
knowledge and systems that exist elsewhere in the same corporation, which can be 
deployed to reduce the cost or time required either to create a new strategic asset or 
expand the stock of an existing one’ further supports the argument for their coordinating 
and integrative nature. Consequently, it becomes clear that core competencies are a 
function of the knowledge/skills (potentially competencies) of individual organizational 
members and organization-specific routines that cut across organizational units, 
bringing together technologies and skills related to delivering services to the company’s 
end customers.  
According to the core competence theory’s proponents (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Sanchez and Heene, 1996; 1997) an additional unique 
feature of core competencies is that they: 
� Provide potential access to a wide variety of markets; 
� Make a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end 
product; 
� Are difficult for competitors to imitate. 
 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) positioned core competencies in an organizational context, 
distinguishing between ‘core competencies’, ‘core products’, ‘core businesses’ and ‘end 
products’ (Figure 3.6).  They used the metaphor of a ‘tree’ to describe core 
competencies in diversified, multi-business unit (BU) organizations, describing the 
trunk and major limbs as ‘core products’, smaller branches as ‘business units’, leaves 
and fruits as ‘end products’ and core competencies as the ‘roots’ that keep the tree alive. 
Building on the ‘interdependence’ between the parts of a living organization (the tree), 
they further argued that by focusing on core competencies, organizations can create 
unique,   integrated   systems   that   reinforce the  ‘fit’  among  diverse  production  and  
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technology skills -  a systemic advantage that competitors cannot easily copy20. They 
described ‘core products’  as  the  tangible  link  between  identified  core  competencies  
and  ‘end products’, characterizing them as the physical embodiments of core 
competencies. To illustrate this with a construction-specific example, where a core 
competence may be ‘managing subcontractors’, the core product would be ‘concrete 
frames’, the BUs ‘residential construction’ and ‘commercial construction’ and the end 
products ‘residential buildings’ and ‘commercial offices’. 
After conducting research on engineering-procurement-construction (EPC)21 firms 
from a number of countries including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
France, Malaysia and Japan, Lampel (2001) concluded that they base their operations on 
essentially four types of core competencies: 
� ‘Entrepreneurial’: which are directly related to capturing contracts. Those are 
experience-based and depend on detecting opportunities as they emerge, or even 
better, on stimulating the emergence of opportunities by bringing project ideas to 
the attention of potential clients; 
                                               
20
 For a competitor that may acquire some of the technologies that constitute specific core competencies, 
it will be more difficult to duplicate the more or less ‘comprehensive’ patterns of internal coordination 
and learning that support them. 
21
 Those are the types of firms that are most common in the ‘process engineering’ sector (Morris, 2004) - 
viz. Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
End Products 
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� ‘Technical’: which relate first and foremost to the effective use of technological 
knowledge and engineering know-how22;  
� ‘Evaluative’: which relate to transforming opportunities to contracts at a profit. 
Those core competencies are invariably a mixture of formal and informal 
processes. An evaluation of a project’s cost relies on the tacit expertise and 
experience of engineers and managers23;  
� ‘Relational’: which are created by the fact that projects are relational systems that 
bring together a wide range of actors and institutions with different roles and 
different amount of influence to facilitate or hinder the development of the 
project. The most important interaction at which relational core competencies are 
deployed is that between EPC firms and their clients. 
 
He argued that in the case of project-based service firms, where final products are 
defined by the unique requirements of individual clients/end consumers, there are no 
core products or core technologies to link final products with core competencies. 
Instead, there are core processes that describe the life-cycle of most - if not all - 
projects, from an exploratory formulation of the basic project concept - usually 
involving contacts with potential clients - to detailed technical studies and costing 
estimates, bid preparation and project execution24. 
Building on Hamel and Prahalad (1994) and Lampel (2001), it is worth noting that 
the word ‘core’, apart from being used to describe competencies with the distinctive 
‘integrating’, ‘coordinating’ and ‘value-adding’ features described in this section, is also 
used to describe the relativity of ‘competencies’ with the ‘core businesses’ of the 
company that possesses them. In construction, Langford and Male (2001) describe core 
businesses as those that possess some or all of the following characteristics: 
� Where the company has a long standing interest and has built-up a considerable 
expertise; 
� Where a fairly substantial turnover is generated; 
                                               
22
 As opposed to entrepreneurial competencies, those are programmable, in that they can be broken down, 
analyzed and described in detail. In addition, they are relatively accessible, as their knowledge base can 
be obtained through traditional education methods. 
23
 Evaluative core competencies are based on the two elements of judgment and memory. Judgment is 
based on the tacit knowledge of employees whereas memory, has both a tacit and explicit element. Tacit 
in the case of the memory of individuals who have worked in the past in similar projects and explicit in 
the case of organizations who analyze and record data on the projects with which they have been 
involved. 
24
 This point links back to Davies and Hobday’s (2005) concept of ‘project capability’ and could be used 
to argue that in a project-based management context, there is room for the existence of ‘project core 
competencies’. 
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� Where reasonable market growth can be expected or where the firm has a 
captive market; 
� Where there are low capital requirements. 
 
 So, for example, for a company that has been involved in the last fifty years with 
‘building’ and ‘civil’ engineering general contracting, ‘managing sub-contractors’ may 
well be a core competence, whereas ‘secretarial support’ at the head office may not, 
even through secretarial support may indeed be provided ‘competently’ to the 
company’s staff and executives. 
 Prahalad and Hamel (1990) argued that the ‘decentralization’ that often 
accompanies diversified/divisionalized organizations - such as ICMs (viz. Chapter 2, 
Sections 2.6 and 2.8) - makes it difficult to focus on core competencies. Instead, 
individual BUs become increasingly dependent on outsiders for critical skills and 
critical components. Hence, they forego the core competencies to develop core products 
that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products/services. They 
advocate that the manifestation and deployment of core competencies necessitates 
communication across BUs, involvement and a deep commitment to working across 
organizational boundaries, as these tasks involve many levels of people and all 
functions. Finally, they argue organizational leadership often fails to develop core 
competencies, because it fails to escape the ‘BU’ mindset and develop an understanding 
of its organization as a portfolio of core competencies. They summarize the implications 
of the two mindsets on the following table (Table 3.1).  
 
Being captured in a ‘BU’ mindset, organizational leadership often lacks the vision 
to build core competencies, as well as the means to ‘assemble’ resources, capabilities 
Table 3.1: BU-Mindset vs. Core Competence Mindset 
                                                                         BU                                       Core Competence 
Basis for competition Competitiveness of today’s products Inter-firm competition to build 
competencies 
Corporate structure Portfolio of business related in 
product-market terms 
Portfolio of competencies, core 
products and businesses 
Status of the business 
unit 
Autonomy is sacrosanct; the BU 
‘owns’ all resources other than cash 
BU is a potential reservoir of core 
competencies 
Resource allocation Discrete businesses are the unit of 
analysis; Capital is allocated 
business by business 
Businesses and competencies are the 
unit of analysis top management 
allocates capital and talent. 
Value added of top 
managers 
Optimizing corporate returns 
through capital allocation trade-offs 
among businesses 
Enunciating strategic architecture and 
building competencies to secure the 
future. 
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and competencies spread across multiple BUs. A BU mindset can lead to the 
‘imprisonment’ of resources. As a BU evolves, it often develops unique competencies. 
Typically, the people who embody these competencies are seen as the sole property of 
the BU in which they ‘grew’. Often, BU managers are reluctant - or even refuse - to 
give them to another BU’s manager who may ask to borrow them. This problem is also 
present regarding innovation. Individual BUs will pursue only those innovation 
opportunities that are close at hand. Conceiving the corporation in terms of core 
competencies widens the domain of innovation. 
Core competence theory postulates that competition for the future is unlikely to fit 
neatly within single BU boundaries, but will most likely require the contribution of 
numerous organizational BUs and functions. This is why the theory’s main proponents 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) advocated that competing for 
the future must be a corporate responsibility - not just the responsibility of individual 
BU heads - noting that this responsibility may be ‘exercised by a group of corporate 
officers or, preferably, a cohort of BU heads working horizontally across the 
organization’ (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994: 32). The core competencies needed to access 
the new opportunities may be spread across a number of BUs and it is up to the 
enterprise to bring these competencies together at the appropriate point and time within 
the corporation (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990).  
Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.5 have described the relationships between resources, 
capabilities, competencies and core competencies, while distinguishing between those 
referring to organizations and those referring to individuals. The purpose of the 
following section is to build on the theory reviewed in this chapter so far, to develop a 
model that can capture the relationship between resources, capabilities, competencies 
and core competencies, while positioning and describing them within an organizational 
context, such as the diversified context of the ICMs studied in this research and 
described in theory in Chapter 2. 
 
3.3 The Competence Hierarchy, its Critical Review and a New Model 
 
         As already introduced at an earlier stage of this chapter (viz. Section 3.2), the first 
attempt to describe the relationships between resources, capabilities, competencies and 
core competencies within a single coherent framework was made by Javidan (1998) 
(Figure 3.1 also shown here as Figure 3.7). The model presents resources as the building 
blocks of capabilities, competencies and core competencies.  
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 The theory reviewed in this chapter so far has made clear the existence of such a 
‘hierarchical’ relationship but has also demonstrated the interrelationships between the 
different hierarchical levels. The competence hierarchy developed by Javidan (1998) 
does assist in developing an understanding of the relationship between resources, 
capabilities, competencies and core competencies. However, it does not provide a 
framework that can be used to adequately address, identify and examine in parallel their 
interrelationships and those of their constituting elements. First and foremost, it does 
not distinguish between the different types of resources (physical, human and 
organizational) (Barney, 1991) that the firm exploits through the deployment of 
capabilities, competencies and core competencies. Consequently, it does not address 
that the manifestation of organizational capabilities involves the integration of multiple 
knowledge bases (Grant, 1996a,b). Second, it does not directly link different types of 
resources with the elements of capabilities they correspond to. In other words, it does 
not provide a link to explain that it is the ‘human capital resources’ which embody the 
knowledge, skills, attributes and other characteristics of individuals needed to 
coordinate other types of resources and that it is the ‘organizational capital resources’ 
that constitute the organizational routines, which dictate the norms through which 
individuals conduct a company-specific activity. This brings us to the third limitation of 
Javidan’s existing model, the fact that it is not inclusive enough of terms that can 
distinguish between the level of the individual and the level of the organization, when 
addressing the distinction between capabilities, competencies and core competencies. 
Core Competencies 
Competencies 
Capabilities 
Resources 
Increasing 
Value Difficulty 
  Source: Javidan (1998) 
Figure 3.7: The Competencies Hierarchy 
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Fourth, Javidan’s model does not demonstrate that core competencies are manifested 
through the inter-BU integration and coordination of resources, capabilities and 
competencies. Finally, the model is not inclusive enough to be used as a theoretical 
platform in explaining the evolutionary and transformatory processes taking place from 
the lowest level of the competencies hierarchy to the highest25.  
Considering therefore the five points outlined above, it became evident that a 
more ‘inclusive’ and ‘holistic’ competencies hierarchy should be developed to position 
and describe core competencies within the context of multi-BU organizations, such as 
the ICMs that this research studies.  
 
3.3.1 The New Competence Hierarchy 
  
The theory reviewed in this chapter so far has demonstrated that core 
competencies are complex ‘social constructs’, created from the intra-organizational 
‘integration’ and ‘coordination’ of resources, capabilities and competencies, while at the 
same time they are supported by ‘functional’ and ‘cultural’ capability differentials that 
the organization possesses over its competitors. In order to better understand their 
nature and ‘positioning’ within an organization-specific context, a new model is brought 
forward in this section, developed for the purpose of this study (Figure 3.8).  
The ‘new competence hierarchy’ is not a hierarchy of authority and control, but 
a hierarchy of ‘integration’ and ‘coordination’ - both in the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions. At the base of the hierarchy are i) human capital resources (HCRs) - and 
more importantly the broad base of specialized knowledge, skills and other attributes 
held by individual organizational members, ii)  organizational capital resources (OCRs), 
in the form of formal and informal processes and routines and iii) physical capital 
resources (PCRs), in the form of assets (fixed and financial). At the first level of 
integration are organizational capabilities, which deal with specialized tasks. 
Competencies are organizational capabilities that exhibit a ‘functional’ and ‘cultural’ 
capability differential over the capabilities of competitors and which, when deployed, 
consistently deliver desired results. Core competencies are at a higher level of 
integration, requiring wide-range, cross-functional and cross-BU integration. 
To highlight their ‘integrative’ and ‘coordinating’ nature, Figure 3.8 shows core 
competencies as spread across more than one organizational unit and demonstrates with 
the  use  of  arrows  the   interrelationships   that  may  exist  between  them.  Since  core  
                                               
25
 The arguments developed in sections 3.3.1-3.3.2 are based on Zoiopoulos et al., 2008a.b. 
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Where HCR: ‘human capital resources’, OCR: ‘organizational capital resources’ and PCR: 
‘physical capital resources’. 
Source: Author Generated 
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Figure 3.8: The New Competencies Hierarchy 
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competencies are spread across distinct, yet related, BUs of an organization, Figure 3.8 
highlights the importance of the ‘horizontal organization’ (viz. Chapter 2, Section 2.8) 
across BUs in deploying and developing them. The figure also demonstrates that the 
inter-BU integration and coordination necessary for core competencies to be deployed 
can take place at different levels of the organizational hierarchy, which in turn helps 
explain that different types of ‘horizontal organization’ devices are required to leverage 
core competence elements that belong to different levels of the competence hierarchy. 
Along those lines, the new competencies hierarchy can help in identifying 
different levels of inter-BU coordination and collaboration through which core 
competencies are manifested and deployed. Specifically: 
� Individual level core competence (ILCC) leverage, including: 
o Knowledge transfer: in practice through knowledge management systems 
and inter-BU employee networks. 
o Employee mobilization: implemented in practice when individuals who 
have been recognized as ‘embodying’ elements of their organization’s 
core competencies are mobilized across BUs to positions of 
authority/responsibility; 
� Process/routine replication across BUs: in practice often accompanied by 
‘employee mobilization’, since it is individuals who possess the knowledge of 
how ‘routines’ operate in different organizational settings and their tacit 
knowledge is paramount for the routines’ successful replication; 
� Organizational-level competence leverage which, in practice, refers to a 
situation during which two distinct BUs will ‘coordinate’ at a high-level to 
‘integrate’ their ‘outputs’, without having integrated or coordinated at lower 
levels of the hierarchy. 
 
All these levels of intra-organizational integration and coordination are 
implemented through ‘horizontal organization devices’ and should - according to core 
competence theory proponents - form part of the corporate responsibilities ‘exercised by 
a group of corporate officers, or preferably, a cohort of BU heads working horizontally 
across the organization’ (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994: 32), for core competencies to be 
effectively deployed and developed. 
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In addition, Figure 3.8 demonstrates that both ‘operational’ and ‘dynamic’ 
mechanisms of core competence development are ultimately based on the coordination 
and integration of ‘human’ and ‘organizational’ capital resources (Barney, 1991; Hall, 
1992, 1993) through organization-specific routines. Hence, it can be used to address 
how the development of human and organizational capital resources that support 
companies’ functional and cultural capability differentials over their competitors relate 
to the development of core competencies. It could also be used to identify the 
mechanisms organizations have in place to transform capabilities to competencies and 
core competencies (Zoiopoulos et al., 2008).  
It is argued here that this model overcomes the limitations of the one proposed 
by Javidan (1998) (Figure 3.1 and 3.8), by being more inclusive of related work in the 
field  and hence more appropriate to address the complexities that the issues related to 
core competence development pose. It is in itself a theoretical contribution to 
knowledge, as it is much more inclusive of core competence dimensions and can 
therefore facilitate a more rigorous and detailed examination of core competence 
development in an organizational context - necessary to investigate this research.  
Finally, Figure 3.8 helps in being able to propose a more accurate definition of 
core competencies, which is in itself a contribution to knowledge in the field, and for 
this research in particular, it enables to operationalize the concept and examine it within 
this research’s scope. Along those lines, the following definition is proposed: 
 
‘Core competencies are the skills, knowledge and behavioural attributes of 
individual organizational members and the organization-specific routines through 
which they are being deployed, manifested through mechanisms for their intra-
organizational ‘integration’ and ‘coordination’ that provide the organization they 
belong to with the competence (functional and cultural differential) to obtain and 
retain access to a wide variety of markets and add value to end products/services 
in a manner recognizable by end users/clients as superior to alternative providers 
of similar products/services.’ 
 
From this definition it can be understood that core competencies are 
simultaneously part of and deployed through, the ‘structural properties’ and ‘social 
practices’ of an organization, and supports the approach adopted in this research (viz. 
Chapter 1, Section 1.5), that the issue of how the combinations of organizational 
configurations influence the effectiveness of ICMs’ core competence development can 
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be viewed through the lens of ‘structuration’ (Giddens, 1979; 1984) within 
organizational social systems. 
Having developed a model that can be used to identify the relationships between 
the different types of resources, capabilities, competencies and core competencies, the 
purpose of the next section is to position and describe those within the context of an 
organization, such as the ICMs this research studies. 
 
3.4 Core Competencies in Organizations 
 
  The purpose of this section is to fuse theory from Chapter 2 (viz. Section 2.6 to 
2.9) with the theory reviewed and developed in this chapter so far, to demonstrate how 
ICMs could be perceived as a ‘portfolio of competencies’ (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) 
rather than a portfolio of BUs. Such a fusion will enable the reader to visualize 
simultaneously the structural, functioning and core competence characteristics of ICMs. 
Towards that end, the new competencies hierarchy developed in the previous section is 
deployed.   
  On Figure 3.926, the ‘Olympus Corporation’ is portrayed as a portfolio of core 
competencies instead of a portfolio of BUs. Each BU (International, Construction and 
Housing) is shown as a competence hierarchy on its own, and the corporation as a 
whole as coordinating and integrating these competencies to deploy and develop its 
existing core competencies. Core competencies are shared by Olympus’ BUs since they 
are all related to the corporation’s core businesses.  
Figure 3.9 highlights with red arrows the importance of a ‘horizontal 
organization’ (Galbraith, 1973; Mintzberg, 1979; 1989; Porter, 1985) in the deployment 
and consequently development of core competencies. In Chapter 2 (viz. Section 2.8), it 
was proposed that this horizontal organization should contain mechanisms that could   
facilitate and develop inter-BU employee networks, fostering thus the development of 
‘trust’ and ‘social capital’ within the organization - which has been associated with 
effective inter-BU resource (knowledge) exchange (Ghoshal et al., 1994; Malnight, 
1995; Grant, 1996a,b; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Therefore, it could also lead to effective 
stretching and leveraging of resources and core competencies. 
                                               
26
 Essentially the fusion of Figure 2.6 from Chapter 2 and Figure 3.8 from this chapter. 
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Figure 3.9: Core Competencies of the ‘Olympus Corporation’  
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Such a horizontal organization could allow resources, capabilities, competencies and 
core competencies to be leveraged across distinct, yet related organizational units. It can 
allow, for example, tapping tacit expertise and experience of engineers and managers in 
‘evaluating’ projects that pose similarities but are undertaken by different BUs, or tapping 
‘technical’ core competencies (e.g. ‘Building’ from the construction BU on Figure 3.9) that 
would be required by another BU of the corporation (e.g. when the ‘Housing Development’ 
BU might wish to diversify towards commercial development).  
In light of the argument developed in this section so far, it can also be understood that 
‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics of organizations - particularly related to the 
horizontal organization between their BUs - have to be considered by their leadership when 
‘exhibiting strategic intent’ and ‘crafting strategic architecture’, to be able to proactively 
develop plans to overcome obstacles that may arise during core competence development. In 
such a way, ideas for solutions on these issues will be ‘integrated’ within an organization’s 
core competence development strategy execution (viz. Chapter 1, Figure 1.2) maximizing 
thus the potential for its effective implementation.  
Through Figures 3.8 and 3.9, it becomes clearer now how issues of inter-BU 
coordination and integration reviewed in Chapter 2, relate to core competence manifestation 
and development within multi-BU organizations. Examining the relationship between the 
configurations that ICMs adopt and the effectiveness with which they develop their core 
competencies will explore these issues for the case of ICMs. Consequently, insights could be 
developed that will contribute to our knowledge and allow suggestions to be made in order to 
improve the performance of such organizations. 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
  
Chapter 3 has defined and described key terms related to the resource-based view of the 
firm, evolutionary economics, organizational behaviour and organizational learning within the 
context of core competence theory. With the ‘new competencies hierarchy’ (Figure 3.8), the 
first step was taken in describing core competencies within ICMs (Figure 3.9). Chapter 4 will 
build on the analogy drawn between the execution of a core competence development strategy 
and Mintzberg’s (1978) strategy process, as well as the issues this chapter has identified 
regarding the nature of core competencies, to propose five, generic, corporate-level activities 
as the most influential to effective core competence development. 
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Chapter 4: Core Competence Development and the Research   
                    Question               
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this Chapter is twofold. First, to review and link management 
control theory with the theory reviewed and developed in Chapters 1-3, to propose a 
number of generic, corporate-level activities through which core competence 
development can be effectively controlled. Second, to link these activities, in conceptual 
terms, back to the primary research question (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.7) in order to set 
the stage for its ‘operationalization’ in the following chapter. 
  
4.2 Core Competence Development and Management Control 
 
In Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.7), it was noted that this research is an exploratory 
study to understand the relationship between the organizational configurations that 
international construction majors (ICMs) adopt and the effectiveness with which they 
develop their core competencies. It was also explained that ‘configuration’ is a term 
referring both to the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics of organizations and 
that this research would focus on examining issues related to ‘organizational-level’ core 
competence development, not ‘individual-level’ core competence development, except 
insofar as how the later influences the development of the former. Building on the 
analogy drawn between core competence development and Mintzberg’s (1978) strategy 
process, it was then proposed that this research’s purpose would be fulfilled by 
addressing the following research question: 
 
‘How do the configurations that ICMs adopt influence the effectiveness with which they 
execute a core competence development strategy?’ 
 
Having described ICMs as project-based, diversified and internationalized multi-
BU organizations (viz. Chapter 2) and having defined and positioned core 
competencies within the context of ICMs (viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.4), the purpose 
now becomes one of describing - in theory - what it is exactly that the execution of a 
core competence development strategy entails.   
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Hamel and Prahalad (1994: 32) described core competence development as ‘a 
corporate responsibility, exercised by a group of corporate officers, or preferably, a 
cohort of business unit (BU) heads working horizontally across the organization’. To 
develop therefore a better understanding of the organizational activities the undertaking 
of this corporate responsibility involves, it would be helpful to initially revert to the 
description of the competing for the future, core competence theory ‘philosophy’ first 
introduced in Chapter 1. Figure 1.2 from Chapter 1 is reproduced here (Figure 4.1) to 
assist towards that end. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown, Stage 1 of a core competence development strategy involves:  
� Identifying existing core competencies1; 
� Examining dynamics of competition2; 
                                               
1
 A number of methods have been brought forward in the strategic management literature to identify the 
core competencies of an organization. Although outside the scope of this research, they are outlined here 
as they are helpful in understanding the perception that exists regarding the nature of core competencies 
and their development, in practice and within the academic community: 
� Tampoe (1994) proposed a reverse engineering approach which starts with end products and 
decomposes them to identify the core competencies. 
� Galon et al. (1995) outlined a modular approach for the identification of core technical competencies 
which starts by constructing an inventory of capabilities. 
� Coates (1996) proposed a top-down method which picks the core competencies intuitively and then 
de-aggregates them into critical capabilities. 
� Marino (1996) described a two phase method for developing consensus on a firm’s core competencies 
and capabilities which starts by profiling the current product/market situation and then assesses 
capabilities in terms of future market opportunities. 
� Bakker et al. (1994) proposed a process which begins internally interviewing individuals; the potential 
core competencies are then evaluated after interviews with customers, competitors and industry 
experts. 
 
             Source: Author Generated 
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� Identifying future potential opportunities. 
 
 As clarified in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.7), the focus of this research is on the 
‘execution stage’ (Stage 2) of core competence development. Adopting the notion of 
core competence development as an intentional effort of organizations in a changing 
environment (Barnard, 1938; Mintzberg, 1978), core competence development 
‘execution’ can be described from theory as consisting of the following activities: 
� Exhibiting strategic intent (SI); 
� Crafting strategic architecture (SA); 
� Stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies. 
 
Building on the analogy drawn between ‘core competence development’ and 
Mintzberg’s (1978) ‘strategy process’ (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.5 and 1.7), it can be 
understood that, from a management theory point of view, the effectiveness with which 
a core competence development strategy can be ‘executed’, is an issue of ‘management 
control’. Adopting Barnard’s (1938) point of view of organizations as ‘purposive’ 
entities and Beer’s (1959) point of view of organizations as ‘exceedingly complex 
probabilistic systems’ - in line with core competence theory’s notion of organizations 
‘exhibiting strategic intent’ - Berry et al. (1995: 4) defined management control as ‘the 
process of guiding organizations into viable patterns of activity in a changing 
environment’. In that sense, they argued that control includes both regulating the 
process of formulation of ‘purpose’ (i.e. exhibiting strategic intent and crafting strategic 
architecture) and regulating the processes of ‘purpose achievement’ (i.e. stretching and 
leveraging resources and core competencies). Subsequently, they argued that without 
some control mechanisms, purposive organisational behaviour would degenerate into a 
composite of uncoordinated activities that are unlikely to possess the cohesion 
necessary for continued organisational survival and development3. 
                                                                                                                                         
2
 Though outside the scope of this research, it is worth mentioning some techniques available to decision 
makers, for them to analyze market environments and determine how those are related to their company’s 
strengths. The most relevant to the core competence approach is SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-
Opportunities-Threats) analysis, which can be used to identify strengths and weaknesses of a company 
with respect to the opportunities and threats it faces in the markets it competes or wishes to compete in. 
Additional tools and techniques are Porter’s (1985) five-forces and competitor analysis (Chen, 1996). 
3
 The theory of management control links back to the theory of ‘cybernetics’. Cybernetics was coined by 
Weiner (1948) to denote an area of study which covered the entire field of control and communication 
theory, whether in the machine or the animal. Beer (1959; 1966) attempted to adapt the principles of 
‘cybernetics’ to organizations. He described ‘cybernetics’ as the scientific study of the nature of control, 
not in the narrow sense of command and giving orders, but in the subtle sense of ‘self-regulation’ and 
‘adaptability’. He argued that the principles of cybernetics can be applied to ‘exceedingly complex 
probabilistic systems’, which he described as ones that have become so complicated that they cannot be 
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According to Beer (1959), one of the key ideas that underlie ‘control’ is the 
mechanism of ‘feedback’. Through feedback mechanisms, a ‘controller’ will take care 
of disturbances to the system, whose causes may be external and unknown. In 
‘cybernetic’ terms therefore, feedback mechanisms are crucial to the system’s ability to 
‘self-regulate’. Building on Beer (1959), Berry et al. (1995) described management 
control  using a ‘simple control loop’ scheme (Figure 4.2), consisting of the following  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
elements. First is a process of establishing the patterns of activities to be undertaken in 
the future, which constitutes the ‘plan’. Second is a process for undertaking the work 
that is contained in the plan and measuring the work that is done in relation to the plan. 
Third concerns creating reports and statements relating the work done to the work 
specified in the plan. Fourth concerns reviewing the relationship between the expected 
and actual pattern of activities and deciding what, if anything, should be done about it. 
Echoing Beer (1959), Berry et al. (1995) also argued that in any control loop, there is a 
requirement for a ‘controller’ or ‘decision-maker’ to make decisions that would change 
either the ‘input mix’ or the ‘transformation process’ to achieve the desired end result. 
They considered controllers to be managers or groups of managers, such as a company’s 
organizational leadership. Along those lines, it can be argued that in the context of the 
                                                                                                                                         
described in a precise and detailed fashion, and therefore, no precisely detailed prediction can be given 
about their behavior. Beer considered companies to be cybernetic systems and argued that they should be 
designed and controlled as such.  
Figure 4.2: Simple Control Loop 
Establishing 
the Plan 
Undertaking 
the Work of 
the Plan 
Reports/ 
Statements relating 
work to the plan 
Reviewing plan/ 
implementation 
relationship and 
deciding on 
‘amending’ action 
Controller 
Created from Berry et al. (1995) 
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ICMs this research intends to study, ‘controllers’ are the ICMs’ management and 
organizational leadership4. 
 
4.3 Generic, Corporate-Level, Core Competence Development Activities 
  
 From the previous section, it emerges that the activities explicitly proposed by 
core competence theory (i.e. ‘exhibiting SI’, ‘crafting SA’ and ‘stretching and 
leveraging resources and core competencies’) fall short when wishing to address: 
� The ‘regulative’ processes necessary to integrate emerging with intended 
strategies; 
� The qualities and availability of ‘controllers’ responsible for making decisions for 
‘regulating’ and potentially ‘reinventing’ their organization’s strategies. 
 
 For the exploratory purpose of this research to be adequately fulfilled, these last 
two points have to be incorporated in the study. Consequently, two more generic, 
corporate-level activities are proposed as effectively shaping core competence 
development: 
� Regulating SA implementation; 
� Developing managerial and organizational leadership capacity. 
 
 Even if the corporate-level activities identified so far appear to be adequate to 
describe core competence development, they still fall short in addressing the 
‘transformation’ that ICMs - and organizations in general - go through during core 
competence development5. What is missing are feedback mechanisms, in addition to 
those of ‘regulating SA implementation’, through which knowledge created as the 
system operates can be captured through organizational learning mechanisms6 and 
utilized by the system’s controllers, potentially leading to decisions about 
changes/improvements in social practices, structural properties and organisational 
                                               
4
 Kotter (1990: 1996) distinguishes between management and leadership by putting forward the thesis 
that management is about dealing with complexity, whereas leadership is about coping with change. In 
addition, he argues that leadership is responsible for creating organizations in the first place, or, adapting 
them to significantly changing circumstances. In that capacity, organizational leadership is the ‘designer’ 
of its organization (in cybernetic terms) and a ‘feedback controller’ that acts as the system’s self-
regulator.  
5
 Giddens (1979) argued that models of systems, especially those tied to the notion of ‘homeostasis’ (such 
as cybernetic systems), will not suffice to illuminate some of the key issues posed by the analysis of 
social systems. Bringing back the ‘system’ simply in a state of ‘homeostasis’ - as is the purpose of 
controllers acting on feedback mechanisms in cybernetic systems (Beer, 1959) - does not suffice. 
6
 Viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.3.6 
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norms. Re-negotiation of organisational norms has to do with culture and politics within 
the organization and may or may not involve any learning. Indeed, on occasions it could 
stifle it. Along those lines, ‘management control’ - as described by Berry et al. (1995) - 
can take the form of a ‘triple control loop’ (Figure 4.3). 
 The argument developed so far, demonstrates that for a holistic examination of 
core competence development, the mechanisms through which ICMs ‘learn’ from their 
experience as well as the mechanisms through which this knowledge is transferred, 
integrated and diffused corporate-wide need to be considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such a ‘feedback’ mechanism is, in combination with regulating strategic 
architecture implementation, an integral component of the organization’s dynamic 
capability (Teece et al., 1997). It will be referred to for the purpose of this research as: 
‘improving business practices’.  
Having proposed five generic, corporate-level activities, through which core 
competence development can be effectively controlled, the next five sections will 
review them and link them back to core competence theory issues and the research 
question. 
 
Figure 4.3: Triple Control Loop 
Establishing 
the Plan 
Undertaking 
the Work of 
the Plan 
Reports/ 
Statements 
relating work to 
the plan 
Reviewing plan/ 
implementation 
relationship and 
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‘amending’ action 
Controller 
                              Source: Author Generated 
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4.3.1 Exhibiting Strategic Intent and Crafting Strategic Architecture7 
 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) argue that exhibiting SI and crafting SA, forces the 
organization to identify and commit to the linkages across business units (BUs) that will 
provide a basis for value to be created. They argue that it is consistency in resource 
allocation and the development of an ‘administrative infrastructure’ that links laterally 
organizational units, that creates a managerial culture of teamwork, a capacity to change 
and a willingness to share resources across BUs. In construction, Chinowsky and 
Meredith (2000) argue that the way strategic intent (SI) is exhibited and strategic 
architecture (SA) is crafted has important implications, because it establishes a roadmap 
that employees, managers and executives can each look to for guidance in daily and 
long-term decisions. Along those lines, it could be argued that when exhibiting SI and 
crafting SA, organizational leadership should make provisions for: 
� Recognition to be given to BU directors who implement their work with an 
inter-BU collaborative spirit; 
�  Rotating employees across BUs from early on in their career; 
� Tracking and guiding competent managers; 
� Creating ‘communities’ transcending BUs, for individuals whose 
‘competencies’ are closely related to the ‘core competencies’ of the 
organization. 
 
The importance therefore is ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’ to establish a ‘core 
competence mind-set’ (viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6), that will foster inter-BU 
coordination and collaboration at later stages of strategy execution.  
SA should make resource allocation priorities transparent to the entire 
organization, as it is critical for management not only to ‘comprehend’ the objectives 
emanating from the SI exhibited, but also to develop a clear understanding of where the 
resources it will utilize towards that end exist within their organization and how they 
can be obtained. This will create a ‘deft’ environment8  in which organizational 
leadership, management and other employees can pursue corporate objectives in light of 
comprehension (McGrath et al., 1995). 
                                               
7
 Although presented in theory as two distinct activities, in reality, exhibiting strategic intent and crafting 
the strategic architecture to realize it occur simultaneously. Therefore, from now on in the thesis they will 
be considered interdependently. 
8
 Which, as already explained, is a ‘prerequisite’ of organizational competence (viz. Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.3.1) 
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In addition, alignment of ‘individual’ with ‘organizational’ objectives is 
necessary to ensure the alignment of individual-level and organizational-level core 
competencies so that corporate strategies - such as core competence development - can 
be effectively pursued (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 1996; Harari, 1994; Lahti, 1998). 
Consequently, SI and SA have to be exhibited and crafted in a way that ensures the 
objectives of individual employees are aligned with organizational objectives and 
strategies, to create a more co-operative organizational environment in which 
employees can collectively work towards strategy execution. Numerous techniques have 
been developed to link individual with corporate objectives, such as appropriate reward 
systems, clarity of career progression paths and, at more senior management levels, 
leadership development and succession planning programs. The most prominent 
approach is Kaplan and Norton’s (1992, 1996) ‘Balanced Scorecard’, a structured 
method through which organizational objectives are communicated in a way that 
ensures corporate strategy is translated to strategies for individual employees, creating 
personal goals against which the performance of individuals can be monitored. 
In the light of this research’s question, what has been reviewed so far highlights 
that examining ‘the relationship between the configurations ICMs adopt and the 
effectiveness with which they develop their core competencies, requires examining the 
relationship between their configuration and the effectiveness with which they ‘exhibit 
SI and craft SA’. This involves investigating whether: 
� A core competence mindset is developed during that stage of the strategy 
process; 
� Alignment is achieved between corporate objectives and the objectives of 
individual employees; 
 
4.3.2 Regulating Strategic Architecture Implementation 
 
‘Regulating SA implementation’ is inextricably linked with ‘exhibiting SI and 
crafting SA’. Often, in the context of unintended outcomes (Giddens, 1979) emerging 
issues may require an organization to alter its intended strategies (Mintzberg, 1978), 
both on a regular and irregular basis. New strategies might emerge out of necessity to 
respond to external forces acting on the company, or internal efforts of managers to 
adapt in a continuously changing market environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Galbraith, 1973; Peters and Waterman, 1984). In construction, Langford and Male 
(2001) argued that companies demonstrating good strategic management processes have 
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mechanisms that permit strategies to be changed if external or internal circumstances 
necessitate this. Linking this point back to ‘management control’ and ‘cybernetics’ 
theory (viz. Section 4.2), it can be understood that ‘feedback’ mechanisms must exist to 
provide a link between ‘exhibiting strategic intent and crafting strategic architecture’ 
and strategy execution. 
Mintzberg (1979; 1989) observed that companies often set-up management 
information systems (MIS) as a way of gathering, integrating and reporting information 
up the hierarchy. He observed that as information passes through each hierarchical 
level, it is aggregated until finally, it reaches the strategic apex as a broad summary of 
overall organizational performance. In reality, managers at different ‘hierarchical’ levels 
can (and often do) interrupt these flows to make decisions appropriate to their own 
level. Information on exceptional situations that cannot be handled at a given level is 
passed up the hierarchy until it reaches a manager with the necessary formal authority to 
handle them. These information systems serve the purpose of ‘feedback’ mechanisms, 
which allow management to review information and decide on whether and how to 
integrate ‘emerging’ with ‘intended’ strategies, or, abandon intended strategies in favour 
of new ones. In practice, these reviews can range from more ‘strategic’ ones (e.g. 
strategic reviews, annual reviews, investment decisions) to more ‘operational’ ones (e.g. 
monthly reporting and management review processes, project reporting, project 
selection) and from more ‘reflexive’ to more ‘reflective’ ones (Giddens, 1984). 
The issue this section highlights as worthy of examination within the context of 
this research is that of ‘the relationship between the combinations of configurations that 
ICMs adopt and their ability to ‘regulate’ strategic architecture implementation in a 
manner that permits them to change strategies if internal or external circumstances 
necessitate this. In the absence of knowledge about the above, the relationship between 
the combinations of configurations that ICM adopt and the effectiveness with which 
they execute a core competence development strategy - and consequently develop their 
core competencies - cannot be adequately understood. 
 
4.3.3 Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies 
 
As noted in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.2), core competence theory stipulates that 
organizations stretching and leveraging their existing resources and core competencies, 
will manage to develop them quicker and more cost effectively than their competitors 
that do not (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). Javidan (1998) 
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argues that successful stretch and leverage requires an organizational culture that fosters 
and values collaboration and joint thinking, learning and decision making across intra-
organizational boundaries, as well as an organizational environment of ‘trust’ and 
‘respect’, where employees are prepared to learn from each other.  
In Chapter 2 (viz. Sections 2.6 and 2.8), issues related to intra-organizational 
(inter-BU) coordination and resource exchange within ICMs were discussed. It was 
identified that: 
� Inter-BU employee networking leads to greater ‘social interaction’, which could 
lead to greater ‘trust’ and ‘social capital’, leading to better inter-BU 
collaboration (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai, 2000); 
� A ‘horizontal organization’ is required for intra-organizational collaboration to 
take place in the context of multi-BU organizations, such as ICMs (Galbraith, 
1973; Mintzberg, 1979; 1983; 1989; Porter, 1985); 
� Inter-BU employee networks are effective for sourcing and transferring 
knowledge (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Tsai, 2000) and critical competencies. 
� Shared ‘vision’, ‘values’ and ‘norms’ between BUs are positively related to 
resource exchange and combination across BUs (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998); 
 
In addition, the project-based management literature reviewed (e.g. Davies and 
Brady, 2000; Brady and Davies, 2004 and Prencipe and Tell, 2001), highlighted (viz. 
Chapter 2, Section 2.7 and Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.3 and 3.4) that project-based 
organizations, such as ICMs, require ‘knowledge management’ and ‘organizational 
learning’ routines to be effective in leveraging resources and core competencies across 
projects - and potentially BUs. Such routines could allow ICMs to ‘redeploy’ 
knowledge across different projects/organizational contexts. This would enable ICMs to 
overcome the obstacles created by the ‘divisionalization’ inherent in diversified 
configurations, and leverage intra-organizationally the human-dependent, intangible 
element of their core competencies, embedded in the tacit knowledge of their individual 
organizational members.  
In the light of this research’s question, what has been reviewed in this thesis so 
far indicates that examining the relationship between the configurations that ICMs adopt 
and the effectiveness with which they develop their core competencies, requires an 
examination of the relationship between the configurations they adopt and the 
effectiveness with which they stretch and leverage their resources and core 
competencies. Having defined and described core competencies within the context of a 
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multi-BU organization (viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.4), this would involve investigating 
the relationship between the configurations ICMs adopt, and the effectiveness with 
which they: 
� Transfer knowledge across BUs; 
� Mobilize employees across BUs; 
� Replicate routines across BUs; 
� Integrate organizational-level BU-specific competencies. 
 
4.3.4 Improving Business Practices 
  
In the process of developing its core competencies a company will inevitably 
have to re-engineer critical business processes to improve their effectiveness (Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1994 and in construction, Chinowsky and Meredith, 2000). As noted in 
Chapter 1 (viz. Sections 1.3.5 and  1.3.6), organizational learning could lead to changes 
in norms, standard operating procedures, structures and cultures (Lipschitz et al., 2002). 
In a project-based business environment - as the one in which ICMs operate - Brady and 
Davies (2004) recognized that learning through projects is one of the main ways 
through which organizations interact with, and are changed by, their environment. In 
their attempt to capture knowledge and experience gained through projects, some firms 
establish organizational learning mechanisms to systematically collect, analyze, store, 
disseminate and use information (Popper and Lipschitz, 2002). In the absence of such 
mechanisms ‘there is a risk that the knowledge and experience gained is lost when 
projects finish, teams dissolve, and their members move on to other projects or are 
reabsorbed into the organization (Davies and Brady, 2004). 
Beginning with ‘project-based learning’ (Brady and Davies, 2004; Davies and 
Hobday, 2005), knowledge captured at projects can be effectively evaluated by 
management at a BU and corporate levels, leading to reconfigurations of structure and 
practices and re-negotiation of norms. Depending on the relationship between BUs, the 
corporate-centre and other BUs, these changes could be applied corporate-wide through 
‘business led learning’ (viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.1). Consequently, for an 
organization to effectively develop its core competencies, organizational routines have 
to exist that capture innovations and knowledge created at the project level, as well as 
an organizational structure with ‘functioning’ characteristics that allow these 
innovations and knowledge to be evaluated,  disseminated and redeployed corporate-
wide (Figure 4.4). 
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In the case of ICMs, which exhibit structural properties of project-based 
organizations, understanding how changes in business processes, management practices 
and organizational routines takes place is made particularly complex by the uniqueness 
of projects (Hobday, 2000; Davies and Hobday, 2005). Although the development of 
effective routines can lead to the development of long-term project capabilities, 
embedding change is difficult (Bresnen et al., 2005). As it often interferes with (or is 
seen to interfere with) project management practices and can potentially disrupt the 
existing organizational power/knowledge balance. As a result, the examination of the 
influence configurations ICMs adopt exerts on the organizational routines through 
which they improve their business practices could provide insights related to the 
influence their configurations exert on the effectiveness with which they develop their 
core competencies.  
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4.3.5 Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
 
Prahalad (1993) argued that the critical role of management and organizational 
leadership in core competence development, is to create the capacity to stretch and 
leverage corporate resources. It becomes therefore evident that the role of organizational 
leadership to act upon multiple responsibilities, as entrepreneur and resource allocator 
(Chandler, 1962), creator of structural context (Bower, 1970), establisher of standard 
operating procedures and resolver of conflict (Cyert and March, 1963; 1992) and 
finally, creator of purpose and challenger of status-quo (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993), is 
crucial to the effective execution of a core competence development strategy. To do this 
in the context of ICMs, management and organizational leadership should be competent 
in managing inter-BU ‘relationships’, to actualize the latent economic potential of 
related diversification9. Leadership therefore should comprehend inter-BU ‘social 
network’ relationships and utilize the social capital of the organisation by putting 
personal social networks of individuals to work for the organisation’s benefit (Burt, 
1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998)10. 
 Along those lines, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) proposed that leadership 
development needs to evolve to a level of contribution whereby it is considered an 
investment in the ‘social capital’ of the organisation. Mehra, Dixon, Brass and 
Robertson (2006) found that differences in leaders’ social networks were related to 
differences in the economic performance of their organizations11.  
Availability of such individuals could reduce ‘instability’, and lead to higher 
organizational performance, highlighting the value of managerial and leadership 
availability in smooth leadership transitions (Rothwell, 2006). This brings forward the 
significance of professional development, succession planning and leadership 
development programs, which apart from being formal training functions, could also be 
informal functions facilitating the socialisation of promising managers across BUs and 
into the corporate upper echelons, by12: 
                                               
9
 Viz. Chapter 2, Section 2.8 
10
 The importance of organizational leadership’s social capital links back to the work of Helfat and 
Peteraf (2003) on ‘capability development’ (viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.3)  
11
 This brings forward the important of a ‘relational’ model of leadership (Drath and Palus, 1994), at the 
heart of which are commitments in the form of ‘mutual obligations’, which are supported by reciprocated 
trust and respect (Brower, Schoorman and Tan, 2000). 
12
 In a cross-case comparison of four international construction majors, Zoiopoulos et al. (2008) 
compared the systems four ICMs have in place for leadership development and observed that the earlier 
their involvement in an employee’s career and the more centralized the strategy for the coordination 
across BUs, the greater the social capital developed between employees and the greatest the level of trust 
between employees from different BUs. 
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� Assuring intra-organizational mix of management and leadership; 
� Focusing on ‘social capital’ component formation, critical in the global team-
based mechanisms that need to enable and coordinate the influence of specific 
‘relational’ capabilities (potentially competencies and core competencies). 
 
Within the context of this research therefore, managerial and leadership 
development emphasizes ‘social capital’ development resting on a foundation of 
‘interpersonal’ competencies, built in social networks’, on a foundation of ‘mutual trust 
and respect’ (Drath, 2000; McCawley, 2000).  
The focus of this research is on ‘organizational-level’ core competence 
development, not ‘individual-level core competence’ (ILCC) development, except 
insofar as how the latter influences the development of the former. Thus, this research is 
not interested in investigating how ICMs develop the ILCCs of their employees, but 
rather how they maintain and increase the capacity of a specific ‘pool’ of human 
resources within their organization, containing the individuals capable of shaping 
organizational strategy and influencing the development and deployment of core 
competencies. Along those lines, addressing this research’s question requires 
investigating the relationship between the configurations that ICMs adopt and the 
effectiveness with which they develop their managerial and organizational leadership 
capacity. 
 
4.4 Controlling Core Competence Development: Issues and the Research Question 
 
This chapter has so far proposed that core competence development can be 
effectively controlled through the following five generic, corporate-level activities: 
� Exhibiting strategic intent and crafting strategic architecture; 
� Regulating strategic architecture implementation; 
� Stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies; 
� Improving business practices; 
� Developing managerial and organizational leadership capacity. 
 
To address this research’s question - that is, ‘how do the configurations that 
ICMs adopt influence the effectiveness with which they execute a core competence 
development strategy’ - the influence of the ICMs’ configuration on the effectiveness 
with which they conduct each of the activities should be examined. However, effective 
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core competence development does not only depend on the effectiveness with which the 
corporate-level activities are conducted in isolation, but also on the effectiveness with 
which they are conducted collectively. This is related to the extent that 
‘interrelationships’ between them are actively managed, which in turn determines the 
extent to which they are integrated into a comprehensive corporate strategy, under the 
responsibility of a cohort of BU heads working horizontally across the organisation 
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1994)13. What this entails regarding their interdependencies can 
be better understood with the help of Figure 4.5.  
In light of the above, it is proposed that in order to address this research’s 
question, an appropriate methodology to collect and analyze data should be developed 
to examine how the combinations of configurations that ICMs adopt influence the 
effectiveness with which they conduct the five, corporate-level, core competence 
development activities and manage their interrelationships. Such a methodology will 
also produce results that will contribute to our knowledge regarding the following 
issues:  
� What is the relationship between the configurations that ICMs adopt and: 
- The development of corporate strategies with optimal potential for effective 
implementation; 
- The effectiveness with which they integrate emerging with intended 
strategies when externally or internally generated circumstances necessitate 
this; 
- The effective intra-organisational (inter-BU) stretching and leveraging of 
resources and core competencies; 
- Effective organizational learning, which may lead to the reconfiguration of 
their social practices, structural properties and the re-negotiation of their 
organizational norms; 
- The effectiveness with which they can develop their managerial and 
organisational leadership capacity; 
- The effectiveness with which core competence development can be 
controlled by a cohort of BU heads working horizontally across the 
organization. 
                                               
13
 ‘Interrelationships’, within that context, refer to how integrated the core competence development 
activities are, not how ‘integrated’ the distinct BUs of the ICM are. Therefore, interrelationships relate 
with how ICMs economize on resources when implementing the corporate-level, core competence 
development activities, by ensuring that they are individually conducted in line with corporate objectives 
set-out in the SI exhibited and the SA crafted. 
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Interrelationships 
 
� SI is exhibited and SA crafted in a manner that all five 
activities are integrated into a comprehensive strategy 
under the responsibility of a cohort of executives working 
horizontally across the organization (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1994); 
� Routines through which resources and core competencies 
are stretched and leveraged are integrated with: 
� Feedback mechanisms (Beer, 1959; Berry et al., 1995) 
for ‘regulating strategic architecture implementation’; 
� Routines that allow ‘self reflective’ (Giddens, 1984) 
organizational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978) that 
may lead to revising standard operating procedures 
(Cyert and March, 1965; 1992; March, 1991) and re-
negotiation of organizational norms (Cameron and 
Quinn, 2005) in line with ‘improving business 
practices’ as a function of experiential learning; 
� Routines that allow management and organizational 
leadership to develop intra-personal competencies and 
social capital built on the participation in social 
networks and an environment that fosters joint 
thinking, collaboration, trust and a willingness to learn 
from others (Penrose, 1959; 1995; Javidan, 1998). 
Figure 4.5: Interrelationships between Activities 
Exhibiting Strategic Intent and Crafting Strategic Architecture 
Regulating Strategic Architecture Implementation 
Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies 
Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
 
Improving Business Practices 
                                                   Source: Author Generated 
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In the absence of knowledge about these issues, the relationship between the 
ICM’s configurations on the one hand, and effective core competence development on 
the other, cannot be adequately understood. Therefore, no suggestions could be made to 
improve their performance. Addressing these issues will contribute to our knowledge 
regarding the ‘gaps’ in core competence theory identified in Chapter 1, Sections 1.5-
1.6.1.  
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has fused ‘cybernetics’ and ‘management control’ theories with the 
theory reviewed and developed at earlier parts of this thesis, to propose five generic, 
corporate-level activities through which the development of core competencies is 
effectively controlled. The purpose from this point on becomes one of developing and 
implementing a research methodology to collect and analyze data from ICMs related to 
the routines through which they conduct each of these activities, linking them back to 
the ICMs’ configuration. In light of this, the following chapter will present and describe 
the methodology through which this research was conducted. 
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Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
 
‘One must learn how to distinguish the unintelligible truth behind the observable 
illusion’ 
 
        Milan Kundera 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter describes the methodology through which this research was 
undertaken. First, why critical realism was adopted as an epistemological approach is 
explained. This is followed by an explanation of why it was decided to use a qualitative 
research method and a case-study strategy. Subsequently, the process through which the 
research was conducted will be described, starting from how the companies were 
chosen, the techniques used to collect and analyze data and the display formats 
constructed to present them at the case studies and their cross-case comparison. The 
Chapter will conclude by explaining why the methodology is appropriate for this 
research’s explanatory and exploratory nature. 
 
5.2 Choosing the Epistemological Approach 
 
A number of philosophical approaches exist regarding what constitutes 
knowledge, its value and the validity of how it has been created. The most widely used 
in management research are positivism, empiricism and realism (Griseri, 2002). 
Positivism claims to be objective yet embodies an underlying ‘normative’ approach in 
the form of values and idealised models that are conceptually or theoretically ‘value-
laden’ (Krige, 1979; Sayer, 1992; Smyth et al., 2006). Empiricism has been argued as 
being inappropriate in clearly identifying causal processes and hence provide 
explanations (May, 2003). Causes can be identified inductively if that is recognized as 
possible, but identification tends to be linear.  Recognising other factors (usually 
contextual) can inhibit identification of causes where context is not seen as a legitimate 
104 
 
research object. Both positivism and empiricism therefore, are not appropriate for the 
purpose of this research1.  
‘Realism’ has as one of its major objectives to identify the underlying structural 
mechanisms of everyday social life, such as the interactions between people and the 
mechanisms that make those possible in the first place (Collier 1994, Sayer, 1999; May, 
2003). Explanations depend on identifying local mechanisms and how they work in 
practice, and discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions. It also 
recognizes processes and context (Sayer, 1999). Thus, realism is more appropriate to 
‘recognize the complexity of reality’ (Smyth et al., 2006) and facilitate an analysis of 
causation (Sayer, 1999).  
 A branch of realism - the two are frequently, and wrongly, conflated (Smyth et 
al., 2006) - that has enjoyed a particular boost in social sciences with the works of 
Bhaskar (1975) is ‘critical realism’. Critical realism distinguishes not only the world 
and our experience of it, but between the ‘real’, the ‘actual’ and the ‘empirical’, 
defining these in a special way (Bhaskar, 1975). When the critical realists refers to the 
real this is not in order to claim privileged knowledge of it, but to note two things. First, 
the real is whatever exists, be it natural or social, regardless of whether it is an empirical 
object and whether we happen to have an adequate understanding of its nature. Second, 
the real contains the realm of ‘objects’, their ‘structures’ and ‘powers’. Whether the 
objects are ‘physical’, like minerals, or ‘social’, like bureaucracies, they have certain 
structures and causal powers, that is, capacities to behave in particular ways, and causal 
liabilities or passive powers, that is, specific susceptibilities to certain kinds of change. 
Critical realism emphasizes the importance of identifying and examining these 
‘structures’ and ‘powers’ (Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, 1999; Smyth et al., 2006).  
 The strength of the critical realist approach is its ability to deal with causality 
and complexity in context (Smyth and Morris, 2007). This aligns with the path 
dependent nature of core competencies, their evolutionary nature and the evolutionary 
                                                             
1
 In addition to ‘positivism’ and ‘empiricism’, two more approaches were briefly considered but rejected, 
namely ‘subjectivism’ and ‘constructivism’. Subjectivism is the doctrine that all knowledge is limited to 
experiences by the self and that transcendent knowledge is impossible. As a result, adopting such an 
approach here would not allow making generalizations and drawing conclusions applicable across 
different contexts. Constructivism holds that knowledge comprises ‘mental’ constructs that have emerged 
in the attempt to explain sensory experience and - similarly to subjectivism - that ‘meaning’ and 
‘knowledge’ are human constructions. However, this approach holds that concepts stemming from two 
different social formations are entirely different and incommensurate. Along those lines, it is impossible 
to make comparative judgments from two different contexts. This approach is at odds with the objectives 
of this research and therefore inappropriate to be applied here. The argument developed here does not 
insinuate that subjectivism and constructivism are epistemological approaches of lesser significance than 
positivism, empiricism and realism. On the contrary, they constitute major streams of human reasoning. 
However, they are not appropriate to examine the issues that this research addresses. 
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change of ICMs as organizations, as well as with the ‘contingency’ notion that is 
inherent in the concept of the organizational configuration. Consequently, it was 
decided that critical realism is the most closely aligned with this research’s demands. 
The ICMs are organizational social systems with ‘structures’ and ‘powers’, that is, 
capacities to behave in different ways. The purpose of this research is to collect data in 
order to identify their structures and their particular behaviour, manifested in their 
organization-specific routines. From these, it aspires to draw conclusions, as to their 
capacity to allow core competencies to emerge. Critical realism will facilitate the 
development of a methodology that will assist in identifying these organizational issues.  
 
5.3 Choosing Between a Quantitative and a Qualitative Research Method 
 
There has been an extensive debate over the use of research methods in social 
science, with the two opposing views being quantitative and qualitative methods. This 
debate has also heated up among construction management researchers (Seymour and 
Rooke, 1995; Seymour et al., 1997; Rooke et al., 1997; Runeson, 1997; Harris, 1998; 
Wing et al., 1998; Raftery et al., 1997) but has not been conclusive. The approach 
adopted in this research is that the choice of method should be determined depending on 
the type of research question to be answered. 
Quantitative research is characterised by the development of hypotheses drawn 
out of a literature review and are subsequently tested. Typically, statistical analysis is 
used to produce research findings (Fellows and Liu, 1997; Amaratunga et al., 2001). 
This research method is popular in positivism and for some empiricist approaches. 
Qualitative research is often used for the exploration of a subject area in which 
only a limited amount of ‘objective’ knowledge exists. Therefore, the nature of 
qualitative research is often ‘explanatory’ and ‘exploratory’, with the aim to gather and 
analyse information from which new knowledge can be produced. Qualitative research 
is sometimes referred to as ‘hypothesis generating’ as it often needs to precede 
quantitative research (Fellows and Liu, 1997; Amaratunga et al., 2001).  
This research was of an exploratory and complex nature. Consequently, the use 
of quantitative research methods would not make it possible to significantly further the 
knowledge already existing in the domain. Qualitative research fits well with the study 
of areas where little knowledge exists. This is the case in this research, which aspires to 
gather and investigate data from a construction context, from which we can further our 
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knowledge in unexplored and under-developed areas of core competence theory. It was 
decided therefore that a ‘qualitative research’ method would be adopted.  
 
5.4 Choosing a Research Strategy 
 
Critical realism is compatible with a relatively wide range of research strategies 
but implies particular choices should depend on the nature of the study object and what 
is to be learnt about it (Sayer, 1999; Smyth et al., 2006). An in-depth examination of 
organizations such as ICMs calls for a research strategy that allows in-depth 
examination of ‘contexts’, as well as their comparison for any potential replication of 
findings. Case studies provide such an in-depth, longitudinal examination of a single 
context, as they rely on multiple sources of evidence to add breadth and depth to data 
collection (Yin, 2003). As a result, a case study strategy enables the researcher to gain a 
sharpened understanding of why an ‘instance’ or ‘event’ happened as it did, and what 
might be important to look at more extensively in future research. The case study 
strategy has a particular advantage when ‘a how or why question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control’ (Yin, 
1994: 9). Such was the case of this research. 
In addition, this research’s exploratory character requires contrasting and 
comparing across cases to take place, for generalizations to be made and conclusions to 
be drawn that can be potentially theory-building, contributing thus to our knowledge 
regarding the gaps in core competence theory and the construction strategic 
management domain, which have been identified in Chapter 1 (viz. Sections 1.5-1.6.1). 
Consequently, a ‘multiple case study’ strategy was considered to be the most 
appropriate. Multiple case studies have been extensively used in management research 
(Chandler, 1962; Mintzberg, 1978; Peters and Waterman, 1984; Pettigrew, 1988), as 
well as research related to project-based management (e.g. Morris and Hough, 1987; 
Miller and Lessard, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2006). They can simultaneously involve ‘multiple 
sources of data’ with highly synergistic effects (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989) and assist 
in addressing a broader range of ‘historical’, ‘attitudinal’ and ‘behavioural’ issues to 
achieve the development of a converging line of inquiry (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
This research is of an ‘exploratory’ and ‘explanatory’ nature and has elements of 
theory building (cf. Glazer and Strauss, 1967) from case-based fieldwork, in addition to 
theory building from the literature and conceptual analysis.  The literature and 
conceptual analysis has led to the creation and development of integrative theoretical 
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frameworks, which allow new conceptualizations regarding core competencies and their 
development to be made - within the context of ICMs in particular and multi-BU 
organizations in general. The fieldwork’s intent is to test this conceptualization, which 
may or may not be overthrown or refined.  Within that context, the purpose of the 
individual case studies is more ‘explanatory’, as its purpose is to describe the ICMs’ 
‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics and organizational routines through which 
core competence development activities (viz. Chapter 4) take place. The cross-case 
comparison is of a more detailed-level theory-building nature, as it is the part of the 
research where the potential ‘causal links’ between the ICMs’ configurations and the 
effectiveness with which they execute core competence development can be identified. 
 
5.5 Case Study Design 
 
 This section sets the boundaries for the cases studied and describes the process 
of their selection. Exploratory research projects are often theory building, relying on 
theoretical sampling where cases are chosen for theoretical not statistical reasons 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 1990). For example, Chandler (1962) 
conducted case studies of four major US companies to identify how their structure 
evolved as they diversified. In the ‘management of projects’ field, Morris and Hough 
(1987) chose one mega-project representative from each of a number of industries, to 
infer conclusions on the management of projects in general. 
This research’s sampling ‘logic’ draws from Grounded Theory and particularly 
the methods of Corbin and Strauss (1990). They argue that when a research project 
begins, the researcher brings to it some ideas of the phenomenon s/he wants to study. 
Based on these ideas, organizations - as in the case of this research - representative of 
that phenomenon can be selected for study. In this research, the intent was to choose 
and study companies that would constitute an adequately diverse sample of ICMs to 
allow the review and comparison of their practices, in order to infer useful conclusions 
about i) how they conduct specific, corporate-level activities related to core competence 
development, ii) why they do so and iii) how is their behaviour related to the 
organizational configuration each has adopted. Consequently, defining the boundaries 
of a ‘case’ becomes necessary. 
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5.5.1 Case Study Boundaries 
  
 Defining the case study boundaries brings to the forefront the importance of 
defining the ‘unit of analysis’ of this research. Precise definition at this stage would 
streamline efforts of collecting and analyzing data during research implementation 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). Since this thesis is interested in how 
organizational configurations of ICMs effectively ‘execute’ a core competence 
development strategy, the unit of analysis becomes the generic, corporate-level 
activities for strategy execution. These have been identified in Chapter 4 as i) exhibiting 
strategic intent and crafting strategic architecture, ii) regulating strategic architecture 
implementation, iii) stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies, iv) 
improving business practices and v) developing managerial and organizational 
leadership capacity. 
 These generic, corporate-level activities are implemented - in practice - within a 
contextual ‘setting’. Each organizational setting refers to one ICM. The unit of analysis 
being the ‘execution of a core competence development strategy’ and the ‘setting’ the 
organization executing that strategy within its environment, an additional parameter had 
to be used to describe the type of organizational setting that this research studied. Along 
these lines, it was decided that the ICMs studied here would be large, internationally 
diversified construction groups, with characteristics - in theory - as those have been 
described in Chapter 22. 
 
5.5.2 Data Collection 
 
Two methods for this type of research were considered and rejected. The first 
was ‘participant observation’. This method was rejected because - within the scope of 
this research - it was unlikely that the researcher would have been able to gain any 
adequate insight or overview of the processes studied across a number of ICMs. The 
second method rejected was ‘pure observation’. This method was rejected due to the 
perceived commercial sensitivity of strategic management related issues of ICMs. It was 
identified early on during the effort made to contact ICMs that they were unwilling to 
reveal information that may reduce market competitiveness (misguidedly because of 
difficulty of emulating core competencies).  
                                                             
2
 Viz. also Chapter 1, Section 1.6.1, regarding  the choice of organizational context to be studied. 
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It was decided to collect data on ICMs primarily through interviews, in which 
the main issues to be discussed would be drawn from the theoretical constructs 
developed during the literature review stages of this research. In addition, the intent 
existed to be able to examine the behaviour of ICMs within their own historical and 
evolutionary context. For that reason, it was decided that prior to conducting interviews 
with ICM employees, a desk-study would be undertaken for each ICM, whose purpose 
would be to map its evolutionary profile for a number of years prior to the beginning of 
this research3. 
Multiple data sources were used to increase reliability and internal validity 
(Sayer, 1999; Yin, 2003) of the study. In addition, a ‘case study protocol’ was created to 
control the process4. The protocol is desirable under all circumstances, but it is essential 
when conducting a multiple case study because it helps target on the subject and foresee 
problems (Yin, 2003). 
 
5.5.3 Case Selection  
 
 For exploratory and potentially theory-building research projects, Eisenhardt 
(1989) suggests that while there is no ideal number of cases, a number between 4 and 10 
usually works well. She argued that with fewer than four cases it is often difficult to 
generate theory with much complexity and its empirical grounding is likely to be 
unconvincing, unless each case has several mini-cases within it, whereas with more than 
10 cases it quickly becomes difficult to cope with the complexity and volume of the 
data. Due to the exploratory nature of this research and the breadth of issues it 
simultaneously examines, it was decided to limit the scope of this research to four case 
studies and their cross-case comparison.  
 To find the most appropriate cases of ICMs to be studied, the research started 
from an initial pool of companies from which the cases could be chosen. The most 
widely accepted publicly available list of international construction majors is published 
annually by the Engineering News Record (ENR). The ENR, publishes annually two 
lists: i) the top 225 global contractors and ii) the top 225 international contractors. Both 
                                                             
3
 Choosing specific data collection methods specifies what constitutes ‘data’ for the purpose of this 
research. This is what gives the research its qualitative nature and distinguishes it from the Grounded 
Theory methodology (Glazer and Strauss, 1967; Glazer, 1978; 1998) where the dictum ‘all is data’ holds. 
4
 See Appendix 5.1. 
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provide information on turnover and market share with respect to the regions and 
markets that companies are active in5.  
 The initial criteria set to formulate the boundaries of the sample group, 
stipulated that the ICMs studied must: 
� Have been in the list of ‘ENR’s 225 Top International or Top Global 
Contractors’ for the last five years in a row; 
� Follow a strategy of related diversification within the construction industry6; 
� Be internationalized in at least two geographical regions of the world; 
� Have - at the time that this research began - a turnover in excess of $1billion. 
 
 Being included in ENR’s lists for five years in a row would suggest an ICM has 
a long-standing position in its markets and would therefore ensure the ICMs chosen 
were companies with a history that would have allowed strategy execution routines to 
have developed. The criterion of following a strategy of related diversification was 
considered important, as core competence development involves inter-BU coordination 
and therefore the study of companies that have adopted specific configurations to 
coordinate related BUs is relevant here. The criterion of ‘operating in at least two 
geographic regions of the world’ was included, as it was desirable to identify and study 
core competence development routines transcending national boundaries. This selection 
criterion was intended to exclude ICMs that would not have had to capture and 
disseminate ‘market-specific’ knowledge obtained through experiential learning during 
internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 2003). Finally, the threshold of 
$1billion turnover was applied to select companies of a scale where economies (or 
diseconomies) of scope arise and provide the opportunity for inter-BU coordination 
issues to be examined. 
 The advantage of studying ICMs from different national origins are that 
common findings can be generalised and differences point to features that are context 
specific. The initial sample pool was rather heterogeneous, achieving the highest degree 
of potential generalization. It was practically too large and was reduced, yet within the 
range advised by Eisenhardt (1989). The next step was therefore to start approaching 
companies from the initial list and determining, which would be willing to participate in 
the research. 
                                                             
5
 Though the accuracy of ENR’s data is disputed by some, the lists are widely considered as providing 
adequate information on the companies’ scale of operation, activities and overall standing in the market. 
6
 Viz. Chapter 2, Section 2.4 
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 Approaching the companies started by trying to find influential individuals from 
the ‘pre-qualified’ ICMs. Letters of introduction were initially sent to such individuals 
from three ICMs in January 20067. One ICM wished to further engage with the research 
project and a series of interviews were set-up to take place in the following months. A 
paper presented at the ASCE Leadership in Construction and Engineering conference 
(Zoiopoulos et al., 2006) drew the attention of a research group based at Stanford 
University, the Colaboratory for Research on Global Project (CRGP), which agreed to 
set-up interviews with US-based ICMs. After a five to six month period of planning and 
preparation, a series of interviews with senior executives were scheduled with three 
ICMs, to take place at their US headquarters. The interviews took place between mid-
October and late November 2007. As those events unfolded, a Middle Eastern ICM and 
an ICM of Cypriot-Greek origin exhibited the interest to be included in the research. By 
March 2008, a series of interviews was scheduled with the latter, which took place over 
the summer that year8.  
 Completing the interviews with the Cypriot-Greek ICM, data had been gathered 
on three ICMs from the US and two from Europe, a total of five. It was determined 
during the later stage of data analysis that the data collected for one of the five ICMs 
where not sufficient for it to be included in the study9. It was therefore decided to 
proceed with the analysis of the remaining four. The total number of ICMs satisfied the 
number of case studies sufficient for exploratory research (Eisenhardt, 1989; 2000) and 
provided a relatively diverse yet internally comparable sample. Figure 5.1 depicts the 
timeline of the case-study work10. Table 5.1 provides a brief description of each ICM 
studied  and  the ‘pseudonym’  used   for  the purpose of this research, as confidentiality  
 
                                                             
7
 See Appendix 5.2. 
8
 The interviews were conducted at the offices of the companies studied. Unavoidably, time was spent 
with employees of the companies outside the interview sessions. This may create the impression that the 
research has elements of participant observation and perhaps ethnography. This, however, is not the case. 
The interaction between the researcher and the interviewees was limited to the time spent during the 
actual interviews. The existence of ‘ethnographic’ elements may be stronger than the participant 
observation ones - through in reality negligible - as the time spent with the interviewees was strictly used 
to discuss pre-defined themes, which were by and large repeated across interviews. 
9
 Though not included, the work undertaken for this fifth ICM served as a ‘shadow’ case, which helped 
the researcher developing his understanding. First, it provided useful insights which helped clarify the 
conceptual boundaries of this research within the mind of the researcher. Second, it helped the researcher 
refine his research skills - particularly related to data collection through interviews. Finally, it assisted in 
shaping the boundaries of what constitutes a case-study for the purpose of this research, making the 
remaining case studies a ‘sample’ which was more uniform and internally comparable. 
10
 This timeline also demonstrates a clear distinction between the qualitative research strategy adopted in 
this research and that of Grounded Theory. In Grounded Theory (Glazer and Strauss, 1967; Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990), data collection and analysis are interrelated processes and analysis begins as soon as the 
first bit of data is collected. In this research, the majority - if not all - of the data was collected prior to 
beginning the systematic analysis. 
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Table 5.1: Description of ICMs 
Aegean Group Albion plc Pacifico 
Corporation 
Cyclone 
Corporation 
 
A leading international 
building, 
civil and electro-
mechanical construction 
services group, also 
active in property and 
infrastructure 
development, with an 
annual turnover in excess 
of $1 billion, operating in 
11 countries straddling 
South Eastern Europe, 
North and East Africa 
and the Middle East and 
employing directly 
around 5000 people. 
 
An internationally 
diversified 
construction 
services and 
investment business 
with a turnover 
close to £10bn, 
valued at £1.7bn 
and operating in the 
United Kingdom, 
Continental Europe, 
the United States, 
South America, 
North Africa, 
Middle East and 
Asia/Pacific 
regions, employing 
around 50,000 
people. 
 
The corporation 
provides 
engineering, 
construction, 
systems and 
resource integration, 
project/program 
management, and 
environmental 
services to a wide 
range of global 
customers. It is a 
multinational 
company with 2,500 
clients and 8,000 
projects worldwide, 
a turnover close to 
$3 billion, operating 
in 50 US states and 
80 foreign countries, 
with more than 
11,500 employees. 
 
 
The corporation 
provides 
engineering, 
construction 
procurement and/or 
project/program 
management 
services, has an 
annual turnover in 
excess of 
$13billion, 
operates out of 25 
offices in as many 
countries and 
employs directly 
approximately 
25,000 people. 
 
Figure 5.1: Case-Study Work Timeline 
Jan’  
letters 
sent to 
three 
ICMs 
 
Mar’ to Dec’ 
Interviews 
conducted 
within one 
ICM 
(i)Pilot Case 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Beginning of Analysis and 
Write-up 
 
ASCE 
Conference 
 
Interviews arranged 
with 3 ICMs in the 
US 
(ii, iii, iv), (iv) being 
the ‘Shadow’ case 
 
Oct’ and Nov’  
Interviews 
conducted with the 
ICMs 
 
Oct’: Middle Eastern and Cypriot­
Greek ICMs exhibited interest 
Jun’ and Jul’ 
Interviews 
conducted 
with Cypriot­
Greek ICM 
(v) 
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agreements were signed with all ICM as a pre-requisite for their participation in the 
study11. 
 
5.6 Data Collection: The Desk Study  
 
 The historical context of ICMs assists in understanding their present 
configurations (Miles  and  Huberman,  1994;  May, 2003).   Therefore,  desk   studies   
of   the   ICMs  were conducted to map their ‘evolutionary profiles’ focusing on a ten-
year period prior to the beginning of this research. Ten years represent a time-period 
slightly greater than a full economic cycle of 7 years (Gruneberg and Ive, 2000). 
Therefore, they constitute a time-frame within which a successful - in terms of survival 
- company can be observed for ‘transformation’ purposes. In addition, the time-frame is 
not too long for the researcher to run the risk of considering data that are irrelevant to 
the organization’s present state, and not too short so that path dependency issues can be 
identified and how the organization came to be to its present state can be adequately 
understood.The intention, was for the evolutionary profiles to provide the following 
information: 
� How the ‘structural’ characteristics of each ICM and the ‘roles’ it had adopted 
in the production of the built environment had evolved during the last eight to 
ten years; 
� A reflection on each ICM’s current practices; 
� A time-ordered overview of each ICM’s strategic intents, the strategic 
architecture to achieve those, as well as insights on how it stretched and 
leveraged its resources; 
� An indication of the core competencies the ICMs had developed and the 
dynamic capabilities they deployed to continuously transform them. 
 
 To be able to construct such evolutionary profiles, publicly available data were 
gathered for each ICM for a ten-year period prior to the interview date, such as: i) 
company archival records, ii) published documents (annual reports, investors’ reports) 
and iii) other documents published in the press. In publicly listed companies annual 
reports were available on the web. For private companies the focus shifted on gathering 
                                                             
11
 In retrospect - and linking back to Section 5.5 - it should be recognized that the sampling logic adopted 
and the ICMs ultimately chosen, stemmed also from reasons of practicality. 
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documents publicly available in the press, from which an image of their evolutionary 
profile could be built. 
 Finally, the evolutionary profiling was intended to provide vital background 
information that could be used to transform generic theory-based constructs into topics 
for discussion in company-specific interviews. 
 
5.7 Data Collection: The Interviews 
 
 There is a wide range of question-types that can be asked to interviewees. May 
(2003) distinguishes between three generic types of interviews: i) structured, ii) semi-
structured and iii) unstructured/focused interviews. The structured interview method 
permits greater ‘comparability’ between responses relying upon a uniform structure, and 
might be appropriate when the primary objective is to identify similarities and 
differences across various contexts (May, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 1994). However, 
such interviews might not be the most appropriate for an exploratory case-study 
research intending to identify underlying and unobservable structures and mechanisms. 
Unstructured interviews on the other hand are said to have the ability to challenge the 
preconceptions of the researcher, as well as enable the interviewee to answer questions 
within their own frame of reference, by allowing the person being interviewed to talk 
freely about the topic. Unstructured interviews, however, are not appropriate to exploit 
the ‘analytic’ benefits of the theoretical concepts developed for the purpose of this 
research. 
It was decided that the most appropriate interview type was that of ‘semi-
structured’ interviews. In semi-structured interviews, questions are normally specified, 
but the interviewer is freer to probe beyond the answers in a manner that would appear 
prejudicial to the aims of some standardization and comparability. The ability of the 
interviewer to seek both clarification and elaboration on the answers given enables a 
dialogue with the interviewee and allows people to answer more on their own terms 
than the standardized interview permits - providing still a greater depth and richness for 
comparability over that of the focused interview (Rubin and Rubin, 1995; May, 2003). 
In addition, the data gathered would not only embrace subjectivity of perceptions of 
inside experts, but also be tested against internal consistency and against the mapping of 
external data sources gathered through the evolutionary profiling of the desk study. 
115 
 
 With this research’s primary question and the theory reviewed and developed in 
Chapters 1-4 as a starting point, a list of subject areas and questions to be discussed with 
interviewees was formed12. The intention was to keep the list: 
� Broad and generic enough to be transferable across construction markets;  
� Broad and generic enough to be relevant across different organizations; 
� Specific enough to be compatible with the nature of construction work. 
 
The interviews were conducted with senior executives of the companies studied. 
The fact that the interviewees were people in key executive positions of their 
organization was suitable, because it provided insights on practices transcending 
organizational units. Table 5.2 shows the number of interviewees per case, their initials 
and their hierarchical position (excluding Bechtel, the ICM that did not become part of 
this research). 48 interviews were conducted (9 with Aegean, 8 with Albion, 11 with 
Pacifico, 12 with Cyclone and 8 with senior executives of Bechtel).  
Initially, the purpose was for one interview to focus on identifying the general 
‘functioning’ and ‘structural’ characteristics of the ICM studied, as well as the 
‘horizontal organization’ set-up to coordinate and integrate their distinct, yet related, 
BUs. Then, five more interviews were to be conducted, each focusing on each one of 
the five generic, corporate-level activities respectively. In each of these interviews, 
interviewees were asked to describe: 
� The organization-specific routines through which the generic activities are 
implemented within the ICM s/he was employed; 
� The general ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics of the ICM and how 
they influenced the implementation of the activity; 
� The ‘horizontal organization’ set-up in the ICM and how this influenced the 
implementation of the activity; 
 
Due to scheduling constraints of the interviewees, interviews of the first case 
were completed before any other case studies were initiated (viz. Figure 5.1). 
Unintentionally, ‘Albion plc’ acted as a ‘pilot’ study for the following ones and enabled 
the refinement of the data collection method, as is typical for exploratory research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003)13. 
 
                                                             
12
 See. Appendix 5.1. 
13
 See Appendix 5.4.  
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Table 5.2: ICMs, Interviewees and their Position14 
ICM Interviewee Initials and Position 
 
Aegean 
 
NG: Regional Vice President of the Board of Directors and member of regional  
       executive management team 
KK: Regional Chief Executive Officer 
GG: Regional Procurement Director 
KH: Managing Director of Real Estate and Development BU 
BH: Managing Director of PPP/PFI Concessions BU 
GS: Regional Director of ‘Pursuing and Securing Projects’ Function 
IK: Regional Director of Human Resources 
NS: Director of Regional Construction Division (Building) 
                                                                                                                              Total: 8 Interviews 
 
Albion 
 
JK: Corporate Director of Succession Planning 
DV: Corporate Director of Strategic Planning and Development 
IN: Corporate Director of Risk and Opportunity Management 
AS: Director of Internal Audit 
PS: Corporate Director of Knowledge Management 
PP: Commercial BU Director 
AMcN: BU Managing Director (Civil Engineering Construction) 
JF: BU Managing Director (Infrastructure Services) 
TS: Director of Corporate Communications 
Total: 9 Interviews 
 
Pacifico 
 
TW: SVP, GBU Business Development Director 
MH: SVP, GBU Operations Director 
MZ: SVP, GBU Finance Director 
DR: VP, GBU Human Resources Director 
GB: GBU Procurement Director 
MN: Manager, Project Controls 
BS: SVP, Division Director 
ER: SVP, International Division Director 
TP: VP and GBU Engineering Director  
JS: VP, GBU Director Construction 
MT: Manager, International Construction Manager 
TL: Division Director 
Total: 12 Interviews 
 
Cyclone 
PF: BU Managing Director 
RA: SVP, Construction and Procurement Director 
LJ: VP, Strategy and Sourcing Management 
JMcK: VP, Construction and Procurement 
JMcQ: VP, Technology Strategies and Knowledge Management 
LB: VP, Corporate Accounts 
PM: Project Execution Services 
WH: Senior Director, Operations and Maintenance 
DS: Corporate Engineering Manager 
CS: SVP, Upstream Operations, Energy and Chemicals 
KS: SVP, Government Services 
PF: SVP, Managing Director, Infrastructure 
Total: 12 Interviews 
 
 The interviews lasted on average around one hour and were recorded so that 
they could be later transcribed. The senior executives interviewed were selected on the 
basis of their knowledge regarding the topic each interview addressed. For example, 
when the issue of ‘people development’ was addressed, a senior Human Resources 
director was interviewed. The fact that the interviewees were managers of the ICMs 
                                                             
14
 The following abbreviations apply: Business Unit (BU), Senior Vice President (SVP), Global Business 
Unit (GBU), Vice President (VP) 
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studied raises the issue of ‘managerial bias’ regarding their responses. This issue was 
partly overcome by the nature of the interviews and the type of questions asked, as 
interviewees were not asked to give their personal subjective opinions on their company 
and its performance, but were asked to describe specific processes and mechanisms of 
their organization15.  
 
5.8 Data Analysis 
 
Mills and Huberman (1994) defined qualitative research analysis as consisting 
of three concurrent flows of activity (Figure 5.2): 
� Data reduction; 
� Data display; 
� Conclusion drawing/verification. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In their view, conclusions are also verified as the analysis proceeds, since 
qualitative data analysis is a continuous interwoven process. 
 Data reduction - or data condensation (Tesch, 1990) - refers to the process of 
selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming the data in written-up 
                                                             
15
 Such a process-oriented approach has been argued by some as being appropriate when examining 
competence-related issues (Tampoe, 1998; Markides et a., 1994; McGrath et al., 1995). 
 
 Figure 5.2: Components of Data Analysis: Flow Model 
Data Collection Period 
Anticipatory 
DATA REDUCTION 
DATA DISPLAYS 
CONCLUSION 
DRAWING/VERIFICATION 
During                 
Post 
During                 
Post 
During                 
Post 
       Adapted from Miles and Huberman (1994) 
=  ANALYSIS 
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field notes or transcriptions. Data reduction occurs continuously throughout the whole 
lifecycle of qualitative research as part of the analysis. The decisions regarding which 
data chunks to code and which to pull out, which patterns better summarize a number of 
chunks, which evolving story to tell, are all analytic choices.   
Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that valid analysis requires, and is driven by, 
displays that are focused enough to permit viewing of a full data set in the same location 
and are arranged systematically to answer the research question. They distinguish 
between two major families of display formats: matrices and networks, stressing the 
choice of format must be driven by the research questions. 
 As extended text is weak and usually cumbersome to display (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), in this research, extended texts from documents, interviews and field 
notes had to be coded, extracted, condensed and summarized. For each case study 
conducted, the analysis was separated to that of the ‘desk study’ and that of the ‘semi-
structured interviews’. 
 
5.8.1 Analysis of Desk Study Data 
 
 To analyze the documents collected for the purpose of the desk-study 
evolutionary profiling, an analytical framework was required that could categorize parts 
of extended texts into clusters that would reflect ‘structural’, ‘functioning’ and ‘core 
competence development’ characteristics of the ICMs studied. King’s model (1988) 
(Figure 5.3) provided the foundation for the development of such a framework. To 
create a framework more compatible with core competence theory, King’s (1988) model 
had to be adapted to satisfy the needs of the core competence-based context. 
Consequently, its strategic elements were re-arranged and grouped under categories that 
correspond to the sequential stages of core competence development strategy execution 
(viz. Chapter 1, Figure 1.2). The new framework helped highlight the high-level 
transformation ICMs underwent. Subsequently, annual reports and other publicly 
available documents were sorted annually, read, and relevant passages were highlighted, 
summarized and coded under the categories shown on Figure 5.416: ‘strategic intent’ 
(including missions, objectives and goals), ‘strategic architecture’ (including strategies, 
structural and functioning characteristics) and ‘stretch and leverage’ (including 
programs,  resource allocation mechanisms and initiatives).  From this,  the co-evolution  
 
                                                             
16
 As an example, the ‘Desk Study’ analytical framework for Albion plc is shown on Appendix 5.5. 
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of ‘core competence development’ with organization-specific ‘structural’ and 
‘functioning’ transformations could be observed. 
Using the analyzed data, an ‘evolutionary profile’ of each ICM studied was 
constructed, demonstrating the co-evolution of strategic elements of choice for the10-
year period. The evolutionary profiles constructed following the analysis are displayed 
in the individual Case Studies (as Figures 6.1, 7.1, 8.1 and 9.1, in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 
respectively) and are accompanied by an explanatory text. 
Figure 5.4: Desk Study Framework 
Strategic Intent Strategic 
Architecture 
Stretch & Leverage 
            
 
� Mission 
� Objectives 
� Goals 
 
� Strategies 
� Configuration 
(Structural 
Elements) 
 
 
� Programs 
� Resource 
Allocation 
Mechanisms 
� Initiatives 
Source: Zoiopoulos et al., (2008b) 
Figure 5.3: King’s Strategic Elements of Choice 
Mission 
Objectives 
Strategy Goals Programs 
                               Source: King (1988) 
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5.8.2 Single Case Analysis of Interview Data 
 
 Identifying potential causal relationships between the combination of 
organizational configurations ICMs adopt and the effectiveness with which they 
develop their core competencies is at the centre of this study. One way of doing this 
would have been to group interviewee responses per core competence development 
activity (viz. Chapter 4) and then identify how many responses a) cite or imply (in 
verifiable ways from other parties or data sources) a causal relationship, b) do not 
support a causal relationship, or c) cannot be considered valid because they are biased 
or unsubstantiated. However, in the critical realism approach, answers to the questions 
cannot be given on the basis of subjectivity or opinion of interviewees alone. 
Substantiation through several data points plus conceptual alignment is needed in order 
to identify causality that identifies the underlying mechanisms (although these may be 
intangible and even abstract at times in the sense that the evidence supports their 
presence yet actors may not be concretely aware of some processes). 
 In conducting this research, the notion developed by Nelson and Winter (1982) 
that the behaviour of organizations can be explained by the routines they deploy was 
adopted. In that sense, understanding the firm entails identifying its routines, how they 
interrelate and how they change. The activity-based17 nature of the firm allows another 
analogy to be drawn between corporate-level activities involved in the execution of a 
core competence development strategy and the value-adding activities of the value 
chain (Porter, 1985). Whereas the ‘value chain’ concept examines interrelationships 
between primary and secondary company activities that add value to the product/service 
a company provides, the analysis in this research intends first to identify and explain the 
organization-specific routines related to each generic, corporate-level activity for each 
ICM studied, and second, examine interrelationships between ICM-specific activities, 
with respect to the organizational routines they share (viz. Chapter 4, Section 4.4, 
Figure 4.5).  
Undertaking the interview data analysis, the interview voice files were 
transcribed and uploaded to the N*6 software. Although the initial intention was to rely 
exclusively on the use of N*6 as a data management tool, it should be stressed that, at 
times, it was found to be cumbersome and inconvenient. On many occasions, this 
researcher found it faster, easier and more workable, to analyze semi-structured 
interview texts using self-made thematic tables in Microsoft Word files. The research 
                                                             
17
 Viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.4 for clarification. 
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questions and the theoretical concepts and constructs they include, provided the initial 
basis for the ‘coding’ process through which semi-structured interview data was 
‘clustered’. The extended texts of the transcribed semi-structured interviews were 
reviewed and passages (their size ranging from one sentence to three to four paragraphs) 
were coded and clustered, per ICM, under the following categories, which represent the 
theoretical concepts most pertinent to the research questions: 
� Structure , coordination mechanisms, key organizational part, type of market-
focus strategy, role in the production of the built environment; 
� Exhibiting strategic intent and crafting strategic architecture; 
� Regulating strategic architecture implementation; 
� Stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies (further broken 
down to: 
- Individual level core competence (ILCC) leverage (knowledge transfer, 
employee mobilization). 
- Process replication. 
- Organizational-level competence integration; 
� Developing managerial and organizational leadership capacity; 
� Improving business practices. 
  
For the purpose of identifying and analyzing underlying mechanisms in the 
tradition of critical realism, the clustered ‘coded’ interview data was carefully reviewed 
to identify within each ICM the organization-specific routines through which each core 
competence development activity was conducted. The routines identified were broken 
down to: i) the people and/or organizational bodies involved in their implementation 
and the role each played, ii) the processes through which the implementation was 
conducted and coordinated, and iii) the organizational structure that facilitated the 
people and processes through which the activities were conducted. The organization 
(and its environment) was the context18. These findings were then used to describe in 
the individual case studies how each ICM conducted each activity within its own 
organizational setting19. 
                                                             
18
 As an example, the identification of the roles of individuals/organizational bodies, processes and 
structures involved in the implementation of a specific routine, is demonstrated for the case of one ICM in 
Appendix 5.6. 
19
 A note on how interviews are referenced on the case studies: multiple interviewee descriptions were 
used to describe routines linked with core competence development activities. On other occasions, 
vignettes were used to illustrate a point. In both occasion, the text was referenced to the interviewee(s) it 
originated from. The referencing system is simple. Assuming the first interview would have been 
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Throughout the analysis process ‘memoing’ was used, a technique common both 
in Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) as well as qualitative research (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). Through memoing, insights were recorded, which were then 
consulted during write-up to help substantiate this research’s core argument. 
 The routines and the individuals/organizational bodies involved in their 
implementation were tabulated in the case studies, and accompanied by an explanatory 
text in the sections where the activities were described. Following this, a table was 
created (per ICM) from which the routines ‘shared’ between activities could be 
identified20. 
 It should be noted - in favour of the validity and applicability of the theoretical 
constructs/concepts developed in the theoretical chapters of this thesis, that the 
emergent findings from the analysis fell within the boundaries of pre-defined themes.
   
5.8.3 Cross-Case Analysis 
 
 The purpose of the cross-case comparison was to contrast and compare the 
findings of the individual case studies, in order to make generalizations that could 
contribute to our knowledge. This was the research’s most strongly ‘theory-building’ 
part. According to the principle of analytic generalization, if two or more cases are 
shown to support the same findings and/or theory, replication may be claimed. This 
‘replication’ logic is the same that underlies the use of experiments and allows scientists 
to cumulate knowledge across experiments (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). At the cross-
case comparison: i) similarities and differences across cases regarding the 
organizational routines through which the generic, corporate-level activities were 
implemented and ii) similarities and differences with respect to the interrelationships 
between the activities were identified. The findings from the cross-case comparison 
essentially provided the explanatory foundation to this research’s question. On 
occasions, conclusions for the cross-case studies were supported by vignettes, which 
were drawn directly from the extended texts of the transcribed semi-structured 
interviews.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
conducted with ‘Ioannis Zoiopoulos’, then next to the vignette or condensed text, the initials of his first 
and last name would appear, preceded by the abbreviation for ‘interview 1’ (i.e. I1:IZ). 
20
 i.e. Tables 6.7, 7.7, 8.7 and 9.7 in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 respectively.  
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5.9 Concluding Remarks 
 
The research methodology developed for the purpose of this research adopted 
the epistemological tradition of critical realism, a case study strategy and used 
predominantly qualitative data collection and analysis methods. The research design 
focused on four case studies and their cross-case comparison. Because the qualitative 
data secured from interviews was evaluated and interpreted in the light of other material 
available in the public domain published by the companies, the trade and academic 
press, it was expected that this form of cross-checking and evaluation - a quasi-form of 
‘triangulation’ (Krige, 1979), would enhance the quality and validity of the findings. 
In summary, this research is of an explanatory, exploratory and theory-building 
nature. The research design and its implementation reflect this. It is exploratory, 
because it aspires to draw empirically-based conclusions on core competence theory 
areas that still remain unexplored (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.5). The choice of a critical 
realist epistemology and a qualitative research strategy based on documentary and 
interview data are both aligned with this objective. It is explanatory, in the sense that the 
case studies constructed following analysis of the data, wish to describe how the 
theoretical models developed in earlier parts of the thesis (viz. Chapters 1, 2 and 3) are 
applied to and interrelate with organization-specific contexts. Its theory-building nature 
is manifested in the cross-case comparison. There, a second level of analysis (meta-
analysis) based on the individual - explanatory - case-studies, allows generalizations 
and suggestions to be made within the boundaries of this research’s domain of interest 
(viz. Chapter 1, Sections 1.5 to 1.7). 
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Chapter 6: The Aegean Group 
 
6.1 Early History 
 
Aegean was founded in Cyprus in 1940. It quickly grew to become active in the 
Middle East and North Africa, working for oil companies and other industrial 
corporations from 1963 onwards. During the 1960s, Aegean successfully completed a 
number of civil and building contracts of various sizes and types in oil terminals, 
refineries and various industrial sites. During the 1970s, the company grew substantially 
in the Middle East and North Africa and in 1979, it entered the Greek market.  
In the 1980s, the successful completion of a number of mechanical and electrical 
contracts established Aegean as a contractor of choice for many major oil companies. 
The group continued to grow in the Middle East and North Africa, where it had already 
diversified to a number of construction markets such as airports, transportation and 
infrastructure. During the 1990s, the group retained its market share and competitive 
position in the Middle East and North Africa, but shifted its growth efforts towards the 
Balkans and Eastern Europe, using Greece as a springboard for this expansion.  
At the time when this research begun, Aegean was a leading international 
building, civil and electro-mechanical construction services group, also active in 
property and infrastructure development. The Group had an annual turnover in excess of 
1$ billion, operated in 11 countries straddling South Eastern Europe, North and East 
Africa and the Middle East, employing directly around 5000 people.  
 
6.2 Recent Evolutionary Path and Aegean’s Present State 
 
 Recent developments regarding how Aegean’s ‘role’ in the production of the 
built environment and ‘structural’ characteristics of its configuration have evolved in 
relation to notable strategic intents its leadership has set, strategic architectures it has 
pursued and investments it has made, are displayed on Figure 6.11. 
                                               
1
 Interrelationships are demonstrated with the use of ‘line-arrows’ (notice that the thread always starts 
from a strategic intent that the group has set), to explain how new conditions emerge from previous 
decisions and actions.  
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Figure 6.1: Recent Evolutionary Path of the Aegean Group 
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 Figure 6.1 tells us that towards the end of the 1990’s, Aegean exhibited two 
strategic intents: i) to enhance its presence in the countries it already operated in2 and ii) 
to establish itself in new countries and markets. The strategy pursued was growth 
through related diversification and internationalization. At that moment in time, Greece 
offered opportunities for growth both within it as well as opportunities for 
internationalization towards the Balkans and Eastern Europe, mainly because of the 
prominent position that Greek private investors, companies and institutions had attained 
in the region. 
To build on existing strengths, investments were made for acquisitions of 
leading Greek contractors. In June 1999, the group became a strategic shareholder of a 
leading Greek construction company listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. The new 
organizational entity further acquired a number of companies in 2000, gaining access to 
public works of all budget ranges in Greece, as well as the emerging Greek PPP/PFI 
market. Through this, the group began to develop capabilities related to the ‘structuring, 
pursuing, securing and management of concession contracts’. Subsequently, 
investments were made through the Greek entity to set-up offices in Romania and 
Poland.  
During 1999 and 2000, Aegean restructured in two ‘regional’, autonomously 
operating corporate centres (Aegean-Cyprus and Aegean-Greece) through which 
projects in the regions under their responsibility would be coordinated. The 
restructuring was a response to the specific ownership structure of Aegean-Greece3 and 
the belief that the two regional entities would be more successful pursuing the group’s 
objectives relatively independently. Subsequently, the leadership of Aegean Cyprus 
decided that additional growth could be achieved by using its already well-established 
operations in the Middle East and North Africa to grow organically and increase market 
share in those regions, as well as to penetrate the local markets around the Caspian Sea. 
Thus, projects were pursued along the lines of that strategy. 
Having invested considerably in growth through a combination of acquisitions 
and internal development, especially through Aegean-Greece, the group’s leadership 
shifted their intentions in 2002 from ‘growth’ to ‘consolidation’. The strategy was to 
focus on high-margin opportunities in construction, concessions and real estate. In the 
case of concessions, the purpose was to take advantage of the dual benefits from the 
                                               
2
 By the end of the 1990s, the group had established a strong presence in Cyprus, the Middle East and 
North Africa. 
3
 The Aegean Group owned 48% of the shares, four Greek shareholders (who were also executive 
directors of Aegean-Greece) owned 25% and the rest 27% was publicly traded.  
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returns on equity invested and the construction work generated for Aegean-Greece. This 
strategy led to investments for the development of two BUs to manage concessions and 
real estate developments in Aegean-Greece (an autonomous division to manage real 
estate investments in Aegean-Cyprus had already been set-up from the 1970s).  
In 2004, it was decided to ‘regionally’ roll-out enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) and management information (MI) systems. This was followed by a decision 
from both regions to implement stricter selection criteria for real estate investments, 
acquire companies that would enable them to grow in higher-margin construction 
markets (e.g. industrial) and broaden their ‘spectrum’ of investments by entering the 
market of power generation from renewable energy sources. 
Aegean’s evolutionary path can be summarized as follows. The group originated 
from a construction services background, from which it developed throughout the last 
60-70 years into a leading international building, infrastructure, industrial and M&E 
construction services company, with an annual turnover in excess of $1 billion and 
operating in 11 different countries. In addition to its role as a constructor, the group has 
been involved in property development - from Cyprus - since the 1970s, a role which it 
replicated by creating a property development business unit in the Greek-based entity in 
which it invested. During the 1990s, regulatory changes in Greek government 
procurement methods, enabled the group to adopt the role of infrastructure developer 
through the acquisition of Greek contractors who were licensed to bid for such contracts 
within their home country.  From its initial involvement in concessions, the group 
slowly expanded its portfolio while simultaneously developing a capability as a toll 
operator and facilities manager4.  
Along those lines, Aegean’s evolutionary profiling allows three major 
observations to be made. First, that the unique ownership structure of Aegean-Greece 
and its strategic importance to the Group’s growth as a whole, led to an organizational 
restructuring around two regional coordination centres, each one pursuing its objectives 
independently. Second, that Aegean pursued a strategy of related diversification 
(Rumelt, 1974) by acquiring and developing resources that were both supplementary 
and complementary (Wernerfelt, 1984) to the ones it already possessed. Third, that the 
adoption of a new role in the production of the built environment (that of 
developer/owner) through entry and growth in the construction-related markets of 
‘concessions’ and ‘real estate development’, created the necessity to establish 
                                               
4
 Since the introduction of the PFI/PPP procurement route in Greece, the group has managed - in 
collaboration with Greece’s two other largest construction groups - to oligopolize the country’s 
infrastructure and buildings concessions markets. 
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autonomous BUs - within Aegean-Greece  - whose purpose was to specialize on that 
role.  
In light of Aegean’s evolutionary path, it could be argued that the Group has 
developed core competencies related to: 
� Pursuing, estimating, securing and delivering building, infrastructure and 
industrial construction contracts (both within Aegean-Greece and Aegean 
Cyprus); 
� Identifying and developing real estate development opportunities (both within 
Aegean-Greece and Aegean-Cyprus); 
� Structuring, securing and managing infrastructure and buildings concessions 
(only within Aegean Greece). 
 
 Furthermore, Aegean’s evolutionary profiling reveals that it pursued its 
strategies through two main routes: i) acquisition of companies to increase market share 
in markets for which it already possessed the core competencies to compete in (e.g. the 
case of the acquisition of the Greek contractor in 2000) and ii) the organic development 
and ultimate ‘divisionalization’ of activities related to new markets (e.g. the market for 
PPP/PFI contracts). This indicates that Aegean’s ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece et al., 
1997) are based on being able to: 
� Acquire and successfully integrate companies; 
� Organically build core competencies to be competitive in markets it has no prior 
experience. 
 
Other core competencies and dynamic capabilities may also exist. 
 
6.2.1 Structural, Functioning and Agency Characteristics  
 
 Figure 6.25 shows Aegean being organized in two regional centres, Aegean-
Greece and Aegean-Cyprus. Both regional centres have grouped construction projects 
under three market-focused construction divisions (‘Buildings’, ‘Infrastructure and 
Industrial’ and ‘M&E’). Depending on location, projects are undertaken by the local 
subsidiaries  that  each  regional   centre  oversees.   In  some  countries  (Jordan,  Qatar,  
                                               
5
 The figure presented here is an adaptation of an organizational chart that the researcher received from 
one of the interviewees. The adaptation was considered necessary as the original chart contained 
information that could reveal the identity of the ICM, which would go against the confidentiality 
agreement that the researcher had to sign as a prerequisite for the ICMs’ participation in this research.  
 129
Shareholders of Aegean-Greece 
(Aegean Group owns 48%) 
Jordan 
Poland 
Romania 
Greece 
Qatar 
Ethiopia 
Greece Romania 
Cyprus 
Ethiopia 
Qatar 
Jordan 
Libya 
Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE Oman 
Project-specific 
Joint Ventures 
Figure 6.2: Structure of the Aegean Group 
Board of Directors (Aegean-Greece) Board of Directors (Aegean-Cyprus) 
 
Executive Management Team (Aegean-Greece) 
The Aegean Group 
Board of Directors 
Executive Management Team (Aegean-Cyprus) 
Pu
rs
u
in
g 
an
d 
Se
cu
rin
g 
Pr
o
jec
ts
 
Te
n
de
rs
 
an
d 
B
id
di
n
g 
Core Support Functions 
Le
ga
l 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Qu
al
ity
 
Co
n
tr
ac
ts
 
Pr
o
cu
re
m
en
t 
H
u
m
an
 
R
es
o
u
rc
es
 
Pu
rs
u
in
g 
an
d 
Se
cu
rin
g 
Pr
o
jec
ts
 
Te
n
de
rs
 
an
d 
B
id
di
n
g 
Core Support Functions 
Le
ga
l 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Qu
al
ity
 
Co
n
tr
ac
ts
 
Pr
o
cu
re
m
en
t 
H
u
m
an
 
R
es
o
u
rc
es
 
Concessions Division (Greece) 
Construction Divisions 
In
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
Bu
ild
in
gs
 
In
du
st
ri
al
 
an
d 
M
&
E 
Real Estate and Speculative Development Division 
(Greece) 
Construction Divisions 
In
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
Bu
ild
in
gs
 
In
du
st
ri
al
 
an
d 
M
&
E 
Real Estate and Speculative Development Division 
(Cyprus) 
 130
Ethiopia) construction divisions of the two regions form cross-regional joint ventures 
(JVs) to undertake projects. In the case of the local subsidiaries of Aegean-Cyprus, each 
has a unique ‘ownership structure’ in order to abide with company laws of the country it 
operates in and to accommodate the Group’s local partners. Both regions have a BU 
focused in ‘real estate and development’. In the case of Aegean-Greece this BU has 
internationalized to Romania. In addition, Aegean-Greece has set-up a BU to pursue, 
secure and manage concession contracts. All divisions, functions and BUs are lead by a 
‘director’. Regionally, they are coordinated by an ‘executive management team’ led by 
a regional CEO, who reports to a regional board of directors (BoD) (I1:KK, I2:NG, 
I5:GG, I7:IK).  
Aegean exhibits characteristics of a diversified organization operating through 
two regional divisions, broken down in turn to market-based units. It is also a 
bureaucratic organization, where some work processes (particularly ‘materials 
purchasing’ and ‘financial management’) are standardized, albeit regionally. Due to its 
regional focus, no ‘tangible interrelationships’ (Porter, 1985) exist across regions. 
Processes are shared and know-how is being transferred only on an ad-hoc basis, during 
inter-regional joint ventures (Figure 6.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.3: Inter-Regional Horizontal Organization at the Aegean Group 
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Effectively, each region is a semi-autonomous ‘diversified’ organization 
pursuing ‘standardization of outputs’ of its units. As an executive characteristically 
stated: 
 
‘What we all know is that we have to deliver against objectives when the time 
comes to report our results, or when the CEO will come asking.’(I4:KH)  
 
The Group’s highest governing body is the Board of Directors (BoD). Aegean’s 
BoD is responsible for appointing the BoD of Aegean-Cyprus, who in turn appoints the 
regional executive management team. Due to its unique ownership structure, Aegean-
Greece is governed by a separate BoD, on which Aegean-Cyprus exerts however 
considerable formal and informal influence. The BoD of Aegean-Greece is responsible 
for appointing in turn its own executive management team. Both regional executive 
management teams constitute of the directors of regional core functions, construction 
divisions and autonomous BUs. Each regional executive management team elects 
annually its CEO who has ultimate responsibility for the region’s performance. 
Effectively, the regional CEOs and their executive management teams are responsible 
for coordinating the various construction divisions, functions and BUs of their region. 
The members of each executive management team coordinate with each other through 
mutual adjustment, and communication across regions - at the same hierarchical level - 
is based on informal processes, occurring on an ad-hoc basis. The structural, functioning 
and agency characteristics of Aegean are summarized on Table 6.1.  
Having presented Aegean’s background and its current structure, functioning 
and agency characteristics, the purpose of the next section is to describe how they relate 
to the organizational routines through which it implements each of the corporate-level 
core competence development activities, proposed in Chapter 4 as effectively 
controlling core competence development. 
 
6.3 Core Competence Development Activities 
 
 This section is divided into five sub-sections. Its purpose is twofold. First, to 
present and describe the company-specific ‘organizational routines’ through which 
Aegean develops its core competencies. Second, to identify and describe the role of 
organizational agents (individuals/groups) most integral to the implementation of the 
routines   identified.   Findings    related   to  each  activity  will  be   presented  and   the  
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Table 6.1: Aegean’s Configuration Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Structural 
Characteristics 
 
Market-Focused 
Strategy (project-
grouping) 
� Grouped in the country of project location. 
� Then market-focused, under construction (Infrastructure, Building, Industrial and M&E), real estate/speculative 
development and PPP/PFI divisions. 
� Then again geographically-focused, as projects are then monitored first on a national and then on a regional basis. 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal 
Organization/ 
Degree of 
Decentralization 
� Regions operate independently 
� Each region’s executive management team: 
- Coordinates and resolves conflicts that may arise between construction divisions; 
- Coordinates construction divisions with PPP/PFI and real estate divisions; 
- Oversees project-specific joint ventures between construction divisions of the two regional principal subsidiaries. 
� Regionally, the following activities are centralized: 
- Accounting; 
- Procurement (materials); 
- Equipment and fleet management; 
- Human resources (firing/hiring, payroll, professional development and training, managerial services, 
coordinating transfer of individuals across divisions). 
- Decisions to pursue construction projects/investments. 
 
Functioning 
Characteristics 
Coordination 
Mechanisms 
 
� Mutual adjustment at ‘horizontal levels’. 
� Direct supervision of strategic apex and middle management to units. 
� Standardization of outputs for function, divisions and business units. 
� Regional standardization of processes regarding financial management and materials purchasing. 
 
 
Agency 
Characteristics 
Key-People/ 
Organizational 
Parts 
 
� The strategic-apex (CEO and executive management team) of each region. 
� Regional financial management functions. 
� Regional procurement function. 
� Regional ‘pursuing and securing projects’ functions. 
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implications of their implementation with respect to the Group’s configuration will be 
briefly discussed in turn. 
 
6.3.1 Exhibiting Strategic Intent and Crafting Strategic Architecture 
 
Three organizational routines have been identified through which Aegean 
‘exhibits strategic intent (SI) and crafts strategic architecture (SA)’.  The first is that of 
‘setting and communicating the objectives of a strategic initiative’ (Figure 6.4). 
Although strategic initiatives are not routinely undertaken, the process of deciding 
‘whether or not’, ‘how’ and ‘towards what end’ an initiative will be undertaken is in 
itself a standardized process. First, a strategic review of the Group (or one of its units) 
has to take place after an executive voices a concern about an issue related to 
competitiveness. Concerns voiced are first discussed at the level of the regional 
‘executive management team’ and then it is the responsibility of the regional CEO to 
present and discuss them with the regional BoD - which will decide on the necessity for 
a strategic review. Review findings are integrated by the executive management team 
(with inputs from functions, divisions and BUs) and presented by the CEO to the BoD, 
who ultimately decide whether the strategic initiative is necessary. If it is, the regional 
CEOs and  executive management teams are responsible to draft an implementation 
plan, which, once approved by the BoD, can be communicated downwards to functions, 
 Figure 6.4: Setting and Communicating the Objectives of a Strategic Initiative 
- Divisions 
- Business Units 
- Functions 
(Regional) 
Regional 
Executive 
Management 
Team 
Regional 
Board of 
Directors 
Informal 
input 
Discusses ideas 
voiced and 
presents them 
to the BoD 
Decides on necessity of ‘strategic review’ 
Communicate 
objectives and 
coordinate the 
strategic review 
Inputs from market-specific 
knowledge 
Integrate 
findings at a 
regional 
level 
Decides on initiative 
Draft 
implementation 
plan and monitor 
its implementation 
Directors 
incorporate 
emerging issues in 
‘annual’ and ‘long 
term’ plans 
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divisions and BUs that will have to incorporate any emerging issues to the 
implementation of  ongoing business plans (I1:KK, I2:NG). 
 An example of such an initiative was the regional rolling-out of enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) and management information systems (MIS). Having 
established clearer lines of responsibility and authority, the regional restructuring of 
Aegean completed in 2001 brought forward the opportunity for greater control over 
regional construction divisions and other BUs. Some executives identified a cost-saving 
opportunity in centralizing certain functions that could be shared, potentially even 
across regions. Others, observing the Group’s rapid growth - especially in the Greek 
market - felt that immediate action should be taken to expand its ‘administrative 
boundaries’ (Penrose, 1959; 1995). Those factors led to executives from both Aegean-
Greece and Aegean-Cyprus proposing to their executive management teams in 2003 
that ERP and MIS should be rolled-out and implemented in a group-wide manner. 
When the BoD of Aegean-Greece and that of the Aegean-Group considered the 
proposal, it was decided that the systems would be implemented, albeit by each region 
independently. By mid-2004, the executive management teams of Aegean-Greece and 
Aegean-Cyprus where charged with setting-up a plan of how the systems would be 
incorporated6. 
The second routine is that of ‘setting and communicating the annual business 
plan’ (Figure 6.5). The process starts in October of each year at the divisions, functions 
and BUs, whose directors are responsible for drafting their unit’s budget for the next 
year and for developing an ‘annual business plan’ proposal. Subsequently, each region’s 
executive management team (under the coordination of the region’s CEO and chief 
financial officer (CFO)) integrate annual budgets and business plans to a ‘regional 
proposal’ and submit this to their BoD for consideration.  The two boards independently 
review them and decide. The decisions taken are then hierarchically communicated 
downwards through to the regional executive management teams who develop ‘action 
plans’ and set specific targets for their region’s individual units. The directors of those 
units are then responsible to communicate those plans and targets to their own 
employees (I1:NG, I3:BH). 
The third organizational routine is that of ‘setting and communicating a long-
term strategic plan’ (three to five years). This routine is also implemented annually, 
simultaneously to  ‘setting  and  communicating  the  annual  business  plan’.  Divisions,  
                                               
6
 This is an example where Aegean’s existing configuration imposes a BU-mindset (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) on the group, by decentralizing operations and setting a ‘silo’ between 
the two regional centers. 
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functions and BUs first put together ideas drawing from their market-specific 
knowledge. Those are collected and integrated, at a regional level, by each executive 
management team. The CEOs submit and discuss them with their BoD for approval of 
any recommendations made. Once decisions have been made, a three to five year 
strategic plan is drafted by each region’s executive management team and its goals and 
objectives are communicated down through the hierarchy, so that each division, 
function and BU can incorporate them into their annual business plans.   
The routines for ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’ and the people/organizational 
bodies involved in their implementation are shown on Table 6.2. Considering the roles 
of the individuals/groups involved, it can be understood that although it is the 
responsibility of the divisional, functional and BU directors to timely develop annual 
and long term business plans and the responsibility of their BoD to approve these, it is 
the executive management team of each region - led by the annually elected regional 
CEO - that integrates them, presents them to the regional BoD and then plans and 
executes them. This elevates the regional strategic apex and upper middle management 
as the key organizational part in exhibiting SI and crafting SA. This indicates that 
management and leadership will have developed a clear ‘comprehension’ regarding 
long and short term objectives and the strategies to achieve them, a prerequisite, in 
theory (McGrath et al., 1995), of organizational competence. 
Considering the routines identified, it can be observed that, regionally, they 
provide a foundation for regulating longer term (strategic initiatives, long-term business  
 
Figure 6.5: Setting and Communicating the Annual Business Plan  
                       September                                                 December 
- Divisions 
- Business Units 
- Functions 
The Executive 
Management 
Team 
The Board of 
Directors 
Draft and submit proposals 
for annual business plans and 
budgets to the executive 
management team 
Reviews, integrates and 
submits to the BoD for 
approval. CEO and CFO 
play integral role. 
Approves or disapproves plans, signing off final budgets 
Develops annual implementation 
plan for regional and 
communicates to unit heads. 
CEO plays integral role. 
Directors are responsible for 
communicating the plan to 
their management team  
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Table 6.2: Exhibiting SI and Crafting Strategic SA  - Aegean 
Organizational Routines People/ Organizational Bodies Involved 
Setting and Communicating the Annual 
Business Plan 
Aegean Group BoD 
Aegean-Greece BoD (Formal an informal influence by 
Aegean-Group’s BoD) 
CEO of Aegean Greece 
Executive Management Team of Aegean- Greece 
CEO of Aegean-Cyprus 
Executive Management Team of Aegean-Cyprus 
Functional, Divisional and BU directors of Aegean-Greece 
Functional, Divisional and BU directors of Aegean-Cyprus 
 
Setting and Communicating Long-Term 
Strategic Plans (3-5 years) 
Aegean Group BoD 
Aegean-Greece BoD (Formal an informal influence by 
Aegean-Group’s BoD) 
CEO of Aegean Greece 
Executive Management Team of Aegean- Greece 
CEO of Aegean-Cyprus 
Executive Management Team of Aegean-Cyprus 
Functional, Divisional and BU directors of Aegean-Greece 
Functional, Divisional and BU directors of Aegean-Cyprus 
Setting and Communicating the 
Objectives of Strategic Initiatives 
Aegean Group BoD 
Aegean-Greece BoD (Formal an informal influence by 
Aegean-Group’s BoD) 
CEO of Aegean Greece 
Executive Management Team of Aegean- Greece 
CEO of Aegean-Cyprus 
Executive Management Team of Aegean-Cyprus 
Functional, Divisional and BU directors of Aegean-Greece 
Functional, Divisional and BU directors of Aegean-Cyprus 
 
plan) and shorter-term (annual business plan) strategies, permitting strategies to be 
changed when necessary (Mintzberg, 1978 and in construction: Chinowsky and 
Meredith, 2000; Langford and Male, 2001). It could be argued however, that Aegean’s 
regional divisionalization and the fact that SI is exhibited and SA crafted by the two 
regions independently, impose - by default - a BU-mindset (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) 
to the Group, confining resources within regions and not allowing Aegean to set the 
stage for actualizing the latent economic benefits of related diversification (Nayyar, 
1992). 
 
6.3.2 Regulating Strategic Architecture Implementation 
 
 Two main organizational routines with respect to this activity have been 
identified within Aegean: i) reporting and ii) the project selection process. 
Reporting, both within Aegean-Greece and Aegean-Cyprus starts at the project-
level. Project reports are created on a weekly basis and the process is driven by each 
 137
region’s financial management function, which collects information through the 
regional enterprise resource planning (ERP) system. Weekly, project reports are created 
and delivered to construction division, BU and functional directors. These weekly 
reports are aggregated monthly at a divisional and regional level. Monthly and quarterly 
meetings take place between the CEO, CFO, divisional, functional and BU directors of 
each region independently to address emerging issues. In the basic responsibilities of 
every director is the collaboration with the financial management function to 
continuously monitor compliance with the region’s financial targets, regulating 
diversions from plans and proposing remedial action. Division managers are also 
responsible for the timely informing of functions of the resources required by them to 
execute projects. However, it is with the ‘executive management team’ that the ultimate 
responsibility to monitor and regulate the implementation of annual and strategic plans 
lies. Regionally, the CEO and CFO inform the BoD, who in turn informs shareholders.  
 With respect to the ‘project selection process’, the following has been identified. 
Projects are pursued regionally. Once a project is publicised, the responsibility to pursue 
it will be undertaken by the regional ‘construction division’ director whose area it falls 
under, or, who has the most expertise related to it. Initially, it is the division managers’ 
responsibility to discuss the project with the regional executive management team, who, 
depending on project value may have to obtain approval by the regional BoD. In 
collaboration with the regional ‘pursuing and securing projects’ function, the 
construction division’s ‘estimating department’ determines whether the project falls 
within the group’s targets. If it does, the project is pursued (I1:KK, I2:NG). 
Subsequently, the construction division will appoint a bid director who will collaborate 
with divisional ‘estimators’ and the regional ‘pursuing and securing projects’ function, 
until the bid is submitted7 (I4:KH, I6:GS).  
The organizational routines, people and organizational bodies involved in 
‘regulating strategic architecture implementation’ are summarized on Table 6.3. Three 
groups of people emerge as the regulators of strategic architecture implementation: i) 
private shareholders, ii) the boards of directors of Aegean-Greece and Aegean-Cyprus 
and iii) the regional executive management teams.  
 
                                               
7
 Although the estimating department of each division prepares the bids, there is sometimes collaboration 
with the regional procurement function prior to bid submission. Consequently, if and when the project is 
won, there is already a ‘cost structure’, with information on the suppliers and the quotes they gave. This 
cost structure becomes the basis for project control and the monitoring of financial costs during project 
execution.  
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Table 6.3: Regulating SA Implementation - Aegean  
Organizational Routines People/Organizational Bodies Involved 
Reporting 
 
a) Weekly project execution reporting 
- Performance monitored against bidding targets 
and estimating cost 
- Cost monitored through ERP framework 
b) Monthly reviews 
c) Quarterly Reviews 
d) Annual Business Plan 
 
Project controller 
Project director 
Financial management function 
Divisional, functional and business unit 
directors 
CEO and executive management team 
BoD 
Project Selection Criteria 
 
-Bidding decentralized at the division level. 
-Pursuing and Securing Projects function supports 
division. 
-Procurement supports at establishing project 
costs at the bidding stage. 
-Construction person leads the bid preparation. 
 
 
 
Construction division director 
Estimating department of division 
BU directors (in the case of property 
development BU of concessions BU) 
Pursuing and securing projects function 
CEO and executive management team 
BoD 
 
 
As identified in this case study, an organizational environment of ‘vertical 
decentralization’ (Mintzberg, 1979; 1989) of responsibility for strategy execution within 
regions exists at Aegean, with executive decision-making authority held by the 
‘executive management team’ and BoD of each region independently. This section 
highlights the importance of ‘monthly’ and ‘quarterly’ meetings/reviews between 
regional leadership and the process of project selection, in allowing Aegean’s regions to 
‘reflexively’ (Giddens’ 1984) monitor and regulate strategies if external or internal 
circumstances necessitate it (Langford and Male, 2001). 
 
6.3.3 Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies 
 
 At Aegean, three occasions have been identified where stretch and leverage of 
resources and core competencies occurs, one ‘intra-regionally’ and one ‘inter-
regionally’.  
The first intra-regional occasion is when one regional construction division 
undertakes a construction project in a location/country it has not operated before (Figure 
6.6). In this occasion, the core competence leveraged is that of pursuing, estimating, 
securing and delivering construction contracts, through the intra-regional stretch of both 
‘human’ and ‘organizational’ capital resources (Barney, 1991) and their integration on a 
project-basis. At initial project stages, human resources from the ‘pursuing and securing 
projects’  function  are  stretched  to  leverage  ‘relational’  and  ‘entrepreneurial’  core  
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competencies (Lampel, 2001) in order to secure projects. These are complemented by 
‘estimating’ and ‘technical’ core competencies (Lampel, 2001), embodied in individuals 
from the regional construction divisions. 
Assuming such a project is won (following the ‘project-selection’ process 
described in Section 6.3.2), a  project  director  supported by a project start-up team will 
be mobilized to the project’s location8.  If the construction division does not have the 
resources to staff the project internally, it will first try to obtain resources from another  
construction division of the region it belongs to. In such a case, the human resources 
(HR) teams of the construction divisions in collaboration with the regional HR function 
and the regional internal audit team (part of the financial management function that 
monitors divisions as profit and loss centres and therefore has to monitor changes in 
payroll) will be involved (I7:IK). 
 The project director’s primary responsibilities are to hire (if necessary) local 
employees and to ‘replicate’ the regionally standardized processes of i) financial 
management (cost control and project reporting) and ii) materials procurement, by 
                                               
8
 Whether the project director will be appointed and mobilized ‘pre’ or ‘post’ contract award, varies from 
project to project. 
 
Figure 6.6: Stretch and Leverage at Construction Projects in Novel Locations1 
Opportunity 
Identified 
(usually by 
construction 
division) 
 
Executive management team considers 
opportunity and presents it to the BoD who 
decide if the project will be pursued.   
- Pursuing and Securing 
Project Function 
- Estimating department 
and directors of  
construction divisions 
 
 
Evaluate 
Opportunity 
-Project Director and 
start-up team are 
appointed and mobilized 
to location 
 (ILCC leverage  
- Knowledge 
transfer 
- Employee 
mobilization) 
(If employees have to be 
‘borrowed’ from other 
regional divisions, 
corporate HR will be 
involved and corporate 
financial management 
function will monitor) 
 
- Regional Procurement 
center helps train locals 
and replicate ERP 
system and processes of 
financial management, 
materials procurement 
(process replication) 
Estimating department of division prepares 
bid. ‘Pursuing and securing projects’ 
function, assists in managing client 
relationships. Bid signed by BoD. If project 
is won: 
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applying the regional ERP framework. The regional procurement function has 
developed a methodology to support the replication of procurement processes by project 
teams. The practice is to install a ‘local’ procurement centre, directly supervised by the 
centralized regional office in terms of the people appointed, processes followed and 
budgeting limits of the purchases that it can approve (I5:GG). The project start-up team 
members and the newly hired local procurement staff are trained by central procurement 
on how the ERP framework works. As a follow-up, random controls through visits on-
site occur, to ensure processes are being followed (I5:GG).  
It becomes evident that, critical to deploying regionally the core competence of 
delivering construction contracts are the standardized processes of ‘project controls’, 
replicated across projects through the support of the regionally centralized procurement 
centre, through standardization of processes, skills9 and outputs as coordination 
mechanisms. Within that context, replication of effective routines (Nelson and Winter, 
1982) social practices across different localities (Giddens, 1984) enables resources and 
core competencies to be stretched and leveraged effectively.  
 The second occasion of intra-regional stretch and leverage occurs during project-
specific collaborations between a ‘real estate and development’ BU and a construction 
division (Figure 6.7), in order to identify and develop real estate opportunities. To 
illustrate this case with an example, assume the real estate and development BU of 
Aegean-Greece wishes to invest in a commercial building in Romania.  Once the 
investment opportunity  has  been  identified - usually  by  a ‘development manager’ of 
the BU - the BU director liaises with the director of the ‘building’ construction division, 
who provides the expertise of its estimating department for a cost estimate of the project 
to be developed. After an understanding of the investment’s commercial issues has been 
achieved, the business opportunity is presented to the regional executive management 
team who also reviews it. The CEO subsequently presents it to the regional BoD for 
approval. 
 Once the BoD approves the investment, the development BU and construction 
division directors are responsible to develop an ‘action plan’ for its implementation. 
Before design of the building is outsourced to a design company, a project-specific 
contract is signed between the real estate development BU and the construction 
division, allocating responsibilities between the two parties. The enforcement of the 
contract  and  all  subsequent  transactions  between  the two units of Aegean-Greece are  
                                               
9
 Training, is also used as a mechanism to stretch Aegean’s project-control resources. 
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monitored by the regional internal audit team. A ‘development manager’ from the 
development BU will monitor project execution as an ‘internal’ client representative10. 
 In the example described, the ‘real estate and development’ BU brings to the 
table the competence of identifying investment opportunities and the regional building-
construction division brings to the table the ‘estimating’ and construction-related 
‘technical’ core competencies11, in order to successfully develop the project. The two 
units integrate and coordinate their efforts to leverage Aegean-Greece’s ‘identifying and 
developing real estate opportunities’ and ‘construction-related’ core competencies (viz. 
Section 6.2.1). The ‘coordination’ and ‘integration’ mechanisms between the two units 
are not standardized. As the managing director of Aegean-Greece’s ‘real estate and 
development BU’ indicatively stated: 
 
‘At the senior level, communications and decision making between the real 
estate and development business unit and the rest of the group is very informal 
and disorganized. It depends on individuals taking initiatives and does not 
happen through institutionalized processes.’ (I4:KH) 
 
                                               
10
 Understandably, if the project’s location is one where the group has no presence, core competence 
leverage as shown in Figure 6.5 will also take place. 
11
 As these have been defined from Lampel (2001), viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6. 
 
Figure 6.7: Intra-Regional Stretch and Leverage – Real Estate and Development and          
                    Construction 
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opportunity, and the CEO presents it to 
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- Project development 
director 
- Estimating 
department of 
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(financial management 
function) monitor 
transactions between 
regional units 
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The third case of intra-regional stretch and leverage is that occurring during 
project-specific contractual agreements between Aegean-Greece’s concessions BU and 
one of the region’s construction divisions (Figure 6.8)12. In this case the core 
competence deployed is that of ‘structuring, securing and managing infrastructure and 
building concessions’ (viz. Section 6.2.1).  
In this case, once a project opportunity has been identified, a bid-director is 
appointed, usually from the concession’s BU. The bid director is the person responsible 
for bringing together the ‘pursuing and securing projects’ function and the estimating 
department of the relevant construction division to evaluate the opportunity. The efforts 
of the participants at this stage are jointly overseen by the concessions BU and 
construction division directors. Once the opportunity is evaluated, the ‘executive 
management team’ reviews it and subsequently, the CEO presents it to the BoD for 
approval. If the BoD approves the necessary investment, then the internal audit team 
gets involved to structure a project-specific contract between the region’s market-based 
units.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Throughout this process, the bid director leads the efforts of the project team, staffed 
from the regional units involved and coordinates their efforts until after bid submission, 
when the project is secured. The ‘pursuing and securing projects’ function is heavily 
involved in that process (I2:NG, I3:BH). 
                                               
12
 This is a case that occurs specifically in Aegean-Greece and not the group as a whole. 
 
Figure 6.8: Intra-Regional Core Competence Leverage – Concessions and           
                   Construction 
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Once a project is awarded, a concessions manager is appointed, most probably 
from the concessions BU. The concession manager will be responsible to oversee the 
successful completion of the project, liaising with BU and division directors to ensure 
their effective coordination. During project implementation, the region’s financial 
management will constantly monitor and record transactions between group units. 
Each organizational unit brings a different competence to the table and these are 
integrated on a project-specific basis through stretching and leveraging of the 
‘specialized knowledge of individuals’. The concessions BU in collaboration with the 
financial management function that of ‘structuring, pursuing and securing concession 
contracts’. The pursuing and securing projects function, that of ‘building relationships 
with the client and managing the project stakeholders’. The construction division, that 
of estimating the project cost (at the estimating stage) and managing the design and 
construction of the built asset. Collectively, they deploy to the project the core 
competence of ‘structuring, securing and managing the concession’. One feature of this 
case is that there is no employee mobilization between the organizational units 
involved. The project team is effectively a ‘virtual team’ led by a bid-director during the 
pre-award stage and the concession manager after the contract has been won, who are 
responsible for bringing together the individuals possessing the expertise needed, but 
who may be directly employed by different divisions (I3:BH).  
Regarding inter-regional core competence leverage, this occurs when two (or 
more) regional construction divisions form a project-specific contractual agreement for 
an international construction project (Figure 6.9)13. The core competence leveraged at 
this instance is that of ‘pursuing, estimating, securing and delivering construction 
contracts’. The way that collaboration between the two regions would be initiated is 
usually after the director of a regional construction division would realize that he needs 
a resource/competence that his division does not possess. In such a case, the director 
would have to communicate with other regional division directors, or through his 
regional executive management team to the other region14. The fact that no direct 
communication exists between BU-directors of different regions, indicates that, as a 
group, Aegean has not managed to ‘economize’ on the communications required for the 
knowledge of its individual members to be more accessible (Grant, 1996b). 
Discussions on how to structure an ‘inter-regional project-specific contractual 
agreement’  would  then begin. In such cases, there is direct communication between the  
                                               
13
 As in the cases of projects undertaken in Jordan, Ethiopia and the UAE (Figure 6.2).  
14
 Viz. Figure 6.5. 
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project-specific agreement would be structured, how the project team will be staffed and  
 
CEOs and executive management teams of Aegean-Greece and Aegean-Cyprus to 
determine how a which region will provide ‘functional’ support. Communication across 
regional boards and executive management teams is informal. In the case of such 
projects, individuals have to be mobilized and functional processes have to be replicated 
in a remote geographical context. A cross-regional project team is created in order to 
undertake the task. 
In addition to the coordination issues between the two regional units, the 
implementation of the project itself and the ‘stretch’ and ‘leverage’ mechanisms 
involved in its execution once the project team has been staffed and the region that will 
provide functional support has been chosen, are identical to the process described with 
respect to a ‘project undertaken in a novel location’ (viz. Figure 6.3). As with intra-
regional coordination, communication is informal at the strategic apex level. In one 
interviewee’s own words: 
 
‘When a joint venture has to be formed, communication starts at the very 
senior level and is very informal…but nevertheless effective. Together we 
decide how the project will be staffed and which region will provide 
functional support.’ (I1:KK) 
  
Figure 6.9: Stretch and Leverage between Construction Divisions 
 
Project 
Opportunity 
Identified 
BoDs agree that 
there is 
potential for 
exploiting inter-
regional 
collaboration 
- Both BoDs approve 
project pursuit 
- Inter-regional project 
company established 
- Interregional project 
team staffed 
- Functional units 
supporting the project 
depend on the 
project’s geographic 
location  
- Project director leads 
project team 
- Dual reporting 
structure towards 
both regions 
- Divisional directors 
coordinate through 
mutual adjustment 
for resource 
allocation 
- Executive 
management teams 
resolve conflicts 
when they arise 
- Financial 
management 
functions of both 
regions monitor 
transactions of the 
project company, as 
shareholders in the 
joint venture. 
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The findings regarding stretching and leveraging resources and core 
competencies at Aegean are summarized on Table 6.4. What can be immediately 
observed is that in three out of four occasions where competencies are leveraged across 
Aegean, a project-specific contractual agreement has to be set-up by different parties, a 
testament to the group’s divisionalization and transaction costs involved in intra-
organizational collaboration. This, points to higher overheads of the group as a whole, 
potentially reducing its cost competitiveness. 
 A review of the people/organizational bodies in the different occasions 
stretching and leveraging occurs, provides useful insights as to the ‘integration’ and 
‘coordination’ mechanisms through which core competencies are deployed within 
Aegean. In all four occasions identified, certain organizational bodies are constantly 
present. First and foremost, there is the regionally centralized procurement function, 
which is responsible for enforcing in regionally dispersed projects the ‘replication’ of 
project control processes. Second, there are the project directors and their support teams 
who embody the core competencies of their region and who actually replicate processes 
across project contracts. Third, there are the executive management teams and the CEO 
of each region, who coordinate the various divisions, functions and BUs, while 
providing direction by specifying their expected outputs. The strategic apex of each 
region is essentially the ‘integrator’ of different organizational units. Fourth, there is the 
HR function involved as the ‘mediator’ between divisions. Finally, it has been identified 
that all transactions between divisions (e.g. a project-specific collaboration between the 
concessions BU and one of the construction divisions, or, the renting of equipment from 
one of the construction divisions) whether those may be inter-regional or intra-regional, 
happen through ‘contractual agreements’ and are monitored by the region’s internal 
audit function. 
As expected from the description of Aegean’s configuration (viz. Section 6.2.1), 
resource ‘stretch’ and core competence leverage is confined within regions, except in 
the case of inter-regional project-specific collaborations. Aegean’s regional mind-set 
inhibits leveraging its core competencies group-wide, which suggests that its ability to 
access, harness, transfer and integrate the knowledge held by its individual members 
(Grant, 1996b) has not yet reached its full potential. In addition, the opportunity and 
lateral linkages do not exist for the establishment of active cross-regional social 
networks between peers, which would allow value to be extracted from the ‘relatedness’ 
and ‘interrelationships’ between the activities that the two regions undertake (Porter, 
1985; Tsai, 2000).  
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Table 6.4: Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies - Aegean 
Generic, Theory-
based Activity 
 
Occasion 
 
People/Organizational Bodies 
Involved 
 
Type of Core Competence 
Leverage 
 
Core Competencies Leveraged 
 
 
 
 
 
Stretching and 
Leveraging 
Resources and 
Core 
Competencies 
Construction 
projects in Novel 
Locations 
- Construction division estimating department 
- Project director 
- Start-up team 
ILCC Leverage (employee 
mobilization) 
 
- Pursuing, estimating, securing and delivering 
projects at novel locations 
- Regional ‘pursuing and securing projects 
function’ 
- Regional procurement 
Process replication 
Intra-Regional 
Contractual 
Agreement Between 
a Real Estate and 
Development BU 
and a Construction 
Division 
- Project manager/construction 
- CEO, executive management team 
- Internal audit team (financial management 
function) 
OLC Integration and Leverage  
- Pursuing, estimating, securing and delivering 
projects at novel locations 
 
- Identifying and developing real estate 
opportunities 
- Director of construction business-unit 
- Construction division estimating department 
ILCC leverage (knowledge transfer – 
Virtual Team) 
- Project development manager and director of 
development 
ILCC leverage (Virtual Team) 
 
Intra-Regional 
Contractual 
Agreement Between 
the PPP/PFI BU and 
a Construction 
Division 
- CEO and executive management team OLC Integration and Leverage  
- Pursuing, estimating, securing and delivering 
projects at novel locations 
 
- ‘Structuring, securing and managing 
infrastructure and building concessions’ 
- Bid director (concessions BU) 
- Director of concessions BU 
- Director of construction division 
- Construction division estimating department 
ILCC Leverage 
- Pursuing and securing projects function 
- Internal audit team (financial management 
function) 
Process Replication 
Inter-Regional 
Project-Specific 
Contractual 
Agreement between 
Construction 
Divisions 
- Board of Directors 
- CEO and executive management team 
OLC Integration and leverage  
 
 
- Pursuing, estimating, securing and delivering 
projects at novel locations 
 
 
- Director of construction division 
- Project director and start-up team 
ILCC Leverage 
- Pursuing and securing projects function 
- Internal audit team (financial management 
function) 
Process replication 
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6.3.4 Improving Business Practices 
 
At Aegean, ‘improving business practices’ occurs either through strategic 
initiatives or ‘experiential learning’ at projects. In the first case, the implementation of 
such initiatives does not transcend regional centres and happens in a process similar to 
‘setting and communicating a strategic initiative’ (viz. Section 6.3.1, Figure 6.5). One 
example (viz. Section 6.3.1) was that related to the rolling out of ‘enterprise resource 
planning’ (ERP) and ‘managing information’ (MI) systems in order to regionally 
standardize practices in i) materials purchasing, ii) financial management and iii) project 
controls15. These three activities are the only ones standardized at a regional level.  
Capturing knowledge and innovations created at projects does not occur 
routinely. Any areas of improvement in the processes related to ERP are identified by 
the procurement and financial management functions during operations. The 
‘routinization’ of any improvements is proposed to the BoD (who control finances) and 
if approved, they become part of the standardized operating procedures of the ERP 
framework (I1:KK, I2:NG, I5:GG). Most frequent is the case when a project manager 
might wish to improve existing processes in a specific project context (I3:BH). As the 
director of one of the construction divisions of Aegean put it: 
 
‘The ERP only serves the finance people. So, what they monitor is the project’s 
implementation in terms of money spent only, not physical asset constructed. 
What we need is some framework to monitor work against what we are 
supposed to be building. So, I asked a project manager to improve the 
monitoring process, by monitoring the physical construction on top of the 
financials. Did we use it again? No. Could we have used it? Perhaps.’ (I8:NS) 
 
 Findings regarding ‘improving business practices’ are summarized on Table 6.5. 
The case study identifies the absence of systematic processes through which project-led 
learning (Brady and Davies, 2004; Davies and Hobday, 2005) can occur, indicating that 
knowledge and experience gained can be lost when projects end and their teams are 
dismantled.  In  addition,  the  absence of learning mechanisms (Prencipe and Tel, 2000) 
and systems to collect, analyze, store, disseminate and use information (Popper and 
Lipschitz, 1995), indicate that Aegean does not have the capacity for ‘self-reflective’ 
(Giddens, 1984) organizational learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978) except learning that 
                                               
15
 Also viz. Section 6.3.2, where the issue of ‘process replication’ within the context of stretching and 
leveraging resources and core competencies was discussed. 
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Table 6.5: Improving business practices - Aegean 
Organizational Routines People/Organizational Bodies Involved 
                  
 
Strategic Initiative 
 
Board of Directors  
Executive management team 
CEO 
Divisional, functional and BU directors 
Project-Specific Improvements Project Manager 
 
occurs as a result of ‘reflection’ during ‘regulating SA implementation’ routines. This 
observation is echoed in the words of one senior executive who stated:  
   
‘The problem starts from the fact that, in our group, we have not spent the time 
and effort to record knowledge gained and to document it so that it can be 
transferable and applicable in different contexts. That’s why usually knowledge is 
lost. And this happens because if a change is made in a process probably no one 
outside the project will care once the project is over.’ (I3:BH) 
 
6.3.5 Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
 
Findings regarding this activity are summarized on Table 6.6. Aegean has not yet 
developed a formalized succession planning and leadership development framework. 
Within both regions, each divisional, functional and BU director is responsible to 
develop and assess, ‘on the job’, his/her employees. It is an informal process based on a 
common understanding that exists, that superiors are responsible for recognizing 
managers with potential and helping them develop further. Along these lines, the 
development of management and organizational leadership capacity happens through 
functional and divisional directors informally monitoring individuals who show 
potential and giving them roles of increased responsibility as they may appear. The 
absence of structured programs to develop managers and leadership, means that 
individuals who may hold different positions of responsibility at the group are not being 
evaluated  against  a  set  of  ‘objective’  and ‘explicitly’ stated individual-level skills or 
profession-specific individual level core competencies, but rather on how they measure 
up   to   their   superiors’   expectations.   Consequently,   it   could   be  argued  that  the 
organizational leadership developed will be a perpetuation of the existing leadership’s 
personalities and traits (Rothwell, 2006), irrespective of whether these are the most 
appropriate or not.  
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Table 6.6: Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity –  
                   Aegean  
Organizational Routines People/ Organizational Bodies 
Involved 
- Promotion is based ‘on the job’ performance and 
assessment. 
- Divisional, function and BU directors are 
responsible for developing their own employees, 
assisted by regional HR organizing professional 
development seminars on an ad-hoc basis. 
- Senior managers of divisions, functions and 
business units need to be approved by executive 
management teams. 
- Directors of functions, divisions and business 
units are appointed by the BoD but need to be 
approved by the executive management team. 
- The executive management team elects annually 
the CEO. 
 
 
 
 
BU directors 
Division directors 
Functional directors 
Executive management teams 
Boards of directors 
Regional corporate HR function 
 
The role of regional executive management teams is to decide on the 
competence of their divisional, functional and BU directors. Executives do this through 
informal discussions with their personal networks and the other directors. At this 
hierarchical level, performance assessment implicitly includes an evaluation of their 
motivation and their continuous involvement in the achievement of organizational 
objectives (I2:NG, I1:KK). Ultimately, the BoD appoints the executive management 
team and the directors. However, the latter have to be approved by the former. 
The fact that Aegean does not have a structured system to monitor and guide 
competent managers intra-regionally - let alone inter-regionally - indicates that the 
Group carries the risk of competent managers being trapped within the divisions they 
belong in the first place. This, re-enforces the existence of a BU-mindset (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) already identified as inherent in Aegean’s 
configuration. In addition, the absence of a ‘horizontal organization’ mechanisms to 
rotate managers across regions, in combination with the absence of a ‘horizontal 
organization’ that can facilitate, maintain and develop social networks across regions at 
the operating core and middle management levels, carries the risk of developing 
organizational leadership with reduced social capital and a willingness to trust and learn 
from their colleagues (Penrose, 1959; 1995; Javidan, 1998; Drath, 2000). 
The case study so far has described the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ 
characteristics of the Aegean Group, as well as the ‘routines’ and ‘agents’ involved in 
the implementation of the five core competence development activities. The purpose of 
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the next section is to discuss how Aegean’s configuration influences the 
interrelationships between the five, generic, core competence development activities. 
 
6.4 Interrelationships between Activities  
  
This section integrates findings from sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.5 to identify the 
interrelationships between core competence development activities, as well as how 
these are influenced by Cyclone’s configuration (viz. Chapter 4, Section 4.4). 
Summarized findings from Tables 6.1 to 6.6 are displayed on Table 6.7.  
At Aegean, ‘exhibiting strategic intent (SI) and crafting strategic architecture 
(SA)’ occurs independently in the two regions the group is organized in. Consequently, 
one can talk about two simultaneous, largely independent, corporate strategies. Within 
each region, ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’ is integrated with routines for ‘regulating 
SA implementation’ through the development of an annual business plan. This allows 
management to regulate strategy execution in line with regional objectives, mainly 
through ‘reporting’ and ‘project selection’ routines. It does not however assist in the 
management of each region developing adequate ‘comprehension’ as to the objectives 
of the other region and consequently, of the Group as a whole. At the same time, 
Aegean’s configuration lacks: 
� Organizational learning mechanisms that can put experiential knowledge in 
future use by capturing and disseminating it corporate-wide; 
� Systematic processes to track, monitor and train competent employees. 
 
As a result, routines related to ‘improving business practices’ and the 
‘development of managerial and organizational leadership capacity’ are not a part of 
regional, nor group strategies. The consequences for Aegean are that it may find it 
harder to maintain the human capital that spearheads its growth efforts as current 
leadership retires or moves on. In addition, it could face obstacles when developing 
existing routines or selecting new successful routines as a function of experiential 
learning. Consequently, the effectiveness with which it will develop its core 
competencies could suffer. 
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Table 6.7: Activities, their Routines and Interrelationships - Aegean 
Generic, Theory-Based 
Activities 
Organizational Routines Key-People/ Organizational Bodies  
Exhibiting SI and Crafting 
SA  
� Setting and Communicating the Annual Budget and Business Plan 
� Setting and Communicating Long-Term Strategic Plans (3-5 years) 
� Setting and Communicating Strategic Initiatives 
 
Board of Directors/Shareholders 
Executive Management Team 
Divisional, Functional and BU Directors 
 
Stretching and Leveraging 
Resources and Core 
Competencies 
 
� Construction Projects in Novel Locations 
� Intra-Regional Contractual Agreements between a Property 
Development BU and a Construction Division 
� Intra-Regional Project-Specific Contractual Agreements between the 
Concessions Division and a Construction Division 
� Inter-Regional Project-Specific Contractual Agreement between Two 
Construction Divisions 
 
Executive Management Team 
Divisional, Functional and BU Directors 
Internal Audit Team (Financial Management 
Function)  
Pursuing and Securing Contracts Function 
 
 
Organizational Level 
Competence 
Integration and 
Leverage 
 
Project Director and Support Team 
Regionally Centralized Procurement Team 
Regionally Centralized Human Resources 
Functions 
 
 
Individual Level Core 
Competence Leverage 
 
Regionally Centralized Procurement Team 
Regionally Centralized Financial Management 
Function 
 
 
 
Process Replication 
Developing Managerial and 
Organizational Leadership 
Capacity 
� ‘On the Job’ Performance 
 
 
Divisional, Functional and BU Directors 
Executive Management Team 
Board of Directors/Shareholders 
Improving Business 
Practices 
� Strategic Initiatives 
� Project-Specific Operational Improvements 
 
Board of Directors/Shareholders 
Executive Management Team (especially CEO) 
Divisional, Functional and BU Directors 
Project Directors 
 
Regulating SA 
Implementation 
� Reporting 
� Project Selection Criteria 
 
Board of Directors/Shareholders 
Executive Management Team (especially CEO and CFO) 
Divisional, Functional and BU Directors 
Financial Management Function (including Internal Audit Team)Project 
Directors 
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6.5 Summarizing and Concluding Section 
 
The findings of this case study regarding the issues this research addresses are 
summarized on Table 6.8. When considering the influence of Aegean’s configuration on the 
effectiveness with which it can develop its core competencies, the following can be 
concluded: 
� Aegean’s regionalization could lead to ineffective use of resources from duplication of 
efforts across regions; 
� Intra-regionally, there are additional processes on top of ‘financial management’ and 
‘materials-purchasing’ that could be codified, standardized and replicated across 
projects, to save project managers the time of having to discover solutions that may 
have been already discovered in previous projects. This point is echoed in concerns 
voiced by executives, particularly regarding activities related to project execution. 
Indicatively, a senior executive stated: 
 
‘What would really help in the first stages of a project, would be to have a 
booklet, with method statements about activities that need to be undertaken. This 
would save lot of project managers a lot of time, as they would be able to plan 
and execute their work quicker.’ (I8:NS) 
 
The lack of method statements makes core competence leverage much more dependent 
on the tacit knowledge of project managers. This, combined with the absence of a 
‘horizontal organization’ to the specialized knowledge of individual organizational 
members across organizational units, could reduce Aegean’s ability to replicate 
effective routines and therefore leverage its core competencies; 
� The fact that ‘improving business practices’ is not integrated with the strategy process, 
combined with non-existence of organizational learning mechanisms, indicates that 
Aegean may not be able to improve existing routines or develop new ones as a function 
of experiential learning, and therefore runs the risk of repeating mistakes;  
� No mechanisms exist to promote the creation of social capital between the managers 
and leadership of the two regions. This, combined with the absence of institutionalized 
programmes for succession planning and leadership development, suggests that Aegean 
may not be able to sustain and develop its managerial and organizational leadership 
capacity in line with its corporate objectives. 
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Table 6.8: The Aegean Group: Summarizing 
Issues Findings 
 
 
Configuration 
Two autonomously operating regions, each diversified and internationalized in different construction 
markets (building, civil engineering, industrial), a real estate development BU (both Aegean Greece and 
Aegean-Cyprus), and PPP/PFI BU (only in Aegean Greece). Functions centralized at a regional level and 
facilitate some degree of process standardization in activities such as procurement and financial 
management, but only intra-regionally. Business units have performance responsibility but human resources 
are owned by regions and are coordinated regionally. 
Core Competencies � Pursuing, estimating, securing and delivering building, infrastructure and industrial construction contracts; 
� Identifying and developing real estate development opportunities; 
� Structuring, securing and managing infrastructure and buildings concessions (only within Aegean Greece). 
Dynamic Capabilities � Acquiring and integrating companies 
� Organically building core competencies in related markets with no prior experience. 
On the relationship between Aegean’s 
configuration and its ability to develop a 
corporate strategy, with optimal potential for 
implementation 
Aegean is regionally divisionalized. This creates a ‘regional’-mindset and does not allow setting the stage 
for strategy execution to take place in an environment of organization-wide collaboration. It also inhibits 
‘provisions’ that could be made, regarding corporate-wide trading, training and rotating of competent 
employees. 
On the relationship between Aegean’s 
configuration and the effectiveness with which 
it regulates its strategies 
 
Feedback mechanisms exist to allow strategies to be regulated, albeit regionally 
On the relationship between Aegean’s 
configuration and the effectiveness with which 
it stretches its resources and core 
competencies 
Employees are not mobilized across regions. This reduces Aegean’s ability to stretch its human resources 
corporate-wide, and may reduce its ability to leverage across regions the human-dependent, intangible 
element of core competencies, embedded in the tacit knowledge of individual employees. The absence of 
knowledge management systems may have similar implications. 
On the relationship between Aegean’s 
configuration and the effectiveness with which 
it can reconfigure its processes, structures and 
norms, as a result of organizational learning 
The absence of organizational learning mechanisms suggests that Aegean may not be able to capture 
knowledge created and effectively deploy it to other projects, nor utilize it to undergo necessary 
organizational transformations. 
On the relationship between Aegean’s 
configuration and the effectiveness with which 
it develops managerial and organizational 
leadership capacity 
The absence of succession planning and leadership development programs, suggests that Aegean may not be 
able to intentionally exploit informal networks and intra-organizational relationships between employees 
and develop the ‘social capital’ of its management and leadership. 
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 Reviewing the findings one cannot be certain whether Aegean will successfully 
align its organizational resources with the requirements of its industry environment in 
the long term. However, even in the case that it does, this would likely constitute a 
passive reaction to external forces, which, sooner rather than later, are bound to find the 
group vulnerable to external threats beyond its control. What the findings allow one to 
suggest is that, with its current configuration, Aegean may not be able - in the long run - 
to effectively pursue strategies for the development of its core competencies.  
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Chapter 7: Albion Plc 
 
7.1 Albion’s Early History 
 
 Albion was founded in 1909 in the United Kingdom (UK). Its first contract 
involved laying new track and installing additional generating plant at a power house. 
By the 1920s, Albion had diversified into power and energy. In 1922, its founders 
established a company called ‘Power Investments’ to develop and fund hydroelectric 
projects. Overseas work was massively curtailed during the 2nd World War, but that 
changed during the 1950s. The 1950s also saw ‘Power Investments’ acquiring Albion. 
During the 1960s, the company constructed a major portion of a network of overhead 
power lines in the UK, a number of power projects in Malaysia, Kenya, and 
Tanganyika, as well as water systems in the Jordan Valley. In 1969, ‘Power 
Investments’, which still owned Albion, was taken over by a cable manufacturer. The 
principle benefit for the cable manufacturer was that installation work secured by 
Albion provided some volume for cables sales, capturing market share. During the 
1970s, the company took advantage of the booming railway electrification market. The 
1980s saw further diversification with commercial building as a major activity. A 
strategic acquisition substantially enhanced the group’s mechanical and electrical 
capability and wider activity coverage. In the 1990s, rail privatization and the - then - 
newly introduced PPP/PFI procurement route provided opportunities for growth, which 
Albion decided to exploit by entering those markets. In 1997, the decision was taken to 
dispose of all cables businesses by 1999. It was at that point that the corporate entity 
began trading publicly under the name of ‘Albion plc’.  
 At the time of writing, Albion was an internationally diversified construction 
services and investment business. It had a turnover close to £10bn, was valued at £1.7bn 
and operated in the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, the United States, South 
America, North Africa, Middle East and Asia/Pacific regions, employing around 50,000 
people. 
 
7.2 Recent Evolutionary Path and Albion’s Present State 
 
 Figure 7.1 displays how Albion’s ‘role’ in the production of the built 
environment and ‘structural characteristics’ of its configuration  have  evolved  in  
relation   to   notable  strategic intents its leadership has exhibited, strategic architectures  
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Figure 7.1: Evolutionary Profiling of Albion plc 
YEAR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
‘Role’ in the Production of the 
Built Environment’ 
Developer, builder, operator Developer, builder, operator Developer, builder, operator and 
professional services provider. 
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it has crafted and investments it has made1. 
During the sale of the cable manufacturing business (1996-1999) Albion 
grouped autonomous market-focused business units (BUs) under three sector-focused 
groups: ‘rail’, ‘civil engineering’ and ‘building’. Through these, Albion played in each 
sector the role of construction services provider. This organizational restructuring was 
accompanied by the appointment of a managing director (MD) for each BU and a sector 
managing director (SMD) for each grouping, with clear lines of authority, responsibility 
and accountability.  
Initially, when the focus was clearly on securing more stable and secure 
earnings, the plc’s overall objectives were to: 
� Create stable workload for the group’s BUs; 
� Improve returns on capital investments; 
� Improve operational efficiencies in key business processes. 
 
 Albion’s expansion plan was founded on acquiring businesses that would 
complement or supplement its existing competencies in specific market areas it was 
already active in. Such a strategy necessitated continuous integration of BUs, something 
pursued through on-going ‘organizational restructuring programs’ (1997-1998, 2000 
and 2004). 
 In addition to consolidating and growing in the three construction sectors it was 
already active in, Albion took advantage of the PPP/PFI procurement route introduced 
by the UK government in the early 1990s and decided to enter and pursue growth in that 
market. It did so by building on its existing strengths of ‘design and build’ and 
experience from ‘early contractor involvement’ contracts. As involvement with PFI/PPP 
projects grew (1998-1999), a fourth sector-grouping was created to coordinate market-
focused portfolios of PFI/PPP projects. Its creation reflected the increasing importance 
of PFI/PPP contracts for Albion, as well as the intent to better manage their 
interrelationships with the rest of the plc’s BUs. The aptly named ‘Investments’ sector 
unit, undertook ‘life-cycle management of concession contracts, procuring construction 
and operations services from Albion’s other autonomous BUs. In that capacity, 
‘Investments’ acted as a quasi-client creating workload for the group’s other units, in 
parallel with generating income from equity investments in concessions.  
                                               
1
 The display is in the form of an ‘event-flow network’. Interrelationships are demonstrated with the use 
of ‘line-arrows’ (notice that the thread always starts from a strategic intent the group has set) in order to 
explain how the new conditions emerge from previous decisions and actions.  
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 1999 saw Albion strengthening its focus towards improving key business 
processes2. Efforts were made for ‘risk management’ practices to be embedded in BU-
specific operating systems and in 2000 an effort was made to roll-out a corporate-wide 
‘risk and opportunity management framework’ covering commercial, safety, 
environmental and reputational risks. In 2001, an attempt was made to apply this 
framework’s principles to the processes through which Albion’s BUs selected projects 
and investment opportunities. 
In addition, Albion’s leadership decided in 2000 to pursue a greater degree of 
internationalization. The intent was set to replicate the successful UK business model in 
the US, followed by the acquisition of a major US building contractor in 2002. 
International expansion was also pursued towards Asia/Pacific, with the acquisition of a 
50% stake in a leading construction company in Hong-Kong3. In 2004, Albion exhibited 
the intent of developing a ‘professional’ services business that, coupled with a 
customer-focused strategy and early involvement in the project process, would provide 
clients with a single point of contact with the plc’s BUs. The objective was to provide 
clients with a professional-oriented service regarding activities at the front end of the 
project’s life-cycle (e.g. master planning, design management, procurement methods) 
while exploiting the interrelationships existing between the plc’s four industry-focused 
sector-units of BUs. For that reason, a BU called ‘Albion Management’ was created.  
 A review of Albion’s recent evolutionary profiling allows the following 
observations. First, the group has pursued a strategy of growth by related diversification 
in the construction industry. Second, it has organically grown in the PPP/PFI sector, 
leading to the creation and growth of a sector-focused organizational unit. Third, the 
group has moved from having adopted the roles of ‘developer’, ‘constructor’ and 
‘operator’ of built assets, to adopting the role of ‘professional service’ provider, which it 
intends to use in order to ‘integrate’ the different ‘role-skills’ it possesses and develop 
into a life-cycle service provider. To develop the capabilities required on that role, an 
autonomous BU was originally set-up and charged with the task. 
Albion originated from a construction services and investments background and, 
following a period of ownership by a cables manufacturer, re-emerged to develop into a 
leading diversified international construction services provider. Early involvement with 
                                               
2
 This does not imply that systems to perform these processes did not exist, but that their application was 
specifically reinforced, sometimes with the start-up and implementation or corporate wide programs (e.g. 
risk management).  
3
 Pursuit of growth in the PPP/PFI markets, internationalization and an effort to improve and standardize 
key business processes was being simultaneously pursued up to the time when this research begun.  
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PPP/PFI projects has allowed the company to solidify its position as a leading 
concessions manager in the UK and abroad. What its brief historical review and 
evolutionary profiling suggest, is that Albion has developed the following core 
competencies: 
� Pursuing, securing and executing ‘building’, ‘civil engineering’ and ‘rail 
engineering’ construction projects; 
� Structuring, securing, delivering and managing PPP/PFI concessions. 
 
 In addition, the recent evolutionary profiling provides some useful insights 
regarding the ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece et al., 1997) of Albion and the strategies 
and tactics through which it pursues the development of its core competencies. Thus, 
Albion: 
� Acquires - and may integrate - companies in order to expand its geographical 
scope of operations and complement core competencies it already possesses; 
� Develops organically (e.g. Albion Investments, Albion Professional Services) 
the capabilities and core competencies that may be market-related but revolve 
around a different ‘role’ involved in the production of the built environment; 
� Improves business practices from the centre and tries to disseminate best 
practice to the BUs through BU-specific liaisons. 
 
Other core competencies and dynamic capabilities may also be present. 
 
7.2.1 Structural, Functioning and Agency Characteristics  
 
As Figure 2.44 shows, Albion groups projects in autonomous, market-focused 
BUs, which also reflect their ‘national’ operating context (e.g. Commercial 
Construction US, Utility Solutions UK, Albion Rail US, Albion Concessions US). BUs 
are positioned under three construction-related sector groupings (‘civil engineering’, 
‘building’ and ‘rail’) and one related to PPP/PFI investments. Human resources are 
owned by BUs, which have autonomy over their allocation. Each BU represents an 
organizational level capability (potentially competence) in a specific market rather than 
an orientation towards a ‘client type’ (I2:DV).  
                                               
4
 The figure presented here is an adaptation of an organizational chart that the researcher received from 
one of the interviewees, in order to conceal the identity of the ICM.  
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Figure 7.2: Structure of Albion plc 
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Within the construction-related sector-groupings, the services BUs offer reflect 
the extent of Albion’s ‘horizontal integration’ (e.g. Building and Refurbishment UK vs. 
Commercial Construction US) and ‘vertical integration’ (e.g. Architecture and 
Construction Management US, Commercial Construction US). Albion ‘Investments’ 
has a unique structure. Each  PFI  project  is  a  company  on  its  own, but there are 
permanent relationships between projects. There is a project-grouping called ‘Roads’, 
focusing on road projects; ‘Health’, with different partners, focusing on hospital 
projects and ‘Education’, pursuing schools projects. The reasons behind PPP/PFI 
project-grouping are the market-specific similarities in bidding processes between 
projects (I3:DV).  
Regarding construction-related BUs, ‘market’ and ‘sector’ focus is strengthened 
by decentralization of authority and performance responsibility to BU managing 
directors (MDs) (I1:JK; I2:DV; I9:AMcN). Each BU managing director (MD) reports 
upwards to a sector managing director (SMD), who is responsible for the performance 
of a ‘sector-grouping’ of BUs (e.g. civil engineering). SMDs are responsible for 
managing interrelationships between the BUs of their sector, as well as coordinating 
their sector’s BUs with the rest of the group (I1:JK; I2:DV).  
Albion’s four sector-groupings are coordinated by Albion’s ‘chief executive’s 
team’, which consists of the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief financial officer 
(CFO), the director of a small, corporate, ‘planning and development’ division  and  the  
four  SMDs.  The  ‘chief   executive’s   team’   reports   to  the  board  of  directors 
(BoD) of which the CEO is the only executive member5 (I1:JK, I2:DV; I6:IN; 
I9:AMcN).  
Albion has chosen to play a number of roles in the production of the built 
environment. Through its grouping of BUs around construction industry sectors, it is 
involved as a constructor of built assets in markets within each of those sectors. 
Through ‘Albion Investments’, Albion plays the roles of ‘developer’ and ‘operator’ of 
built assets. It is a diversified and divisionalized bureaucratic organization, with some 
features of a professional organization. In pursuit of a strategy towards related 
diversification, Albion has chosen ‘market-focus’ as a basis for project grouping in 
order to manage important ‘workflow interdependencies’ that allowed it to align its 
supply chain to benefit clients (and itself) from greater efficiencies (Mintzberg, 1979; 
                                               
5
 The BoD appoints the members of the chief executive’s team. The CEO is proposed by the chief 
executive’s team to the BoD for approval. Additionally, sector and BU managing directors are appointed 
by the BoD following their recommendation by the chief executive’s team. 
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1989). This has created however ‘structural’ boundaries between BUs that have ended 
up operating as ‘silos’. 
The primary coordination mechanism is standardization of outputs, which is 
how the group controls the autonomous market-focused BUs. There is limited vertical 
decentralization of authority, as BU MDs and their senior management teams are 
ultimately responsible for their BU’s performance, even though they are being directly 
monitored by the chief executive’s team and supported by corporate functions. These 
characteristics, elevate Albion’s chief executive’ team and BU MDs (and their 
management teams) as a key part of the organization, as it constitutes the people who 
actually manage interrelationships between autonomous BUs, while at the same time 
are responsible for setting and implementing strategies.  
The corporate centre is very small since each BU operates autonomously and 
corporate functions are geared towards (I1:JK, I2:DV, I5:AS, I6:IN):  
� Human resource management: in terms of remuneration of senior executives and 
succession planning;  
� Financial management; 
� Providing ‘Quality Assurance’6 regarding the business processes the plc’s BUs 
follow, through the centrally coordinated: 
- Internal audit function7; 
- Risk and opportunity management framework8; 
� Due diligence on acquisitions and advice on post-acquisition integration, 
through the centrally-based ‘planning and development division’;  
� Setting minimum standards regarding ‘business practices’. 
 
  Corporate functions are responsible for maintaining the ‘social networks’ 
through which individuals from different BUs are brought together and exchange 
                                               
6
 ‘Quality Assurance’ was a corporate wide program launched in 2002 after a strategic review initiated by 
the CEO at the time, to ensure the quality and standards of operations throughout the group, regarding 
strategic business processes such as ‘bidding’, ‘financial management’ and ‘health and safety’.  
7
 The internal audit function ensures financial management practices comply with Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations. It does so by identifying 
potential risk areas in projects and then establishing a project-specific schedule whereby someone from 
the function will monitor proper implementation of corporate-wide processes, in terms of financial 
management and reporting. 
8
 The most operationally involved function from the assurance framework is that of ‘risk and opportunity 
management’, an integral part of processes such as tendering reviews and reporting. The function is 
centrally coordinated and has two main purposes: 
� Assessing and communicating risks up the hierarchy for their management to be appropriately 
allocated; 
� Identifying risks and opportunities when a new ‘project’ is considered. 
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knowledge through ‘socialization’. The ‘risk and opportunity management framework’, 
the HR function and the ‘planning and development’ division, organize fora twice a 
year for their members to socialize (I6:IN)9. These fora help in establishing and 
maintaining relationships between individuals across BUs (Tsai, 2000; Markides, 2002). 
It should be noted though that the US and UK BUs are much more strongly represented 
in these fora than other BUs. Though these fora are an important means for maintaining 
inter-BU employee relations and transferring knowledge through ‘socialization’, 
reliance upon socialization renders the functional-related competencies fragile as the 
fora operate relatively autonomously from the processes operating within the fora. 
  In addition, within individual BUs, ‘special interest groups’ (SIGs) tend to 
spring-up almost in an unstructured way (I1:JK). Those tend to be mostly in ‘support-
type’ functional areas, where there is a functional director at the BU senior management 
with overall responsibility for them. They do not transcend BU boundaries however, 
apart from the case where a sector managing director (MD) agrees to sponsor them 
(I4:PS, I7:JF).   
  At Albion, the only processes that are actually standardized corporate-wide are 
those related to financial management and reporting. In addition, there is some degree 
of standardization of work processes, especially related to the ‘risk and opportunity 
management framework’ and the ‘internal audit function’. Although consistency in 
operational business processes exists between BUs in the US and the UK, there is less 
consistency when considering BUs in countries such as Dubai or Hong Kong that do not 
have the same management systems as the rest of the group (I1:JK; I2:DV; I5:AS; 
I6:IN). The reason for this is that Albion Dubai and Albion Hong Kong both have a 
unique ownership structure and culture that is strongly influenced by the local context in 
which they operate10.  
 Regarding the extent of ‘skills standardization’, the following has been 
observed. Each BU has its own ‘competency profiles’ for individual employees and 
attempts to standardize function-specific skills. At a plc level however, skills 
standardization is pursued only for those individuals who have been chosen by 
corporate succession planning as potential future leadership (I7:JK).  
                                               
9
 Other corporate functions do not. 
10
 In the case of Albion Dubai, the BU operates in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) where partnership 
with a local sponsor is compulsory by law. In the case of Albion Hong Kong, the ownership stake of 
Albion plc on the local company is 50%. In addition, that shareholding has been only recently acquired, 
which means that not enough time has passed for the possibilities of harmonizing business practices with 
the rest of Albion plc to be exploited. 
 
164 
 
Table 7.1 summarizes this case study’s findings with respect to the ‘structural’, 
‘functioning’ and ‘agency’ characteristics of Albion’s configuration.  
 
7.3 Core Competence Development Activities 
 
 This section presents and describes the company-specific routines through which 
Albion conducts each generic, corporate-level activity that has been proposed (viz. 
Chapter 4) as being influential to core competence development strategy execution. As 
a result, it identifies and describes the role of the individuals/organizational bodies most 
integral to the implementation of the routines identified.  
 
7.3.1 Exhibiting Strategic Intent and Crafting Strategic Architecture 
 
In Albion, this activity is conducted through the following three organizational 
routines. First, is the routine related to ‘setting and communicating the objectives of a 
strategic initiative’ (Figure 7.3). This is usually the result of ideas or concerns that have 
been voiced from BU senior management, or any member of the chief executive’s team. 
They are undertaken following a strategic review of the group’s operations by the plc’s 
leadership. Strategic reviews do not happen at regular intervals, but rather when unique 
external or internal circumstances necessitate it. Following a strategic review, which is 
coordinated by the chief executive’s team, the BoD might decide on setting a new 
strategic direction for Albion (as in the decision to enter a new market, such as PFI) or 
approve the implementation of an internal program for change (as in the creation of the 
‘Assurance’ framework). Following such a decision, the chief executive’s team will 
communicate down the hierarchy to the BU MDs the direction the plc intends to follow 
and will ask their contribution as to what they think about the strategies with which it 
can be achieved. Corporate functions will also be asked for similar contributions. The 
implementation of any strategic initiatives in the form of projects/programs for change 
that might arise from this process always become  a  direct responsibility of one 
member of the chief executive’s team - perhaps even the CEO himself depending on the 
strategic importance of the initiative (I6:AS, I5:PP). This individual is responsible for 
drafting and executing an implementation plan, and coordinate with BU MDs who will 
have to incorporate any emerging issues in their BU’s annual and long-term plans. 
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Table 7.1: Albion’s Configuration Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Structural 
Characteristics 
Market-Focused 
Strategy (project-
grouping) 
� Grouped on ‘location’ under market-focused BUs, which are in-turn grouped under industry-
focused sectors. 
 
 
 
Horizontal 
Organization/ Degree 
of Decentralization 
 
� Small corporate centre – functions have a ‘supporting’ and ‘consulting’ role; 
� BUs operate autonomously; 
� Each BU MD responsible for his/her BU; 
� Sector MDs coordinate BUs and resolve conflicts that may arise between them; 
� Chief executive’s management team coordinates BUs and sectors; 
� Relationships between BUs are governed by project-specific contractual joint-venture agreements. 
 
 
Procedural 
Characteristics 
 
 
Coordination 
Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
� ‘Performance’ control regarding BUs - standardization of outputs; 
� ‘Action planning’ regarding managerial and organizational leadership development; 
� Limited standardization of processes (in cases such as: Risk and Opportunity Framework, Internal 
Audit Function, Financial Management) corporate-wide, except in the case of Albion Dubai and 
Albion Hong-Kong. 
 
Agency 
Characteristics 
 
Key-People/ 
Organizational Parts 
 
� Strategic Apex (chief executive’s team and BU MDs); 
� Financial management; 
� ‘Assurance’ activities (Risk and Opportunity Framework). 
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An example would be the strategic initiative towards ‘professionalization’ of 
services, which led to the creation of ‘Albion Management’ as an autonomous BU in 
2004 (viz. Section 7.2). In that occasion, the group’s leadership decided there was a 
market for offering professional services to its clients that were relevant to the front-end 
of the project (feasibility, design management, project management). In addition, it was 
believed that entering that market would create a point of entry for other BUs of Albion. 
‘Albion Management’ was created to develop that capability, drawing from the group’s 
existing resources. From the inception of the plan, the CEO personally oversaw and 
championed the initiative. Even after its creation, the MD of Albion Management 
continued to report directly to the CEO (instead of a sector MD), a testament to the 
initiative’s strategic importance.  
Second, is the routine for ‘setting and communicating the annual budget and 
business plan’ (Figure 7.4). This takes place annually, between September and 
December. Each September, each BU proposes an annual budget and operating  plan for 
the following year. Those are then aggregated at a sector level, and then at a plc level. 
The corporate director of the ‘risk and opportunity framework’ assists sector managing 
directors (SMDs) and the chief executive’s team with the integration of BU-specific and 
sector-specific plans respectively, to ensure clear comprehension of the risks to be 
managed and their allocation to appropriate risk owners.   
 
Figure 7.3: Setting and Communicating the Objectives of a Strategic Initiative 
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 Once the plc’s annual plan is ready, it is submitted to the BoD for approval. The 
annual business plan of each BU contains a ‘risk and opportunity’ assessment11, which 
sets the stage for the financial management-related risks that will be reviewed 
throughout the following year by the plc’s internal audit function. Though integrated 
and approved at a plc level, the implementation of BU-specific plans is entirely a BU 
responsibility. As one senior corporate director noted: 
 
‘We give our operating companies a great degree of autonomy and they will get 
their medium term and long term strategies reviewed and agreed, but then, how 
they will actually go to deliver them is their own responsibility.’ (I4:PS).  
 
 BU annual business plans are essentially a contract between the corporate centre 
and each BU, against which BU MDs have to deliver. Incentive schemes revolve around 
performance with respect to annual budgets. 
 In addition, the annual business plan contains targets regarding the personal 
development of individuals who have been identified as potential leadership of the 
group. These targets are set during the ‘annual peoples review’, which is centrally 
monitored and coordinated by the corporate human resources (HR) function, with the 
contribution of BU-specific HR teams, and coincides annually with setting and 
communicating the annual business plan (I1:JK, I4:PS). This also sets the tone for BUs 
to monitor the development of their managers, regarding: i) the type of projects they 
work for and the scope of the work they do, ii) the clients they work for and iii) their 
key contacts (I4:PS). 
In parallel to reviewing the annual budget and proposing the annual business 
plan, each BU’s MD and their senior management team are responsible to develop a 
medium-term, three-year plan for their unit, the third routine through which SI is 
exhibited and SA crafted. Medium-term plans are aggregated at a ‘sector’ and ‘plc’ 
level in a similar manner to the annual plans (see Figure 7.4). They include financial 
projections and are reviewed annually at all BU, ‘sector’ and ‘plc’ levels. In the case 
that a new strategic direction is chosen, it is the responsibility of the chief executive’s 
team to communicate this to the BU MDs and the latter’s responsibility to implement 
them. The responsibility of the chief executive’s team then becomes to monitor the 
performance of each BU against targets and manage interrelationships (and potentially 
conflicts) that may exist between them. 
                                               
11
 This is developed by BU risk management champions, is  signed off by BU managing directors, and 
then forwarded sector managing director. 
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i) Annual budgets 
ii) Operating plans 
 
 
 
 
 The routines described in this section and the people/organizational bodies 
involved in their implementation are summarized on Table 7.2. What can be identified 
is that, simultaneously to being a routine for exhibiting SI and crafting SA, ‘setting and 
communicating the annual budget and business plan’ is also a routine through which the 
implementation of the plc’s medium term, three-year plan is ‘regulated’ by the chief 
executive’s team and BU managing directors. Along these lines, the role of the chief 
executive team and BU managing directors can be understood as both ‘designing’ and 
‘regulating’ the context of other routines related to setting and executing strategy.  
However, no provisions for rewarding BU directors for ‘cross-BU’ thinking are 
made, highlighting the BU-mindset12 inherent in Albion’s configuration. Consequently, 
although implementation of routines related to exhibiting SI and crafting SA are a 
corporate-wide responsibility, the primary coordination mechanism (standardization of 
BU outputs) in place, does not set the stage for SA to be implemented by a cohort of BU 
managers working horizontally across the organization (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). 
Despite this BU-mindset however, the incorporation of ‘people-development’ objectives 
in the annual business plan of each BU indicates that the plc recognizes the importance 
of managing corporate-wide the human resources which embody its core competencies. 
                                               
12
 Viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6. 
 
Figure 7.4: Setting and Communicating the Annual Business Plan  
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Table 7.2: Exhibiting SI and Crafting SA  - Albion 
Organizational Routines People/ Organizational Bodies Involved 
Setting and Communicating the 
Annual Business Plan 
 
The Chief Executive’s Team 
The Director of the Planning and Development 
Division 
The Managing Directors of BUs (and their senior 
management teams) 
The director of ‘Risks and Opportunities 
Management Framework’ 
 
Setting and Communicating Long-
Term Strategic Plans (3-5 years) 
 
The Chief Executive’s Office 
The Director of the Planning and Development 
Division 
The Managing Directors of BUs (and their senior 
management teams) 
The Director of ‘Risks and Opportunities 
Management Framework’ 
 
Setting and Communicating the 
Objectives of a Strategic Initiative 
 
Managing Directors of BUs and their senior 
management teams 
Business Stream directors and their supporting 
financial controllers) 
Albion’s Corporate Commercial Director 
Planning and Development Division 
 
. 
7.3.2 Regulating Strategic Architecture Implementation 
 
This activity is conducted through two major organizational routines: i) 
‘reporting’ and ii) ‘project’ and ‘investment’ selection. Regarding reporting, ‘project 
reporting’ will be discussed first. The projects’ ‘cost structure’ and ‘risks register’13 are 
prepared from the bidding stage. This creates a framework for what will be reviewed 
throughout the project’s life-cycle, as well as what the review criteria will be. Upon 
project award, a file containing all pre-award information is handed over by the 
estimating/bidding team to the project execution team, who then works to expand it. 
Project reporting occurs weekly within each BU, with project reports integrated all the 
way up to the BU-level, both in terms of financials and risks mitigated.  
Monthly, project reports are integrated as part of the ‘monthly operating 
reviews’. These reviews occur between sector managing directors (SMDs) and each of 
                                               
13
 The purpose of ‘risk and opportunity’ management is to drive an action plan to mitigate risks and then 
monitor delivery. 
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the MDs of the BUs under their responsibility. The participants from the BUs’ senior 
management teams vary, but the MD, finance director (FD) and commercial directors 
are always present. Communications between the chief executive’s team and BU 
management takes place to review the progress of strategy implementation and deal 
with any emerging issues if necessary. Monthly operating reviews looks at performance 
against budget, focusing on i) profit, ii) cash flow, iii) forward workflow that has been 
secured and how this is changing, and iv) monitoring against projections.  
Every three months, BUs go through a ‘quarterly review’, with the same 
participants as the monthly review. At the end of the quarterly review meetings, the 
corporate head of the risk and opportunity management framework assists the BU MDs 
and SMDs to draft a report on i) the identification of new risks, ii) the treatment 
proposed for their mitigation (pending approval) and iii) any other issues that may have 
arisen. These are then disseminated to and communicated back down the hierarchy to 
close the communication cycle. Based on the results of the quarterly reviews, the plc’s 
annual budget is re-forecast. 
Moreover, all BUs go through an ‘all-day review’ every four months14.  The 
participants of these reviews are the BU MDs, their SMD, the CEO, the chief financial 
officer (CFO) and occasionally the BU finance directors (FD). During those meetings, 
the CEO will discuss with each BU MD: 
� The issues facing their business; 
� The impact on their medium term plan; 
� The impact on their forecast; 
� The risk and assurance issues involved. 
 
 On top of that, discussions are held regarding i) what the business is doing, ii) 
where is it going, and iii) what needs to be changed to meet the budget. 
The ‘reviews’ described so far, are routines through which strategy execution is 
evaluated and are hence ‘nodal’ to integrating emerging strategies with intended ones. 
In cybernetic and management control theory (Beer, 1959; 1969; Berry et al., 1995), 
these routines constitute ‘feedback’ mechanisms through which Albion’s controllers 
regulate the behaviour of the plc, depending on the external and internal influences that 
act upon them. The difference between the ‘quarterly’ and the ‘monthly’ reviews is that 
                                               
14
 Albion Management undergoes an additional six-month review by the CEO, because of its strategic 
importance to the group’s intent to professionalize and adopt a greater service management orientation 
towards key clients.  
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the results of the former are documented and disseminated at a group level, whereas 
those of the latter are not. 
 The second routine for regulating strategic architecture implementation is that of 
‘project’ and ‘investment’ selection. The routines in place for project selection 
regarding a) PFI/PPP and b) construction-service projects are of particular interest here, 
as it is these projects that Albion routinely undertakes. In Albion plc, those routines 
follow principles set out in: 
� The ‘risk and opportunity management framework’; 
� The ‘project tender review’. 
 
Both have to comply with each BU’s ‘operating systems manual’. 
The ‘project tender review’ in all BUs is a key routine for managing risks. 
Depending on i) project size and ii) risks identified, the threshold level of the project 
might require approval from the relevant sector managing director (SMD), the chief 
executive’s team, or even the board of directors15. In the UK and the US, corporate ‘risk 
and opportunity assessment’ leads the effort in standardizing the processes followed by 
BUs across the plc, regarding the project selection process. 
 Regarding the selection criteria for PPP/PFI projects, whether interest in bidding 
will be exhibited is based on a judgment related to the probability of securing it and that 
is determined following a consideration of the ensuing factors: 
� Whether it sits within the group’s skills sets; 
� The project’s scale; 
� What the workload is with further PFI. Does Albion and its BUs have the  
capacity to bid for a specific project at that specific time; 
� Whether the client is one that Albion finds reliable and easy to work with. 
 
‘Project selection’ routines of Albion Management often transcend autonomous 
BUs and in the case of PFI/PPP projects, input during the bidding process may include 
external partners.  
                                               
15
 Those threshold levels of decision making authority are specified in what is internally known to Albion 
as the ‘Document of Decision-Making Authority’, which applies corporate-wide. Key project-selection 
criteria are: 
� The level of return the project will make on the investment of resources; 
� The project’s risk profile; 
� The contract’s operating costs; 
� Resource constraints.  
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In the case when a ‘strategic investment’ needs to be made, such as an 
acquisition, the process varies. The need to acquire a company may be voiced from a 
senior BU level and/or the chief executive’s team level. The corporate ‘planning and 
development’ function plays a consulting role on the ‘fit’ between the company targeted 
for acquisition and the rest of the group. In addition, it undertakes the responsibility to 
organize and coordinate all due-diligence activities prior to the decision to go through 
with the acquisition. Depending on the level of expenditure, approval for the investment 
may have to be obtained from the BoD16 (I2:DV).  
The organizational routines and the individuals/organizational bodies involved 
in regulating strategic architecture implementation are summarized on Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Regulating SA Implementation - Albion 
Organizational Routines People/ Organizational Bodies Involved 
 
Reporting Reviews 
� All day review (4 
months) 
� Quarterly reviews 
� Monthly reviews 
� Annual Business Review 
 
For (1) and (2): the ‘chief executive’s team’ as well as BU 
MD and BU finance director (FD). The CEO meets 
directly with each BU MD. 
For (3): sector-MDs and their BU MDs, BU FDs and 
Commercial Directors. 
For (4):BU MDs, sector-MDs, chief executive’s 
management team, CFO, Corporate ‘Risk and 
Opportunity’ Framework. 
 
 
 
Project Selection 
 
For PFI/PPP Projects: PFI/PPP bid directors, Albion 
Capital Projects MD, ‘Investments’ sector-MD (from chief 
executive’s office). 
For Albion Management: Albion Management  MD, other 
BU MDs, the sector-MD or sector-MDs (from the Chief 
Executive’s Office) 
For all other BUs: BU MDs, sector-MDs (from Chief 
Executive’s Office) 
 
Evaluating Acquisitions 
 
 
Chief Executive’s management team, sector-MDs, BU 
MDs, Corporate ‘Planning and Development’, Corporate 
and BU Finance divisions, Acquisition ‘due diligence’ 
team. 
 
The routines described in this section constitute ‘feedback’ (Beer, 1959; Berry et 
al., 1995) mechanisms through which the plans decided upon during ‘exhibiting 
strategic intent and crafting strategic architecture implementation’ are regulated. The 
                                               
16
 A more detailed description of the pre- and post-acquisition stages will be provided in the following 
section of this case study, as it overlaps with organizational routines Albion has in place regarding core 
competence leverage. 
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findings of this section confirm the indications made in the previous one, regarding the 
role of the plc’s chief executive’s team and BU senior management as ‘controllers’ of 
strategy execution. 
 
7.3.3 Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies  
 
       In section 7.2.1 it was proposed that Albion’s core competencies are: 
� Pursuing, securing and executing ‘building’, ‘civil engineering’ and ‘rail 
engineering’ construction projects; 
� Structuring, securing and managing PPP/PFI concession contracts. 
 
  At a plc level, stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies 
happens in the following circumstances. First, in the case of PPP/PFI projects (Figure 
7.5), with respect to: 
� Structuring and securing concession contracts in a way that also secures work 
for Albion’s construction BUs;  
� Managing the concession throughout its life-cycle, by coordinating Albion’s 
BUs involved. 
 
  PPP/PFI projects are a responsibility of ‘Albion Concessions’, which falls under 
the ‘Investments’ sector of the plc (viz. Figure 7.2). To better comprehend how core 
competence leverage occurs in this case, a description of the process through which 
Albion pursues PPP/PFI project opportunities as they appear on the horizon is 
necessary. Once a project opportunity appears, PPP/PFI bid directors communicate 
internally with Albion’s BUs and externally with partners to structure the concession 
contracts during the pre-award (bidding) stage. As pursuing the project will involve 
considerable capital expenditure, the project’s viability has to be evaluated by ‘Albion 
Concessions’ first and then presented to the BoD by the CEO for approval.  
  As, essentially the bid is a project, bid directors are usually chosen on the basis of 
their project management skills/strengths. The bid director is the focal point of 
communication between project participants during the bidding stage, although intra-
organizational communication takes place at various levels depending on the issues that 
need to be addressed. This indicates that, for the case of PPP/PFI, lateral linkages that 
cut across autonomous BUs are in place.  
 
174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following project award, the concession managers (who may or may not be the 
bid directors who managed the bidding stage) manage the transition between 
‘construction’ and ‘maintenance’ as those have been defined while structuring and 
securing the concession contract. Throughout the project’s life-cycle, the efforts of the 
bid director and the concession manager are being overseen by the sector managing 
director (SMD) of Albion Investments, who coordinates with other SMDs responsible 
for BUs that will be involved in the same project when necessary (I2:DV, I7:JF, I8:PP, 
I9:AMcN). 
In light of what has been described in this section so far, it can be understood 
that the core competence of structuring, securing and managing PPP/PFI contracts is 
embodied in bid directors and concession managers of Albion’s ‘Investments’ sector-
grouping and the chief executive team members who supervise and coordinate their 
efforts.  
Figure 7.5: Core Competence Leverage at PPP/PFI Projects 
Opportunity 
Evaluation 
Bidding Process Operations Construction Design 
Financing (SPV) 
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The second case of ‘stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies’ 
is related to the services offered by Albion Management in collaboration with other  
BUs  of  the  plc  (Figure 7.6). Following a client’s need for front-end project activities 
(feasibility, design management, potentially project management), Albion management 
would try to set-up a team of experts drawing individuals from BUs when necessary, to 
offer this client a more ‘holistic’ and ‘professional-oriented’ service. This is a case 
where a project-specific team is formed to serve the needs of a specific-client. 
Essentially, human resources are stretched across BUs and integrated by Albion 
Management, to leverage’ - on a project-basis - the knowledge of individual employees 
(I8: PP, I9:AMcN). The ability of Albion Management to integrate on a project-basis 
the diverse skills that exist elsewhere in the group, not only adds value to clients by 
helping them to manage better the front end of their projects, but can also potentially 
provide access to new clients and new markets to BUs of the group whose services are 
more relevant to later stages of the project’s life-cycle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third case of stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies 
occurs during joint ventures (JVs) between BUs belonging to either the same or 
different sector groupings of Albion. These joint ventures originate when a BU has 
identified a project opportunity that requires the competencies of another BU (I1:JK, 
I7:JF, I8:PP, I9:AMcN). Usually, the need for an inter-BU JV is first voiced during 
the ‘monthly operating reviews’ between BU and SMDs. Then, the SMDs are 
Figure 7.6: Albion Professional Services and Core Competence Leverage 
Albion’s Capabilities and Competencies at Different Project Stages 
O&M Conceptual 
Stage 
Feasibility/ 
Master 
Planning 
Design Construction 
Client 
Albion BUs ILCC Leverage 
Client 
Albion Management 
Potential Client for: 
Project 
Team 
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responsible for coordinating MDs of different BUs. Thus, the ILCCs core competencies 
required to integrate BU organizational level competencies at Albion are embodied in 
sector and BU MDs. The purpose of inter-BU JVs is to set-up project-specific teams to 
‘stretch’ and ‘leverage’ through the mobilization of individuals, Albion’s BU-specific 
competencies or Albion’s core competencies related to construction projects’ pursuit 
and execution. Due to the fact that sector-focused BUs are grouped under a sector 
managing director (SMD) responsible for managing their interrelationships, means that 
managerial action is potentially present to manage relationships between BUs. 
What is also worth mentioning is that in all projects undertaken by Albion’s BUs 
- with the exception of the Albion Dubai and Albion Hong Kong - ‘project-specific 
intranets’ are being set-up to facilitate direct communication between project 
participants, in an attempt to create a project environment that maximizes efficiency of 
knowledge transfer and integration (Grant, 1996b). Project intranets are set-up and 
maintained by each BU’s knowledge management champions. The support of the 
corporate knowledge management function is provided when necessary (I4:KS). These 
project-intranets link to the intranet of each BU participating. BU intranets are not, 
however, linked with each other and remain, up to this day, BU-specific.  
The fourth case concerns stretching resources to create leverage. Leverage can 
be applied to generate or develop core competencies which in turn are stretched. This 
occurs at Albion during ‘acquiring’ of companies. Stretch is more evident during the 
pre-acquisition stage, because of the mobilization of individuals whose specialized 
knowledge is necessary. Once an acquisition opportunity has been identified, Albion 
uses its own employees to conduct due diligence of the company to be acquired. Pre-
acquisition efforts are coordinated by the ‘planning and development’ division. The 
initial objective is to find people from within the plc who possess knowledge related to 
the business of the acquired company. If the business to be acquired is too far away 
from Albion’s spectrum of activities, external assistance is hired17. Due diligence teams 
are formed on an ad-hoc basis, albeit through a standardized process. As the assistant 
director of the planning and development division stated: 
 
‘Albion does not want to subcontract the due diligence business judgment to 
people it does not know, but people it can relate to and understand. The 
company considers the capability of managing that process core in managing 
the pre-acquisition risks.’ (I2: DV) 
                                               
17
 If the transaction involves the acquisition of another plc, an investment bank has to be involved, by law, 
to conduct due diligence on behalf of stakeholders and to oversee the transaction. 
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 Observations regarding core competence leverage at Albion are summarized on 
Table 7.4. What the observations highlight is that in all four occasions of stretch and 
leverage identified, an organizational unit is responsible for maintaining ‘lateral 
linkages’ across BUs and integrate their efforts. This points to the existence of 
systematic processes to manage relationships between BUs (Markides, 2002) in order to 
access and harness the specialized knowledge of individual organizational members 
(Grant, 1996b), actualizing thus the latent economic potential of related diversification 
(Nayyar, 1992; Tsai, 2000).  
However, the plc’s decentralized structure creates an organizational context 
where, in the absence of ‘integrating’ and ‘coordinating’ units and institutionalized 
inter-BU links, the ability of Albion’s autonomous contruction-BUs to leverage the 
plc’s core competencies at the projects they undertake suffers. The reasons for this are 
numerous. First, the absence of a corporate-wide IT network that would allow 
employees to directly contact their peers in other BUs (I4:PS, I6:IN). Second, the fact 
that the social networks of individuals existing between BUs - largely maintained by the 
annual forums organized by corporate functions, in which participation by all BUs in 
not mandatory - do not create an environment where employees from different BUs are 
willing to learn from one another (I1:JK, I2:DV, I4:PS, I7:JF). This condition is very 
accurately captured in the statement of one interviewee: 
 
‘Just because something happened somewhere with a consequence, one 
might not go blindly doing and repeating the same, because he might not 
trust what they tell him. That’s the problem with many of those situations. If 
a project manager in a BU has documented that he solved a problem with a 
specific way, it does not mean that the person who reads it will believe what 
he reads. He will probably want to meet the guy in person and decide 
whether the same approach will be appropriate for him.’ (I4: PS)  
 
Some interviewees have gone as far as to state outright that in the absence of 
inter-BU networks on which ‘trusting’ relationships between individuals can be built, 
the potential of corporate-wide IT networks could not be actualized even if these ended 
up being set up (I1:JK, I6:IN, I7:JF). Indicatively, one employee stated: 
 
 
‘There is no point to have the tools and tell people to use them unless they 
know something about the person on the other end. Even if you have the 
option  to  get  in  touch  with  someone, it does not work that well, that’s the  
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Table 7.4: Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies - Albion 
Generic, 
Activity 
Occasion People/Organizational Bodies 
Involved 
Type of Core Competence 
Leverage 
Core Competencies Leveraged 
 
Stretching and 
Leveraging 
Resources and 
Core 
Competencies 
PPP/PFI Projects 
Chief executive’s management team 
(potentially BoD) 
SMD of ‘Investments’ sector 
MDs of BUs 
Planning and Development Corporate 
Function 
OLC Integration and Leverage 
ILCC Leverage (knowledge transfer 
through informal communication, 
employee mobilization and process 
replication with respect to project 
selection criteria)  
Structuring, securing and managing 
PPP/PFI concession contracts. 
 
Albion 
management 
(Professional 
service Contracts 
CEO 
MD of Albion Management ltd 
SMDs and other MDs of BUs that possess 
desired skills 
Project manager 
OLC Integration and Leverage 
ILCC Leverage (employee 
mobilization at project teams for 
execution, knowledge transfer at 
project’s pre-award stage) 
 
Pursuing, securing and executing 
building, civil engineering and rail 
engineering projects. 
 
Intra-sector BU 
Joint Ventures 
Sector MDs 
BU MDs 
OLC Integration and Leverage 
ILCC leverage (employee 
mobilization at project execution 
team) 
Pursuing, securing and executing 
building, civil engineering and rail 
engineering projects. 
 
Acquisitions (Due 
Diligence and 
Integration) 
Sector MD of the sector group where the 
company will be positioned  
OLC Leverage (acquiring and 
integrating) 
ILCC Leverage (employee 
mobilization for due diligence) 
Process Replication (financial 
management and reporting) 
‘entrepreneurial’, ‘estimating’, 
‘technical’ and ‘relational’ core 
competencies’ (from Lampel, 2001, 
viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6). 
Individuals from across the group with 
knowledge of the market of the company 
acquired 
Planning and Development Division 
Socializing Forums 
 
Corporate function directors 
BU Functional Directors 
SMDs and BU MDs (depending on ‘scope’ 
of special interest groups (SIGs)) 
Knowledge transfer through 
‘socialization’. 
‘technical’ core competencies (from 
Lampel, 2001, viz. Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.6). 
Employee Rotation  
Human Resources (corporate and BU) 
BU MDs and SMDs (if employee mobilized 
shows ‘leadership potential) 
ILCC Leverage (employee 
mobilization) 
‘entrepreneurial’, ‘estimating’, 
‘technical’ and ‘relational’ core 
competencies’ (from Lampel, 2001, 
viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6). 
Business Process 
Harmonization 
Corporate function ‘directors; 
BU functional directors 
Process Replication ‘technical’ core competencies (from 
Lampel, 2001, viz. Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.6). 
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trouble. You need to know the people who are there to help and be able to  
relate  to them.’ (I7:JF). 
 
Third, the fact that BUs develop, in time, specific cultures and moreover that, 
due to the corporate centre’s lack of authority over the practices they follow, some BUs 
(e.g. Albion Hong Kong and Albion Dubai) are resistant to adopt practices that other 
BUs may have found effective (I1:JK, I2:DV, I6:IN). 
All these characteristics of Albion’s ‘decentralized’ diversified configuration 
seem to diminish its ability to create an intra-organizational environment of joint 
thinking and where employees are willing to learn from one another (Javidan, 1998). 
Within that context, Albion’s construction BUs cannot effectively leverage the plc’s 
core competencies on occasions, to deploy them to projects they undertake. 
Consequently, in their quest to develop effective routines that support their 
competitiveness, they may have to duplicate efforts (Mintzberg 1979; 1989) undertaken 
by other BUs, which, for the plc as a whole, would translate to resource waste and 
increased costs.  
 
7.3.4 Improving Business Practices 
 
Due to Albion’s decentralized nature, the responsibility for capturing and 
disseminating knowledge ultimately falls to the executive management of each BU. In 
each BU, there are some ‘knowledge management champions’ who have this 
responsibility as part of their day-to-day job. These may be people working with a 
‘business process improvement’ role, using knowledge management techniques in what 
they are doing. In their capacity, they may be recording good practices on projects and 
helping transfer them to other projects. However, there is no ‘overriding’ function for 
‘knowledge management’ practices across the group (I4:PS, I6:IN). 
Innovations and knowledge created is communicated informally by the  
knowledge management champions to the BU managing directors (MDs) and it may be 
discussed with sector managing directors (SMDs) during the ‘monthly’ or the 
‘quarterly’ reviews18. This may act as an opportunity for norms to be re-negotiated and 
practices and structures reconfigured. 
At projects, knowledge may be captured on project-intranets (provided BU-
knowledge management champions or someone else records it). Even though 
                                               
18
 Viz. section 7.3.1. 
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knowledge captured may be recorded, no ‘corporate-wide’ intranet, nor processes exist 
to make it available to other BUs of the group (I4:PS). Lacking structured processes to 
capture, store, analyze and disseminate information, Albion carries the risk of 
knowledge gained from ‘experiential learning’ to be lost once project teams are 
dismantled and their members move to the next project (Brady and Davies, 2004; 
Davies and Hobday, 2005). 
Employees at a BU might identify and implement an improvement and 
communicate it to their counterparts in other BUs through ‘socialization’ during 
functionally-led inter-BU forums (viz. Section 7.2.1). This is a case where the loosely 
bound central functional communities of practice and the organically developed special 
interest groups can contribute to the reproduction of Albion’s business processes, 
through knowledge transferred through a process of ‘socialization’. 
The ‘Internal Audit’ function - though not created with ‘improving business 
practices’ in mind - might lead to improvements of financial management practices. If, 
when auditing a project, the internal audit function identifies financial management 
practices that need to be improved, then, in collaboration with the BUs it will 
determine: i) who will undertake the responsibility to conduct those improvements and 
ii) a timeframe for their implementation. The monitoring of the implementation of those 
changes then occurs quarterly, to coincide with the internal meetings of Albion’s Audit 
Committee19. 
Finally, business practice improvements can occur through ‘strategic initiatives’ 
that the group may undertake as a whole. Strategic initiatives are intended to establish 
the application of new processes or improve the ones in place. In Albion, two major 
initiatives that have occurred in the last ten years are the following: 
� The rolling out of a corporate-wide enterprise resource planning (ERP) system 
(on-going); 
� The creation, rolling-out and application of a corporate-wide framework to 
provide assurance with respect to ‘standards’ Albion’s business processes are 
applied. 
 
Each of these initiatives is centrally coordinated by a team at Albion’s corporate-
centre that was specifically assembled to oversee its successful implementation.  
                                               
19
 The ‘Auditing Committee’ is a non-executive board member committee monitors corporate governance 
of the plc. 
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Findings from this section regarding the organizational routines through which 
‘improving business practices’ occurs and the individuals/organizational bodies 
involved in their implementation have been summarized on Table 7.5. The observations 
made in this section identify that at Albion, no institutionalized, structural and 
procedural arrangements exist to systematically collect, analyze, store and disseminate 
knowledge created at projects.  
Table 7.5: Improving Business Practices - Albion 
Organizational Routines People/ Organizational Bodies Involved 
Reporting 
 - Operational management reviews 
 - Management reviews 
 
BU ‘knowledge management champion’ 
BU MD 
Sector MD 
Knowledge management – in a restricted 
and partial sense for explicit knowledge 
Project-intranets 
BU intranets 
SIGs and discussion forums Functional/technical experts 
 
    Strategic Initiatives Managing directors of BUs and their senior management 
teams 
Business stream directors and their supporting financial 
controllers) 
Albion’s Corporate Commercial Director 
Planning and Development Division 
 
This, indicates that Albion’s potential to learn from projects is reduced, as 
knowledge created can be lost when project teams are dismantled and members move 
on. Consequently, theory (e.g. Cyert and March, 1965; 1992; Prencipe and Tell, 2001; 
Brady and Davies, 2004) would suggest that Albion’s BUs and the plc as a whole 
cannot effectively revise its operating procedures as a function of ‘experiential 
learning’, nor use lessons learned to engage in self-reflective organizational learning. 
 
7.3.5 Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
 
With respect to developing managerial and organizational leadership capacity, 
the following have been identified. Albion plc has a structured ‘succession planning 
framework’ in place, concentrating on the individuals who have been identified as the 
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plc’s future potential leadership (top 150-200 employees). The team responsible for 
‘succession planning’ is part of the corporate human resource function. It coordinates 
the ‘annual people’s review’ in collaboration with each BU’s human resources (HR) 
function. The participants in the reviews are the corporate HR director, the head of the 
succession planning team, the BU managing directors (MDs) and relevant sector 
managing director (SMD). During these reviews, the top-team of each BU is looked at, 
both in terms of their ‘performance’ and ‘potential’. Their individual performance is 
assessed and their importance to their managers and directors is reviewed. 
During the annual ‘people’s review’, each BU MD and the people belonging to 
their management team are asked to identify their successors in terms of who is ready to 
succeed them a) now, b) in 1-2 years and c) in 5 years. The meeting with each 
individual lasts between three to four hours. When all interviews are completed across 
all BUs, the corporate succession planning function produces a report on its findings. 
Subsequently, a meeting occurs between the succession planning team and the entire 
chief executive’s team to discuss succession issues at a group level (I1:JK). The 
succession planning team then assists the HR functions of the individual BUs to develop 
individual professional development plans for each individual who has been identified 
as a potential ‘successor’. Each BU is then responsible for the professional development 
of these individuals, but its efforts are monitored by the corporate succession planning 
team.  
Experience is often provided by mobilizing employees across different BUs and 
sectors, exposing them to a variety of responsibilities and roles (I1:JK, I6:IN; 
I9:AMcN). At Albion, it is preferred to develop key people in high positions from 
within the business as much as possible (I6:IN). This managerial and leadership 
development practice links with ‘regulating SA implementation’. SMDs monitor 
through the monthly reviews the need for mobilizing individuals across BUs belonging 
to their sector and facilitate communication between the interested BU MDs (I1:JK, 
I2:DV, I6:IN, I5:AS). When the occasion concerns an individual who has been 
identified by corporate succession planning as someone who belongs to the future 
leadership of Albion, then his/her mobilization across BUs is tracked by senior 
management and corporate succession planning, who want to have a clear picture of 
where within the group potential leaders are positioned (I1:JK, I2:DV, I6:IN, 
I9:AMcN). This constitutes a characteristic of an organization that has overcome the 
BU-mindset inherent in divisionalized, diversified configurations, by perceiving the 
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‘competencies’ of individuals as corporate-wide, rather than BU-specific property 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
In addition to succession planning at a corporate level, all UK and US BUs 
independently assess the development of managers with leadership potential through: 
� ‘Assessment development centres’: 2-3 day events where managers with 
leadership potential undertake a series of exercises while being observed by a 
group of senior managers trained as observers, for the latter to get a good idea of 
i) the strengths the former have and ii) the skill areas which the former need to 
grow and get experience.  
� A 360o feedback review where a promising employee’s boss and three 
colleagues complete questionnaires on their managerial competencies. 
 
The ‘assessment development centres’ and the ‘360o feedback reviews’ are 
implemented by the business units, with the immediate support of its human resources 
(HR) function, but their implementation and results are also monitored by the corporate 
succession planning team and form part of the annual ‘peoples review’ (I1:JK).  
Table 7.6: Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity -    
                Albion 
Organizational Routines People/Organizational Bodies Involved 
Management Development Program 
 
Corporate HR receives proposals from BU HR and 
evaluates 
 
 
Personal Development 
Assessment/Leadership Development 
- Annual HR Review 
 
 
 
BU HR 
Corporate HR Succession Planning Team 
 
Succession Planning 
- People’s Review 
- Annual HR Review 
 
 
Corporate HR: Succession Planning Director 
SMD 
BU MD 
BU HR 
 
The findings of this section are summarized on Table 7.6. They identify an 
organization that has made provisions to track, train and rotate competent employees 
across market-focused BUs, an indication that a BU-mindset (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1994) regarding the ownership of resources is absent, a positive influence to the 
effective development of the ICM’s core competencies. In the absence of active social 
networks across BUs (viz. Section 7.3.3) it could be argued however that Albion still 
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has obstacles to overcome if it wishes to develop management and leadership with 
interpersonal competencies and ‘social capital’ built in social networks with a culture of 
trust, mutual respect and a willingness of members to learn from one another (Javidan, 
1998; Drath, 2000; McCawley, 2000). 
 Having identified the ‘routines’ through which Albion plc implements each of 
the core competence development activities and the context in which they take place, 
the following section will discuss the interrelationships existing between these activities 
and how these are related to the configuration that Albion has developed. 
 
7.4 Interrelationships between Activities  
 
The purpose of this section is to integrate the findings from sections 7.3.1 to 
7.3.5 and identify the interrelationships between core competence development 
activities, as well as how these are influenced by Cyclone’s configuration (viz. Chapter 
4, Section 4.4). Findings from Tables 7.1 to 7.6 are displayed on Table 7.7.  
When ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’, the routine of ‘setting and communicating 
the annual budget and business plan’ (viz. Section 7.3.1) essentially links long-term 
strategy with ‘regulating SA implementation’. Changes identified and integrated to 
intended strategies through ‘management reviews’ and ’project selection’ criteria (viz. 
Section 7.3.2) feed into the following year’s annual budget and business plan, and may 
influence medium and long-term plans. Setting and communicating the annual business 
plan also makes provisions for tracking, training and rotating competent employees by 
containing the ‘annual people’s  review’  (centrally  coordinated  by  corporate  
succession  planning), whose  
Finally, the interrelationships existing between ‘stretching and leveraging 
resources and core competencies’ and ‘regulating strategic architecture - manifested 
especially in project-selection routines - implementation’ indicate that Albion’s 
configuration can facilitate decision-making and resource allocation in-line with SA set. 
The ‘monthly review’ emerges as an integral routine for regulating the group’s efforts 
towards meeting its targets, and offers the opportunity to Albion’s middle management 
and strategic apex to monitor strategy execution and merge emerging issues with 
intended ones when necessary (Mintzberg, 1979; 1989 and in construction: Langford 
and Male, 2001).  
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Table 7.7: Activities, their Routines and Interrelationships - Albion 
Generic, Theory-Based 
Activities 
Organizational Routines Key-People/ Organizational Bodies  
 
 
Exhibiting SI and 
Crafting SA  
Setting and Communicating the Annual Business Plan 
The Chief Executive’s Team 
The Director of the Planning and Development Division 
The Managing Directors of BUs (and their senior management teams) 
The director of ‘Risks and Opportunities Management Framework’ 
Setting and Communicating Long-Term Strategic Plans (3-5 
years) 
The Chief Executive’s Office 
The Director of the Planning and Development Division 
The Managing Directors of BUs (and their senior management teams) 
The director of ‘Risks and Opportunities Management Framework’ 
Setting and Communicating the Objectives of a Strategic 
Initiative 
Managing directors of BUs and their senior management teams 
Business Stream directors and their supporting financial controllers) 
Albion’s Corporate Commercial Director 
Planning and Development Division 
 
 
 
 
Stretching and 
Leveraging Resources 
and Core 
Competencies 
PPP/PFI Projects 
Chief executive’s team (potentially BoD) 
Sector MD of ‘Investments’ sector 
MDs of BUs 
Planning and Development Corporate Function 
OLC Integration and Leverage 
ILCC Leverage (knowledge transfer through informal communication, employee mobilization 
and process replication with respect to project selection criteria)  
Albion management (Professional Service Contracts) 
CEO 
MD of Albion Management ltd 
Sector MDs and other MDs of BUs that possess desired skills 
Project manager 
OLC Integration and Leverage 
ILCC Leverage (employee mobilization at project teams for execution, knowledge transfer at 
project’s pre-award stage) 
Intra-sector BU Joint Ventures Sector MDs 
BU MDs 
OLC Integration and Leverage 
ILCC leverage (employee mobilization at project execution team) 
Acquisitions (Due Diligence and Integration) 
Sector MD of the sector group where the company will be positioned  OLC Leverage (acquiring and integrating) 
ILCC Leverage (employee mobilization for due diligence) 
Process Replication (financial management and reporting) Individuals from across the group with knowledge of the market of the company acquired 
Planning and Development Division 
 
Socializing Forums 
Corporate function directors 
BU Functional Directors 
SMDs and BU MDs (depending on ‘scope’ of special interest groups (SIGs)) 
Knowledge transfer through ‘socialization’. 
Employee Rotation Human Resources (corporate and BU) 
BU MDs and Sector MDs (if employee mobilized shows ‘leadership potential) 
ILCC Leverage (employee mobilization) 
Business Process Harmonization Corporate function ‘directors; 
BU functional directors 
Process Replication 
 
Developing Managerial 
and Organizational 
Leadership Capacity 
Management Development Program Corporate HR receives proposals from BU HR and evaluates 
Personal Development Assessment/Leadership Development 
� Annual HR Review 
BU HR 
Corporate HR Succession Planning 
Succession Planning 
� People’s Review 
� Annual HR Review 
Corporate  HR: Succession Planning Director 
Sector MD 
BU  MD 
BU HR 
 
Improving Business 
Practices 
Reporting 
� Operational management reviews 
� Management reviews 
BU ‘knowledge management champion’ 
BU MD 
Sector MD 
Knowledge management – in a restricted and partial sense for 
explicit knowledge 
Project-intranets 
BU intranets 
Special Interest Groups (SIG)s and discussion forums Functional/technical experts 
Strategic Initiatives 
 Managing directors of BUs and their senior management teams 
Business Stream directors and their supporting financial controllers) 
Albion’s Corporate Commercial Director 
Planning and Development Division 
 
Regulating SA 
Implementation 
Reporting Reviews 
� All day review (4 months) 
� Quarterly reviews  
� Monthly reviews  
� Annual Business Review 
1) From CE Office, CEO, CFO, GMD as well as BU MD and BU FD. CEO meets directly with each BU MD. 
2) SAME 
3) Sector MDs and their BU MDs and BU FD and Commercial Director. 
 
Project Selectivity 
� Project tender review 
1) PFI/PPP bid directors, Albion Capital Projects, BU MD, I&D BS, GMD (from chief executive’s office). 
2) BBM MD, other BU MDs, the Sector MDs (from the Chief Executive’s Office) 
3) BU MDs, Sector MDs (from Chief Executive’s Office) 
Assurance Framework 
� Risk and opportunity framework (Assurance). 
� Project specific 
Internal Audit Function, Risk Management. 
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7.5 Summarizing and Concluding Section 
 
The findings of this case study regarding the issues this research addresses are 
summarized on Table 7.8.  At Albion, the effectiveness of ‘stretching and leveraging 
resources and core competencies’ may suffer in the absence of institutionalized, 
structured, inter-BU links, as it becomes hard to access, transfer and integrate the tacit 
knowledge of individual employees, who are spread-out throughout the plc. 
Regarding  ‘improving business practices’, the absence of organizational learning 
mechanisms and a horizontal organization through which information on knowledge 
and experience gained can be captured, stored and disseminated on a corporate-wide 
basis may inhibit long-term competitiveness. Knowledge may end-up being lost 
following project completion and Albion’s BUs may not be able to develop new 
routines - or existing ones - as a function of ‘experiential learning’. Consequently, the 
plc’s effectiveness in developing its core competencies could suffer if those structural 
and functioning issues are not addressed. 
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Table 7.8: Albion plc: Summarizing 
Issues Findings 
Configuration Diversified configuration with some elements of professionalization embodied in standardized processes that corporate 
support functions develop and assist autonomous BUs in implementing. Autonomous BUs, coordination through 
standardization of outputs and vertical decentralization of authority to their directors. The plc’s strategic apex emerges 
as a key organizational part, which acts both as a designer and controller of the group’s strategies. 
Core Competencies � Pursuing, securing and executing building, civil engineering and rail engineering projects; 
� Structuring, securing and managing PPP/PFI concession contracts. 
Dynamic Capabilities � Acquires companies in order to expand its geographical scope of operations and complement core competencies it 
already possesses; 
� Develops organically (e.g. Albion Investments, Albion Professional Services) the capabilities and core competencies 
that may be market-related but revolve around a different ‘role’ involved in the production of the built environment. 
On Albion’s configuration and its ability to 
develop a corporate strategy, with optimal 
potential for implementation 
SI and SA set in a BU-mindset with provisions made however for tracking, training and rotating competent employees. 
BU autonomy could lead to objectives of individual employees being aligned with BU objectives, rather than corporate 
objectives 
On Albion’s configuration and the 
effectiveness with which it regulates its 
strategies 
Feedback mechanisms (reporting and project selection) allow upper middle management to ‘reflexively’ strategy 
execution. 
On Albion’s configuration and the 
effectiveness with which it stretches and 
leverages its resources and core competencies 
Stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies is effectively implemented when a centralized 
organizational body with authority to manage inter-BU links exists (e.g. Albion ‘Investments’ and Albion 
‘Management’). In the absence of this (such as in the case of construction-related BUs), lack of ‘trust’ and cultural 
differences across BUs, could inhibit the transfer of the specialized knowledge of individual employees, as well as the 
replication of effective routines and social practices. 
On Albion’s configuration and the 
effectiveness with which it can reconfigure its 
processes, structures and norms, as a result of 
organizational learning 
 
Absence of organizational learning mechanisms as well as the structures and processes to store and diffuse knowledge 
and experience gained across organizational units. 
On Albion’s configuration and the 
effectiveness with which it develops 
managerial and organizational leadership 
capacity 
Inter-BU social capital is developed mainly through loose corporate functional fora. Centrally coordinated succession 
planning framework, which monitors and regulated the development of managerial and organizational leadership 
capacity is corporate-wide, but focuses on a small number of employees. 
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Chapter 8: The Pacifico Corporation 
 
8.1 Pacifico’s Early History 
 
Pacifico was first established in 1916 as a refinery design company. In 1944, its 
founder incorporated in California the ‘Pacifico Corporation’ offering engineering, 
construction and technical services. During the 1950s, Pacifico diversified into the 
chemical and petroleum industries and oversaw the construction of a number of refineries 
for natural gas and petroleum in Turkey and several European nations. In 1958, the 
company began the first of many airport projects in the United States (US). Internationally 
that was followed by the design and development of an airport in Saudi Arabia, which 
signified the beginning of Pacifico’s involvement in the design and construction 
management of airports worldwide. In 1961 a strategic acquisition brought significant 
involvement in mining and metallurgy. During 1965 and 1974, Pacifico transitioned from 
its entrepreneurial stage into a sophisticated organization with strategic, long-term financial 
and operational plans.  In 1976, the joint venture company ‘Saudi Arabian Pacifico 
Limited’ was founded to administer and pursue project opportunities in the Middle East. In 
1977, Pacifico acquired two established engineering firms based in Houston, in order to 
strengthen its engineering capability.  
During 1978 and 1979 Pacifico divisionalized its structure, grouping projects under 
four market-based units: ‘Pacifico Design and Construction’, ‘Pacifico Environmental and 
Transport Projects’ (both in the US), ‘Pacifico Constructors Inc.’ (a subsidiary intended to 
provide construction capability) and ‘Pacifico International Limited’ (to undertake projects 
outside the US). In the same year, Pacifico transitioned to a 100% private ownership by its 
employees.  
Between 1985 and 1995, Pacifico’s leadership exhibited the intent for the 
corporation to become a ‘total integrated services’ provider. That intent was pursued 
through acquisitions of companies that complemented the corporation’s existing 
capabilities. Within that decade of acquisitions and growth, the firm expanded into an 
international network of autonomously operating companies specializing in a broad 
spectrum of activities. In 1995 an organizational shift led to the consolidation of Pacifico’s 
subsidiaries into global business units (GBUs), each focused on specific industry sectors. 
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8.2 Recent Evolutionary Path and Pacifico’s Present State 
 
 Figure 8.1 displays how Pacifico’s ‘role’ in the production of the built environment, 
as well as its ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics, have evolved in relation to 
notable strategic intents its leadership has set, strategic architectures it has pursued and 
investments the corporation has made1. 
In 1997, Pacifico had just completed a restructuring program to consolidate its 
subsidiaries in four market-focused ‘global business units’ (GBUs): i) Process, ii) 
Infrastructure and Technology, iii) Power and iv) Transportation. Each GBU constituted 
market-focused divisions, which offered engineering, procurement, construction and 
project management services, each with their own President and executive management 
team. Following this organizational restructuring, Pacifico continued to pursue the strategic 
intent it had set from 1985 - becoming a ‘total integrated service provider’ - by pursuing 
horizontal diversification in related markets through acquisitions. 
However, it had become clear that greater uniformity in terms of business practices 
was required. To better integrate the corporation’s units, efforts towards the standardization 
of business processes throughout the corporation, mostly in terms of i) accounting, ii) 
human resource management and iii) the implementation of a enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) and managing information systems (MIS) were undertaken, albeit within GBUs, not 
across them. Furthermore, a centrally coordinated global ‘business development unit’ was 
created within each GBU. 
 Following some years of ‘growth-oriented’ acquisitions, the corporation’s 
leadership decided in 2005 to focus primarily on internal growth, complemented by 
acquisitions only when a new capability was required that could not be internally 
developed. The intent was for the corporation to broaden its capabilities in service 
offerings. In the meantime, Pacifico’s leadership decided to further optimize the systems in 
place to integrate the corporation’s resources (essentially, to better leverage its core 
competencies, so that it could become better at providing ‘total integrated services’ to its 
clients). This led to the development of GBU-specific ‘global policy manuals’ and in the 
development of a corporate-wide, Pacifico-specific ‘project management handbook’. 
                                                
1
 The display is in the form of an ‘event-flow network’ (Miles and Huberman, 1995) and is colour coded so 
that its constituting elements can be easily distinguished.  
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Figure 8.1: Evolutionary Profile of the Pacifico Corporation 
YEAR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
‘Role’ in the Production of the 
Built Environment’ 
Designer, builder, maintainer/operator, professional service provider. The company offers engineering, procurement, construction and project management 
services to its clients. 
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Organization/ 
Decentralization 
GBUs coordinated through a small corporate management team. GBU divisions are coordinated by their GBU’s executive management team. Functions 
are centralized at a GBU level. 
Project Grouping (type 
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At the time of writing, Pacifico provided engineering, construction, systems 
and resource integration, project/program management, and environmental services 
to a wide range of global customers. It was a multinational company with 2,500 
clients and 8,000 projects worldwide, operating in 50 US states and 80 foreign 
countries, with more than 11,500 employees.  
The brief historical review and evolutionary profiling of Pacifico allows the 
following observations to be made. Pacifico started operating as a small oil refinery 
design firm and within a few decades diversified vertically (into construction), 
horizontally (into the chemicals and petroleum, metals and mining and airport 
markets) and internationally (with projects in Turkey, Europe and ultimately the 
incorporation of Pacifico Saudi Arabia), to become an international engineering and 
construction services provider. Diversification brought ‘divisionalization’ and a 
subsequent need for intra-organizational ‘integration’. As the corporation continued 
to grow, it complemented its capabilities with acquisitions that allowed it to offer its 
clients a more ‘holistic’ service. Continuous expansion, restructuring and 
consolidation around market-focused units based on client interrelationships brought 
Pacifico to its present state. 
The brief historical review and a snapshot of Pacifico’s present state, indicate 
that its core competencies revolve around ‘offering engineering, construction, 
procurement and project management services to different types of ‘clients’ of the 
construction industry’.  
In addition, the historical review and more recent evolutionary profiling of 
the corporation offer insights concerning the ‘dynamic capabilities’ of the 
corporation (Teece et al., 1997). The evolutionary profiling suggests the following 
dynamic capabilities are potentially present: 
� Acquiring companies and successfully/appropriately integrating them into 
the corporation’s existing body; 
� Organically developing internal systems that allow it to integrate the business 
activities of its various units; 
� Restructuring its organization to better facilitate and serve the needs of its 
clients. 
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Others may also be present. 
  
8.2.1 Structural, Functioning and Agency Characteristics 
 
 As shown on Figure 8.2, Pacifico is involved in many diverse markets, 
spanning all three sectors of ‘process’, ‘civil engineering’ and ‘building’2. Its 
structure is one of four autonomously operating global business units (GBUs) 
overseen by a corporate centre. The four GBUs are: 
 Commercial Technology: responsible for all projects related to 
telecommunications, both wire and wireless, biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical work, industrial environmental work such as industrial 
waste treatment processes, environmental remediation, schools, hospitals 
and healthcare.  
 Infrastructure and Technology: responsible for all projects undertaken for US 
federal government institutions (e.g. Department of Defence (DoD), 
Department of State (DoS) and Department of Energy (DoE)). 
 Transportation: responsible for all projects related to ground and air 
transportation, including bridges, tunnels, rail, highway, aviation and 
airports, as well as the systems engineering that accompanies those markets.  
� Water and Infrastructure: responsible for all projects related to water, 
wastewater, water conveyance, as well as major infrastructure development 
projects. 
 
GBUs are broken down to market-focused ‘divisions’ and these in turn to 
market focused ‘sector’ units. In reality, the structure is a bottom-up rather than a 
top-down creation (I3:BS) determined by client and market interrelationships. In 
addition, GBUs operate through a number of offices (essentially local/regional 
resource centres), providing  their  divisions  and  sectors  with  the  resources  they   
 
                                                
2
 As these have been described by Morris (2004), viz. Chapter 2, Section 2.3 
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Figure 8.2: The Structure of the Pacifico Corporation 
Board of Directors 
Corporate Management Team 
- Chairman and CEO 
- Group Executive, 
Development/Strategy 
- Chief Financial Officer 
- General Counsel 
- Global Shared Services 
- Group Executive, 
Operations/Risk 
- Human Resources 
- Corporate Relations 
- Government Relations 
- Safety 
Commercial Technology Infrastructure and Technology Transportation Water and Infrastructure 
GLOBAL BUSINESS UNITS (GBUs) 
Executive Management Team 
 
Executive Management Team 
 
Executive Management Team 
 
Executive Management Team 
Global 
Business 
Developmen
t 
Operations 
Core 
Functions 
Global 
Business 
Developmen
t 
Operations 
Core 
Functions 
Global 
Business 
Developmen
t 
Operations 
Core 
Functions 
Global 
Business 
Developmen
t 
Operations 
Core 
Functions 
Construction Construction Constructio
n 
Constructio
n 
Life Sciences 
Division 
Technology 
Division 
Buildings 
Division 
Energy, 
Systems and 
Security 
Division 
Applied 
Systems 
Division 
Installations 
and 
Environment
al Division 
Chemical 
Demilitarization 
Division 
Aviation 
Division 
Consumer 
Services 
Division 
Rail and 
Transit 
Systems 
Division 
Road and 
Highway 
Division 
Bridge and 
Tunnel 
Division 
East US 
Division 
Middle East 
Division 
West US 
Division 
 194
need on a project basis (I5:GB, I11:ER)3. Resources are ‘owned’ by divisions, although 
their allocation is centrally coordinated at a GBU level where functions are centralized. 
All GBUs have the following functions (I2:MH)4: 
� Business development; 
� Operations (includes quality management, project controls, safety and  
information systems management); 
� Engineering; 
� Procurement; 
� Construction; 
� Finance. 
 
Of particular importance are ‘business development’ and ‘operations’. Business 
development (BD) was created as a result of a corporate philosophy to strive for greater 
client focus and, in the words of a GBU’s BD Director:  
 
‘it is the tip of the sphere and drives the organization. Our whole structure is 
created around how we pursue and win work.’(I6:TW).  
 
Essentially, BD is responsible for all pre-contract award activities within each 
GBU. Each GBU has a BD director and BD divisional managers (I6:TW)5. 
‘Operations’ are responsible for all project-stages after contract award.  
Engineering is centralized as a core function at the GBU level (I8:TP). 
Procurement is also centralized at a GBU level and operates almost autonomously as a 
support function out of regional and local offices/resource centres. Its responsibilities 
include both ‘subcontracting’ and ‘materials purchasing’ on behalf of the divisions 
(I5:GB). This arrangement facilitates better alignment and integration of the supply 
chain on behalf of the clients each GBU serves6 (I2:MH, I10:JS&MT). Finally, each 
GBU has its own finance function, led by the GBU’s chief financial officer (CFO), to 
whom ‘division’ and ‘sector’ financials controllers report (I4:MZ).  
                                               
3
 For example, Pacifico’s ‘Infrastructure and Technology’ GBU operates through three main offices: i) 
West of the State of Mississippi and ii) East of the State of Mississippi (in the USA) and iii) International. 
4
 Though centralized at a GBU-level, there is a core team for each function at each division.  
5
 In the ‘Transportation’ GBU, where clients are at different geographic locations, BD efforts are more 
centralized at a national level 
6
 It should be noted that Procurement staff allocated at projects cannot be hired or fired by the project 
manager, to ensure checks and balances are kept in place against corruption. 
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Each GBU sector-unit has a ‘sector manager’ (SM) who reports to his/her 
‘division manager’ (DM), who then reports to his/her GBU president (I6:TW, I3:BS)7. 
GBU executive management teams comprise the directors of BD, operations, 
engineering, procurement, construction, finance and market-focused divisions8, report to 
their GBU President and have a global responsibility to coordinate market-focused 
divisions, sector units and functions. On top of the GBUs sits a small corporate centre, 
which coordinates, integrates and resolves conflicts between GBUs if necessary. The 
corporate management team constitutes of the GBU presidents, the chief executive 
officer (CEO), chief operating officer (COO) and a corporate CFO. (I2:MH, 
I1:DR&ER, I6:TW).  
There are varying levels of communication, coordination and cooperation across 
GBUs. At the GBU senior management level, direct links exist between counterparts. 
The corporate CEO and functional directors resolve conflicts across GBUs (I6:TW). 
    Pacifico has chosen to play the roles of the ‘designer’, ‘constructor’ and 
‘operator’ in the production of the built environment, in addition to being a project 
manager on behalf of its clients. All of Pacifico’s ‘sector-focused’ units offer 
engineering, procurement, construction and project/program management services to 
their clients, either in combination or in isolation.  
Pacifico has developed into a ‘diversified’ and ‘divisionalized’ organization, 
which groups projects primarily under client-focused sector units. Providing a project 
management service to their clients, Pacifico also exhibits the characteristics of a 
‘professional’ configuration.  In such a configuration, the ‘operating core’ comes to the 
forefront and ‘standardization of skills’ and ‘norms’ emerges as an important 
coordination mechanism. At Pacifico, this has been pursued corporate-wide for project 
managers only, through the development of a ‘project management certification 
program’ (PMCP). Although the standardization of skills regarding project managers is 
corporate-wide, standardization of norms does not transcend GBU boundaries, as it is 
driven by each GBU’s client-focus. Finally, the inevitable standardization of work 
processes, when coordinating a company with such a scale of operations, gives Pacifico 
some characteristics of a machine bureaucracy. Due to the corporation’s decentralized 
                                               
7
 The ‘Water and Infrastructure’ GBU is the only one whose divisions represent project groupings based 
on geographic location. Within the other three GBUs there is a separate ‘international’ division for 
projects outside  the  USA. 
8
 In the Transportations GBU, the executive management team is led by the BD and Operations directors, 
who have equal authority. In all other BUs, the director of BD is the executive director of the GBU. 
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nature, this standardization happens at a GBU level - with the exception of project 
management practices.  
Table 8.1 summarizes this case study’s findings with respect to the ‘structural’, 
‘procedural’ and ‘agency’ characteristics of Pacifico’s configuration. The next section 
describes the ‘organizational routines’ and ‘individuals/organizational bodies’ involved 
in the implementation of the five core competence development activities through 
which core competence (viz. Chapter 4, Section 4.3) can be effectively controlled. 
 
8.3 Core Competence Development Activities 
 
 This section identifies and describes - in turn - the ‘organizational routines’ 
through which Pacifico conducts each core competence development activity. As a 
result, it identifies and describes the role of the individuals/organizational bodies most 
integral to the implementation of these ‘organizational routines’.  
 
8.3.1 Exhibiting Strategic Intent and Crafting Strategic Architecture 
 
 Two organizational routines regarding ‘exhibiting strategic intent (SI) and 
crafting strategic architecture (SA)’ at Pacifico have been identified. The first is that of 
‘setting and communicating the strategic plan’ (Figure 8.3). The plan formulation 
happens in two parallel streams. One is related with ‘business development’ (BD) and 
the other with ‘operations’.  
The process is GBU-specific and takes place annually between August and 
December (I7:TL). There is an on-going two-year plan in place that is updated every 
year with the development of the ‘annual business plan’. In reality therefore, each year a 
two-year plan is drafted and from that two-year plan the first year is rolled up into an 
annual business plan. Consequently, it can be understood that the process of creating the 
annual business plan also constitutes a ‘feedback’ mechanism through which the GBUs’ 
and the corporation’s longer term plans can be regulated.  
 The plan originates as a bottom-up creation that starts at the ‘sector-unit’ level. 
Business development (BD) directors and sector managers set BD targets and determine 
operational requirements of sector-specific annual business plans, which specify i) 
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Table 8.1: Pacifico’s Configuration Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Structural 
Characteristics 
 
Market-Focused 
Strategy (project-
grouping) 
 
 
1. Client-focused 
 
Horizontal 
Organization/ 
Degree of 
Decentralization 
 
 
1. Within GBUs, interrelationships between sectors are managed by division managers, between divisions by 
the GBU’s executive management team. Processes stipulated in the GBU’s Global Policy Manual. 
2. Between GBUs, interrelationships are managed by the corporate management team through ‘informal 
routines’. 
3. Key business/functional processes are GBU-specific 
4. HR systems are GBU-specific, transcending GBUs only in the case of the ‘leadership council’. 
5. No organizational bodies exist to manage cross-GBU interrelationships in terms of value-adding activities 
such as procurement. 
 
Procedural 
Characteristics 
 
Coordination 
Mechanisms 
 
 
1. Standardization of outputs 
2. Standardization of skills (Project Management) 
3. Standardization of processes (BD and Operations albeit GBU-specific) 
4. Standardization of norms (client-oriented, GBU-specific) 
 
Agency 
Characteristics 
 
Key-People/ 
Organizational 
Parts 
 
1. Corporate management team 
2. GBU executive management teams 
3. GBU BD director, operations directors, division managers, finance directors and HR directors. 
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targets and objectives, ii) client management strategies and tactics, iii) financial targets 
for the following year and iv) how the above influence the 2-year business plan 
(I6:TW, I2: MH). These sector-specific plans are then integrated at a ‘division’ level. 
Each division manager, in collaboration with sector and BD managers identifies clients 
and potential opportunities for the following year. Resource requirements are then 
projected on a monthly spend rate, adding those to the requirements of the existing 
back-log. Subsequently, BD managers and the GBU’s BD director devise a plan as to 
how clients will be managed in order for each sector and division to successfully service 
project opportunities targeted. At that stage, information obtained from clients 
contributes to the creation of Pacifico’s internal targets (I2:MH). The GBU finance 
function drives and coordinates the process, especially with respect to integrating 
budgets across sectors and divisions (I4:MZ). 
The division-level plans are integrated by the GBU presidents and BD directors 
to create GBU-specific annual business plans. Subsequently, these plans are submitted 
to the ‘corporate management team’, who reviews them and then sends them to the 
board of directors (BoD) for approval. The approved plans are then communicated 
downwards through the hierarchy to the GBUs, divisions and sectors. Performance of 
both operations and sales/business development is then monitored and regulated against 
that corporate plan (I2:MH). The process introduces standardization of outputs 
Figure 8.3: Setting and Communicating the Strategic Plan 
BoD level 
Corporate 
Level 
GBU Level 
Division 
Level 
Sector 
Level 
Business 
Development 
Operations 
Business 
Development 
Business 
Development 
Business 
Development 
Operations Operations 
Operations 
GBU President, BD Director, GBU 
CFO and Executive Management 
Team Review Plans 
GBU President, BD Director, GBU 
CFO and Executive Management 
Team ‘Communicate’ Plans 
 
Corporate Management Team 
Communicates to GBU President 
Approved Plans 
Board of Directors Reviews and Ultimately Approves 
Corporate Management Team 
Reviews and Submits to BoD 
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(Mintzberg, 1979; 1989) as a coordination mechanism through a combination of ‘output 
performance’ (financial targets) and ‘action planning’ (client management strategies and 
tactics) enforced during business plan execution. 
The second organizational routine is that of ‘setting and communicating the 
objectives of a strategic initiative’. Strategic initiatives are almost always related to 
improving client satisfaction and therefore they usually emerge in a bottom-up process 
(I3:BS, I2:MH). Strategic initiatives may take various forms, ranging from internal 
programs for developing a competence or improving business processes, to acquiring 
companies that can enhance the breadth and quality of services the corporation can offer 
its clients9. When the need for an initiative is identified, a study is undertaken by the 
GBU. Depending on the capital expenditure required, the corporate management team 
or the BoD may have to approve it.  
The findings of this section regarding the organizational routines identified and 
the individuals/organizational bodies involved in their implementation are summarized 
on Table 8.2.  
Table 8.2: Exhibiting SI and Crafting SA - Pacifico 
Organizational Routines People/ Organizational Bodies Involved 
 
 
Setting and Communicating the Strategic 
Plan 
a. Two year strategic plan (while 
updating annual). 
b. Annual business plan 
 
 
Sector Managers 
Division Managers 
GBU BD Directors 
Divisional BD Managers 
Finance function integrates (Divisional 
Finance Directors, GBU Finance Directors) 
GBU Executive Management Team. 
Corporate Executive Management Team 
 
 
 
 
Setting and Communicating Strategic 
Initiatives and their Objectives  
 
Sector Manager 
Division Manager 
GBU BD Directors 
Divisional BD Managers 
GBU Executive Management Team 
Corporate Executive Management Team (level 
of involvement depends on risk profile) 
 
                                               
9
 How acquisitions are related to core competence leverage at Pacifico will be discussed to a greater detail 
in section 8.3.2.   
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Considering the description of Pacifico’s routines for ‘exhibiting SI and crafting 
SA’, in combination with the description of the corporation’s configuration from the 
previous section, the following could be suggested. First, the fact that each GBU sets its 
strategy and operates autonomously indicates that comprehension of strategy objectives 
remains GBU-specific. Second, Pacifico’s strong client-focus highlights the importance 
of each GBU’s ‘business development’ division as integral in setting the strategies that 
the corporation will collectively pursue.  
 
8.3.2 Regulating Strategic Architecture Implementation 
 
 Two streams of organizational routines have been identified related to 
‘regulating strategic architecture (SA) implementation’ at Pacifico. First, those related 
to the ‘assessment and pursuit of business opportunities’ will be described. These 
organizational routines can be separated between those relating to i) the assessment of 
project opportunities (Figure 8.4) and ii) the evaluation of specific capital expenditures 
(e.g. acquisitions). They will be described here in turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The purpose of business development (BD) managers is to find project 
opportunities that align both with global business unit (GBU) and corporate goals 
(I9:MN, I2:MH). Once an opportunity is identified, the divisional BD manager and the 
division manager - under whose responsibility the market-focused sector that will 
undertake the project falls - will decide whether the project is of interest. If deemed of 
interest, the opportunity is presented to the GBU’s BD Director who decides whether 
Figure 8.4: Assessment and Pursuit of Project Opportunities 
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the project is worth pursuing. Subsequently, preparations are made for the ‘winning 
strategy review’. For this review, divisional BD managers become responsible for 
conducting a preliminary analysis, to determine the amount of working capital required 
to pursue the project and provide justification regarding why the project can be won 
(I6:TW). The review’s decision-making body comprises the GBU’s BD director and 
the divisional BD manager and division and sector-unit managers that will undertake the 
project. The issues reviewed include an analysis of competitors and the level of risk that 
dealing with the particular client entails (I2:MH). The outcome of this review is then 
circulated to the GBU’s functional departments and then, the GBU’s BD director, 
operations director and the sector-unit and division managers collaboratively appoint the 
project’s manager and a project team to assist him/her in pursuing the project. 
The next stage is the ‘executive proposals review’. At this review, the appointed 
project manager (PM) has to present a bidding strategy for winning the project 
(I10:JS&MT). The issues discussed are i) what the project is about, ii) familiarity with 
the client and iii) issues related to project execution (I4:MZ). To prepare the 
presentation, PMs draw individuals from operations to assist them. 
 There are risk thresholds determining whether it will be the division manager, 
the GBU BD director, the GBU President or the corporate CEO, who will decide during 
this review whether the project will be pursued. ‘Value’ and ‘type’ of contract 
determine risk levels (I2:MH). Who is the appropriate person to approve the project 
pursuit depends on the level of risk it exposes the company to and is specified in a 
corporate-wide applicable framework, known in Pacifico as the ‘Matrix of Authority’.  
Subsequently, the process moves to the ‘proposal stage’10, where essentially the 
bid to be submitted to the client is put together. A bid director is appointed to lead the 
team that has been involved with the project so far. The project manager is heavily 
involved in the process. After the proposal has been prepared, it is signed off by 
everyone involved in its preparation and is then submitted to the client. If the project is 
won, a corporate-wide ‘matrix of authority’ specifies who is the appropriate person in 
the hierarchy to sign the contract with the client (I6:TW).  
 Throughout the four-stage process described, division and sector managers are 
involved as early as possible to review what the BD managers are proposing and to 
                                               
10
 In the case of the Infrastructure and Technology GBU where the bidding process is longer due to the 
bureaucracy involved during the tendering processes of US Federal Government organizations, that stage 
has 4 sub-stages. 
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consider issues related to ‘project execution’. The objective is for project ownership to 
move to the divisions as soon as possible by involving them early on in the articulation 
of execution management (I6:TW, I5:GB, I10:JS&MT). 
 As during the assessment and pursuit of project opportunities, evaluation of a 
capital expenditure follows similar steps. The most common situation of this is the case 
of acquisitions. Acquiring and integrating companies has been identified as a dynamic 
capability of Pacifico earlier in this Chapter (viz. Section 8.2.1) and the reason for this 
will be illustrated here with an example. If Pacifico wishes to bid for projects tendered 
by the Department of Energy (DoE), they have to buy a company in order to obtain the 
necessary accreditation11 for that client. In such a case, a company is found and then a 
‘letter of intent’ is written to approach it. Subsequently, ‘due diligence’ is conducted 
drawing both from internal (finance, contracts, HR and technical) and external (auditing 
and legal firms) resources. The person who is appointed to lead ‘due diligence’ during 
the pre-acquisition stage is preferably a BD manager or a divisional manager from the 
GBU where the company targeted for acquisition will be positioned. The team that will 
run the company once it has been acquired is picked during the pre-acquisition stage. In 
the case where someone with experience will be mobilized to lead the new company, 
there is always a successor in mind who will step up and take his place. The due 
diligence process on its own takes 90 days (I4:MZ).  
 The second collection of ‘regulating SA implementation’ routines is related to 
‘reporting’. They constitute ‘feedback’ mechanisms (Beer, 1959; Berry et al., 1995) 
through which the performance of the corporation against the targets that its units have 
set in annual business plans (viz. Table 8.2) can be regulated (I2:MH)12. Reporting 
occurs in two streams, with respect to: 
� ‘Project execution’ (operations);  
� Targets regarding ‘sales’ and ‘business development’. 
 
Each GBU’s finance function essentially drives the reporting process, which is 
very formal. At the project level, the finance function has weekly and monthly meetings 
with the project teams. Project controllers monitor: i) financials, ii) schedule and iii) 
                                               
11
 Which constitutes the acquisition of what Hall (1992; 1993) referred to as ‘regulatory’ and ‘positional’ 
capability differentials. 
12
 In each of the GBUs, resources have been allocated for the whole year to be deployed in order to meet 
targets. Each GBU therefore, might have to adjust to any changes that might arise with respect to its 
annual plan. 
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overall project performance against targets set during the bidding stage. The ‘sector’ 
and ‘division’ controllers aggregate project-specific information, focusing on revenue 
generated and more accounting-related issues (I4:MZ). 
Project managers are assessed with respect to the targets set at the signing of 
each contract (I11:ER). Sector-unit directors are assessed based on the performance of 
projects of their sectors, division directors based on the performance of their divisions 
and so on and so forth. BD managers are assessed with respect to whether they have met 
their targets regarding ‘contracts signed’, but not regarding how those projects ended-up 
performing. 
 Each GBU president gets weekly updates on the progress of projects and the 
status of ‘sectors’ and ‘divisions’. Monthly there are ‘executive management meetings’ 
looking at each one of the divisions, how they are meeting their targets and any other 
issue that may arise, such as challenges with clients and key issues for which the 
functional departments should be informed (I2:MH). On the monthly executive 
management meeting, there are some topics covered in specific business areas with the 
GBU Presidents. Division directors are physically there every other month. Sector 
managers call in. The functions most actively involved are ‘finance’, ‘contracts and 
procurement’ and ‘project controls’. 
 From the monthly executive meetings, reports are created for the corporation as 
a whole through an integrated reporting system called ‘PRISM’ (Pacifico Resource 
Information System Manager) - a finance and accounting database that ties the GBUs 
together from a financial point of view (I10:JS&MT). Project managers also use 
PRISM to report monthly project progress to their sector and division directors. The 
monthly integrated reports link ‘execution’ and BD reporting at a GBU level13. 
Quarterly, there is an executive management team meeting per GBU, which 
integrates monthly reports into a GBU-specific quarterly report (I2:MH). These reports 
are submitted to the corporate management team that also meets quarterly to review 
progress against the corporate plan. 
 The findings of this section are summarized on Table 8.3. What the description 
provided in this section indicates is that each GBU’s business development (BD) 
division (and the divisional BD managers in particular) is at the vanguard of ‘regulating 
                                               
13
 It should be noted that the reporting process for BD is more iterative and on-going, as it is directly 
linked with the process followed for assessing and pursuing project opportunities. In addition, there are 
monthly division-specific meetings, during which the GBU goes through all of the projects in the pipeline 
with the division managers and the BD managers assigned to those divisions (I6:TW). 
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Table 8.3: Regulating SA Implementation - Pacifico 
Organizational Routines Individuals/ Organizational Bodies 
Involved 
 
Assessment and pursuit of Business 
Opportunities 
- Projects 
- Acquisitions/Capital Investments 
 
 
GBU Business Development Director 
BD Managers (Division and Sector levels) 
Division and Sector Directors 
GBU President 
Corporate Management Team and BoD 
(depending on level of investment and risk) 
 
 
Reporting (BD and Operations) 
� Project reporting 
� Monthly executive management 
meetings (reports created through 
PRISM) 
� Quarterly executive management 
meetings  
� Quarterly corporate management 
meetings 
 
 
Project Manager, Sector-unit Director, 
Division Director 
Project controller, Sector controller, 
Divisional controller 
GBU President  
GBU executive management team (GBU 
President, Operations Director, BD Director, 
Division Directors) 
GBU Business Development Director 
BD Managers (Division and Sector levels) 
Corporate management team(CEO, COO, 
CFO and GBU Presidents) 
 
 
SA implementation’ as they are the ones who are essentially responsible for identifying 
and evaluating both: 
� Project opportunities their GBU may pursue; 
� Investment opportunities to ensure they are in line with GBU and corporate 
strategies. 
 
In addition, ‘feedback’ mechanisms allow Pacifico to ‘reflexively’ monitor 
strategy execution and change strategies if internally and/or externally generated 
circumstances necessitate it (Mintzberg, 1979; 1989; and in construction Langford and 
Male, 2001), linking therefore the implementation of these strategies back to the 
strategic intent (SI) exhibited and the strategic architecture (SA) crafted. 
 
8.3.3 Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies 
 
In project-based businesses, such as ICMs in general and Pacifico in particular, 
the opportunity for stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies appears 
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first and foremost in the case of projects. In Pacifico, this opportunity is first grasped by 
each GBU’s business development (BD) division during ‘project/investment 
selection’14. Once a project opportunity has been identified by a divisional BD manager, 
the GBU’s BD director and the division’s director are informed and a team is set-up, 
comprising experts from the division, who prepare a presentation for the GBU’s BD 
director in what is known internally as the ‘win strategy review’. Provided the decision 
to pursue the project is positive, the project manager is appointed and a team is set up to 
assist him/her. At that stage, if the appropriate people are not available within the 
division, communication with other divisions - across GBUs if necessary - takes place, 
in order to mobilize the most appropriate individuals with the specialized knowledge, 
skills and experience required to do the job. The project team then develops an 
‘execution plan’, which the project manager presents at the ‘executive proposals review’ 
(I2:MH). 
The team working on the executive proposals review will be proposing how they 
will put specific processes in place to start-up the project if it is won (especially if the 
project is international and in a remote location). The functions most influential in this 
team are ‘contracts and procurement’, ‘finance’ and ‘project controls’ (I3:BS, I4:MZ). 
BD plays an ‘integrating’ and ‘coordinating’ role during that stage of the project - 
crucial to leveraging Pacifico’s ‘entrepreneurial’, ‘estimating’, ‘relational’ and 
‘technical’ core competencies (Lampel, 2001) - as it is responsible for setting up and 
maintaining, on a project-specific basis, an on-line project-collaboration tool called 
‘PIVOTAL’ (I6:TW; I8:TP; I10:JS&MT) (Figure 8.5). PIVOTAL constitutes a 
project-specific knowledge database and communication forum, providing the 
opportunity to have all the information about a project and the competition documented 
and accessible to project participants15.  
It could be argued that PIVOTAL economizes on the communication channels 
required to transfer and integrate specialized knowledge of individuals (Grant, 1996b) 
on specific projects. It should be stressed however that its ‘potential’ is limited by the 
fact that its application is GBU-specific and the fact that it does not offer access to the 
specialized knowledge of organizational members who are not project participants. 
 
                                               
14
 Viz. Section 8.3.2. 
15From the description so far, it can be understood that GBU BD directors, divisional BD managers and 
division directors, are the ‘integrators’ and ‘coordinators’ of Pacifico’s core competence of ‘engineering, 
construction, procurement and project management services’ (viz. Section 8.2.1).  
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The pursuit and execution of international projects and/or projects in remote 
locations (Figure 8.6) exhibits certain distinguishing features with respect to stretching 
and leveraging resources and core competencies. In such projects, the start-up team 
chosen at the pre-award stage identifies specific issues related to project controls and 
how to put the   systems  in  place  to start  the project  as quickly as possible once it is 
awarded. After the ‘executive proposal review’ - but before bid-submission - a project 
‘start-up’ team goes to the country or location where the project will be undertaken and 
conducts research on the local resources available. If and when the project is won, the 
start-up team is moved in and builds on the resources it has identified (I2:MH). 
Obtaining resources to undertake projects in novel/remote locations is more 
easily achieved if an GBU office/resource centre exists nearby. If this is not the case, 
then the GBU’s sector-unit undertaking the project may form a ‘project-specific 
contractual agreements’ with offices/resource centres belonging to another of Pacifico’s 
GBUs  that  are located within close proximity to the project (I4:MZ). This   constitutes  
an instance when the corporation stretches its human resources to leverage its existing 
core competencies, by utilizing potentially idle capacity that may exist across GBUs. 
All of Pacifico’s GBUs have dedicated start-up teams for international projects 
who will not stay for the duration of the project but will give a six-month breathing 
room until the people are found to stay permanently. ‘Start-up’ teams are responsible for  
 
Figure 8.5: Core Competence Leverage at Contract pre-Award Stage 
‘Win 
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setting-up and replicating company processes, as they constitute of individuals who 
have knowledge and experience of their GBU’s practices,  particularly those related to 
project controls (I9:MN). When choosing the project manager, the objective is to 
commit a long-term company employee who will lead initially the ‘project start-up’ 
team and subsequently - as the foot-print in terms of locals increases - train a team of 
locals and bring down to them the expectations existing from the corporate body.  
What becomes evident therefore for this second occasion of stretching and 
leveraging resources and core competencies is that Pacifico’s core competence of 
‘engineering, construction, procurement and project management services’ is deployed 
through the mobilization of employees (the project start-up team and the project 
manager) who are responsible for ‘reproducing’ the GBU’s ‘social practices’ (Giddens, 
1984) and effective routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) in a novel location. 
 Within each of Pacifico’s GBUs, collaboration between ‘sectors’ or ‘divisions’ 
at projects is frequent and the processes through which it happens is standardized and 
explicitly stipulated in each GBU’s ‘global policy manual’. The clear allocation of 
responsibilities between business development and operations, as well as the deft 
(McGrath et al., 1995) project environment created through the application of 
 
Figure 8.6: Core Competence Leverage at Novel/Remote Locations 
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PIVOTAL, ensure the effective stretch and leverage of resources and core competencies 
at projects.  
Often - as in the case when one GBU pursues and executes projects in locations 
or markets where resources from other GBUs are necessary - stretching and leveraging 
of resources and core competencies has to transcend GBUs. In such cases, intra-
organizational conflicts often arise, which may lead to reduced project performance 
(I2:MH; I3:BS; I4:MZ; I5:GB; I6:TW). One senior executive from Pacifico’s 
‘Infrastructure and Technology’ GBU has described the situation as follows: 
 
‘Sometimes, other GBUs can execute or participate in government projects that 
are run by us. This is difficult, primarily because of personnel issues. When 
another GBU executes a government job, nine out of ten times they will screw 
it up because they do not know how the government works.  On several 
occasions they have reduced our performance. I talk to my counterparts in other 
GBUs. The communication is there, but this is not the issue. The issue is that 
people from other GBUs are not so familiar with the processes we follow here’ 
(I6:TW). 
 
Conflicts arise due to functioning and cultural differences in the way that GBUs 
conduct their business. As noted in Section 8.2.1, Pacifico is ‘structured’ around clients, 
particularly with respect to the way it pursues projects. Because Pacifico’s clientele is 
not uniform, different GBUs have developed different processes to align themselves 
with different clients’ processes and needs. Employees, particularly those at the 
operating core and lower middle management levels, have become accustomed to 
operate with GBU-specific functional processes and norms (I4:MZ; I6:TW). As cross-
GBU employee mobilization is not frequent at that hierarchical level, the loyalty of 
employees lie with their GBUs of origin. Consequently, the identity of these individuals 
(Giddens, 1984; Wenger and Snyder, 2000) is influenced and honed by the culture of 
their GBU community. As a result, when they are brought together with peers from 
other BUs, a clash of cultures occurs. Within Pacifico’s ‘departmentalized’ GBU 
structure, the lack of a horizontal organization that enables ‘process’ standardization 
across GBUs - with the exception of project management practices16 - (I2:MH; I5:GB) 
inhibits the development of corporate-wide social networks within which cross-GBU 
                                               
16
 Recognizing that greater standardization in skills and processes would make easier the mobilization of 
employees across GBUs, Pacifico recently decided to do this for the case of project managers, by 
implementing a corporate-wide ‘project-management certification’ initiative and developing a corporate-
wide ‘global project management handbook’.  
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thinking and collaboration can be fostered. It could be argued therefore that Pacifico’s 
‘divisionalized’ diversified configuration does not allow effective corporate-wide 
stretch and leverage of resources and core competencies and contributes to core 
competencies being confined within GBUs.  
 Finally, stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies takes place 
in the case when a company has to be acquired (as this has been described in section 
8.3.2), because of the efforts undertaken to integrate the company acquired in Pacifico’s 
existing structure. That will not happen to its full extent of course, if the acquired 
company is immediately transformed into an autonomous ‘market-sector’ unit and is 
positioned under one of the GBUs’ divisions (I3:BS). This is an issue decided during 
the pre-acquisition stage, when it is also determined who the director of the acquired 
company will be (perhaps from Pacifico perhaps from the acquired company) and 
whether any staff will be mobilized from other Pacifico units to staff it (I4:MZ)17. 
When a company is acquired, some processes need to be harmonized with the rest of the 
group, with financial control first, and others depending on the level of integration as 
this has been decided during the pre-acquisition stage. There is a transition period for 
this harmonization to take place, the implementation of which is also planned at the 
‘due diligence’ stage (I2:MH). 
 The findings of this section regarding the organizational routines implemented 
and the individuals/organizational bodies involved are summarized on Table 8.4. 
 
8.3.4 Improving Business Practices 
 
Pacifico has not developed a corporate-wide program specifically to capture 
knowledge created that could lead to improvements in business practices. This brings 
the responsibility for capturing and recording knowledge created at the level of the 
functional departments and operating units (sectors and divisions). 
As already explained (viz. Section 8.2.1), each GBU has a set of policies and 
procedures known as the GBU’s ‘global policy manual’ (GPM). It is to the GPM that 
personnel refer to regarding the business practices they have to follow. Through the 
process of ‘reporting’, knowledge created at projects may be identified as adding value 
to  customers  and being potentially usable to future projects. This knowledge is initially  
                                               
17
 These processes have already been described in section 8.3.2 and link with the corporation’s succession 
planning practices. 
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Table 8.4: Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies - Pacifico 
Generic 
Activity 
 
Occasion 
 
People/Organizational Bodies 
Involved 
 
Type of Core Competence 
Leverage 
 
Core Competencies Leveraged 
 
 
Stretching 
and 
Leveraging 
Resources 
and Core 
Competencies 
 
Project Execution in a 
Novel Location 
 
 
 
BD Manager and GBU’s BD 
Director 
Project Manager 
Project Start-up team 
 
ILCC Leverage(Project Manager, 
Project Start-up Team (employee 
mobilization) as well as ‘knowledge 
transfer’ through ‘PIVOTAL’). 
 
 
 
Offering engineering, construction, 
procurement and project management 
services to different types of ‘clients’ within 
different sectors of the construction 
industry.  Process Replication (GBU-Specific 
Global policy Manual and ‘Project 
Management Handbook’) 
Project-specific 
Contractual JVs 
between GBUs 
 
BD Function 
Division Manager 
Sector Manager 
GBU’s Executive Management 
Team 
 
 
 
ILCC Leverage (knowledge transfer 
through PIVOTAL) 
 
 
 
Offering engineering, construction, 
procurement and project management 
services to different types of ‘clients’ 
within different sectors of the construction 
industry. 
 
 
 
Acquisitions 
 
BD Divisional Manager and 
GBU’s BD Director 
CFO and Divisional Controller 
Contracts and Procurement 
Divisional Manager 
Technical Experts 
New Company Management Team 
 
ILCC Leverage (both in relation to the 
‘due diligence’ process and the 
mobilization of the newly appointed 
management team) 
 
 
‘Entrepreneurial’, ‘estimating’, ‘technical’ 
and ‘relational’ core competencies’ (from 
Lampel, 2001, viz. Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.6).  Process Replication (during the process 
of ‘harmonization’) 
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recorded on the project-specific on-line collaboration tool (PIVOTAL) that has been set-up 
to facilitate communication and knowledge exchange between project participants. If in the 
future the opportunity to use this  knowledge reappears,  then it  is the responsibility of the 
functional director under whose ‘discipline area’ it falls to incorporate it in the GPM, in the 
form of a ‘policy supplement’. 
In addition, each area of operations, functions and any other discipline-oriented 
activities will undertake some initiative of their own to improve their business practices and 
this will be in its majority GBU-specific. Major changes in practices happen most of the 
time after a ‘forum’ is formulated, a target date for the implementation of changes is set and 
all the relevant management is informed (I2:MH). The whole process therefore is similar to 
that of a ‘strategic initiative’ (viz. Section 8.3.1).  
The findings of this case study regarding the organizational routines and 
individuals/organizational bodies involved in business practice improvement are 
summarized on Table 8.5. The observations made here indicate there are certain limitations 
to the extent that Pacifico can undergo self-reflective (Giddens, 1984) organizational 
learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978). First, the systematic processes related to storing, 
analyzing and disseminating information (Prencipe and Tell, 2001) are focused on 
‘financial performance’ (PRISM) and not information related to knowledge and experience 
gained that could lead to potential re-negotiation of organizational norms (Cameron and 
Quinn, 2005). Second, as already described in Section 8.3.3, selecting new routines and 
generating new alternative routines (March, 1991) is something which happens at a 
‘project-execution’ level and therefore, any revision of standard operating procedures as a 
function of experiential learning (Cyert and March, 1969; 1992), though it is recorded in 
PIVOTAL, is not widely disseminated to lead to changes in the functional/discipline 
practices of the GBUs, let alone the corporation as a whole. This problem is manifested due 
to the absence systematic processes that can update organizational level practices, as a 
function of project-led learning (Brady and Davies, 2004). 
In the absence of a ‘horizontal organization’ necessary to disseminate knowledge 
created corporate-wide, Pacifico’s diversified configuration does not effectively the 
reproduction of social practices (Giddens, 1984) across GBUs. 
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Table 8.5: Improving Business Practices - Pacifico 
Organizational Routines Key People/ Organizational Bodies 
Involved 
 
Functionally-Driven Ad-hoc Efforts 
 
 
Functional Directors 
GBU Operations Directors 
 
Reporting 
 
PM and Operational or Functional Needs (-
project controls and construction focused) 
 
 
 
8.3.5 Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
 
First are the organizational routines linked to the implementation of the ‘project 
management certification program’ (PMCP), which aims at ensuring that all project 
managers are competent enough to apply project management practices in their line of 
work, no matter for which sector, division or GBU they are employed. The program is 
centrally coordinated by the corporate human resources (HR) function and is implemented 
with the collaboration of GBU HR functions. 
 During their career progression, project managers in Pacifico usually start on 
smaller projects and are given on the job training (unless hired at a senior management 
position). In parallel with on-the-job training, the PMCP offers advice on all the tools 
available to them (technological, articles and documents they have to be familiar with). As 
they become more senior, they might be directed towards an external university or business 
school to develop their skills.  As experience builds-up, the GBU’s HR management 
function monitors the progress individual project managers make. When a project manager 
is ready to be accredited by Pacifico’s PMCP, the employee takes a number of quizzes and 
written tests corresponding to different project management knowledge-areas. Then the 
candidate PM has a final essay-type test, followed by an interview from a panel of senior 
experts, at which s/he either passes or fails. Table 8.6 summarizes the PMCP steps. 
 
 
 
 213
Table 8.6: Project Management Certification Program (PMCP) – Steps 
 
1. Advisory role early on PM’s career on available PM tools within Pacifico 
2. Advisory role in later stages on external university programs to round up 
individuals’ skills 
3. Evaluation of PM competence in collaboration with HR. 
4. PM knowledge-level evaluation, through quizzes and written tests corresponding 
to PM knowledge areas. 
5. Final certification examinations: 
o A written essay type test 
o Interview with a panel of experts. 
 
  
 The second group of organizational routines related to the development of 
managerial and organizational leadership capacity at Pacifico are those related to the 
corporation’s structured ‘leadership development framework’. At its lowest hierarchical 
level, leadership development starts with the Hi-Po program (‘High Potential’ individuals). 
The program is initially responsible for identifying individuals who have certain attributes 
and qualities that stand above others in their performance. Its purpose is to assist those 
individuals in developing from project managers to successful sector managers, to division 
managers and to part of the corporate leadership. The implementation of this program takes 
place independently within each of the GBUs. The GBUs’ HR functions monitor who has 
what knowledge, working with division managers to identify the best and brightest 
(I11:ER). 
Hi-Po individuals are identified on an annual basis, typically in spring, when the HR 
function of each GBU will ask divisions to nominate them. Each spring therefore, the 
personal development of existing Hi-Pos is reviewed by each GBU’s HR function in 
collaboration with each GBU’s leadership committee (I11: ER). This review coincides 
with the individual performance assessment of all employees conducted by GBU HR 
functions. There is a screening process for Hi-Po nominees, which is performed by what is 
known in Pacifico as the ‘leadership committee’. Leadership committees are GBU-specific 
and consist of divisional managers, the GBU President, the operations director and the 
business development director18. 
                                                
18
 The criteria for accepting employees with leadership potential are quite broad: 
� Demonstrated ability for taking on a number of tasks, managing them and executing them well; 
� Deductive reasoning; 
� Decision making; 
� Technically sound in their field; 
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Once Hi-Po individuals are accepted into the program, they are assigned a ‘mentor’ 
and they are fast-tracked and given higher responsibilities to develop their skills. 
Furthermore, they are taught matters of strategic importance to the company. The objective 
is for Hi-Pos to get a broader and quicker experience in the management disciplines with 
which the company is involved. Often, the development of a Hi-Po individual involves 
their mobilization across GBUs. Such a mobilization has to be reviewed and approved by 
the executive management team of the individual’s GBU. Cross-GBU employee 
mobilization is encouraged, because it conditions future leaders in developing an overview 
of the corporation and assists in the development of their ‘social capital’ and ‘intrapersonal 
competencies’19 (I11: ER, I6:TW).  
From 2002 onwards, an additional phase of the leadership development framework 
has been put into practice. The crème de la crème of Hi-Po individuals are being nominated 
to participate in what is known as the ‘leadership council’. The leadership council is a 
group of people whose composition transcends GBUs and, at any given time, it has 18-20 
participants who remain in the program for a period between 18 and 24 months (I2:MH, 
I1:DR&ER, I6:TW). Leadership council members receive assignments two-to-three times 
a year, for which they have to collect and analyze corporate-wide data and then collectively 
present a report with recommendations to the corporate management team during its regular 
quarterly meetings20.  
Finally, there is a loosely structured, GBU-specific ‘succession planning 
framework’ in place, which links with the identification of Hi-Po individuals. Annually- in 
a process that overlaps Hi-Po identification each spring - a list is put together from each 
GBU’s human resource (HR) function containing potential successors and Hi-Pos. The list 
is reviewed by the respective GBU presidents and their executive management teams, so 
that there is a constant awareness for the existence of successors.  
The observations made in this section regarding the routines through which this 
activity is implemented and the individuals/organizational bodies involved in their 
                                                                                                                                               
� Good people skills in interaction; 
� A willingness to relocate and learn from different situations. 
19
 Within that context, Hi-Po individuals are mobilized across GBUs either because: 
� A position with increased responsibility that would assist in their personal development has become 
available; 
� There is a need for their individual skills in a specific position at another GBU than the one they 
originally belong to. 
20
 For example, the last assignment was to examine issues related to ‘retention of leaders’.  
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implementation are summarized on Table 8.6. What can be deduced is that, at the level of 
the GBUs the development of Pacifico’s managerial and organizational leadership capacity 
has been elevated to a level of ‘corporate responsibility’ with systems to: 
� Track and train competent employees; 
� Rotating competent employees corporate-wide. 
 
Consequently, it could be argued that efforts at the level of the BUs are in line with 
the ‘core competence-mindset’ that theory proposes as appropriate to effective core 
competence development. These efforts however - excluding the corporate-level leadership 
council - remain GBU-specific and therefore fail to exploit the benefits of the core 
competence mindset that Prahalad and Hamel (1990) advocated in favour of. In addition, in 
the absence of active social networks that cut across the organization, it could be argued 
that the effective development of the ‘social capital’ of employees will be hindered. 
 
Sections 8.2.1 to 8.3.5 have described Pacifico’s organizational characteristics as 
well as the structural context and organizational routines through which it conducts each of 
Table 8.7: Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity -   
                Pacifico  
Organizational Routines People/Organizational Bodies 
Involved 
Hi-Po Program 
� HR’s annual personal performance 
assessment. 
 
HR 
DMs and SMs 
Leadership group (DMs, GBU President, 
Operations Director and Senior VP for BD 
The Leadership Council Executive Committee (Corporate CEO, CFO 
and President) 
Succession Planning  
� HR’s annual personal performance 
assessment (done in parallel with Hi-Po 
assessment and monitoring); 
� DMs and upwards propose successors. 
 
HR 
DMs and upwards 
GBU presidents & Executive Committee of the 
corporation 
 
 
Project Management Certification 
Framework 
 
 
Sector Managers, Division Managers, 
Operations Directors 
Corporate Committee for PM Certification 
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the five generic, corporate-level core competence development activities. The purpose of 
the next section is to describe Pacifico’s configuration. 
 
8.4 Interrelationships between Activities  
 
The purpose of this section is to integrate the findings from sections 8.3.1 to 8.3.5 
and identify the interrelationships between core competence development activities, as well 
as how these are influenced by Pacifico’s configuration (viz. Chapter 4, Section 4.4). 
Findings from Tables 8.1 to 8.6 are displayed on Table 8.7.  
Due to Pacifico’s divisionalized, diversified and client-focused configuration, 
interrelationships between core competence development activities remain GBU-specific. 
Within each GBU however, ‘setting and communicating the annual business plan’ (viz. 
Section 8.3.1) sets the stage for ‘regulating strategic architecture (SA) implementation’ in 
line with strategy objectives. At the same time, ‘regulating SA implementation’ routines 
integrate with ‘stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies’ particularly 
through project selection processes. PIVOTAL (the project collaboration software (viz. 
Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.3) is used to link at any given project the efforts of ‘business 
development’ and ‘operations’, creating thus project-specific collaboration platforms 
through which the tacit knowledge of individual organizational members can be harnessed.  
Routines regarding the development of managerial and organizational leadership capacity 
are very loosely interrelated to the other core competence development activities. First, the 
process of identifying promising individuals and developing plans for their professional 
development is not integrated with the strategy process and therefore, it cannot be 
controlled as such. Along those lines, it could be argued that there is no routine in place to 
link organizational objectives directly with the development of individuals. There is 
however a link between ‘stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies’ and 
‘developing managerial and organizational leadership capacity’, as often, competent 
managers are mobilized across organizational units - including GBUs - to positions of 
responsibility where their expertise is required. This type of stretch and leverage 
contributes in addressing the corporation’s resource needs while at the same time 
contributes to the professional development of its employees. ‘Improving business 
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Table 8.8: Activities, their Routines and Interrelationships - Pacifico 
Generic, Theory-
Based Activities Organizational Routines Key-People/ Organizational Bodies  
Exhibiting SI and 
Crafting SA  
Setting and Communicating the Strategic Plan 
� 2 year strategic plan (while updating annual). 
� Annual Business Plan 
Sector Manager 
Division Manager 
Finance Division integrates (Division FDs, GBU FD) 
GBU Executive Management Team. 
Corporate Executive Management Team 
 
Setting and Communicating SI and their Objectives  
 
 
Sector Manager 
Division Manager 
GBU Executive Team 
Corporate Executive    Team.(level of involvement depends on risk profile) 
 
Stretching and 
Leveraging 
Resources and Core 
Competencies 
Project Execution in a Novel Location 
 
BD Manager and GBU’s BD Director 
Project Manager 
Project Start-up team 
ILCC Leverage (Project Manager, Project Start-up Team (employee 
mobilization) as well as ‘knowledge transfer’ through ‘PIVOTAL’). 
Process Replication (GBU-Specific Global policy Manual and 
‘Project Management Handbook’) 
Project-specific Contractual JVs between GBUs 
BD Function 
Division Manager 
Sector Manager 
GBU’s Executive Management Team 
 
ILCC Leverage (knowledge transfer through PIVOTAL) 
 
 
 
 
Acquisitions 
BD Divisional Manager and GBU’s BD Director 
CFO and Divisional Controller 
Contracts and Procurement Divisional Manager 
Technical Experts 
New Company Management Team 
ILCC Leverage (both in relation to the ‘due diligence’ process and the 
mobilization of the newly appointed management team) 
 
Process Replication (during the process of ‘harmonization’) 
Developing 
Managerial and 
Organizational  
Leadership 
Capacity 
Hi-Po program 
� HR’s annual personal performance assessment 
 
HR 
DivisionManagers and SectorManagers 
Leadership group (DMs, GBU President, Operations Director and Senior VP for BD 
The Leadership Council Executive Committee (Corporate CEO, CFO and President) 
Succession Planning  
� HR’s annual personal performance assessment (done in parallel with Hi-Po 
assessment and monitoring); 
� - DMs and upwards propose successors. 
    HR 
DMs and upwards 
GBU presidents & Executive Committee of the corporation 
Project Management Framework Corporate HR, GBU HR 
Improving Business 
Practices 
Functionally-Driven Ad-hoc Efforts Functional Directors 
GBU Operations Directors 
Reporting PM and Operational or Functional Needs (-project controls and construction focused) 
Leadership Council Hi-Pos 
Corporate Executive Team (CEO, President, CFO, GBU Presidents 
 
Regulating SA 
Implementation 
 
Assessment and pursuit of Business Opportunities 
� Projects; 
� Acquisitions/Capital Investments. 
BD Development 
- GBU’d BD Director 
- Divisional BD director 
- Divisional Managers 
- GBU President or corporate executive management team or BoD 
Reporting 
� Project Execution (Operations); 
� Business Development. 
PM, SM, sector FD, project controllers, divisional controller 
GBU President and Division Managers 
GBU President and GBU directors 
GBU Executive Committee (GBU President, Senior VP Executive, BD Director, GBU CEO, Division Managers) 
Corporate Executive Committee CEO, COO, CFO + GBU Presidents) 
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practices’ is linked to ‘regulating SA implementation’ through ‘PIVOTAL’ and ‘PRISM’. 
However, the problem is that knowledge captured: 
� May not be effectively communicated up the hierarchy; 
� Is not systematically disseminated across projects. 
 
8.5 Summarizing and Concluding Section 
 
The findings from Pacifico’s case study are summarized on Table 8.8. Pacifico is a 
diversified, client-focused organization. Within Pacifico’s organizational context, strategic 
intents and strategic architectures are exhibited and crafted independently across GBUs, 
albeit interdependently across divisions and sector-focused units within each GBU. As a 
corporation, it could be argued that Pacifico has not managed to overcome the BU-mindset 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) inherent in its market-based configuration. As identified in this 
case study, this could inhibit the effectiveness with which resources and core competencies 
are stretched and leveraged across GBUs.  
Project selection, pursuit and execution routines, combined with the use of 
PIVOTAL, provide a project collaboration framework and knowledge database that can 
capture innovations and knowledge created at projects, potentially leading to the selection 
of new successful routines, or the improvement of existing ones as a function of 
‘experiential learning’. The integration of Pacifico’s reporting system (PRISM) with 
PIVOTAL, also provides scope for innovations and knowledge created to be communicated 
up the hierarchy and disseminated across the corporation. However, this may not happen in 
practice for two reasons. First, the decentralized nature of Pacifico’s configuration does not 
facilitate the existence of a ‘horizontal organization’ (Porter, 1985) that could disseminate - 
or make readily available - knowledge created in a corporate-wide manner. Second, the 
systems are not in place - not even within GBUs - to record innovations and knowledge 
created and re-use them on future projects, carrying the risk that knowledge will be lost 
once projects finish and project teams dismantle (Brady and Davies, 2004; Davies and 
Hobday, 2005).  
In light of the above, it could be argued that the absence of a ‘horizontal 
organization’ to foster greater inter-GBU collaboration, as well as systematically transfer 
knowledge across projects, could inhibit Pacifico from effectively executing core 
competence development activities and therefore developing its core competencies. 
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Table 8.8: Pacifico: Summarizing 
Issues Findings 
 
 
Configuration 
A diversified configuration structured in four autonomous client-focused global 
business units (GBUs). GBUs constitute of sector-focused managerial units groped 
under market-focused divisions. GBUS are professionally oriented because of the 
role they have chosen to play in the production of the built environment 
(engineering-procurement-construction-project management). At a corporate-
level, the primary coordination mechanism is that of standardization of GBU 
outputs. Standardization of skills and processes is pursued corporate-wide with 
respect to financial and project management practices. Within GBUs, business 
development and core functions are centrally coordinated.  The strategic apex of 
each GBU is essentially the key organizational part of the corporation’s units, as 
they are the designers and controllers of their strategies. 
 
Core Competencies 
� Offering engineering, construction, procurement and project management 
services to different types of ‘clients’ within different sectors of the construction 
industry.  
 
Dynamic Capabilities 
� Acquiring companies and successfully/appropriately integrating them into the 
corporation’s existing body; 
� Organically developing internal systems that allow it to integrate the business 
activities of its various units; 
� Restructuring its organization to better facilitate and serve the needs of its 
clients. 
On the relationship between 
Pacifico’s configuration and its 
ability to develop a corporate 
strategy, with optimal potential 
for implementation 
Strategy is formulated bottom-up and is GBU-specifics. GBU strategic apexes 
integral in setting strategic and operational plans. 
On the relationship between 
Pacifico’s configuration and the 
effectiveness with which it 
regulates its strategies 
Feedback mechanisms (reporting and project/investment selection processes) in 
place to regulate strategy implementation. Reporting is coordinated by each 
GBU’s finance function and project/investment selection processes are led by each 
GBU’s business development function. 
On the relationship between 
Pacifico’s configuration and the 
effectiveness with which it 
stretches its resources and core 
competencies 
On-line project collaboration platforms (PIVOTAL) are set up by each business 
development function during the project pursuit stage and become the forum for 
intra-GBU coordination. Collaboration problems may during inter-GBU joint 
ventures due to differences in GBU cultures, inhibiting effective core competence 
leverage. 
On the relationship between 
Pacifico’s configuration and the 
effectiveness with which it can 
reconfigure its processes, 
structures and norms, as a 
result of organizational 
learning 
Improving business practices is a responsibility undertaken by GBU functional 
directors, who update annually the practices related to their discipline. Knowledge 
created may be captured in the project-specific collaboration framework 
(PIVOTAL) but is not disseminated corporate-wide, due to the lack of a horizontal 
organization that connects different GBUs. 
On the relationship between 
Pacifico’s configuration and the 
effectiveness with which it 
develops managerial and 
organizational leadership 
capacity 
Social capital stronger within GBUs rather than across them. Leadership 
development (Hi-Po program) starts as GBU-specific but individuals with 
potential leadership are mobilized across GBUs to different positions of 
responsibility in order to develop intra-organizational social capital and develop 
professionally. 
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Chapter 9: The Cyclone Corporation 
 
9.1 Cyclone’s Early History 
 
 Founded in 1912 in California, Cyclone quickly built its reputation within the 
emerging petroleum industry as a small oil refinery designer. During the 1920s, Cyclone 
developed expertise in the oil and gas construction field. Sales steadily grew in the 1920s 
with Cyclone remaining a family-owned business. During the 1930s, the company won 
refinery construction contracts across the United States of America (USA), as well as its 
first overseas job in Bahrain. In the 1940s, the war effort boosted the company’s domestic 
workload and secured contracts for refineries and natural gas plants in Canada, Venezuela 
and Saudi Arabia. In the early 1950s, Cyclone began working with the US Federal 
Government executing contracts in the nuclear field. The company also contracted for the 
US Air Force in Saudi Arabia, and for refineries in Puerto Rico. Cyclone slowly developed 
a ‘design and build’ capability for plants in the petrochemical industry and undertook 
projects in Australia, Canada, Scotland, and South Africa. By the end of the decade, 
Cyclone had established offices worldwide, and was a publicly traded company on the New 
York Stock Exchange. The 1950s also saw Cyclone investing heavily into research and 
development and establishing in-house training and college tuition reimbursement 
programs for the development of its employees. In the 1960s, Cyclone continued its 
international expansion into offshore drilling. In 1969 the company also got involved in the 
mining and metals industry.  
By the 1970s, Cyclone had focused heavily on the ‘natural resources’ industries and 
the mega-projects arena and set-up business units (BUs) in Alaska, Europe, Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. In 1977, Cyclone acquired a corporation that was a leader 
in establishing the ‘design and build’ concept in the US. What was so significant about the 
acquisition was that Cyclone, as an oil & gas company primarily, acquired a company that 
was more construction oriented, providing synergies with respect to both ‘geographic’ and 
‘market’ diversification.  
The 1980s saw the two companies integrating into a single worldwide operating 
unit. In the 1990s the corporation expanded its international operations successfully 
completing many petrochemical, infrastructure, and environmental projects around the 
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globe. Through another strategic acquisition, the corporation expanded the provision of 
engineering and construction services to the electrical, pharmaceutical, commercial and 
manufacturing industries.  
 
9.2 Recent Evolutionary Path and Cyclone’s Present State 
 
 Figure 9.1 displays more recent developments regarding how Cyclone’s ‘role’ in the 
production of the built environment and ‘structural characteristics’ of its configuration have 
evolved in relation to notable strategic intents its leadership has set, strategic architectures it 
has pursued and investments it has made. The display is in the form of an ‘event-flow 
network’ (Miles and Huberman, 1995) and is colour coded so that its constituting elements 
can be easily distinguished. 
In 1998 and 1999, the company undertook a long term strategic review, concluding 
that it would focus on the provision of engineering, procurement, construction and 
management services only (Figure 9.2). Subsequently, a business plan was developed to 
transform Cyclone into a ‘global knowledge-based diversified services company’1. The 
business plan defined goals for each BU to clarify accountability across all units of 
Cyclone. A ‘client relationship management’ approach was adopted through the 
development of a ‘global account management’ centralized function. In addition, a service 
management strategy was pursued through investments to create an autonomous BU named 
‘Cyclone Global Services’ (CGS), whose purpose was to provide support services both to 
other units of the corporation and their clients, regarding activities such as operations and 
maintenance, construction and procurement. Capabilities within CGS included operations 
and maintenance activities, small capital project engineering and construction, site 
equipment and tool services, industrial fleet outsourcing, plant turnaround services, 
temporary staffing and supply chain solutions. Services for large capital projects were 
provided to clients in concert with CGS and other Cyclone segments or on a stand-alone 
basis. The role of CGS also involved the implementation of additional strategic initiatives 
such as the piloting and deployment of an corporate-wide enterprise resource planning 
(ERP)  management system. Due  to  its strategic importance, the creation, launch and 
                                                  
1
 In 2000, Cyclone successfully completed the spin-off of its coal business and acquired several companies to 
expand the range of services it could offer the US government, strengthening its operations and maintenance 
capabilities. 
 222
Figure 9.1: Evolutionary Profiling of the Cyclone Corporation 
YEAR 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
‘Role’ in the Production of 
the Built Environment’ 
Engineering, Procurement, 
Construction, Project/Program 
Management, Coal Producer and 
Distributer 
Engineering, Procurement, Construction, Operations and Maintenance, Project/Program Management Services 
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s Structure One coal mining BU and 3 
market/client focused EPCM BUs 
4 EPCM client-focused GBUs and one ‘support services, GBU (CGS) 
Horizontal Organization/ 
Decentralization 
Executive Management Executive Management, Global Account management, Techno-structure 
Project Grouping (type 
of market-focus strategy) 
Market-focused Client-focused 
  
Strategic Intents, 
Strategic 
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Investments and 
Resource Allocations 
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Professional 
Services 
Organization 
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- Knowledge Management  
- Procurement/Supply Chain Management 
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- Human Resource Management 
Acquisitions 
for Growth in 
US Federal 
Market 
Acquisitions  
for Growth in 
the US Federal 
Market 
Restructuring 
to better align 
acquired 
companies with 
client-base 
Become a truly ‘global’ service 
provider 
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operation of CGS was initially directly supervised by Cyclone’s chief executive officer 
(CEO). In 2003, Cyclone’s strategic focus shifted towards growth in the US federal 
services market. Towards that end, the corporation completed two niche acquisitions to be 
able to compete for projects tendered from the Department of Defence (DoD) and 
Department of State (DoS). Subsequently, restructuring took place to better align the 
corporation’s resources with the needs of its client-base. 
 Business process improvement initiatives were mostly related to project selection 
criteria and the ‘timely provision of information to leadership’, through the rolling-out of 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) and managing information systems (MIS). Furthermore, 
the integration of all of the above with a group-wide ‘risk management framework’ was 
pursued. In addition, routines for project selection were linked with an ‘account 
management’ initiative and ‘human resource development’ initiatives. Finally, investments 
were made towards the development and utilization of a corporate-wide knowledge 
management framework.  
Having taken some steps towards the direction decided upon during the 
corporation’s last strategic review, Cyclone exhibited in 2004 the intent to build on its 
 
 
 
� Change in Business Profile and Value Proposition 
- Provide Knowledge-Based Services; 
- Align Business Activities with Strategic Direction; 
- Divest all non-EPCM Businesses. 
 
� Fix the Bottom-Line 
- Reduce Costs through Better Supply Chain Management; 
- Implement Knowledge  Management Framework; 
- Implement Risk Management Framework; 
- Adopt a Client-Management Philosophy. 
 
� Focus on Adding Value Through People 
- Focus on Developing Intellectual Capital; 
- Make Employee Development a Priority; 
- Adopt a Pay-for-Performance Philosophy. 
 
� Position the Corporation for Future Growth 
- Strengthen Involvement in EPC Markets; 
- Expand Knowledge-Base Services; 
- Offer Total Asset Solutions; 
- Leverage Web-Based Technologies; 
- Tighten Project Selection Criteria for Higher Margins. 
Figure 9.2: Outcomes of 1998-1999 Strategic Review 
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existing strengths and become a truly ‘global’ service provider of construction, engineering, 
procurement, operations and maintenance and project/program management services. When 
this research begun, Cyclone had an annual turnover in excess of $13 billion, operating out 
of 25 offices in as many countries and employing directly approximately 25,000 people. 
Cyclone originated from an oil refinery design and construction background, from 
which it developed during the last 90 years into a leading international engineering, 
procurement, construction, operations and maintenance and project/program management 
service provider. Increased US Federal Government spending in the late 1990s and early 
2000s allowed the company to rapidly grow in that market, many segments of which it 
entered through the acquisition of small, ‘accredited’ contractors; not in order to obtain core 
competencies it did not already possess, but in order to obtain the legal accreditations2 that 
would allow it to compete in those markets. Investments in the oil and gas sector sparked 
by high oil prices (at the time) enabled the group to grow organically by providing its 
services to numerous clients across the globe. At the same time, the corporation invested 
heavily in integrating its BUs by undertaking corporate-wide initiatives related to 
knowledge management practices and the standardization of skills and processes. In light of 
these, it could be suggested that Cyclone’s core competence is that of ‘providing globally 
engineering, procurement, construction, operations and maintenance and project 
management services, individually or integrated on a project-basis’. Other core 
competencies may also be present. 
Furthermore, Cyclone’s evolutionary path reveals that the ways through which the 
corporation entered and grew in the markets it wished to compete in, were a combination of 
acquisitions and internal development of the systems required to manage the expansion of 
its administrative boundaries. This suggests that Cyclone’s ‘dynamic capabilities’3 are 
based in being able to: 
� Acquire companies and successfully/appropriately integrating them into the 
corporation; 
� Organically develop core competencies in areas in which it has no (or little) 
experience; 
                                                  
2
 What Hall (1992; 1993) referred to as ‘regulatory’ and ‘positional’ capability differentials (viz. Chapter 2, 
Section 3.2.4). 
3
 Viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.1 
 225
� Standardize processes and business practices to make easier the stretching and 
leveraging of knowledge resources and core competencies across organizational 
units. 
 
Other dynamic capabilities may also be present. 
 
9.2.1 Structural, Functioning and Agency Characteristics 
 
As shown on Figure 9.3, Cyclone is structured in five ‘industry lines’ (ILs): i) 
Energy and Chemicals, ii) Industrial and Infrastructure, iii) Government, iv) Power and v) 
Global Services. ILs are broken down to market (client)-focused business units (BUs)4. The 
services Cyclone provides fall into five broad categories: i) engineering, ii) procurement, 
iii) construction, iv) operations and maintenance and v) project management. Those 
services are offered independently as well as on a fully integrated basis from all BUs. They 
can range from basic consulting activities (often at the early stages of the project) to 
complete, sole responsibility, engineering-procurement-construction contracts. 
BUs draw resources from ‘functions’ situated at local/regional offices that are 
spread in different geographical regions throughout the world. Offices are essentially 
resource centres, which provide BUs of all ILs with the human resources they need for their 
projects. So, human resources are located in offices but, at any given time, they may be 
employed by the BUs belonging to any one of the five ILs. In addition to the above, 
Cyclone has set-up ‘engineering’ centres in the Philippines, India and Poland, in an effort to 
lower its base costs and become more global.  
Each office/resource-centre groups human resources into functional activities and 
may facilitate simultaneously projects from more than one BUs - often more than one IL. 
This structural arrangement superimposes an IL structure and hierarchy on each office. 
Functions have core teams residing in each office to support each BU of each IL, but are 
centrally coordinated in terms of strategies and policies. Functional and business practices 
are standardized corporate-wide.  
The functions facilitated in the offices are not stand-alone, but cut across the 
corporation. So do the BUs. To facilitate these links between ‘functions’ and ‘ILs’ across  
                                                  
4
 For example, Energy and Chemicals is broken down to i) Upstream, ii) Downstream and iii) Chemicals 
BUs. 
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offices, Cyclone has set up a horizontal organization known internally as the ‘global 
communities network’, which constitutes of corporate-wide communities of practice known 
as ‘knowledge communities’. Communities align with the organization’s structure. 
Essentially, there is a community for every function  within  the  company  and  a  
community  for  each  BU  within  the  company.  So, the ‘business’ communities form a 
matrix structure with the ‘functional’ communities5. Knowledge communities 
corresponding to functions are grouped under a sub-unit of the ‘global community network’ 
called ‘project execution services’. The way that community members communicate is 
through a central on-line network, so that every employee, when they log in, has access to 
every community. Employees can sign up to any community and be a member (I3:JMcQ; 
I6:PM). 
Each knowledge community has a ‘global community leader’ and a number of 
‘subject matter experts’. Together, they try to establish common practices and procedures 
related to their community’s activities and they use the on-line network to leverage 
corporate-wide the knowledge of individual community members possess. For the 
functional communities, there is no difference in role being the global community leader 
and being the corporation’s functional director. Essentially, community leaders are 
responsible for the ‘people’, the ‘work practices’ and the ‘software tools’ of their function. 
Community leaders are also responsible for ‘global consistency’ of practices. 
Processes/protocols of disciplines are available on an on-line database - called ‘knowledge 
on-line’ - for employees to directly access or download. The way communities function, 
allows anyone to submit knowledge or ideas to a community. This knowledge will go 
through a ‘peer review’ process, where the peers are each community’s subject matter 
experts and community leader (I3:JMcQ). 
Cyclone ensures that the functional communities remain business-focused by 
forcing BUs to contribute to the costs of the communities they are associated with. Through 
‘project execution services’, knowledge managers are paid. The community leaders are 
budgeted by approximately 1/3 of their time for their role in their community.  
                                                  
5
 In addition, there are a few communities, such as the ‘leadership community’ (helping develop leadership 
expertise in younger employees) and the ‘strategy and business intelligence’ community (provides business 
intelligence and strategy to group executives).  
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Cyclone has focused very strongly on being a ‘knowledge-sharing organization’ and 
for that reason requires a robust information technology (IT) infrastructure that allows 
every single employee global access to knowledge on-line. The emphasis includes: 
� Sharing knowledge that is developed at projects; 
� Creating dependable and responsible communities; 
� Being able to depend on the communities to have the content employees are looking 
for; 
� Creating an environment where employees can rely on the fact that there will be a 
forum in the community where they will be able to ask a question and expect they 
will get an answer. 
 
 To achieve this, Cyclone’s ‘knowledge management’ program is heavily leveraged 
(I3:JMcQ, I6:PM). There is a core team responsible for knowledge management, 
corporate-wide, which maintains the IT infrastructure supporting ‘global collaboration’.   
Finally, each community is responsible for: 
� The career path definition for its members, through a program called the ‘global 
functional track’; 
� Maintaining ‘people development forums’ and helping more people through stretch 
assignments to develop professionally. 
 
 Although knowledge communities are allowed to emerge organically, the process of 
their creation is standardized and rigorous, ensuring they exist to add value. In the words of 
the corporation’s knowledge management director: 
 
‘We go through a very rigorous community development process and the very 
first step is what we call the ‘readiness assessment’. The readiness assessment is 
really there to help us, as the leading team, as well as to help the business 
understand: is there really a legitimate business need for the community? Are the 
people that want the community really committed to have the community and the 
responsibilities that come from that? Are they acting like a community of people 
to begin with? So we go through this very rigorous process, and then define the 
community’s charter, define objectives for the community, help the community 
set up its structure so that their content is well organized and their discussion 
forums are well organized, hoping to identify the subject matter experts, getting 
the subject matter experts to subscribe to the appropriate places in the 
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communities, and then we go through what we call our formal launch.’ 
(I3:JMcQ) 
 
 Regarding resource coordination, certain functions are more centralized than others. 
First are those of ‘construction’ and ‘procurement’. These are grouped under a centralized 
BU with corporate-wide responsibility for managing construction and procurement 
resources and are positioned as a profit and loss centre under the industry line (IL) of 
‘Cyclone Global Services’. The procurement part of this unit consists of ‘strategic 
sourcing’ and ‘procurement’. Procurement is responsible for assigning procurement-related 
human resources to offices, industry lines, BUs and projects.  ‘Strategic sourcing’ is a 
centralized sub-unit, which: 
� Manages relationships with key suppliers; 
� Manages relationships with clients’ procurers; 
� Leverages its purchasing power to achieve economies of scale;  
� Leverages its knowledge and corporate-wide employee networks to advise Cyclone’s 
BUs on procurement issues.  
 
 This centralization works only because there is a functional matrix and an IL matrix 
superimposed on the offices/resource centres (I1:RA, I7:JM, I8:DS). ‘Construction and 
procurement’ has ‘core teams’ at each of the corporation’s offices (I8:JMcK). The 
existence of these teams and the communication channels between them help in better 
understanding the resource needs of each BU and in coordinating resource deployment in a 
manner that ensures: i) rapid response, ii) maximization of resource use and iii) awareness 
to BU managers regarding what resources are available and where (I1:RA; I8:JMcK). 
 ‘Sales’ also have core teams at each office, which are linked corporate-wide 
through the corporate function of ‘Global Accounts’, created to integrate services that are 
provided by different industry lines when clients need them (I4:LB, I4b:KS). A supporting 
unit to the sales function is a small, centralized ‘marketing’ organization, whose mission is 
to collect information (both from within and from outside the corporation) related to 
markets, clients and competitors and then document them and feed them back monthly, 
either in the form of letters or through ‘knowledge on-line’(I5:LB).   
The corporate HR function centrally supports the coordination of human resources 
and is responsible for setting strategy and policies regarding human resource development 
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across the corporation. It also has a central team in each office/resource centre, to serve the 
BUs each office facilitates (I12: SG, I13: RA).  
From sales and global account management, to project execution, to operations and 
maintenance, the relationships between the corporation’s different units during their 
involvement at any given project are governed by rules explicitly stated in a corporate-wide 
‘operating systems manual’ (OSM). The OSM describes in detail the responsibilities of 
different organizational units, the roles of key individuals and the processes and protocols 
for managing the interfaces between organizational units at any given project. Each IL has 
to maintain an IL-specific OSM which complies with the corporate one. The existence of 
the OSM ensures coordination through standardization of processes at a corporate level and 
control of the ILs through compliance of their processes with a common framework of 
reference. 
 The company’s highest governing body is the Board of Directors (BoD), 
comprising 11 independent and one executive director. Independent board members meet 
regularly (at least quarterly) without members of management present. Cyclone's ‘lead 
independent director’ sets the agenda for these sessions and is elected for a three-year term 
by the independent directors. He also consults with the Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the corporation with respect to agendas, scheduling, and information 
needs relating to Board and committee meetings. 
 Underneath the BoD sits the ‘corporate management team’ led by Cyclone’s 
Chairman and CEO. The team constitutes of ‘corporate executives’ (the Chairman and 
CEO, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Legal Officer and Corporate Secretary, Group 
President for Industrial and Infrastructure, Group President for Government and Global 
Services, Chief Information Officer, Corporate Health and Safety Director, Corporate 
Security and Construction Services Director and Corporate Human Resources Director, the 
President of Cyclone Constructors International, Vice President of Global Public Affairs, 
Vice President for Corporate Compliance, Vice President for Corporate Finance and 
Investor Relations, Senior Vice President for Government Relations, Vice President and 
Treasurer, Vice President and Controller and Vice President for Corporate 
Communications) and ‘key operating executives’ (the Presidents of each of Cyclone’s ILs). 
Table 9.1 summarizes the ‘procedural’ and ‘agency’ characteristics (Mintzberg, 
1979; 1989) of Cyclone’s configuration. Cyclone could be described as a professionally-
driven, diversified, bureaucratic configuration. Although structured as a diversified 
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Table 9.1: Cyclone’s Configuration Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Structural 
Characteristics 
 
Market-Focused 
Strategy 
(project-
grouping) 
 
 
1. Projects grouped geographically under global market-focused BUs, which are grouped in turn under client-
focused industry lines (ILs).  
 
Horizontal 
Organization/ 
Degree of 
Decentralization 
 
 
1. Corporate management team (across ILs) 
2. IL executive management team 
3. Knowledge communities of the ‘global excellence network’ 
4. Human resources function 
5. ‘Construction and procurement’ BU 
6. ‘Functional’ and ‘business’ networks between individuals/teams located at offices/resource centres 
7. ‘Sales’ and ‘global accounts’ functions 
 
 
Procedural 
Characteristics 
 
Coordination 
Mechanisms 
 
 
1. Standardization of outputs and action planning, with respect to setting and communicating SI and SA. 
2. Standardization of skills and processes (global knowledge communities and operating systems manuals) 
3. Informal corporate-wide employee networks 
 
Agency 
Characteristics 
 
Key-People/ 
Organizational 
Parts 
 
1. CEO and corporate management team (corporate and operating executives) 
2. CFO 
3. BU directors 
4. ‘Global communities network’ core team, knowledge excellence leaders, subject matter experts. 
5. Directors of corporate HR, ‘sales and account management’ and of the ‘construction and procurement’ BU. 
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organization, Cyclone has managed to overcome drawbacks related to market-based 
divisionalization by focusing on corporate-wide skills and processes standardization. The 
‘global communities network’ is essentially a ‘techno-structure’ set up for that purpose, 
which drives discipline-oriented skills standardization and provides all necessary support 
for the continuous (i.e. routine) updating and routinization of practices. Standardization of 
work processes is also reinforced by the existence of a corporate-wide and IL-specific 
OSMs. Due to its corporate-wide uniformity in skills and processes related to functions, 
disciplines and business practices, Cyclone has developed a corporate-wide ideology and a 
degree of standardization of norms, which, to an extent, can be used to characterize it as a 
‘missionary organization’ - according to Mintzberg’s (1979; 1983;1989) configurations.  
 Having described Cyclone’s background and presented its current state, the purpose 
of the next section is to describe the organizational routines through which it implements 
each of the generic, corporate-level core competence development activities proposed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
9.3 Core Competence Development Activities 
 
 The purpose of this section is twofold. First, to present and describe the Cyclone-
specific ‘routines’ through core competence development activities are conducted. Second, 
to identify and describe the role of the individuals/organizational  bodies  most  integral  to  
the  implementation of these routines. Findings related to each activity will be presented 
and briefly discussed in turn. 
 
9.3.1 Exhibiting Strategic Intent and Crafting Strategic Architecture  
 
The routines through which exhibiting strategic intent (SI) and crafting strategic 
architecture (SA) takes place and the individuals/organizational bodies involved in their 
implementation, are shown on Table 9.2.  
First are the organizational routines related to ‘strategic planning’. At Cyclone, base 
strategy is developed by the Chairman and BoD with input from executives. Base strategy 
has a 20-year horizon. On this strategy, each industry line (IL) develops a five-year 
strategic plan, focusing on: 
� Which markets are expanding or contracting;  
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Table 9.2: Exhibiting SI and Crafting SA - Cyclone  
Organizational Routines Individuals/ Organizational Bodies Involved 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Planning 
     
 BoD sets strategic direction 
 Bottom-up strategy creation from: 
- Executive management Team (Group Presidents     
           ILs) 
Corporate Strategic Planning Division 
Marketing Division 
Provide info and gather, record, communicate to divisions 
- CEO 
- CFO 
 
 
 
Annual Operating Plan 
     
  BoD (CEO) 
  Executive Management Team 
  CFO especially) 
  Finance division 
  CFO’s organization ultimately responsible 
  
 
Strategic Reviews  
 
 
Chief Executive’s Management Team 
BoD (Depending on expenditure) 
 
Internal Communications 
Department 
 
Internal Communication Department’s Members 
CEO and the Corporate Management Team 
 
� What needs to be done to respond from a ‘technology’ and ‘resources’ perspectives.  
 
The ILs’ executive management teams develop ‘action-plans’ and submit them to 
the IL Presidents for review and approval. Business plans are then submitted to the 
‘corporate strategic planning’ department for a ‘consistency review’ and to Cyclone’s Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) and Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Subsequently, plans are 
incorporated into a consolidated, corporate-wide plan. The consolidated plan is in turn 
submitted to the BoD for discussion and approval. Once strategic plans are approved, the 
direction or the ‘strategic intent’ is communicated  to  the  IL  Presidents  and  through  the  
hierarchy  to  the management of their BUs. This leads to the development of ‘operating 
plans’ for each year, which are reformulated annually between September and December. 
Strategies and operating plans are locked down and then each IL caries the communication 
to their management teams and to their offices. Hence, there is a formal process of 
communication within each group through its business-line management and resource 
centres. (I1:RA). 
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This brings us to the second set of organizational routines and the bottom-up 
creation of the corporation’s ‘annual operating plan’ (Figure 9.4). For the annual operating 
plan, three streams of information are integrated. One along the IL-hierarchy, one of the 
‘global communities’ one related to ‘sales and account management’. These streams are 
integrated at the IL-level with the assistance of corporate strategic planning and are then 
submitted to the BoD for approval. This ‘approval process’ includes: 
� Reviewing the controlling mechanisms of the planning process;  
� Consolidating proposals at the corporate level;  
� Developing targets with the CEO; 
� Routine analysis and reporting of results, again in collaboration with the CEO.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BoD reviews: 
- Controlling mechanisms of the planning process 
- Consolidation of plans at a corporate level 
And develops down to the BU-level in collaboration with the CEO: 
- Targets 
- Routines analysis and reporting of results 
Figure 9.4: The Annual Operating Plan 
BoD 
Corporate 
Executive 
Management 
Industry 
Line Level 
BUs, 
Functions 
and Sales 
Corporate strategic planning integrates 
at an IL level for consistency 
Reviews IL proposals and 
submits them to BoD for 
approval 
‘Functional 
Proposals’ 
- Investments 
Levels 
- Resource 
Needs 
- Personnel 
Personal 
Development 
Plans 
‘BU 
Proposals’: 
-EBIT 
-Cash Flow 
-Profit 
Margins 
-Backlog 
-New Orders 
-Investment 
levels 
 
‘Sales and 
Account 
Management
’ Proposals 
- Sales 
Prospects 
- Resource/I
nvestments 
Needs 
IL Executive Management Team 
updates the 5-year plan 
Approved plans, targets and 
objectives communicated 
‘Functions’ 
Collaborate with 
IL executive 
management 
team to create 
Function-
specific action 
plans 
‘BUs’  
Collaborate 
with IL 
executive 
management 
team to create 
BU-specific 
action plans 
 
‘Sales and 
Account 
Management’ 
Collaborate 
swith IL 
executive 
management 
team to 
create BU-
specific 
action plans 
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Operating plans are detailed to the level of individual BUs, projects and sales 
prospects. Key ‘metrics’ used are earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), cash flow, profit 
margins, backlog, new order levels, investment levels, and overhead levels. After approval 
from the BoD, targets and objectives set are cascaded down to the ILs. Subsequently, the IL 
management teams update as necessary their five-year business plan and create in 
collaboration with BUs and functions the ‘annual operating plan’, which specifies the 
actions that need to be taken to meet the annual targets. The corporate finance is 
responsible for coordinating the creation of the annual operating plan. 
Third, is the case of ‘strategic reviews’, which may lead to strategic initiatives. 
Strategic reviews are usually initiated by someone from the corporate management team, 
with input from key operating executives. Ideas are discussed and reviewed at that level 
and depending on the corresponding investment value for their implementation and their 
alignment with corporate objectives, approval from the BoD may be required. The decision 
making process (as well as the communication of the actual decisions of the reviews) and 
the individuals/organizational bodies involved, are the same as those of the ‘strategic 
planning process’6.  
The interdependence of strategic planning and the annual operating plan suggests 
that the latter may act as a feedback mechanism that allows Cyclone’s management and 
leadership to better regulate the implementation of its intended strategies. Third, the 
existence of a horizontal organization that can integrate and then disseminate information 
corporate-wide during exhibiting strategic intent and crafting strategic architecture, ensures 
that management develops comprehension7 as to: 
� Which are the corporate objectives to be met; 
� Where the resources to pursue them exist within the organization and how they can 
be obtained (corporate-wide). 
 
Finally, in addition to the communication that takes place during the setting and 
communicating of long-term strategy, annual operating plans and strategic initiatives , there 
is a ‘communications department’ within Cyclone, with the responsibility to communicate - 
                                                  
6
 An example of a strategic review, which led to the development of multiple strategic initiatives was the one 
described in section 9.2. 
7
 A pre-requisite to organizational competence and effectiveness in task execution - viz. Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.3 
 236
corporate-wide - to Cyclone’s management any outcome of periodic meetings of the CEO 
with his management team that may have an impact on strategy (I1:RA). 
 
9.3.2 Regulating Strategic Architecture Implementation 
 
 Two ‘groups’ of organizational routines have been identified with  respect to 
regulating strategic architecture (SA) implementation (Table 9.3). First, are the 
organizational routines related to ‘reporting’ and contain information on schedules, costs 
and resources utilized from offices/resource centres on projects (I3:JMcQ). These are 
created bottom-up and start at the project level. BU directors get weekly project-reports. 
Monthly, ILs create informal reports by integrating the reports of their BUs and comparing 
them to the targets set in their annual operating plan. The monthly reports are not circulated 
corporate-wide, but are intended to provide BU ‘sales’, ‘operations’ and ‘managing 
directors’, as well as BU and IL Presidents, information on how their unit performed 
against targets. They are discussed at the BU level by each BU’s management team and at 
IL level by each IL’s executive management team. In addition, they are circulated to the 
directors of the offices/resource centres from which the ILs’ BUs draw their human 
resources from (I1:RA). 
Every quarter, each IL creates a formal report regarding its performance and that of 
its units against the ‘annual operating plan’. Based on these reports, annual targets are re-
forecast at a corporate level. The same process is repeated, until the time comes for the 
following year’s ‘annual operating plan’ to be created8. Significant ‘quarterly’ or ‘mid-
year’ changes normally do not result in changing BU, IL or corporate strategic plans, but 
rather to update them during the following year’s planning process. The focus on change 
conditions is therefore on the annual operating plan. If the change is growth, a business 
case is developed, supporting the new investment/risk levels and then submitted for 
approval to the appropriate decision-making body, depending on the levels of expenditure 
and risks involved. If the case is one of rapid decline in workload secured, actions plans are 
developed and implemented by IL and BU management to limit the financial impact on the 
operating plan (I1:RA).  
                                                  
8
 It is worth noting that all executive management of Cyclone (approximately 700 employees within the 
corporation) are rated quarterly and annually against ‘corporate goals’, individual BU goals and their own 
‘personal development’ goals, as will be explained later in this Chapter, links strategy execution with the 
development of managerial and organizational leadership capacity. 
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Table 9.3: Regulating SA Implementation - Cyclone 
Organizational Routines Key People/ Organizational Bodies 
Involved 
 
Reporting  
� Annual Reviews 
� Quarterly Reviews 
� Monthly Reviews 
� Project reporting 
 
 
IL President, CFO, IL-BU directors, BU FDs, 
Project Controllers 
Project Excellence Network 
- knowledge communities 
- gathering lessons learned 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project Selection Process 
� bid-no-bid 
� S.O.T. 
 
a) During Sales 
- The Marketing Organization. 
- Client account manager 
- Sales VP 
- Bid coordinator 
- Director of Engineering (technology) 
b) During Execution 
- Project Manager 
- Operations 
- Engineering 
- Construction 
- Procurement 
 
 
 The second routine identified is related to ‘project selection’. This routine starts 
with the establishment of what is known internally to Cyclone as the ‘Sales-Operations-
Technology’ (SOT) team and a ‘bid-no-bid’ review (I4: LB). Both are standardized 
processes stipulated in Cyclone’s operating systems manual (OSM). The SOT team is first 
brought together by the ‘client account manager’ or the ‘sales director’ of the BU 
associated with a project opportunity once it is identified. This project-specific SOT team 
will continue to exist for the whole duration of the project (if this is pursued, won and 
awarded) and may cut across BUs and ILs depending on whether the client requires 
services from different BUs of the corporation.  
Apart from a ‘sales’ representative, the SOT team includes a representative from 
‘operations’ of the BU that will undertake the execution of the project who knows ‘what’ 
the company is capable of doing and ‘whether’ resources are available. In addition, the 
team will include a ‘technology/technical’ expert from the same BU, who is capable of 
identifying the critical technological challenges of the project. The ‘sales’ individual will 
look at the project from a sales and client-management point of view, a project controller 
(usually) from a cost point of view and an engineer from an engineering point of view 
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(I1:RA). In addition, SOT members can use the ‘on-line’ facilities of the global 
communities to access the specialized knowledge of individual employees (Grant, 1996b) 
corporate-wide. 
Following the establishment of the SOT team, an individual from the sales function 
undertakes the responsibility to coordinate the bid-no-bid review. If pursuit of the project is 
approved, then a ‘bid director’ is appointed who is responsible for coordinating the SOT 
team’s efforts until contract award. Usually, the bid director will be the same individual 
from sales who coordinated the team’s efforts during the bid-no-bid review.  During the 
bid-no-bid review the sales, technology and operations directors of the BU(s) involved with 
the project are responsible for defining specific initiatives of the team and deciding on 
personnel participation. In addition, the project manager responsible for project execution is 
identified. There is a transition in responsibility from ‘sales’ to ‘operations’ when the 
contract is won and signed, during which the responsibility for coordinating the SOT team 
is also transferred to the project manager. Sales people will continue however to have an 
involvement throughout the project’s life-cycle and will be involved in project meetings to 
understand the project’s progression and resolve any client management-related issues that 
may arise. The input from sales, operations and technology therefore is continuous (I5: 
LB).  
The SOT team contributes to understanding what the client wants and how to align 
internal resources and competencies with client needs to add value (I1:RA, I8:DS). In 
addition, early involvement of employees from Cyclone’s units that will undertake project 
execution, creates a trusting relationship with the client and a trusting relationship within 
the company itself by helping to break down silos between functions and project 
participants from early project stages (I4:LB). 
 From this section it can be identified that both ‘reporting’ and ‘project selection’ 
routines constitute ‘feedback’ mechanisms through which management and leadership can 
regulate strategy implementation towards corporate objectives. The standardization of 
processes regarding what Davies and Brady (2004) referred to as ‘project capability’ (Viz. 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.2), combined with the global resource reach that the global 
communities provide regarding the knowledge that can be leveraged, offer the opportunity 
for Cyclone’s management to ‘reflexively’ (Giddens, 1984) monitor its conduct both at the 
upper middle management/strategic apex and operating core, allowing the corporation’s 
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strategic apex to be more ‘reflective’. Through ‘project selection’ routines in particular, the 
stage is set for ‘stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies’ corporate-wide. 
 
9.3.3 Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies 
  
 The findings of this case study with respect to the routines and 
individuals/organizational bodies involved in stretching and leveraging resources and core 
competencies are summarized on Table 9.4. They will be discussed here in turn. 
As in all project-based businesses, resource and core competence stretch and leverage 
is most important when managing projects. It is in this case where the opportunity arises to 
stretch resources across organizational units to leverage the corporation’s core 
competencies. At Cyclone, how a project will be received, pursued and - if won - facilitated 
within the organization, happens through specific processes applicable corporate-wide, 
explicitly specified in Cyclone’s ‘operating systems manual’ (OSM) and the OSMs of its 
constituent industry lines (ILs). According to the OSMs, all activities of individuals and 
organizational units involved in a project throughout its life-cycle revolve around the 
‘Sales-Operation-Technology’ (SOT) team, whose process of creation has been already 
described in section 9.3.2.  
The existence of the SOT team, in combination with the horizontal organization that 
core centralized functions (human resources, procurement) and the ‘global community 
network’, act as an opportunity to leverage corporate-wide the core competencies the client 
and the project need.  Construction and procurement stretches resources to leverage 
‘technical’ and ‘relational’ core competencies (regarding suppliers/sub-contractors), ‘sales’ 
stretches resources to leverage ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘relational’ (regarding clients) core 
competencies and through the collaboration that the SOT team facilitates, BUs can leverage 
‘estimating’ core competencies to pursue and execute the project profitably9. In addition, it 
links project strategy to the client’s organization from the very early stages of the project’s 
lifecycle. As one global account manager stated: 
 
‘It is an absolute mandate that Cyclone goes through the SOT process, as it brings 
all of our resources to bear’ (I4:LB) 
                                                  
9
 In addition, the SOT team links directly ‘stretch and leverage’ with ‘regulating SA implementation’, 
ensuring resource allocation in line with operating and strategic plans and corporate strategies and objectives. 
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Table 9.4: Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies - Cyclone 
Organizational Routines Key People/Organizational 
Bodies Involved 
Type of Core Competence 
Leverage 
Core Competencies Stretched and Leveraged 
 Sales-Operations-
Technology (SOT) Team 
BU Sales Director and/or Client 
Account manager 
BU ‘Technology’ Director 
Operations Representative 
(Construction and Procurement 
representative: maybe) 
Process Replication 
ILCC Leverage (both through 
‘employee mobilization’ as well as 
‘knowledge transfer’ through the 
knowledge communities) 
� Providing globally engineering, procurement, construction, 
operations and maintenance and project management 
services, individually or integrated on a project-basis. 
� ‘Entrepreneurial’, ‘estimating’, ‘technical’ and ‘relational’ 
core competencies’ (from Lampel, 2001, viz. Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.6). 
 
Sales and Account 
Management 
BU Sales Director 
Client Global Account Manager (if 
applicable) 
Bid Director 
Process Replication (initially set-up 
SOT team) 
� Providing globally engineering, procurement, construction, 
operations and maintenance and project management 
services, individually or integrated on a project-basis. 
� ‘Entrepreneurial’ and ‘relational’ core competencies’ (from 
Lampel, 2001, viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6). 
Informal Functional, BU and 
IL  
Employee Networks 
All project participants ILCC Leverage through employee 
mobilization 
� Providing globally engineering, procurement, construction, 
operations and maintenance and project management 
services, individually or integrated on a project-basis. 
 
Human Resource Function 
BU Human Resource Directors and 
teams 
Corporate HR Director 
Office managers 
ILCC Leverage through employee 
mobilization 
� ‘Entrepreneurial’, ‘estimating’, ‘technical’ and ‘relational’ 
core competencies’ (from Lampel, 2001, viz. Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.6). 
Global Excellence Network 
- Project Execution 
Services 
- Knowledge 
Communities 
All project participants ILCC Leverage (both through 
‘employee mobilization’ and 
‘knowledge transfer’ (through 
knowledge on-line)) 
Process Replication through 
‘knowledge on-line’ 
� Providing globally engineering, procurement, construction, 
operations and maintenance and project management 
services, individually or integrated on a project-basis. 
� ‘Entrepreneurial’, ‘estimating’, ‘technical’ and ‘relational’ 
core competencies’ (from Lampel, 2001, viz. Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.6). 
 
 
Global Execution Centers 
 
 
Engineering/Technology 
Design ‘work packages’ given to 
execution centres (a case where work 
is mobilized to the ILCCs that can do 
it) 
� Providing globally engineering, procurement, construction, 
operations and maintenance and project management 
services, individually or integrated on a project-basis. 
� ‘Technical’ core competencies’(from Lampel, 2001, viz. 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6). 
 
 
Construction and 
Procurement 
BU-specific Construction and 
Procurement Director and team  
Office Construction and Procurement 
link and team 
Construction and Procurement BU 
Director 
Construction Director 
Strategic Sourcing Team 
Procurement Director 
ILCC Leverage (both in terms of 
‘employee mobilization’ as well as 
‘knowledge transfer’) 
Process Replication (knowledge 
communities and knowledge on-line) 
 
� Providing globally engineering, procurement, construction, 
operations and maintenance and project management 
services, individually or integrated on a project-basis. 
� ‘Technical’ core competencies’(from Lampel, 2001, viz. 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6). 
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Immediately after it has been decided that a project is worth pursuing at the bid-no-
bid review, an on-line ‘project collaboration platform’ is set-up by Cyclone’s ‘project 
automation group’, a sub-unit of its internal information technology (IT) organization. This 
on-line platform becomes the collaboration space for all project participants (clients, 
suppliers, potential partners etc.) (I3:JMcQ). 
A better understanding of how the SOT team, in combination with Cyclone’s 
horizontal organization, can facilitate stretching and leveraging of resources and core 
competencies, can be achieved with the help of Figure 9.5.  The figure shows that from the 
‘bid-no-bid’ review stage, the contribution of the ‘horizontal organization’ (Porter, 1985) 
set-up corporate-wide, is critical to mobilizing the appropriate individuals to staff the 
project. Human resources (HR) uses the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ networks existing between 
employees at functions, offices and BUs, industry lines and global communities to ensure 
the most appropriate (and available) employees to staff the project are identified. By being 
centralized at a corporate-level while at the same time having a central team located at all 
offices it tries to leverage human resources across BU and industry line boundaries. 
The mobilization of employees across BUs and ILs is made easier by ‘skills’ 
standardization related to both ‘functional’ and ‘business’ practices that the group’s global 
communities have achieved. In addition, employee mobilization across organizational 
boundaries is made easier due to the corporate-wide consistency that exists in employee 
benefits, compensation and relocation.  
Community-specific social networks, a culture of corporate-wide cross-BU 
employee mobilization and the informal networks this helps create and maintain, are 
integral components of Cyclone’s ability to leverage  human  resources  and the  intangible, 
human-dependent element of its core competencies10, embodied in individual employees.  
Social networks facilitate informal communication channels across offices and ILs, through 
which the most appropriate individuals to staff a project are often identified. Indicatively, 
one senior executive stated: 
 
‘We talked about the resources that we have and the fact that in most cases they are 
long term, Cyclone resources. That helps a lot because those resources are 
transferred  sometimes  from  Oil  &  Gas  to  Industrial  and  Infrastructure,  to  
                                                  
10
 Viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4. 
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Government and back again. So these folks have a good understanding of the 
company across the board. To understand and interwork in relationship with this 
company is to be successful. There is a tremendous amount of things that are going 
on in other parts of the group that someone may or may not know unless there is 
good communications across the board. So, the competencies that we have are first 
of all: there needs to be a trusting relationship across the board and in all inter-
workings that we have. I have to be able to trust other people that they will help me 
and others have to trust in me that I will support them. We both have to have a good 
appreciation about the competencies and the core services that we offer. We all bring 
something to bear. I bring the sales. You bring the operations, she brings the 
technology, over here they bring construction; and we all have to ensure that we all 
bring strong competencies to the table and we will all back them up.’ (I4:LB). 
 
 At Cyclone, the development of informal inter-BU employee networks is also 
linked with the long ‘tenure’ of employees with the organization. Indicatively: 
 
‘The success of this company and any major EPC company is a function of 
networking. I have been with the company for 34 years. The average tenure of the 
people who are at my hierarchical level and upwards, on average exceeds 20 years. 
Figure 9.5: Sales-Operation-Technology and Stretch & Leverage at Cyclone 
Project 
Stages 
Pre-contract award Project Execution Project 
Completion 
Handover 
Client 
‘Bid-
no-bid 
review’ 
 
Design 
Construction 
and 
Procurement 
 
Operations and 
Maintenance 
Horizontal Organization 
Bid Director Project Manager 
Sales-Operations-Technology (SOT) Team 
BU Sales Director or 
Account Manager 
Establish SOT Team 
HR (corporate and BU teams) coordinates employee mobilization 
‘Knowledge on-line’ provides corporate-wide access to 
knowledge, processes and innovations 
Informal and formal ‘functional’ and ‘business’ community networks 
support ILCC leverage 
ILCC 
Leverage 
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And so as a result communication is very strong simply because we have been 
around and together for a very long period of time, we have been at a series of 
projects at any time all around the world, we have all worked together at various 
points.’ (I1:RA).  
 
 In addition, ‘knowledge on-line’ is a very important medium through which the 
specialized knowledge of individuals can be accessed and harnessed (Grant, 1996b) 
globally and at any given project. This brings to the forefront the importance of an 
information technology (IT) infrastructure that facilitates corporate-wide communication as 
crucial to global core competence leverage. Integrating every ‘project on-line collaboration’ 
framework with the global communities’ on-line databases further supports this potential. 
 Following the 1998-1999 strategic review that Cyclone undertook (viz. Section 9.2), 
it was decided to invest in creating ‘Global Execution/Low Cost Engineering Centres’ in 
Manila, New Delhi and Poland (I1:RA, I3:JMcQ, I6:PM). There, engineering work 
packages were sent from offices all over the world and then returned, integrated and used 
on projects (I6: PM). These centres therefore emerged as a ‘hub’, in a ‘horizontal 
organization’ that coordinated the breaking down of design work to manageable packages 
and transferred them where they could be conducted at equivalent quality but lower cost. In 
this role, low cost engineering centres were instrumental in the corporate-wide 
standardization of design practices. The low cost engineering centres were in the unique 
position to identify differences in practices and interpretations across offices and BUs, so 
they collaborated with the engineering global communities to standardize practices 
corporate-wide. 
 Following project award, design execution takes place. To leverage its ‘technical’ 
core competencies, Cyclone often executes design by breaking up and assigning work 
packages to teams at different geographic locations where employee costs (salaries) are 
lower. The geographically dispersed engineering teams that are placed at each low cost 
engineering centre collaborate through the on-line project collaboration platforms, so that 
‘design execution’ is undertaken on a 24 hour basis. Consequently, it can be understood 
that the corporate-wide standardization of design practices is paramount to the 
efficient/effective collaboration of geographically dispersed design teams and to the overall 
efficiency of the design process.  
In the following stage of the project’s life-cycle, construction is undertaken. The 
construction director of the BU associated with the project serves as the primary interface 
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between the ILs and the ‘construction and procurement’ organization. Usually, s/he will 
have been involved with the project from as early as the bid-no-bid review, although this 
varies depending on the complexity of ‘constructability issues’ of the project undertaken 
(I6: JM, I8: DS)11. 
 Apart from construction-related core competencies, the construction and 
procurement BU is also responsible for leveraging ‘strategic sourcing’ competence at any 
given project through participation in the sales-operation-technology (SOT) team. For that 
reason, in projects where procurement represents a high proportion of the project’s budget, 
or it has been identified as a major risk issue, strategic sourcing will be closely involved 
with the SOT team to provide its expertise as required. 
 The standardized ‘operating process’ of the OSM, the knowledge transfer and 
process replication made possible by the global community networks’ on-line 
communication tools, the global consistency in practices that both ‘business’ and 
‘functional’ knowledge communities have developed and the ‘integrative’ nature of the 
SOT team at any given project, are collectively responsible for what is known in Cyclone 
as ‘One Cyclone’ (I3:JMcQ). In light of this, it can be understood why Cyclone’s 
horizontal organization does not only facilitate the stretching and leveraging of resources 
and core competencies across markets and client-focused global and corporate-wide 
organizational units, but can also integrate and control them once they have been 
transferred (Melin, 1992) . The reason behind this is that Cyclone’s configuration enables it 
to: 
� Simultaneously pursue skills and process standardization with respect to both 
functional and business practices; 
� Develop IT and knowledge management systems that allow it to access and transfer 
globally the knowledge of individual employees who embody the ‘intangible’, 
‘human-dependent’ element of the corporation’s core competencies12; 
� Create an environment where employees can be mobilized across BUs and ILs and 
operate using the same systems and practices, creating thus a ‘deft’ environment 
(McGrath et al., 1995) where common language and practices allow the specialized 
knowledge of individual members to be integrated more effectively. 
                                                  
11
 In the last three years there has been an intentional effort to involve construction and procurement as early 
as possible, to reap the greatest benefits with respect to constructability.  
 
12
 Viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
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All of the above contribute to the corporation being able to overcome the push for 
divisionalization that its diversified configuration creates, while at the same time 
overcoming issues of waste and duplication of resources that are inherent in market-
focused, diversified organizations (Mintzberg, 1979; 1989). 
 
9.3.4 Improving Business Practices 
 
The findings regarding the routines and individual/organizational bodies involved in 
‘improving business practices’ are shown on Table 9.5. These routines will be discussed in 
this section in turn. 
Table 9.5: Improving Business Practices - Cyclone 
Organizational Routines Key People/ Organizational Bodies Involved 
 
 
‘Value Awareness Program’ and 
‘Gathering Lessons Learned’ 
- monthly project review 
- alignment sessions 
 
 
Value awareness coordinator (large project) 
Project Manager (smaller project) 
Project Excellence Network 
Knowledge Communities 
Functional Leads 
Knowledge Community Leaders 
Knowledge managers 
Core Project Excellence Network Team 
Subject matter experts 
 
 
 
Functional Discipline Audits 
Knowledge community leader 
Subject matter experts 
Assigned technical experts from the knowledge 
community 
Ad-hoc, ongoing individual requests and 
contributions 
 
All knowledge community members 
 
Operating Systems Manual 
 
Chief Executive’s Management Team 
IL Senior management 
    
 First, is the routine known in Cyclone as ‘capturing lessons learned’.  This routine 
is part of Cyclone’s corporate-wide ‘value awareness program’. The value awareness 
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program happens through standardized processes, described in the corporate and industry-
line (IL)-specific operating system manuals (OSMs). The purpose of the ‘value awareness 
program’ and ‘capturing lessons learned’ routines is to monitor throughout the duration of a 
project how processes could have been implemented differently and report these 
observations to the ‘global communities’ they relate to. The integration of the value 
awareness program with the feedback mechanism of ‘project reporting’ in particular (viz. 
Section 9.3.2), is critical to capturing innovations and knowledge created at projects 
(I6:PM)13. For the project monthly review, a specific individual is responsible for 
identifying where improvements in routines could have generated additional value, decide 
how many can be usable to future projects and submit/record these at ‘knowledge on-line’. 
(I3:JMcQ). 
On large projects, there is often a ‘value awareness coordinator’ on a full-time basis,  
who is responsible for identifying, gathering and uploading to ‘knowledge on-line’ the 
lessons that could be usable to future projects  and then following through  in  how  many  
should  result  in  a modification of standards and practices14. The value awareness 
coordinator leads ‘alignment sessions’ on projects to make sure that all project participants 
support the program.  Once knowledge captured is uploaded to each global community’s 
body of knowledge - through knowledge on-line -  it is the responsibility of the 
community’s leader and subject matter experts to ensure that ‘practices’ are updated, and 
changes communicated and made available corporate-wide - again through knowledge on-
line (I4: PM).  
The ‘value awareness’ program and the process of ‘capturing lessons learned’ in 
particular, are mechanisms that facilitate self-reflective (Giddens, 1984) organizational 
learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978) and are integrated with routines regarding ‘regulating 
strategic architecture (SA) implementation’, allowing Cyclone to reconfigure its practices 
as a function of its experience. 
In addition to the value awareness program and capturing lessons learned, 
community leaders and subject matter experts organize community-specific audits. These 
audits are implemented on selected projects - as part of the corporation’s annual operating 
                                                  
13
 Capturing lessons learned runs a monthly cycle and coincides with the ‘monthly project review’, a part of 
the reporting process (I3:JMcQ; I6:PM). 
14
 On smaller projects, the responsibilities of the value awareness coordinator often become part of the project 
manager’s role. 
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plan - and their outcomes are reported to the local office manager. The global community 
leaders receive copies of all the audits and look for systemic issues that might come up to 
determine what is the root cause of seeing these issues across multiple offices and multiple 
projects.  Subsequently, they may decide that a modification in practices is necessary 
(I3:JMcQ). If changes in ‘functional’ and/or ‘business practices’ take place, then it is the 
responsibility of each community’s leader and subject matter experts to appoint and train 
individuals from within their community, who will go around offices/resource centres and 
train functional experts on the application of the new practices.  
On top of all this, each global community systematically reviews one third of its 
practices each year. Consequently, every three years, all practices are reviewed and 
potentially improved (I3:JMcQ). These ‘audits’ and ‘reviews’ not only constitute an 
opportunity for self-reflective organizational learning, but also provide an opportunity to 
renegotiate established organizational norms (Cammeron and Quinn, 2005) through which 
the global communities operate. 
Improvements identified through the routines described in this section, may lead to 
updating the corporation’s operating systems manual (OSM) (I1:RA). Changes in business 
practices resulting from ‘gathering lessons learned’, or changes in business practices that 
have been a result of efforts intended to improve the corporation’s functional capabilities 
may lead to or necessitate changes in the processes that are followed to manage the 
interrelationships between organizational units and projects, or organizational change. 
When the necessity for such changes is identified, it is the responsibility of the corporate 
management team to update the OSM. This ‘updating’ process typically takes place 
annually. The corporate management team is informed of changes in business practices 
through the reporting process, as ‘lessons learned’ is an issue that is discussed by corporate 
management during their quarterly reviews. After the OSM has been updated, it is the 
responsibility of each industry line’s executive management team to update their industry-
line-specific OSM so that they comply with corporate-wide practices.  
 From the description provided in this section it can be understood that the ‘value 
awareness program’, the ‘global communities network’ and the process of ‘updating the 
operating system manuals’ are the three stages of ‘feedback’ through which the value 
awareness coordinators, the knowledge community leaders and subject matter experts, as 
well as executive management can decide whether and how they can change the practices 
and structural properties of Cyclone as a function of organizational learning. 
 248
 
9.3.5 Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
 
Regarding the development of managerial and organizational leadership capacity at 
Cyclone, three groups of organizational routines have been identified and summarized on 
Table 9.6. They will be described here in turn. 
Table 9.6: Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity -   
                Cyclone 
Organizational Routines Key People/ Organizational Bodies 
Involved 
 
Global Excellence Network (knowledge 
communities) 
- Global Functional Track 
- Personnel Development Performance 
Plan 
 
 
Functional Directors and Office 
Representatives 
Knowledge Community Leaders 
Knowledge managers 
Core Project Excellence Network Team 
Subject Matter Experts (GFT) 
 
Leadership Development Framework 
Functional Forums  
1) Regional Development Forums 
2) Leadership Development Forum 
(elected on a 3 year basis, 3 new 
every two years) 
3) Executive Development Forum 
 
1) Functional Directors of office and BU 
directors 
2) Sales Directors, Functional Directors and 
BU Directors at a regional level. 
3) Seven members from the Chief Executive’s 
Management Team. Coordinate with the 
help of IL Presidents 
4) The corporate management team 
 
 
 
Succession Planning 
   - CEO and HR coordinate annually  
      
 
Functional Leads 
Knowledge Community Leaders 
Knowledge managers 
Core Project Excellence Network Team 
Subject matter experts (GFT) 
 
 
First, are the organizational routines of the knowledge communities related to the 
professional development of employees (I1:RA, I3:JMcQ, I6:PM, I8:DS). Each 
community implements a structured professional development program for its members, 
known as the ‘Global Functional Track’ (GFT). The GFT defines career progression steps. 
They are community-specific and are developed by the knowledge community leader and 
subject matter experts. They describe the individual level core competencies (ILCCs) that 
people need to develop related to their function or discipline. In addition, the GFTs link the 
ILCCs employees should possess with the hierarchical level they can attain and their 
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compensation levels.  The global communities have the responsibility to undertake, monitor 
and regulate the ILCC development of their members through drafting and pursuing 
‘Personal Development and Performance Plans’ (PDPPs). PDPPs are tied to knowledge 
management and the knowledge communities of each function. So, at any hierarchical 
level, an employee is linked with certain competencies of his/her function that he/she 
should possess. That would roll into his/her PDPP and then the employee would have to 
describe how he/she developed these competencies. That would then have to be reviewed 
by his/her supervisor (I6:PM, I9:WH). 
Second is the case of a ‘leadership development framework’ implemented in 
Cyclone (Figure 9.6). ‘Feeder forums’ (Level 1) exist at each office/resource centre, where 
local management will look at employees and try to distinguish between those who have 
considerate ‘potential’ and those who are ‘strong performers’. Those who have ‘potential’ 
are most likely to become part of the corporation’s executive management. Those who are 
strong performers are more likely to develop at a more ‘technical’ role and may become 
experts in their field or related fields.  
Above the office-level feeder forums are the ‘functional forums’15 (Level 2). All of 
the functional communities (project services communities) have regional development 
forums that collectively look at the global resource-base. On top of these sit the ‘regional 
development forums’ (Level 3). There, the entire population from all the functions, 
disciplines and business groups are looked at by a group of executives that cover a specific 
geography. The people who chair these forums are senior executives with full-time 
responsibilities in other parts of the organization16. The ‘regional development forums’ will 
use the information on individuals gathered at the ‘feeder’ and ‘functional’ forums and will 
assess who have the potential to become part of the group’s leadership and who are better 
equipped to become ‘technical’ leaders in their field. It is at this stage that mentors are 
‘identified’ and individual professional development programs with a focus on leadership 
development are put in place.  
                                                  
15
 For example, in the case of construction, the ‘Construction Development Forum’ looks at all the 
construction people at Cyclone and tries to decide how the next generation of leaders will be developed.  
16
 For example, the Chairman of the Central Western Regional Forum, which includes the offices of Houston, 
California and Calgary, is currently the director of Procurement at the Construction and Procurement division. 
This is a situation where Cyclone stretches its human resources to develop individuals who may embody core 
competencies of the corporation as a whole. 
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Figure 9.6: Cyclone’s Leadership Development Framework  
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 The process followed by the ‘regional forums’ is very formal. Sixty to seventy 
people per region will be identified annually as potential leaders and the regional 
development forums will assume responsibility for developing them. The individuals 
identified as potential future leadership will continue to work in the various offices/resource 
centres that have to ensure these individuals get the training and the assignments they need.  
 The regional forums are in turn overseen by Cyclone’s ‘leadership development 
forum’ (Level 4). The leadership development forum has responsibility for developing the 
processes through which the feeder forums, the functional forums and the regional 
development forums operate and has the ultimate responsibility for the development of 
executive management. So, when individuals are being identified by the regional forums as 
showing executive potential, those individuals are surfaced to the leadership development 
forum and if they are approved, then they become executive management and bonus-
based17. In order for the ‘leadership development forum’ to consider a candidate, a senior 
officer of the company has to openly endorse and support him/her. Then, s/he must go 
through a number of ‘readiness assignments’ that are chosen based on the specific work 
history of the individual. 
 On top of the leadership development forum sits the ‘executive development forum’ 
(Level 5), which constitutes of Cyclone’s CEO, corporate and operating executives. Their 
responsibility is to manage the development of the executive managers. Cyclone has 
developed an ‘executive management certification guidebook’, where the processes 
followed and requirements that need to be met for accepting an individual to the ‘executive 
development forum’ are made explicit. In short, these are: 
� Evidence of his functional experience, through a: 
- Curriculum Vitae; 
- Readiness endorsement letter from a senior company executive. 
� A recommendation letter on the individual, describing: 
- Financial impact; 
- Execution excellence; 
- Customer focus; 
- People development skills; 
- Leadership; 
                                                  
17
 It should be noted that the leadership development forum has greater authority than a group president in 
deciding ‘who will become what’, if they feel he/she does not fulfil the criteria. 
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- Driving strategic initiatives. 
 
 The four forums described here are sub-units of the leadership development 
framework Cyclone has in place. From the ‘regional forum’ upwards, they transcend BUs 
and industry lines. This signifies the existence of a ‘horizontal organization’ that transcends 
the corporation with respect to the development of managerial and organizational 
leadership capacity. 
For the five years prior to the beginning of this study, an additional program has 
been established - the ‘Global Business Leadership Track’ - which operates simultaneously 
with the leadership development forum (I1:RA). 18. This program focuses on ‘star 
performers’ and is coordinated by corporate HR. There are around 30 participants in the 
program at any point in time, more or  
Finally, there is a program in place focusing specifically on ‘succession planning’. 
Succession planning is an annual process led by the CEO with the support of corporate HR. 
The CEO circulates a letter to all executives of the company asking them to propose (with 
arguments) their potential successors in one, two, three and five years time. Corporate HR 
then gathers the responses and updates the list of potential successors. Within a month, it 
closes the loop by communicating with the HR counterparts at all company units and 
updating the personal development plan of each employee with ‘leadership potential’, as 
well as seeing how s/he has met (or not) his/her growth objectives. 
It can be understood from what has been described in this section so far that 
Cyclone has designed and implemented ‘leadership development’ and ‘succession 
planning’ frameworks directly linked with its structure and functioning characteristics, 
through which feedback mechanisms and controllers exist to channel the professional 
development paths of management and organizational leadership. The frameworks are 
implemented through the direct involvement of Cyclone’s knowledge communities and are 
corporate-wide. This indicates they contribute to management and organizational leadership 
developing the desirable ‘social capital’ (Drath, 2000; McCawlley, 2000) through 
participation in corporate-wide communities of practice and both formal and informal 
employee networks. In an environment that fosters corporate-wide joint-thinking, 
                                                  
18
 This program, monitors competent individuals who are put in ‘stretch’ positions of extremely increased 
responsibility, or portfolio assignments.. 
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collaboration, trust and a willingness to learn from others (Penrose, 1959; 1995; Javidan, 
1998). 
 
9.4 Interrelationships between Activities  
 
This section integrates findings from sections 9.3.1 to 9.3.5 and identifies 
interrelationships between the individual core competence development activities, as well 
as how these are influenced by Cyclone’s configuration. Findings from Tables 9.1 to 9.6 
are displayed on Table 9.7.  
Cyclone’s configuration facilitates strong and complementary links between core 
competence development activities. The ‘exhibiting strategic intent (SI) and crafting 
strategic architecture (SA)’ routine of ‘setting and communicating the annual operating 
plan’ not only sets the stage for ‘regulating SA implementation’, but also sets integrated 
targets in terms of sales prospects, execution performance, as well as the use and 
development of resources. The reporting routines of regulating SA implementation pick-up 
on how projects, BUs, ILs and the corporation as a whole performs against these targets 
and, in addition to measuring performance against sales and execution targets, they capture 
knowledge created at projects, effectively facilitating experiential learning. Fed with this 
knowledge captured, the ‘knowledge communities’ can disseminate it corporate-wide, 
through their on-line infrastructure. 
 At the same time, the standardized process of the ‘Sales-Operations-Technology’ 
(SOT) team (as stipulated in Cyclone’s corporate and IL-specific operating system manuals 
(OSMs)) in combination with the horizontal organization linking Cyclone’s ILs, BUs, 
functions and office/resource centres, ensure that core competencies are leveraged in 
parallel with evaluating whether each project is aligned with the corporation’s targets. 
  
9.5 Summarizing and Concluding Section 
 
 The findings of this case study regarding the issues this research addresses are 
summarized on Table 9.8.   
 Cyclone’s configuration consists of: 
� Geographically dispersed offices/resource centres; 
� Client-focused business units grouped under industry lines; 
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Table 9.7: Activities, their Routines and Interrelationships - Cyclone  
Generic, 
Corporate Level 
Activity 
Organizational Routines People/Organizational Bodies Involved 
 
 
Exhibiting SI 
and Crafting SA 
 
 
 
Strategic Planning 
  
 BoD  
 CEO and Corporate Management Team 
 Corporate Strategic Planning Division 
 Marketing Division 
 Sales and Account Management Function 
 IL and BU Executive Management 
 Global Excellence Network 
 
 
 
 
Annual Operating Plan 
 
 
   
CFO’s organization ultimately responsible 
IL and BU Executive Management  
Global Excellence Network 
Sales and Account Management Function 
Offices/Resource Centres 
  
 
 
Strategic Reviews  
 
 
Chief Executive’s Management Team 
BoD (Depending on expenditure) 
 
 
Internal Communications Department 
 
 
Internal Communication Department’s Members 
CEO and the Executive Management Team 
 
 
Regulating  SA 
Implementation 
 
Reporting  
� Annual Reviews 
� Quarterly Reviews 
� Monthly Reviews 
� Project reporting 
 
 
IL President, CFO, IL-BU directors, BU Finance Directors 
Global Excellence Network 
- knowledge communities 
- gathering lessons learned 
 
 
 
 
 
Project Selection Process 
� SOT Team and the bid-no-bid review 
 
a) During Sales 
- The Marketing Organization. 
- Client Account manager 
- Sales VP 
- Bid coordinator 
- Director of Engineering (technology) 
b) During Execution 
-   Project Manager 
-   Operations Director 
-   Engineering Director 
-   Construction Director 
-   Procurement Director 
 
 
 
 
 
Stretching and 
Leveraging 
Resources and 
Core 
Competencies 
 
Sales-Operations-Technology (SOT) 
Team 
 
BU Sales Director and/or Client Account 
manager 
BU ‘Technology’ Director 
Operations Representative 
(Construction and Procurement representative) 
 
 
Process Replication 
ILCC Leverage (both through 
‘employee mobilization’ as well as 
‘knowledge transfer’ through the 
knowledge communities) 
 
 
Sales and Account Management 
 
BU Sales Director 
Client Global Account Manager (if applicable) 
Bid Director 
 
 
Process Replication (initially set-up 
SOT team) 
 
Informal Functional, BU and IL  
Employee Networks 
 
 
All project participants 
 
ILCC Leverage through employee  
mobilization 
 
Human Resource Function 
 
BU Human Resource Directors and teams 
Corporate HR Director 
Office managers 
 
 
ILCC Leverage through employee 
mobilization 
 
 
Global Excellence Network 
� Project Execution Services 
� Knowledge Communities 
 
 
 
All project participants 
 
ILCC Leverage (both through 
‘employee mobilization’ and 
‘knowledge transfer’ (through 
knowledge on-line)) 
Process Replication through  
‘knowledge on-line’ 
 
 
 
Global Execution Centres 
 
 
Engineering/Technology 
 
Design ‘work packages’ given to 
execution centers (a case where work 
is mobilized to the ILCCs that can do 
it) 
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Table 9.7: Core Competence Development Activities – The Cyclone Corporation        
                 (continued) 
Generic, Corporate 
Level Activity 
Organizational 
Routines 
People/Organizational Bodies Involved 
 
 
 
 
 
Improving 
Business Practices 
 
 
‘Value Awareness Program’ and 
‘Gathering Lessons   Learned’ 
� monthly project review 
� alignment sessions 
 
 
Value awareness coordinator (large project) 
Project Manager (smaller project) 
Project Excellence Network 
Knowledge Communities 
Functional Leads 
Knowledge Community Leaders 
Knowledge managers 
Core Project Excellence Network Team 
Subject matter experts 
 
 
Functional Discipline Audits 
 
Knowledge community leader 
Subject matter experts 
Assigned technical experts from the knowledge community 
 
Ad-hoc, ongoing individual requests 
and contributions 
All knowledge community members 
        
 Operating Systems Manual 
 
 
Chief Executive’s Management Team 
 IL Senior management 
 
 
Developing 
Managerial and 
Organizational 
Leadership 
Capacity 
 
Global Excellence Network 
(knowledge communities) 
� Global Functional Track 
� Personnel Development   
� Performance Plan 
 
 
 
Functional Leads 
Knowledge Community Leaders  
Knowledge Community Subject Matter Experts 
Knowledge managers 
 
 
Leadership Development 
Framework 
� Functional Forums  
� Regional Development Forums 
� Leadership Development Forum 
(elected on a 3 year basis, 3 new 
every two years) 
� Executive Development Forum 
 
 
 
 
� Functional Directors of office and BU directors 
� Sales Directors, Functional Directors and BU Directors at a regional level. 
� Seven members from the Chief Executive’s Management Team. Coordinate with the help 
of IL Presidents 
� Chief Executive’s Management Team 
 
 
Succession Planning 
� CEO and HR coordinate 
annually  
      
 
CEO and Corporate Management Team 
Human Resource Function 
Functional Directors and Office Representatives 
Knowledge Community Leaders 
Knowledge Managers 
Global Excellence Network 
Subject matter experts (GFT) 
 
� A horizontal organization of function- and business-oriented communities of 
practice facilitating   corporate-wide    standardization    of    skills    and    
processes   and   the development of formal and informal employee networks 
that contribute to the establishment of a uniform corporate culture, 
 
The existence of corporate-wide community networks, a centrally coordinated 
human resources function and the integrative nature of the SOT team, provide scope for the 
 
 
 
Construction and Procurement 
 
BU-specific Construction and Procurement 
Director and team  
Office Construction and Procurement link and 
team 
Construction and Procurement BU Director 
Construction Director 
Strategic Sourcing Team 
Procurement Director 
 
ILCC Leverage (both in terms of 
‘employee mobilization’ as well as 
‘knowledge transfer’) 
Process Replication (knowledge 
communities and knowledge on-line) 
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corporate-wide mobilization of employees, not only optimizing human resource utilization, 
but also providing more opportunities for managers to gain experience in different parts and 
positions within Cyclone. Corporate-wide standardization of processes (through the OSMs 
and knowledge communities) assists in the mobilization of employees across organizational 
units, thus reducing waste from duplication of resources, a characteristic inherent in 
diversified, divisionalized organizations. 
In Cyclone, competence development activities can be effectively conducted and 
their interrelationships managed in a manner that could allow the ICM to proactively 
develop its resources and core competencies in the face of constantly changing market 
environments. Compared to the other three ICMs studied therefore, Cyclone is more 
appropriately configured to effectively develop its core competencies. The findings of the 
case study are summarized on Table 9.6.   
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Table 9.8: Cyclone: Summarizing 
Issues Findings 
Configuration Client-focused BUs and ILs drawing resources from offices/resource centres. Standardization of skills and work 
processes is pursued corporate-wide through ‘function’ and ‘business’ oriented knowledge communities, which 
operate as communities of practice and are collectively structured as a horizontal organization that connects the 
corporation’s BUs. Processes through which intra-organizational, cross-BU coordination is achieved are standardized 
at corporate-wide ‘operating systems manual’ (OSM). Uniform corporate-wide culture. 
Core Competencies � Providing globally engineering, procurement, construction, operations and maintenance and project management 
services, individually or integrated on a project-basis. 
Dynamic Capabilities � Acquire companies and successfully/appropriately integrating them into the corporation; 
� Organically develop core competencies in areas in which it has no (or little) experience; 
� Standardize processes and business practices to make easier the stretching and leveraging of knowledge resources 
and core competencies across organizational units. 
 
On the relationship between Cyclone’s 
configuration and its ability to develop a 
corporate strategy, with optimal potential for 
implementation 
Strategies for resource development, sales/account management and BUs are developed in parallel. The 
interdependence of strategic planning and the annual operating business plan suggests that the latter may act as a 
feedback mechanism that allows Cyclone’s management and leadership to better regulate strategy execution. The 
centrally coordinated horizontal organization that gathers, integrates and then disseminates information corporate-
wide during exhibiting strategic intent and crafting strategic architecture, ensures that management comprehends 
corporate objectives to be met and where the resources to pursue them exist within the organization. 
 
On the relationship between Cyclone’s 
configuration and the effectiveness with which 
it regulates its strategies 
Reporting routines constitute ‘feedback’ mechanisms through which management and leadership can regulate strategy 
implementation towards corporate objectives, in all three ‘planning’ streams that were described in the previous 
section (i.e. industry lines, global excellence network, sales and account management). The SOT process contributes 
to effectively aligning internal resources and competencies with client needs. Early involvement of the client creates a 
trusting relationship with the client and a trusting relationship within the company itself by helping to break down 
silos between functions and project participants from the project initiation stage.  
On the relationship between Cyclone’s 
configuration and the effectiveness with which it 
stretches its resources and core competencies 
Through the efforts of a centralized ‘sales’ unit cutting across BUs, a centralized construction and procurement unit, 
centralized HR, global functional and business communities with standardized skills and processes for their members, 
a corporate-wide OSM that connects these at a corporate level and an SOT team process that integrates these at a 
project level, Cyclone is able to stretch and leverage its resources corporate-wide, overcoming the push for 
divisionalization that the corporation’s diversified configuration creates.  
On the relationship between Cyclone’s 
configuration and the effectiveness with which 
it can reconfigure its processes, structures and 
norms, as a result of organizational learning 
The ‘value awareness program’, the ‘knowledge communities of the global excellence network’ and the process of 
‘updating the operating system manuals’, are the three stages of ‘feedback’ through which the value awareness 
coordinators, the knowledge community leaders and subject matter experts, as well as executive management decide 
whether and how they can change the practices structural properties of Cyclone as a function of learning. 
On the relationship between Cyclone’s 
configuration and the effectiveness with which 
it develops managerial and organizational 
leadership capacity 
 Corporate-wide employee mobilization throughout an employee’s career and inter-BU formal and informal employee 
networks, contribute to management and organizational leadership developing social capital. ‘Leadership 
development’ and ‘succession planning’ programmes build on this to channel the professional development paths of 
management and organizational leadership. 
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Chapter 10: Cross-Case Analysis and Discussion  
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the findings from the 
individual case studies and discuss them in light of the extant literature and the 
theoretical frameworks developed for the purpose of this research. Similarities and 
significant differences between the international construction majors (ICMs) studied 
will be highlighted and this will lead to the identification of potential causal links 
between ‘configurations’ and ‘effective core competence development’. First, how the 
configurations of the ICMs studied came to be and their characteristics will be discussed 
across cases. Second, the way the ICMs studied conduct core competence development 
activities and manage their interrelationships will be compared and discussed. The 
nature of the cross-case comparison allows findings to emerge regarding the research 
issues this thesis has brought forward (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.5-1.6.1 and Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4) as the chapter unfolds. The chapter will conclude by evaluating the 
research and the findings. 
 
10.2 Configurations Developed Revisited1 
 
In all ICMs studied, entrance and growth into a specific market was followed by 
the creation of a market-based unit, concurring with Chandler’s (1962) observations that 
‘structure follows strategy’. The ICMs pursued their growth strategies either through 
acquisitions to obtain capabilities they could build on (such as the acquisitions of Greek 
contractors by Aegean-Cyprus) or through internal development (such as the 
incorporation of Albion Management Ltd, the establishment of ‘business development’ 
divisions at Pacifico and the creation of ‘Global Services’ at Cyclone). The creation of 
market-based units was either accompanied or followed by initiatives to ‘standardize’ 
practices across them (e.g. the ‘enterprise resource planning’ initiative at Aegean, the 
‘risk and opportunity management framework’ at Albion, the ‘project management 
certification framework’ at Pacifico and the corporate-wide standardization of 
‘functional’ practices at Cyclone, through the ‘global communities network’) in order to 
achieve a higher degree of intra-organizational integration.  
                                                             
1
 This section draws from sections 6.2.1, 7.2.1, 8.2.1 and 9.2.1 of case-study chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 
respectively.  
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Throughout their evolutionary path, all companies pursued a strategy of related 
diversification in all three directions of vertical integration, horizontal diversification 
and internationalization. Aegean and Albion, which began as construction contractors, 
ended-up diversifying to adopt the roles of ‘developer’, ‘builder’ and ‘operator’ of built 
assets, whereas Pacifico and Cyclone, which began as engineering firms, diversified 
gradually to adopt the roles of engineer-procurer-constructor and project manager on 
behalf of their clients. The latter two therefore, developed a more ‘professionally’ 
oriented configuration compared to the former two.  
 Table 10.1 summarizes and contrasts the case study findings regarding the 
‘configuration’ that each ICM studied had developed. This allows highlighting of 
significant similarities and differences between them2. All ICMs exhibit characteristics 
of an ‘entrepreneurial’ configuration (as they continuously strive to secure new work), 
an ‘innovative’ configuration (as they continuously create and dismantle project-based 
adhocracies) and a ‘machine’ configuration, as their scale necessitates a degree of 
process standardisation for effective coordination. In addition, all ICMs are ‘diversified’ 
organizations, having to deal with the pull for ‘divisionalization’ that diversification 
creates.  
Their differences give scope for a more in-depth discussion. Considering the 
‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics of the configurations the ICMs studied 
have developed, their major differences lie in: 
� The extent to which they are ‘divisionalized’ and the type of ‘horizontal 
organization’ they have developed to coordinate and manage the 
interrelationships between their market-focused business units (BUs). Aegean 
and Albion on the one hand, have developed a configuration of greater 
divisionalization and BU-autonomy forming market-focused units to integrate 
the efforts of other BUs when necessary (e.g. PPP/PFI BU at Aegean Greece and 
Albion ‘Investments’ and ‘Management’), adopting a structure similar to the one 
Chandler (1962) had described as the multidivisional form (M-form). Pacifico 
has developed a similar structure at a corporate level, but, within its ‘Global 
Business Units (GBUs), it has centralized core functions and built on developing 
                                                             
2
 These descriptions were derived from data, which, in part, was obtained from the ‘Desk Studies’ 
conducted to construct the ‘Evolutionary Profiles’ of the ICMs studied. In retrospect, it should be noted 
that although the intent of the evolutionary profiling (viz. Chapter 5, Section 5.6) was primarily context 
building, it led to the identification of similarities and differences between the ICMs studied. 
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Table 10.1: Configurations Revisited 
Company Aegean Group Albion plc The Pacifico Corporation The Cyclone Corporation 
 
Configurations 
 
Entrepreneurial 
Innovative 
Bureaucratic 
Diversified 
 
Entrepreneurial 
Innovative 
Bureaucratic 
Diversified 
 
Entrepreneurial 
Innovative 
Bureaucratic 
Diversified 
 Professional 
 
 
Entrepreneurial 
Innovative 
Bureaucratic 
Diversified 
Professional 
Missionary 
 
 
 
 
 
Structural 
Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
2 regions, market-focused, no 
horizontal organization. 
 
 
 
 
Portfolio of BUs grouped into four 
Industry groups, no horizontal 
organization. 
 
Portfolio of market-focused sector units, 
grouped in Divisions, grouped in GBUs 
(industry-focused). 
Centralized functions at GBUs maintaining 
a horizontal organization, across divisions 
and sector-units. 
Business development distinct from 
operations, both centralized at a GBU level. 
 
Market-focused BUs grouped into ‘industry-
focused’ business lines, superimposed on 
globally spread regional/local offices/resource 
centres; 
Corporate-wide network-like functions, with 
core teams at each office and business line; 
Global functional/business community 
networks. 
 
 
Functioning 
Characteristics 
 
 
 
Non-standardized intra-
organizational coordination, 
informal, near ad-hoc. 
 
Standardized financial management 
practices corporate-wide; 
Standardization of outputs and BU-
specific standardization of skills. 
 
Standardized processes related to project 
selection (GBU level); 
Standardized project management practices 
(corporate-wide); 
Standardization of leadership skills. 
 
Standardized processes for management of 
interrelationships between BUs (OSM); 
Standardization of function and business related 
skills; 
Standardization of leadership skills 
 
 
 
 
Agency 
Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Strategic apex – upper middle 
management key part 
 
 
Strategic apex key part; 
Not interfering with BU management; 
Oversees relationships between BUs. 
 
 
GBU strategic apex and middle 
management key part; 
Business development division high 
authority. 
 
 
Middle management, operating core and 
techno-structure key parts; 
Techno-structure analysts constitute ‘stretch’ 
positions of upper middle management and 
strategic apex. 
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a structure that can reap the benefits of ‘social capital’ existing in intra-GBU 
employee networks. Cyclone has moved beyond the M-form, to develop a 
network-based structure with characteristics similar to the ones described in 
theory (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Brass et al., 2004) 
as characteristics of network-based multinational corporations (MNCs)3. 
Cyclone has focused on ‘formalising’ and embedding in the organizational 
structure informal cross-BU employee networks;  
� The degree to which they pursue ‘skills’, ‘process’ and ‘norms’ standardization 
as coordination mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1979; 1989). All ICMs studied use 
standardisation of ‘outputs’ as a coordination mechanism for their BUs. 
However, the extent to which they use skills, process and norms standardisation 
varies. Aegean does not pursue ‘skills’ standardization and processes are 
standardized (intra-regionally) regarding procurement and financial management 
only. At Albion, skills standardization is pursued within each BU autonomously, 
apart from skill standardization regarding future leadership, where this is 
pursued corporate-wide by corporate succession planning. Standardization of 
processes is again BU-specific with the exception of the ‘risk and opportunity 
framework’ and the ‘internal audit’ function, which are implemented uniformly 
across all BUs apart from Albion Hong-Kong and Albion Dubai. At Pacifico, 
GBU-specific standardization of skills and processes is pursued by the ‘business 
development’ divisions and the core functions. Corporate-wide standardization 
of skills and practices is pursued through the ‘project management certification 
framework’. Culture and norms are GBU-specific. Finally, at Cyclone, 
standardization of skills and practices is pursued corporate-wide through the 
global knowledge communities. Standardization of norms is also corporate-wide 
and is maintained through a corporate-wide ‘operating systems manual’. 
 
10.3 Addressing the Research Question 
 
 This section compares and contrasts how the ICMs studied conduct each 
generic, corporate-level core competence development activity. The cross-case 
contrasting and comparison, offers the opportunity to discuss findings in light of the 
                                                             
3
 Viz. Chapter 2, Sections 2.6 and 2.8. 
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extant literature and draw inferences regarding the issues this research explores (viz. 
Chapter 1, Section 1.5-1.6.1 and 1.9; Chapter 4, Section 4.4).  
  
10.3.1 Exhibiting Strategic Intent and Crafting Strategic Architecture 
 
The ‘relationship’ between configurations that ICMs adopt and their ability to 
develop corporate strategies with optimal potential for effective implementation will be 
addressed in this section through the cross-case comparison of the way the ICMs 
studied ‘exhibit strategic intent (SI) and craft strategic architecture (SA)’. 
Comparing and contrasting across cases4 (Table 10.2), it can be observed that all 
the ICMs studied have well established routines for setting long-term strategic plans and 
developing shorter-term plans for their implementation. Their differences revolve 
around how:  
� Facilitating is their organization-specific context in developing a commitment to 
linkages across BUs for a core-competence mind-set (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990) to develop and value to be created during strategy execution; 
� Corporate objectives are linked with the objectives of individual employees 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1994; 1996 and Gratton, 1996).  
 
These will be discussed here in turn. 
 Each ICM’s ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics allow different types of 
commitments to be made when ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’, to set the stage for 
intra-organizational collaboration during strategy execution.  At  Aegean, regional  
resource  ownership  and  incentives  for  management to focus on ‘regional’ 
performance establish a regional-mindset5 that could inhibit inter-regional collaboration, 
employee mobilization and sharing of resources. This leads to the entrapment of core 
competencies within regions and potentially ‘duplication’ of efforts (Mintzberg, 1979; 
1989) when these have to be reproduced across them.  
At Albion, BU-autonomy and resource ownership, combined with 
‘standardization of outputs’ as a primary coordination mechanism used by the plc’s 
corporate centre, does not incentivize BU directors to develop an inter-BU collaborative 
spirit. This creates an environment where BUs operate as ‘silos’ and where individuals  
                                                             
4
 This section draws from sections 6.3.1, 7.3.1, 8.3.1 and 9.3.1 of case study chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 
respectively. 
5
 Equivalent to Prahalad and Hamel’s  (1990) ‘BU-mindset’- viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6 
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Table 10.2: Exhibiting SI and Crafting SA  
 
Aegean Albion Pacifico Cyclone 
Planning Horizon 3-5 years 3-5 years 5 years (Corporate) 
2 years (GBUs) 
20 years (Corporate) 
5 years (Industry Lines) 
 
 
Routines 
� Annual business plan (action 
planning) - Region-specific; 
� Long-term strategic plans (3-5 
years) - Region-specific; 
� Strategic initiatives - Region-
specific. 
 
� Annual business plan (performance 
control) - BU-specific; 
� Long-term strategic plans - 
Corporate-wide; 
� Strategic initiatives - BU-specific 
and Corporate-wide. 
� Annual business plan (action planning, resources 
allocated for sales and operations) - GBU-specific 
and Corporate-wide; 
� Two-year plan - GBU-specific and Corporate-
wide; 
� Strategic initiatives - GBU-specific and 
Corporate-wide. 
� Strategic planning (20-years) -  Corporate-
wide; 
� Annual operating plan (action planning) - 
BU-specific, integrated to Corporate-wide; 
� Strategic reviews (ad-hoc basis) - 
Corporate-wide. 
 
Commitment to 
Linkages Across 
BUs for ‘Value’ to 
Be Created 
� Resources owned by regions, 
shared within them, not across 
them; 
� Directors incentivized to focus on 
regional performance; 
� Employees rotated ‘within’ 
regions, not across them; 
� Communities’ and ‘social networks 
do not exist within, or across 
regions. 
� Human resources owned by BUs; 
� BU directors incentivized to focus 
on own BU performance; 
� Rotation of employees does take 
place – particularly between UK 
and US and mostly for employees 
having been identified by 
succession planning as potential 
future leadership; 
� Competent managers tracked and 
trained: 
- Within BUs by human 
resources (HR); 
- Corporate-wide (for potential 
future leaders) by central 
succession planning. 
 
� Human resources owned by GBUs; 
� Directors incentivized to focus on their GBU’s 
performance; 
� Rotation of employees takes place within GBUs 
routinely, across GBUs only for competent 
managers and potential future leadership; 
 
� Human resources owned by offices, shared 
by ‘functions’ and BUs; 
� Directors need to collaborate with other 
BUs, since they share resources; 
� Employees are rotated corporate-wide; 
� Competent managers are tracked and 
trained; 
� Formal and informal networks maintained 
by ‘global communities’ and enabled 
through corporate-wide IT systems. 
Aligning Corporate 
Objectives with the 
Objectives of 
Individual 
Employees 
� Competent managers not tracked or 
trained; 
� From middle management 
upwards, alignment with corporate 
objectives achieved through 
executive remuneration. 
 
� Middle management aligns most 
with BU-objectives; 
� BU senior management aligns with 
corporate-objectives (corporate 
succession planning involved). 
� 100% employee owned corporation; 
� Competent managers are tracked and trained: 
- Within GBUs by HR and ‘leadership 
development’ program; 
- Across GBUs by corporate HR and 
leadership development program. 
� Potential future leadership offered increased 
responsibility, further career progression, rotation 
across BUs. 
� Performance objectives of individuals 
linked with performance of BUs, personal 
development linked with ‘community-
specific’ career progression paths, uniform 
corporate-wide. 
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who embody the plc’s construction-related core competencies may be trapped within 
BUs. 
At Pacifico, resource ownership and centralized decision-making regarding 
resource allocation at the GBU level, incentivizes directors to collaborate across 
market/client-focused units, albeit within GBUs only. Intra-GBU collaboration is led by 
the directors of the two centralized units of ‘business development’ and ‘operations’, 
who have ultimate decision-making authority over resource allocation during ‘pre-
contract’ award and ‘execution’ stages of projects respectively.  
Finally, at Cyclone, the ‘structural’ characteristics of its configuration are such 
that resources are owned by local/regional offices/resource centres and are shared - by 
default - by all functions and BUs corporate-wide. Commitment to linkages across BUs 
for value to be added is therefore embedded in the SA crafted. This is further re-
enforced by the corporation’s global communities, of practice. These, facilitate the 
development and maintenance of global, corporate-wide, formal and informal employee 
networks. Such social networks - which are absent in all other ICMs studied - are 
leveraged when strategies are being set, to set the stage for strategy execution to take 
place in an organizational environment that cross-BU relationships can be actively 
managed. Theory (Nayyar, 1992; Tsai, 2000; Markides, 2002) would suggest that this 
allows Cyclone to actualize the latent economic potential of related diversification6. 
Reviewing the practices of the ICMs studied, it could be argued that the 
existence of inter-BU employee networks contributes to the creation of ‘mutual 
obligations’ across BUs when setting strategies, which in turn contributes towards the 
development of a collaborative environment of mutual-trust across BUs during strategy 
execution, thus contributing to greater effectiveness when developing core 
competencies. This finding is in line with previous findings of core competence theory 
research (Fairtlough, 1994; Ritter an Gemünden, 2002) - albeit from production-
oriented industries - which have highlighted the importance of inter-BU communication 
and employee networks in effectively promoting exchange of ideas and fostering 
innovation. What this identifies is that the ‘existence’ of intra-organizational networks 
contributes to effective core competence development in more than one industry. This, 
contributes to our knowledge regarding the contexts in which core competence theory 
can be applied, and strengthens the theory’s overall breadth of application. 
                                                             
6
 Viz. Chapter 2, Sections 2.6 and 2.8 
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 Regarding the alignment of corporate objectives with the objectives of 
individual employees, evidence from the case studies suggests this is also influenced by 
the configuration the ICMs studied have adopted. At Aegean, where formal mechanisms 
do not exist to track and train competent employees, and where retaining them is 
pursued through informal promises of career advancement and executive remuneration, 
it could be argued that alignment of corporate objectives with the objectives of 
individual employees below the middle management level will be tenuous.  
 At Albion, BU autonomy and ‘standardization of outputs’ as a primary inter-BU 
coordination mechanism, create an environment within BUs where ‘middle 
management’ and ‘operating core’ employees are more aligned with BU, rather than 
corporate objectives. To overcome this issue at a BU upper-middle management and 
strategic apex levels, corporate ‘succession planning’ tracks potential future executives, 
develops training plans with the human resources (HR) management teams of the BUs 
they belong to and monitors their mobilization and development across BUs. The 
professional development of these individuals is part of each BU’s annual business plan, 
further enabling the alignment of their individual objectives with the plc as a whole. 
 At Pacifico, competent employees are tracked and trained from a bit earlier in 
their career, due to the existence of the corporate-wide ‘project management 
certification framework’. For potential future leaders, centralized units in each GBU 
develop personal development plans - which are integrated with GBU annual business 
plans - in line with corporate objectives set. 
 At Cyclone, each ‘global community’ has developed standardized personal 
development plans, which it customizes for its individual members in collaboration with 
the human resource (HR) management teams of the offices and BUs employees belong. 
Employees are tracked and trained from the beginning of their career to better align 
their individual development with the long-term resources the corporation intends to 
develop. Career progression depends on how individuals perform against their personal 
development targets and this in turn is linked with the targets of the BU and ‘global 
communities’ they belong to. 
This section’s cross-case comparison identifies that the existence of a 
‘horizontal organization’ linking autonomous, yet related, BUs, allows SI to be 
exhibited and SA to be crafted in a manner that enables ICMs to overcome the 
limitations that the ‘BU-mindset’ inherent in their diversified configuration creates 
(Mintzberg, 1979; 1989). When accompanied by a centrally coordinated HR 
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management strategy, the existence of a horizontal organization can assist in better 
linking corporate objectives with the objectives of individuals employees, improving 
thus the conditions through which organizational agents can effectively pursue 
corporate strategy execution.  
The way SI is exhibited and SA crafted determines whether the organisation 
effectively establishes a roadmap that employees, managers and executives can each 
look to for guidance in daily and long-term decisions (viz. Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1). In 
addition, it presents a unique opportunity for each firm to integrate under all activities 
related to core competence development execution (viz. Chapter 4, Section 4.4). The 
findings from this section, complement mainstream core competence theory on ILCC 
and OLCC alignment (Gratton, 1996; Lahti, 1999; Gilgeous and Parveen, 2001)), by 
identifying structural and procedural characteristics – from the ICMs context - which 
actually allows for this alignment to occur.  The structural and functioning similarities 
between ICMs, MNCs and project-based organizations (PBOs)7, allow generalizing 
these findings to MNCs and PBOs - following contextual modifications. The 
consequences of what has been identified in this section for the cases, for theory and for 
practice in general, will be revisited and discussed in light of the cross-case comparison 
of the remaining activities and their interrelationships, in Section 10.4 of this Chapter. 
 
10.3.2 Regulating Strategy Implementation 
 
 The relationship between the configurations that ICMs adopt and the 
effectiveness with which they regulate their strategies will be addressed in this section 
through the cross-case comparison of the way the ICMs studied ‘regulate strategic 
architecture (SA) implementation’8. 
As noted in Chapter 4 (viz. Section 4.2), in ‘cybernetic’ and ‘management 
control’ theory (Beer, 1959; Berry et al., 1995) terms, ‘regulating strategic architecture 
(SA) implementation’ routines constitute ‘feedback’ mechanisms through which 
management and organizational leadership can monitor strategy implementation and 
deal with emerging issues when necessary (Mintzberg, 1979; 1989; and in construction: 
Langford and Male, 2001). For the ICMs studied here, it was identified that ‘regulating’ 
                                                             
7
 Viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.6.1 and Chapter 2, Section 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8. 
8
 This section’s cross-case comparison draws from Sections 6.3.2, 7.3.2, 8.3.2 and 9.3.2 of Chapters 6, 7, 
8 and 9 respectively. 
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routines fall under three categories (Table 10.3): i) reporting, ii) project selection and 
iii) investment selection (predominantly related to acquisitions). 
Regarding ‘reporting’, differences were identified in the speed of 
‘responsiveness’ they allow ICMs to changes in their markets. Aegean, Albion and 
Pacifico all have routines that permit them to update their strategies on a monthly and 
quarterly basis, whereas Cyclone - due to the corporate-wide integration of resource 
management and coordination - will alter them in the following annual business plan it 
develops. This observation concurs with mainstream strategic management literature 
(e.g. Chandler, 1962; Mintzberg, 1979; 1989; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993) in that 
‘divisionalization’ allows diversified organizations to adapt quicker to changes in their 
business environment9. At the same time however, it does not provide any explanation, 
nor proposition, as to how they can avoid compromising their ability to ‘proactively 
develop’ their resources in the long term10.  
Regarding ‘project selection’ the differences between the ICMs studied revolve 
around ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics that allow them (or inhibit them 
from) harnessing intra-organisationally the specialised knowledge of individual 
employees (Grant, 1996b). Aegean does not have the intra-organizational mechanisms 
to do this across regions. Consequently, project selection is implemented following the 
input of a pool of individuals confined by the ‘vertical’ line of hierarchy of regional 
divisions. Albion faces similar issues when BUs evaluate construction-related projects, 
but not in the case of PPP/PFI and front-end, ‘professional service’ contracts. For such 
contracts, a centralized unit (Albion Investments and Albion Management respectively) 
draws and integrates corporate-wide the efforts of individual employees, on a project-
basis. At Pacifico, the ‘business development’ divisions of each GBU are responsible 
for coordinating and integrating GBU-specific resources in order to evaluate project 
opportunities. Integration is achieved through a project-specific collaboration 
framework (PIVOTAL), which the business development division has the responsibility 
to set-up and maintain on a project-basis. 
At Cyclone, the standardized  - corporate-wide - process of the ‘Sales-
Operations-Technology’ (SOT) team (viz. Chapter 9, Section 9.2.1), in combination 
with corporate-wide ‘functional’ and ‘business-line’ networks - both ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ -  and   a   corporate-wide   knowledge   management  framework,  allow  the  
                                                             
9
 In Giddens’ (1984) terms, this means that divisionalized diversified organisations can be more 
‘reflexive’ to changes in their environment. 
10
 This addresses an issue that will be discussed in section 10.3.4. 
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11
 ‘PRISM’ stands for ‘Parsons Resource Information Systems Management’. 
Table 10.3: Regulating SA Implementation  
 
Aegean Albion Pacifico Cyclone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reporting 
 
Region-specific (driven by 
regional finance function) 
� Weekly project reporting; 
� Monthly reviews; 
� Quarterly reviews; 
� Annual business plan. 
� Weekly project reviews (BU-specific); 
� Monthly reviews (Industry sector BU 
groups – reports to SMDs discussed with 
CEO); 
� Quarterly reviews (integrated by finance 
to update plc’s annual business plan); 
� Four month reviews (CEOs in person); 
� Annual business review. 
� Reporting routines used to adjust to changes in 
resources allocated for the year; 
� Two reporting streams: ‘operations’ and ‘sales’; 
� Business development directors, project managers, 
sector managers and division managers accountable 
for targets set (regarding sales, projects, sectors and 
divisions respectively); 
� Project-sector-division weekly reports to GBU 
President (though PRISM.11). 
� Monthly (GBU executive management meetings), 
PRISM used to link ‘execution’ and ‘BD’ reporting 
at a GBU-level; 
� Quarterly (GBU-specific management meetings), 
monthly reports integrated and submitted to 
corporate centre, which meets quarterly to review 
corporate plan. 
  
� Three reporting streams: ‘sales’, ‘execution’, 
‘offices/resource centres’; 
� Weekly project reports to Bu directors; 
� Monthly BU reports on project performance and 
sales, integrated at an IL level (IL President, BU 
MDs and sales directors review how they perform 
against targets; 
� Quarterly, IL formal reports submitted to corporate 
centre and annual targets are re-forecast at a 
corporate-level; 
� Target changes do not lead to BU strategy changes; 
� In case of rapid decline in workload secured, action 
plans are developed and implemented by ILs and 
BUs to limit financial impact on ‘operating plan’. 
 
Project Selection 
� Project selection region-
specific; 
� Construction division 
director evaluates 
opportunity with 
‘executive management 
team’, but BoD has 
ultimate decision making 
authority; 
� “pursuing and securing 
projects’ function heavily 
involved in pre-contract 
award stages  
� Project tender review (BU-specific); 
� Transcend BUs only for PPP/PFI projects 
(Albion Investments) and ‘professional 
service’ projects (Albion Management). 
� Four-stage process (GBU-specific) 
� GBU business development director leads, GBU 
President responsible, corporate CEO or BoD 
depending on level of expenditure and risk. 
� Sales-Operations-Technology (SOT) team and ‘bid-
no-bid’ review standardized processes corporate-
wide, links ‘sales’, ‘operations’ and ‘global 
communities’, as well as ‘knowledge on-line’. 
 
Investment 
Selection 
(Acquisitions) 
 
Ad-hoc, no standardized 
routines, although 
‘acquiring’ has been 
identified as one of 
Aegean’s ‘dynamic 
capabilities’ (viz. Section 
6.2.1). 
� .Corporate planning and development 
division consults on ‘fit’ of acquisition 
and coordinates due diligence and pre-
acquisition efforts. 
� Four-stage process (GBU-specific) 
� GBU business development director leads, GBU 
President responsible, corporate CEO or BoD 
depending on level of expenditure and risk. 
� Ad-hoc, not standardized 
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corporation to harness corporate-wide the specialized knowledge of its individual 
members when selecting projects.  
The findings regarding project selection indicate that only in the presence of i) a 
centrally leveraged ‘horizontal organization’ and ii) systematic processes designed to 
transfer and control resources across BUs (Melin, 1992; Markides and Williamson, 
1994; Grant, 1996b), can ICMs effectively leverage intra-organizationally the 
knowledge of their individual members, to make better informed project selection 
decisions. This cross-case comparison therefore, highlights the importance of a 
‘horizontal organization’ to maintain the ‘linkages’ between autonomous, yet related 
BUs, in order for latent economic potential of their relatedness to be actualized (Nayyar, 
1992; Tsai, 2000). 
Considering the significance of these findings outside the context of ICMs, it 
should be stressed that they exhibit the greatest potential for application for the case of 
project-based organizations (PBOs). The findings of this section are in line with 
research on that domain, particularly regarding the links across autonomous, yet related 
BUs, structured as project portfolios (Artto, 2002; Artto and Dietrich, 2004; Davies and 
Hobday, 2005) 
In addition, considering the findings on project selection in light of what was 
observed on the influence of configurations to the speed of ‘responsiveness’ to market 
changes, it is suggested here that, although ‘divisionalization’ reduces response times to 
market changes for the ICMs studied, this might come at the cost of limiting inter-BU 
deployment of the specialised knowledge of individuals, who could contribute to better 
decisions regarding the projects the organisation pursues. It could be argued therefore 
that ‘divisionalization’ reduces  the effectiveness with which the ICMs can stretch their 
resources to leverage their ‘entrepreneurial’, ‘estimating’ and ‘relational’ (regarding 
‘clients’) core competencies (Lampel, 2001), for effective project selection. The 
implications of this are that ‘divisionalization’ does allow diversified multi-BU 
organisations to adapt quicker in their environment, but, may reduce their ability to 
make the ‘best’ decisions as to the direction they change towards, potentially making 
them vulnerable in the long run. This finding constitutes a contribution to knowledge 
regarding the ‘applicability’ of core competence theory in. It should be noted however 
that smaller construction firms may not have the luxury of being so proactive. More 
research in required to determine whether the principles can be applied similarly to 
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other types of project-based firms, and production oriented organizations -  of the same 
scale and diversity as ICMs. 
 Third, are the routines related to ‘selecting investments’ and, particularly for the 
purpose of this study, acquisitions. At Aegean, no systematic processes exist, and in the 
case where a company will be acquired, the process will be managed directly by the 
regional executive management team concerned. At Albion a centralized unit at the plc 
level (the ‘planning and development division’) is vested with the responsibility to 
coordinate intra-organisationally efforts related to evaluating companies acquired, with 
the authority - only for this occasion - to pull human resources corporate-wide, who are 
considered the most knowledgeable to conduct the due diligence on the company to be 
acquired. Albion’s planning and development division, coordinates efforts up and until 
the company is indeed acquired. At Pacifico, ‘investment selection’ processes are 
identical to ‘project selection’ processes. Finally, at Cyclone, some skills related to pre-
acquisition evaluation (such as financial feasibility) are centralized under a single 
corporate unit called ‘Investments’. However, Cyclone does not routinely acquire 
companies - a conscious decision of its leadership - since it prefers to organically 
develop the resources and technologies its core competencies are based on. 
Consequently, teams to evaluate and decide on potential acquisitions are created on an 
ad-hoc basis, are led by a senior executive and include members both internal and 
external to the organization. 
The consequences of what has been identified in this section for the cases, for 
practice in general and for theory, will become clearer if they are discussed in relation to 
how ICMs improve their business practices through self-reflective organizational 
learning. Therefore, the discussion of this section will be revisited and further 
developed in section 10.3.4 of this chapter, where the activity of ‘improving business 
practices’ will be discussed. 
 
10.3.3 Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies 
 
In Chapter 3 (viz. Section 3.4), core competencies were described and positioned 
within an organizational context (Figure 10.1)12. It was identified that stretching and 
leveraging resources and core competencies involves intra-organizational coordination 
at various organizational levels, in a manner that effectively facilitates: 
                                                             
12
 Figure 3.8, reproduced here from Chapter 3. 
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Figure 10.1: The New Competencies Hierarchy  
Where:  
HCR = Human Capital Resources,  
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� Knowledge transfer; 
� Employee mobilization; 
� Process replication; 
� BU-level competence integration. 
 
 Comparing and contrasting the practices of the ICMs studied13, both similarities 
and differences are identified. As expected, ‘stretch and leverage’ always involved the 
intra-organizational harnessing of the specialized knowledge of employees, in order to 
‘replicate’ effective routines and social practices (Giddens, 1984).  
In Aegean this was confined within regions, not allowing the organization to 
fully exploit the potential of its core competencies and the resources that constitute 
them. In Albion and Pacifico, effectively stretching and leveraging resources and core 
competencies was inhibited when it involved the collaboration of organizational 
members from organizational units that operated in an environment with different 
processes and norms. In such cases, inter-BU ‘procedural’ and ‘cultural’ differences 
created a ‘lack of trust’ (particularly in Albion) and absence of ‘joint-thinking’ between 
employees. In both companies, these problems were accentuated because of little inter-
BU employee mobilization and the absence of inter-BU employee networks at the level 
of the operating core. Both companies managed to overcome these obstacles in the cases 
where they developed organizational units to actively manage inter-BU relationships. 
Pacifico on the one hand centralized and standardized ‘functional operations’ at a GBU-
level - creating a common frame of reference for GBU employees - and established 
GBU-specific centralized ‘business development’ divisions responsible to coordinate 
and integrate organizational efforts on a project-basis. Albion on the other hand, created 
market-based units (Albion ‘Investments’ (e.g. Figure 10.2) and Albion ‘Management’) 
whose responsibility was to manage inter-BU relationships on specific types of projects 
where inter-BU collaboration was necessary. 
The cases of Albion and Pacifico highlight the importance of actively managing 
inter-BU relationships for effective stretching and leveraging of resources and core 
competencies to occur. However, they do not provide an answer as to which are the 
‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics that enable this in the case of ICMs. 
 An answer to this issue can be obtained if the case of Cyclone is considered. At 
Cyclone,   a   collaborative   environment   of   joint-thinking,   mutual  trust  and  where  
                                                             
13
 This section draws from sections 6.3.3, 7.3.3, 8.3.3 and 9.3.3 of case study chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 
respectively. 
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employees are willing to learn from one another (Javidan, 1998) is enabled by an 
organization-specific context with the following characteristics (Figure 10.3): 
� Functional resources owned by local/regional offices and shared between BUs; 
� Informal cross-BU employee networks developed due to frequent employee 
mobilization across BUs on projects; 
� Informal employee networks formalized, maintained and developed by corporate-
wide ‘functional’ and ‘business’ communities of practice;  
� Corporate-wide on-line knowledge databases and communication networks - 
maintained by a centralized ‘knowledge management’ unit, part of the 
corporation’s ‘global communities network’; 
� Corporate-wide standardization of function-related skills and processes pursued 
by functional ‘global communities’; 
� A corporate-wide ‘operating systems manual’ (OSM) standardizing processes and 
norms within BUs and across them; 
� A standardised process (the Sales-Operations-Technology team) followed during 
both intra- and inter-BU integration and coordination of project teams. 
 
Such a configuration enables leveraging what Lampel (2001) (viz. Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.6) referred to as ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘relational’ core competencies through a 
centralized ‘sales and account management’ function and what he referred to as 
‘evaluative’ and ‘technical’ core competencies on a project-basis, highlighting thus 
specific intra-organizational ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics  through which 
resources and core competencies could be effectively stretched and leveraged in ICMs. 
At Cyclone, the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics that support its 
ability to manage a ‘network’ of specialized practitioners in order to deliver a global 
offer (Langford and Male, 2001) are also what makes its competitiveness more 
‘sustainable’ as they are hard for competitors to  imitate.  This is an issue of ‘path 
dependency’ (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003 and Tyler, 2001) and 
stems from Cyclone’s focus on the organic development of its capabilities and core 
competencies. In the words of Cyclone’s knowledge management director: 
  
‘Cyclone had worked on employee networks for about 15 years prior to starting a 
formal knowledge management process, so the department managers, the experts 
at the different offices, they have all been collaborating for 15 years prior to 
starting knowledge management. Now, certainly there have been transitions and 
people have moved up in the organization or moved to other roles, but because of 
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that strong emphasis on networks I think you will find that people know their 
counterparts in other parts of the organization and other people in their offices, 
on a much higher degree that they would in many other organizations.’ 
(I3:JMcQ) 
 
In light of Cyclone’s description, it can be understood why in Aegean’s, Albion’s 
and Pacifico’s  organizational contexts of departmentalization, divisionalization and 
lack of a corporate-wide horizontal organization to link distinct, yet related, 
organizational units: 
� Corporate-wide stretch of resources cannot be effectively achieved on occasions 
and the knowledge of individuals who embody the human, intangible element of 
their organization’s core competencies can be confined within the units they 
belong; 
� Conflicts may arise during intra-organizational collaboration, due to differing 
‘cultures’ and ‘norms’ across BUs; 
� Effective routines and social practices through which core competencies are 
deployed cannot - on occasions - be reproduced in different localities. 
 
 The findings from this section’s cross-case comparison concur with core 
competence theory postulations derived from research on production-oriented industries 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Fairtlough, 1994 and Higgins, 
1996), in that effective manifestation and deployment of core competencies necessitates 
communication across BUs, involvement and a deep commitment working  across 
boundaries. This suggests that core competence theory principles regarding ‘stretch and 
leverage’ can be applied in an additional industry context, which contributes to the 
overall strength and breadth of application of core competence theory.  
 In addition, this section has highlighted the positive influence of actively 
managing inter-BU relationships and employee networks on the effective stretching and 
leveraging of resources and core competencies. This finding concurs with organisation 
theory on multi-BU firms (e.g. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Nayyar, 1992; Tsai, 2000), 
in that relationships between BUs need to be actively managed for the latent economic 
benefits of related diversification to be actualised. Moreover, it concurs with findings of 
organization theory of ‘network-based’ multinational corporations (MNCs), regarding 
the following issues: 
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� A shared ‘vision’, ‘values’ and ‘norms’ between BUs are positively related to 
resource exchange and combination across BUs (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998); 
� Inter-BU networking among managers increases the quality of intra-
organizational communication (Ghoshal et al., 1994) and the effectiveness of 
sourcing and transferring knowledge and critical competencies (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1990; Tsai, 2000); 
� Social interaction, trust and social capital developed in inter-BU networks 
facilitates inter-BU collaboration within diversified organisations (Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998); 
� Knowledge existing in one BU may not be harnessed by another BU of the same 
organization (Tsai, 2000) due to a lack of ‘motivational disposition’ (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000). 
 
Finally, findings suggest that ‘resource ownership’ is linked with the disposition to 
share resources (intra-regionally at Aegean, intra-BU at Albion - except in the case of 
Albion Investments and Albion Management - intra-GBU at Pacifico and corporate-
wide at Cyclone), concurring with earlier findings in the field of organization theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981), which have shown that organizational 
processes are contingent upon the ‘internal distributions’ of organizational resources.  
All of the above suggests that the branch of organization theory developed by 
conceptualizing MNCs as ‘network-based’ organizations could have significant 
application potential to construction organisations such as ICMs.  Vice versa, research 
on ICMs can find application in the filed of mainstream strategic management, which 
examines issues of intra-organizational collaboration and coordination in MNCs. 
Finally, the findings of this section constitute a major advancement in the field 
of project-based management, as they identify particular organizational characteristics 
through which knowledge can be diffused across projects and portfolios of projects 
(Artto and Dietrich, 2004), without interfering with project management practices nor 
disrupting the existing organization’s power-knowledge balance (Bresnan et al., 2005). 
 
10.3.4 Organizational Transformation through Learning 
  
 In Chapter 4 (viz. Sections 4.2 and 4.3.1), it was proposed that for any 
organization to be able to effectively develop its core competencies, it would have to 
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have established mechanisms through which it can reconfigure its structure and 
processes and re-negotiate organizational norms, as a result of experiential learning. 
Drawing from project-based theory (Davies and Brady, 2000; Prencipe and Tell, 2001; 
Brady and Davies, 2004), the importance of organizational learning mechanisms 
(OLMs) that allow organizations to systematically collect, analyze, store and 
disseminate information in order to avoid knowledge and experience gained at projects 
being lost was highlighted. The characteristics of the ICMs studied in this research with 
respect to the mechanisms they have in place for improving their business practices, are 
summarized and contrasted on Table 10.414. 
Stark differences are identified across cases. At Aegean, the absence of OLMs 
allows to suggest - from theory (Prencipe and Tell, 2001) - that this ICM is not well 
configured to select successful routines and/or generate new ones as a function of 
experiential learning. At Albion, the responsibility for what Brady and Davies (2004) 
initially described as ‘project-led learning’ falls in the hands of project managers who 
may be undertaking knowledge management responsibilities in addition to their role. 
The ‘risk and opportunity management framework’ and the ‘internal audit function’ 
(both part of Albion’s ‘assurance framework’15) could incidentally lead to the 
improvement of existing routines or the development of existing ones. However, neither 
functions are implemented systematically with that objective in mind, nor a horizontal 
organization exists across BUs to allow communication and dissemination of any 
improvements. Improving business practices becomes therefore the responsibility of 
centralized corporate functions, which, however, have no authority over BUs and are in 
no position to impose, or effectively diffuse improvements to the BUs. This, combined 
with the fact that embedding change in project-based organizations is difficult as it: i) 
interferes with project management practices and ii) disrupts the existing organisational 
power-knowledge balance (Bresnan et al., 2005), indicates that Albion is not well 
configured to ‘improve its business practices’ as a function of experiential learning. 
At Pacifico, individual project team-members identify and record knowledge 
created at projects related to their discipline. They communicate this, informally, up the 
hierarchy, and functional directors are responsible for updating at the end of each year 
the ‘operating manual’ of their function. These improvements however, remain GBU-
specific. The only exception is project management practices, the upgrading of which is  
                                                             
14
 This section is based on the comparison of sections 6.3.4, 7.3.4, 8.3.4 and 9.3.4 of Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 
9 respectively. 
15
 Viz. Chapter 7, Section 7.2.1 
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Table 10.4: Improving Business Practices 
 Aegean Albion Pacifico Cyclone 
 
 
 
 
 
Project-led 
learning 
 
 
 
 
At projects 
� No mechanisms; � Ad-hoc; 
� More frequent in large (e.g. PFI) 
projects; 
� Responsibility of project managers; 
� Knowledge captured and recorded in 
project-specific intranets. 
� Knowledge captured in client-
specific databases (PIVOTAL); 
� Functional members informally 
communicate knowledge 
captured to their managers. 
� ‘Capturing lessons learned’ is a 
program implemented at all projects; 
� Value awareness coordinators are 
responsible to capture and record 
knowledge (in ‘knowledge on-line’ of 
global communities). 
 
 
 
Project-to-
organization 
� Informally through information 
that moves up the management 
hierarchy (region-specific). 
� Informally through information that 
moves up the hierarchy of BUs (BU-
confined); 
� Issues identified discussed between BU 
MDs and SMDs at ‘monthly reviews’; 
� Risk and opportunity management 
framework may capture (from the BUs 
it is applied) knowledge at the 
corporate-centre. 
� Functional directors 
responsible for updating 
annually the practices of their 
discipline (GBU-specific); 
 
� ‘Global community leaders’ update 
discipline-oriented practices in 
collaboration with community ‘subject-
matter experts; 
 
Business-led learning 
(diffusing knowledge to 
BUs and projects) 
� Informally and ad-hoc, through 
executive authority of 
management. 
� Ad-hoc through management 
hierarchy; 
� Routinely through annual fora, 
organized by some corporate functions: 
- mostly US and UK BUs participate; 
- corporate functions have no authority 
to improve changes. 
� Functional directors 
responsible for updating 
annually the practices of their 
discipline (GBU-specific); 
 
� Implemented by way of compliance to 
the corporate-wide OSM; 
� Global community leaders and subject-
matter experts are part of executive 
management and therefore have 
authority to implement changes. 
 
 
Re-negotiation of 
organizational norms 
� Through ‘reflection’ during 
‘regulating SA implementation 
routines; 
� Following informal 
communications at regional 
strategic apexes; 
� Changes ‘region-specific’; 
� Through strategic reviews. 
� Through reflection during ‘regulating 
SA implementation (BU-specific); 
� Corporate centre functions advise on 
improvements but have no authority 
over implementation; 
� Through strategic reviews. 
� Through reflection during 
‘regulating SA implementation 
(GBU-specific); 
� Through informal 
communication between sector, 
division, operation and BD 
directors; 
� Through strategic reviews. 
� Through reflection during ‘regulating 
SA implementation (GBU-specific); 
� Through strategic reviews; 
� Through on-going negotiation within 
global communities of practice; 
� Through the annual updating of the 
OSM. 
 
Reconfiguration of 
structural properties 
� Through exhibiting SI and 
crafting SA routines; 
� Through exhibiting SI and crafting SA 
routines; 
� Updating BU-specific business 
manuals. 
� Through exhibiting SI and 
crafting SA routines; 
� Updating GBU-specific policy 
manuals. 
� Through exhibiting SI and crafting SA 
routines; 
� Updating corporate-wide and IL-
specific OSM. 
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the responsibility of the ‘project management certification program’, also responsible 
for updating Pacifico’s ‘global project management handbook’. This corporate-wide 
application made it easier to enforce the application of improved project management 
practices, overcoming some of the obstacles theory (Bresnan et al., 2005) has found are 
faced by project-based organizations. In addition, ‘PIVOTAL’ (the project-specific on-
line communication tool and knowledge database) may act  as  a  database  where 
knowledge created can be recorded. However this is again confined within the 
boundaries of GBUs, another testament to the BU-mindset (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) 
that Pacifico’s divisionalized configuration creates. In the absence of a horizontal 
organization to diffuse across autonomous organizational units knowledge created and 
successful routines identified, the ability of Pacifico to reconfigure corporate-wide its 
social practices and potentially ‘structural properties’ (Giddens, 1984) can be expected 
to suffer. 
Finally, at Cyclone, OLMs are integrated with operating procedures (the ‘value 
awareness program’ and ‘capturing lessons learned’16) and more importantly, with 
routines for regulating strategic architecture implementation. At the project-level, the 
value awareness coordinators are appointed to manage the process. Lessons captured are 
‘integrated’ in Cyclone’s reports and uploaded to the on-line body of knowledge of the 
‘communities’ that they relate to. Community practices, in turn, are systematically 
monitored and evaluated by community leaders and subject matter experts, who decide 
whether they should be disseminated corporate-wide. Knowledge managers at the 
global communities are responsible for updating functions and BU-related processes 
and make them available corporate-wide to employees through access to the on-line 
community databases. The existence of corporate-wide communities, each having the 
authority to standardize ‘processes’ and ‘skills’ related to their body of knowledge, 
make their diffusion easier, as they are in a position to exert authority over Cyclone’s 
operating core. Furthermore, improvements could also come from the routine reviews 
global communities go through to update their practices. As community leadership 
consists of individuals who are at the same time part of the upper middle management 
and strategic apex of their organization, the process also provides scope for the 
improvements made in practices to lead to renegotiation of organizational norms and 
potentially changes in Cyclone’s ‘structural properties’ by updating the corporation’s 
‘operating systems manual’ (OSM). Finally, improvements could come from executive 
                                                             
16
 Viz. Chapter 9, Section 9.3.4. 
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management reviews, which form part of ‘reporting’ routines identified in Section 
10.3.2. During these reviews, informed decisions are made to improve processes, 
structure and norms of the organization. These are then made explicit through updating 
the corporation’s OSM. 
What this section’s cross-case comparison identifies, is that the ability of the 
ICMs studied to re-negotiate their organizational norms and reconfigure their social 
practices and structural properties as a function of organisational learning, seems to 
diminish when: 
� No mechanisms exist to capture, store, analyze and disseminate information and 
knowledge created through experiential learning - as management and 
organizational leadership will re-evaluate the effectiveness of routines, norms 
and social practices not based on ‘informed awareness’, but on their ‘subjective’ 
perception of reality, which may be detached from the reality of their 
organization’s operating core17; 
� No mechanisms exist to disseminate knowledge created across autonomous BUs 
inhibiting what Brady and Davies (2004) referred to as ‘project-led’ learning18; 
� BUs possessing the knowledge related to improvement in routines could not 
diffuse it to other BUs (e.g. as in the case of the ‘risk and opportunity 
management framework’ at Albion and its relationship with Albion Dubai and 
Albion Hong Kong), because of a) lack of authority and b) lack of ‘motivational’ 
disposition on the part of the receiving BU to receive it. 
� ‘Regulating strategic architecture implementation’ routines are not integrated 
with ‘improving business practices’ routines19. 
 
The findings of this section find particular application in the case of project-based 
organizations (PBOs). In fact, they complement and extend the works of Brady and 
Davies (2000), Prencipe and Tell (2001), Davies and Brady (2004 and Davies and 
Hobday (2005), by identifying organization-specific mechanisms through, which not 
only ‘project-led’, but also business-led learning20can take place in multi-BU  PBOs. In 
                                                             
17
 e.g., Aegean, viz. Chapter 6, Section 6.3.4 
18
 As in Aegean (Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3 and 6.3.4), Albion, (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.3 and 7.3.4) and 
Pacifico (Chapter 8, Section 8.3.3 and 8.3.4) 
19
 As in Aegean (Chapter 6, Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.4), Albion (Chapter 7, Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.4) and 
Pacifico, (Chapter 8, Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.4) 
20
 Viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.3 and Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5 
 
 
282 
 
addition, the multi-BU context of ICMs expands the range of the application of 
findings to the field of MNCs. 
Finally, the observation that the integration of ‘organizational learning’ with 
‘reporting’ mechanisms (viz. Cyclone) influences the effectiveness with which ICMs 
can transform through learning, is in itself a significant contribution to knowledge. 
This ‘integration’, rends support to Band and Scanlan’s (1995) theoretical postulations 
- from core competence theory - that pursuing core competence development is an 
effective means for ‘controlling’ the strategy process, as it links business strategy with 
organizational learning.  
 
10.3.5 Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
 
As noted in Chapter 4 (viz. Section 4.3.5), effective managerial and leadership 
development programs should be oriented towards the development of ‘social capital’ 
of managers and leadership, built in inter-BU social networks that foster an environment 
of ‘mutual trust’, ‘joint-thinking’ and a ‘willingness to learn from one another’ 
(Penrose, 1959; 1995; Javidan, 1998; Chinowsky and Meredith, 2000; Drath, 2000; 
McCawley, 2000; Rothwell, 2006). It is management and leadership with ‘social 
capital’ that can effectively manage intra-organizational relationships and steer the 
organization towards the achievements of its objectives21. 
Contrasting the ICMs’ characteristics (Table 10.5)22, the following can be observed. At 
Aegean’s, no systematic processes exist to identify, track and train competent 
employees, let alone structured ‘succession planning’ and ‘leadership development’ 
frameworks to develop them. The process is informal and happens on the job. This 
carries the risk of management and leadership not being developed based on objective 
criteria, but based on the subjective criteria and motives of their superiors (Rothwell, 
2006). Second, there are no social networks such as communities of practice (Wenger 
1998; Wenger and Snyder, 2000), which can contribute to the development of ‘intra-
personal’ competencies and the social capital of employees. 
                                                             
21
 Viz. Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5. 
22
 This section draws from sections 6.5, 7.4.5, 8.4.5 and 9.4.5 of Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 
respectively. 
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Table 10.5: Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
 Aegean Albion Pacifico Cyclone 
 
Structured 
‘Succession 
Planning’ and 
‘Leadership 
Development’ 
Programs 
 
� No structured framework; 
 
� Region-specific 
responsibility to develop. 
 
 
� Structured leadership 
development - corporate 
responsibility. 
� Leadership skills 
standardized 
 
 
 
� Two tier system 
- Potential leadership (GBU-
specific); 
- Executive leadership 
(corporate responsibility); 
 
� Structured leadership 
development and 
succession planning 
framework 
� Development direction 
given by functional and 
business communities, 
resources provided by 
offices 
 
 
 
 
 
Employee Social 
Networks 
 
� Region-specific at 
operating core and middle 
management levels, 
group-wide at strategic 
apex; 
� Little cross-regional 
employee mobilization 
� Networks informal, based 
on employees’ career 
paths. 
 
� Responsibility to develop 
individuals BU-specific; 
� Potential leadership 
mobilized corporate-wide 
for individual level core 
competence and social 
capital development; 
� Networks BU-specific 
� Weak cross-BU informal 
networks, facilitated 
mainly by corporate 
functional fora. 
 
 
� Potential leaders mobilized 
across divisions and GBUs 
for individual level core 
competence leverage and 
social capital development. 
� GBU-specific functional 
networks; 
 
� Potential leadership 
mobilized corporate-wide 
and given stretch positions 
of dual responsibilities. 
� Social capital development 
inherent in global 
communities and 
organizational culture. 
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At Albion, a centrally coordinated ‘succession planning’ framework is in place 
(viz. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.5), which actively promotes the mobilization of competent 
employees in positions of responsibility across BUs and sector groupings. However, not 
only formal and informal networks this could facilitate are limited by the autonomy of 
BUs and the plc’s decentralized nature, but case evidence related to another activity 
(viz. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.3) indicates that ‘trust’ between employees who work across 
different BUs is low. The consequences for Albion is that it lacks the social networks at 
a middle management level to enable the development of the social capital of its 
employees, who are in turn perpetuating the BU-mindset (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) 
inherent in ‘divisionalized’ configurations. 
At Pacifico, mobilization of employees across market-focused sectors and 
divisions is frequent, but confined within GBUs. Informal networks between employees 
exist, however, they remain largely GBU-specific. In the case of Pacifico, there is 
evidence from the examination of ‘stretching and leveraging resources and core 
competencies’ (viz. Chapter 8, Section 8.3.3), to indicate that this is responsible for the 
development of GBU-specific cultures, which create conflicts between ‘operating core’ 
and ‘lower middle-management’ employees working for different GBUs.  
At Cyclone, the global communities facilitate formal and informal corporate-wide 
employee networks and contribute to the corporate-wide mobilization of employees 
from early on in their career. Hence, a horizontal organization is set-up by design at 
Cyclone, to effectively facilitate the development of social capital of employees. In 
addition, a corporate-wide ideology built on the corporate-wide standardization of 
processes, skills and norms, pursued by global communities and a corporate-wide 
‘operating systems manual’ (OSM), contribute to an organizational environment where 
theory (Giddens, 1984; Wenger and Snyder, 2000) would suggest individual employees 
can shape their identity and influence the identity of their networks. Furthermore, the 
corporation’s leadership development practices are a corporate-wide responsibility, 
involving a cohort of BU heads working horizontally across the organization, and the 
routines through which it is implemented are embedded within the configuration’s 
operating procedures. Cyclone’s leadership development program leverages inter-BU 
sharing of resources to choose the individuals who show leadership potential and utilize 
their skills while simultaneously offering them opportunities for personal growth. 
 The findings of this section’s cross-case comparison suggest that the less 
‘divisionalization’ inherent in the diversified configuration, coupled with a corporate-
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wide horizontal organization that enforces corporate-wide uniformity in business and 
functional processes, the greater would be the:  
� centralization of human resource coordination; 
� inter-BU employee mobilisation leading to stronger informal networks 
between employees;  
� ‘social capital’ developed by management and organizational leadership. 
 
Consequently, the greater would be the effectiveness with which the 
organization will develop its managerial and organizational leadership capacity. 
 These findings, drawn from the ICMs’ context, constitute contributions to the 
strategic management of large construction groups, as they identify organization-
specific characteristics that allow leadership with desirable qualities to be developed. 
They complement particularly the work of Chinowsky and Meredith (2000), who 
stressed the importance of organizational leadership for effective core competence 
development for the case of engineering and construction organizations.  
 In addition, they rend support - and provide additional and enhanced empirical 
evidence from the ICMs’ context - to core competence theory research (Gratton, 1996; 
Capelli and Heffer, 1996 and Hagan, 1996) regarding the significance of human 
resource management tools in the effective development of organizational leadership 
and consequently, core competence development. 
 Finally, due to the ICMs’ nature as organizations, these findings may apply to 
the strategic management of multi-BU organizations, such as MNCs, as well as the 
management of project-based organizations in general. 
 
10.4 Interrelationships between Activities  
  
In Chapter 4, core competence development was described as a ‘triple-control 
loop’ strategy process (Figure 4.5, reproduced here as Figure 10.4). Subsequently (viz. 
Chapter 4, Section 4.4), it was proposed that the effectiveness with which ICMs can 
develop their core competencies is not only  a function of how effectively they can 
execute each core competence development activity, but also of how ‘enabling’ their 
configuration is in effectively integrating and managing interrelationships between the 
five activities (Figure 10.5). Along those lines, this section will compare and contrast 
across cases ‘whether’ and ‘how’ this takes place in the ICMs studied  
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In Aegean, ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’ occurs independently in the two 
regions the group is active in. Consequently, two simultaneous, loosely interdependent 
SIs are exhibited and SAs are crafted. Within each region, ‘exhibiting SI and crafting 
SA’ is integrated with routines for ‘regulating SA implementation’ - through the ‘annual 
business plan’ routine (viz. Chapter 6, section 6.3.1). This allows management to 
establish feedback mechanisms in order to regulate strategy execution in line with 
corporate objectives, integrating emerging with intended issues when necessary. 
However, Aegean lacks: 
� A horizontal organization connecting the two regions; 
� Institutionalized structures and systematic processes that can put 
experiential knowledge in future use by capturing and disseminating it 
corporate-wide; 
� Systematic processes to track, monitor and train competent employees. 
 
Consequently, core competence development activities are not - and cannot,   
without   structural   and   functioning alterations - be integrated and managed by a 
cohort of executives as a uniform, comprehensive corporate strategy. 
                              Source: Author Generated 
Questioning and 
reconstructing 
existing perspectives, 
interpretation 
frameworks and 
decision-making 
processes. 
Figure 10.4: ‘Triple-Control Loop’ 
Organizational 
learning, 
renegotiation of 
organizational 
norms, culture 
dynamics, 
social 
construction of 
reality. 
Controller 
Establishing 
the Plan 
Reports/ 
Statements 
relating work to 
the plan 
Reviewing plan/ 
implementation 
relationship and 
deciding on 
‘amending’ action 
Undertaking 
the Work of 
the Plan 
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Interrelationships 
� SI is exhibited and SA crafted in a manner that all five 
activities are integrated into a comprehensive strategy under 
the responsibility of a cohort of executives working 
horizontally across the organization (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1994); 
� Routines through which resources and core competencies 
are stretched and leveraged are integrated with: 
� Feedback mechanisms (Beer, 1959; Berry et al., 1995) 
for ‘regulating strategic architecture implementation’; 
� Routines that allow ‘self reflective’ (Giddens, 1984) 
organizational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978) that 
may lead to revising standard operating procedures 
(Cyert and March, 1965; 1992; March, 1991) and re-
negotiation of organizational norms (Cameron and 
Quinn, 2005) in line with ‘improving business 
practices’ as a function of experiential learning; 
� Routines that allow management and organizational 
leadership to develop intra-personal competencies and 
social capital built on the participation in social 
networks and an environment that fosters joint 
thinking, collaboration, trust and a willingness to learn 
from others (Penrose, 1959; 1995; Javidan, 1998). 
Figure 10.5: Interrelationships between Activities 
Setting and Communicating Strategic Intent and Strategic Architecture 
Regulating Strategic Architecture Implementation 
Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies 
Improving Business Practices 
Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
                                                   Source: Author Generated 
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In Albion, SI is exhibited and SA crafted in a more ‘centralized’ manner at the 
plc level by the organization’s executive management team and BoD.  Similarly to 
Aegean, in Albion, ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’ routines link with ‘regulating SA 
implementation’ routines, in this case through ‘setting the annual business plan’23. The 
development of managerial and organizational leadership capacity is also integrated in 
the strategy process through that routine and is pursued - across BUs - by corporate 
‘succession planning’. Consequently, the ‘development of managerial and 
organizational leadership capacity’ can be monitored and regulated in line with strategy 
execution. Provisions for stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies as 
part of ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’ are made, albeit only as part of the strategies set 
by BUs with authority to manage intra-organizational (inter-BU) relationships (i.e. 
Albion ‘Investments’ and Albion ‘Management’). As evidenced from the case study, 
this could lead to ineffective stretch and leverage between construction-related BUs, due 
to poor inter-BU relationships and the lack of ‘trust’ between employees. Finally, the 
absence of systematic processes to store, analyze and disseminate knowledge captured 
at projects, indicates that Albion has not integrated, and therefore cannot conduct in line 
with its corporate strategy, routines through which it can improve business practices. 
At Pacifico, ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’ is undertaken by the leadership of 
each of the corporation’s four GBUs independently, and then integrated at a corporate 
level for consistency. Within Pacifico, GBU-specific provisions are made regarding: 
� Stretching and leveraging resources through routines integrated with 
‘regulating SA implementation’; 
� Developing managerial and organizational leadership capacity through 
routines integrated with ‘stretching and leveraging’ resources and core 
competencies and ‘regulating SA implementation’. 
 
      In addition, SA crafted makes provisions for ‘routines’ through which 
knowledge and experience gained at ‘projects’ is captured and stored in project/client-
specific databases (PIVOTAL), to be integrated  with the routines related to ‘stretching 
and leveraging resources and core competencies’. However, in the absence of: 
� Systematic processes to communicate this knowledge at higher hierarchical 
levels (i.e. project-to-organization learning (Brady and Davies, 2004)); 
                                                             
23
 Viz. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1. 
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� Cross-divisional ‘structures’ and ‘processes’ to disseminate and make it 
accessible to other projects (i.e. project-to project learning, (Brady and Davies, 
2004)) undertaken for other clients, both within and across GBUs, 
 
Pacifico’s configuration does not enable management and organizational leadership to 
integrate routines for the improvement of its business practices as part of its corporate 
strategy. 
Finally, at Cyclone, ‘SI exhibited and SA crafted’ allows the integration of all 
corporate-level core competence development activities under the responsibility of a 
group of corporate officers working horizontally across the organization. Cyclone is 
able to achieve this by ‘horizontally decentralizing’ resource-allocation authority 
between offices/resource centres, a professional and bureaucratic techno-structure (i.e. 
the ‘global communities network’) and BUs. The fact that ‘global community’ members 
and leadership are at the same time part of the corporation’s executive management, 
contributes to the successful operationalization of this arrangement24. 
Within Cyclone’s context, when SI is exhibited and SA crafted, provisions are 
made for ‘human’ and ‘procedural’ development issues to be incorporated into the 
strategy process, as well as for feedback mechanisms to be established to regulate their 
implementation in line with corporate objectives and corporate strategy execution. 
Standardized corporate-wide practices for integrating project teams (the Sales-
Operations-Technology (SOT) team) ensure that strategy objectives are pursued while 
resources and core competencies are stretched and leveraged at projects. 
Within that context, Cyclone has also integrated with its corporate strategy, 
mechanisms that link projects with the ‘middle line’ and the ‘strategic-apex’ of the 
organization, through which: 
� Knowledge created can be captured, stored and disseminated corporate-wide, in 
a manner that may lead to the improvement of practices, the re-negotiation of 
organizational norms and potentially the re-configuration of its structural 
properties; 
� Management and leadership is developed with the necessary qualities to support 
the corporation’s core competence development efforts and existing core 
competencies; 
                                                             
24
 At Cyclone therefore, the ‘role’ of different organizational parts does not fit neatly within Mintzberg’s 
(1979; 1989) theoretical descriptions, where ‘analysts’ of the organization’s techno-structure are not 
involved in management execution. 
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From this section’s cross-case comparison, it is demonstrated that the 
configuration ICMs adopt has a clear influence on whether they can integrate core 
competence development activities and control them as a ‘triple control loop’ process. 
In addition, it identifies ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics that could facilitate 
‘activity integration’ and management of activity interrelationships. These are: 
� Shared resource ownership between BUs; 
� Lateral links across BUs at various hierarchical levels for: 
- Corporate-wide consensus of corporate objectives to be built. 
- Visibility and accessibility of resources and core competencies to exist 
during strategy implementation; 
� Lateral links across BUs for corporate-wide resource coordination and 
mobilization; 
� Standardisation of processes through which ‘succession planning’ and 
‘leadership development’ can take place; 
� Standardisation of systems to capture knowledge created at projects, and 
communicate them ‘vertically’ up the organization’s hierarchy, and 
‘horizontally’ across BUs. 
 
This section’s comparison contributes to our knowledge regarding the strategic 
management of ICMs. In the ‘strategic management in construction’ tradition of 
Langford and Male (1991; 2001), Male and Stocks (1991) and Chinowsky and Meredith 
(2000), this section identifies organization-specific characteristics that enable ICMs to 
effectively execute their strategies through core competence development. In addition, 
this section identifies specific structural and functioning organizational characteristics 
which allow Band and Scanlan’s (1995) theoretical postulation (that pursuing core 
competence development is an effective means for ‘controlling’ the strategy process) to 
be applied in practice. Finally, considering the ICMs’ project-based nature and their 
similarities with MNCs and PBOs (viz. Chapter 2, Sections 2.6-2.8), it could be argued 
that this section’s findings can find application - following ‘contextual’ modifications - 
to the case of MNCs and PBOs. Considering all of the above, this section’s findings 
contribute to our understanding of the organizational characteristics which enable core 
competence development to be effectively pursued. 
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10.5 Configurations of ICMs and their Potential for Effective Core Competence  
        Development 
 
The purpose of this research has been to conduct an exploratory study in order to 
examine the relationship between the configurations that ICMs adopt and the 
effectiveness with which they develop their core competencies. The focus has been on 
the ‘relationship’ and the identification of potential causal links. Following the ICMs’ 
cross-case comparison in sections 10.2 to 10.4, the purpose of this section is to highlight 
and propose - in line with this research’s epistemological approach of critical realism25 - 
‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics that could ‘empower’ effective core 
competence development in ICMs. 
 From the cross-case comparison, it emerged that the configurations of Aegean, 
Albion and Pacifico, reduce their capacity to effectively control core competence 
development. Cyclone on the other hand has developed a configuration that ‘enables’ 
organizational agents to effectively do so. Similar characteristics to Cyclone’s are 
shared by the other three ICMs (i.e. some form of horizontal organization linking 
autonomous organizational units, some type of techno-structure that pursues process 
and skills standardization, some extent of standardization of norms), but not to the 
extent that they can create an organizational context that ‘empowers’ organizational 
agents to effectively develop their organisation’s core competencies.   
Cyclone’s case study in particular has allowed the identification of ‘structural’ 
and ‘functioning’ characteristics, whose presence is a condition that enabled this ICM 
to overcome the obstacles faced by the other three ICMs studied26. These conditions 
stem from the principle of ‘resource ownership and sharing’ that Cyclone adheres to. 
Human resources (in which core competencies are ultimately embodied) are owned by 
25 local/regional offices/resource centres around the world. On these offices, 
corporate-wide functions are superimposed, which operate as global communities of 
practice. Each is responsible for establishing corporate-wide the standardization of 
related skills and processes. Offices facilitate at the same time the operations of more 
than one BU, which share between them functional resources. This leads to the 
development of informal, inter-BU social networks between employees, from as low as 
the level of the corporation’s operating core. On top of these networks, ‘global 
                                                             
25
 Viz. Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1 
26
 This does not mean that internal conflicts and tensions do not exist at Cyclone, but rather than 
institutional mechanisms and outlets exist to better manage them and diffuse them. 
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communities’ maintain the on-line tools to facilitate direct communication between 
employees, making their knowledge accessible corporate-wide. To deal with conflicts 
that may arise due to BU-specific cultures, the corporation has developed a corporate-
wide ‘operating systems manual’ that all BUs must adhere to, standardizing thus norms 
across autonomously operating managerial clusters within it. Finally, to better control 
the corporate-wide deployment and integration of its resources, Cyclone has 
standardized the processes - as well as the roles and responsibilities of individuals 
involved in their implementation - through which project teams are fused and operate 
throughout the life-cycle of projects the corporation pursues and undertakes, through 
what is known in Cyclone as the process of the ‘Sales-Operations-Technology’ (SOT) 
team. Having developed these structural and functioning characteristics, Cyclone has 
managed to overcome the BU-mindset inherent in diversified configurations and 
stretch and leverage its resources and core competencies more effectively than the 
other three ICMs studied. 
Within that context - and in line with this research’s ‘critical realist’ 
epistemological approach - the following organizational characteristics (Figure 10.6)27 
have been identified as empowering the effective development of core competencies in 
ICMs: 
� Ownership of resources by local/regional centres; 
� Corporate-wide standardization of functional skills and processes; 
� ‘Sharing’ of functional resources by BUs to promote employee rotation; 
� Corporate-wide standardization of norms to foster inter-BU collaboration; 
� Lateral links across BUs at all three levels of the: i) operating core, ii) middle 
management and iii) strategic apex, preferably in the form of inter-BU employee 
networks, facilitating direct communication and knowledge exchange; 
� Standardization of processes regarding how inter-BU relationships are managed; 
� Standardization of processes regarding project-team integration and management; 
� Organizational learning mechanisms, integrated by ‘strategic architecture’ design 
with ‘regulating strategic architecture implementation’ routines; 
 
It is argued here that ICMs with such configuration characteristics will be able to 
follow the rule of thinking globally but acting locally (Flanagan, 1994) and become 
‘project-centred organizations able to provide flexible logistic skills, organize a network  
                                                             
27
 Where findings have substituted theory-derived text from figure 10.5. 
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 Figure 10.6: Organizational Characteristics and Effective Core Competence Development 
                                                  Source: Author Generated 
Exhibiting Strategic Intent and Crafting Strategic Architecture 
Regulating Strategic Architecture Implementation 
Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies 
Improving Business Practices 
Developing Managerial and Organizational Leadership Capacity 
 
Configuration Characteristics Enabling Effective Core 
Competence Development 
 
� Ownership of resources by local/regional centres; 
� Corporate-wide standardization of skills and processes 
(functional); 
� ‘Sharing’ of functional resources by BUs (promotes employee 
rotation); 
� Corporate-wide standardization of norms to foster inter-BU 
collaboration; 
� Lateral links across BUs (‘horizontal organization’) at all three 
levels of : i) operating core, ii) middle management and iii) 
strategic apex-preferably to facilitate inter-BU employee networks, 
their direct communication and knowledge exchange; 
� Standardization of processes regarding how inter-BU relationships 
are to be managed; 
� Standardization of processes regarding project-team integration 
and management; 
� Organizational learning mechanisms, integrated by ‘strategic 
architecture’ design with ‘regulating strategic architecture 
implementation’ routines. 
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of specialists, have the ability to organize and control financial packages and manage a 
complex multilayered and multi-skilled organization which in combination can deliver a 
global offer’ (Langford and Male, 2001; 136). ICMs lacking these characteristics could 
face integration problems both at the micro-level of managing specific projects (e.g. 
communication and collaboration difficulties between individuals that form project-
specific inter-BU teams) as well as the macro-level of the organization (where no 
systems will be in place to facilitate knowledge capture and transfer across 
organizational units). 
 The discussion of this section brings forward this research’s most exploratory 
insights, as it identifies - from the context of ICMs - organizational characteristics that 
enable core competencies to effectively emerge. Within construction strategic 
management research, it represents an extension to the works of Langford and Male 
(1991; 2001), Male and Stocks (1991) and Chinowsky and Meredith (2000), regarding 
the strategic management of diversified and internationalized construction 
organizations. Moreover, it offers new insights on core competence theory as it has so 
far been examined in construction (Chinowsky and Meredith, 2000; Lampel, 2001; 
Haan et al., 2002; Adams, 2004). Finally, because of the ICMs’ similarities with MNCs 
and project-based organizations, the exploratory findings of this section may find 
application (following contextual modifications) to organizations of the scale and scope 
of ICMs operating outside the construction industry, be they project-based or not. 
 
10.6 Practical Application of Core Competence Theory in the Case of ICMs 
 
 In Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.9), it was noted that in the process of addressing the 
research question, this research would evaluate the potential for the practical application 
of core competence theory principles in the case of ICMs. The case studies and their 
cross-case comparison, have led to the following findings. 
During the historical review and evolutionary profiling of the ICMs studied, it 
was observed that changes in their strategic direction occurred as a response to 
emerging opportunities from regulatory changes in the markets the ICMs operated (e.g. 
the introduction of the PFI/PPP procurement route in Greece for the case of Aegean, the 
privatization of utility services in the UK for the case of Albion, increased military 
spending from the United States (US) Federal Government for the case of Pacifico and 
greater client outsourcing for operation, maintenance and construction services for the 
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case of Cyclone). This identifies a construction industry environment where market 
forces outside the direct control of incumbent firms influence their strategic direction. 
As a result, it identifies an industry environment where the ‘proactive organizational 
development’ notion implicit in core competence theory (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.2) 
are hard to apply in practice. This is accentuated in the diversified configuration of 
ICMs, as often: 
� The ‘divisionalization’ inherent in their multi-BU structure is counter to the 
effective deployment of core competencies; 
� Knowledge gained - which may form the foundations for core competencies to 
be developed - can be lost when projects finish and their teams are dismantled. 
 
 Consequently, construction companies in general and ICMs in particular, face 
significant, yet not insurmountable, obstacles when developing their core competencies. 
It is argued here that ICMs with the configuration characteristics brought forward in 
section 10.5 (viz. Figure 10.6) as ‘empowering’ effective core competence 
development, could apply core competence theory principles in practice and overcome 
the ‘reactionary’ stance to market changes (e.g. as Cyclone has - viz. Chapter 9, Section 
9.3.1) that the construction industry’s environment (Section 10.2.1) forces most ICMs to 
adopt (i.e. as Aegean, Albion and Pacifico). 
 
10.7 Evaluating the Research and Findings 
 
 This has been an explanatory and (potentially) theory-building exploratory 
research, on the relationship between the combinations of configurations ICMs adopt 
and the effectiveness with which they develop their core competencies. The focus has 
been on investigating the relationship and identifying potential causal links. 
 As noted in Chapter 5 (viz. Section 5.4), this research has elements of ‘theory 
building’ from case-based fieldwork, in addition to theory building from the literature 
and conceptual analysis. The fieldwork’s intent was to test these conceptualizations. 
Along those lines, four case studies and their comparison were undertaken, using a 
qualitative research method. The research undertaken was in line with the objectives 
outlined earlier in the thesis (viz.  Chapter 1, viz. Section 1.9) and contributes to our 
knowledge regarding the theoretical gaps identified in Chapter 1 (viz. Sections 1.5-
1.6.1). To address the research question, the issues highlighted in Chapter 1 and 
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revisited in Chapter 4 (viz. Section 4.4) were singled out and noted against existing 
literature in sections 10.3.1. to 10.6. It is from these sections that the contributions of 
this research to knowledge have emerged. 
 Corbin and Strauss’ (1990) approach that the ‘evaluative criteria’ should be 
adapted to fit the procedures of the method, is adopted here. As this research is of an 
exploratory and potentially theory-building nature - particularly in its analysis (viz. 
Chapter 5, Section 5.8.2), the following four evaluation criteria will be used, which are 
generally accepted as appropriate in evaluating qualitative research with theory building 
potential: i) generalizability, ii) reliability, iii) validity and iv) theoretical fit. They will 
be discussed with respect to this research in turn. 
� Generalizability (external validity): Glazer and Strauss (1967) asserted that 
when application of theoretical concepts developed within a group (‘substantive 
theory’) fit into other groups, then the ‘explanatory’ power of those concepts is 
increased and their generalizability is thought to be greater (formal theory). This 
research was based on four case studies and their comparison, so, the database 
constitutes a very small sample and ICMs are a special type of organization for 
them to be representative of the industry as a whole. Therefore, generalizing 
from these case studies was made with the caveat that adoption of suggestions 
brought forward had to be undertaken with contextual sensitivity, as the cases 
showed variations in context that also forms part of the dynamic context of 
evolution. Overall, the concepts and propositions developed here, stemming 
from the empirical data gathered and analyzed, are thought to be ‘substantive 
theory’ applicable to companies whose characteristics are similar to the ICMs 
studied. The theoretical concepts developed and the suggestions emanating from 
the findings can extend their application if they are proved fitting in other kinds 
of companies too (e.g. advertising, accounting, film production, shipping, etc). 
� Reliability: Miles and Huberman (1994: 276) argued that, regarding reliability, 
the underlying issue is whether the process of the study is consistent, reasonably 
stable over time and across researchers and methods. Glazer and Strauss (1967) 
explained that reliability relies on ‘theoretical saturation’, which implies that 
additional evidence does not add more ‘explanatory power’ to the concepts 
developed. The careful analytical, structured and empirical procedure followed 
in this research, impart confidence that the research’s findings and the ‘potential 
causal links’ identified are reliable - within the boundaries of generalizability 
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already explained. Strict adherence was paid to this study’s research protocol, to 
approach the analysis of the different ICMs on equal terms. In addition, the 
interview-texts were examined with great diligence, to ensure the passages 
chosen and coded were the richer and most appropriate for the themes studied. 
Finally, the case-studies were written in an identical structure, so that the 
reliability of comparison would be enhanced. The four case-studies conducted 
are adequate for exploratory and potentially theory-building research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, the use of a case study protocol and software 
(N*6) further strengthened the study’s reliability.  
 Some threats to this research’s reliability exist, which highlight some of 
this study’s limitations, but also one of its methodological contributions. In 
particular, although it has been argued that ‘critical realism’ is an appropriate 
epistemological approach to be adopted when studying project-based 
organizations (Smyth and Morris, 2006), it has not been widely applied, 
particularly for the case of construction organizations. This research successfully 
applied critical realism to investigate a specific and complex type of project-
based organization, the ICM. Overall, this research is considered to be reliable, 
particularly within the context of its purpose, that is, to identify ‘potential’ 
causal links between the configurations that ICMs adopt, on the one hand, and 
the effectiveness with which they develop their core competencies on the other. 
� Validity (Construct-Internal): Great effort was put into maximizing this 
research’s validity. First, data from four case studies was compared and 
contrasted using the principle of ‘analytic generalization’. Convergent evidence 
was sought and triangulation between texts (Krige, 1979), documents and 
empirical data gathered from employees was pursued28. It should be however 
recognized that, unfortunately, this triangulation was not always achieved. In 
addition, data from the literature was enfolded to ensure sense-making of the 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989) and in some cases, theory was used to explain and 
confirm results. The fact that i) a rich description of the case studies was 
attempted to enable a vicarious presence of the reader and that ii) the level of 
uncertainty of results is now discussed, both contribute to the higher internal 
validity of this research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
                                                             
28
 For example, when analyzing data in order to describe organization-specific processes, the descriptions 
of one interview had to be verified by the statements of another employee, and both had to fit with the 
‘structural’ context that - through a similar process of validation - had been described in other interviews 
and/or documentary data. 
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 The main threat to this research’s internal validity is thought to be the 
lack of comprehensive feedback from the interviewees, so that the accuracy of 
the results could be assessed (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Stuart et al., 2002). 
Interviewees from two companies (Pacifico and Cyclone) received preliminary 
findings, committed to read them, but feedback was only received by one. At 
least, the fact that they did not reply claiming inaccuracies may be an indication 
that no inaccuracies were noticed. 
� Theory Goodness: Glazer and Straus (1967: 4) advocated that the true test for 
validity rests on developing ‘good theory’ that is clearly applicable and relevant 
in new situations. It is believed that the main concepts that were developed from 
theory and conceptual analysis are ‘integrative’ and therefore with high analytic 
potential, as well as generic enough to ‘fit’ and ‘work’ when applied to 
numerous organizational contexts. In addition, results and contributions to 
theory are thought to be ‘relevant’, as they can be applicable in other, similar 
organizational settings like the ones of the ICMs studied here - namely 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and project-based organizations (PBOs). 
Furthermore, Eisenhardt (1989) argued that good theory from case study 
research should result in new insights rather than simply validate existing 
theory. New insights have emerged from this thesis and other findings have 
conformed previous results. 
 
 It should be recognized that the evaluation presented above could be either 
‘cognitively’ or ‘emotionally’ biased. Consequently, the best evaluation remains to be 
undertaken by the users of the theoretical models, findings and suggestions brought 
forward in this research: academics interested to use them in further research and 
practitioners appealed by the managerial implications of the findings.  
 Based on this research, four papers were presented in research conferences. This 
evidence suggests that the issues and findings are interesting, relevant and real. In 
general, this research is considered to be reliable and valid (externally and internally). 
However, the findings regarding each research issue addressed are considered to be at 
different quality levels. Thus, every research issue was evaluated using the i) 
generalizability, ii) reliability, iii) validity and iv) theoretical fit criteria described in this 
section, with results shown on Table 10.6.  
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10.8 Cross-Case Comparison Concluding Summary  
 
 This chapter has compared and contrasted the case study findings, in light of the 
extant literature and the theoretical frameworks developed for the purpose of this 
research. The next - and final - chapter, draws conclusions regarding the research 
question, highlights contributions of this research to knowledge, offers recommendations 
to ICMs, evaluates whether the objectives of this research have been met and proposes 
topics for future research.  
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Table 10.6: Assessment of Findings 
Issues Findings Domain of 
Applicability 
Theoretical Fit Generaliza
bility 
Validity Reliability 
No universally adopted 
definition of core 
competencies exists, nor a 
description of their 
relationship with resources, 
capabilities and non-core 
competencies within an 
organization-specific 
context; 
 
This research developed a definition, particularly emphasizing the relationship 
between resources, capabilities, competencies and core competencies within a 
multi-BU organizational context. This definition was accompanied by the 
development of a descriptive schema (viz. Chapter 3, Figures 3.8, 3.9) that helps 
articulate issues related to core competencies and their development. 
ICMs 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Dependent 
upon 
context 
 
High 
 
 
Robust but 
not 
universal 
 
High 
 
 
Robust, but 
not 
universal 
Construction 
 
Low - scale and scope 
of ICMs required 
PBOs 
 
 High - when scale 
and scope of ICMs 
applies 
MNCs 
 
High 
Organizations in 
general 
 
Scale and scope of 
ICMs must apply 
 
No description/ 
conceptualization of the 
process of core competence 
development in an 
organization-specific 
context exists; 
 
 
 
 
By developing a ‘triple control loop’ strategy process (viz. Chapter 4, Figure 
4.9), consisting of five corporate-level activities, a description/conceptualization 
of core competence development within the context of a multi-BU organization 
was attained. 
 
 
 
 
 
ICMs 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
Construction 
 
High – concept 
generic enough 
PBOs High 
MNCs High 
Organizations in 
general 
High – concept 
generic enough 
 
Little evidence as to the 
‘practical’ application of 
core competence theory 
(even less in construction, 
none for ICMs); 
 
The environment that ICMs operate in is extremely complex. This research 
identified specific structural and functioning characteristics of ICMs that could 
‘enable’ the application of core competence theory principles in practice and 
empower their executives to effectively develop their organization’s core 
competencies (viz. Figure 10.5). These characteristics could help implement, in 
practice, core competence theory’s notion of ‘proactive organizational 
development’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ICMs High 
 
Medium 
 
Potentially 
ICM and 
multi-BU-
specific 
How this 
takes place 
varies 
according 
to the cases 
and context 
 
 
Medium-
High 
 
Concepts 
not 
theoreticall
y saturated 
 
Medium-
High 
 
 
No 
feedback 
from 
informants 
 
Construction Low – scale and scope 
of ICMs must apply 
PBOs High – when scale and 
scope of ICMs applies 
MNCs High 
Organizations in 
general 
Scale and scope 
similar to ICMs must 
apply 
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What is the relationship 
between the configuration 
that ICMs adopt and the 
development of corporate 
strategies with optimal 
potential for effective 
implementation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
� This research found that by BUs sharing resources owned by local offices, 
inter-BU employee networks develop, which establish an environment of 
inter-BU coordination when strategies are being set. This could then lead to 
greater inter-BU collaboration and resource exchange during strategy 
execution. 
� It was also found that: i) strong inter-BU links and ii) centrally coordinated 
employee development programs pursuing ‘skills standardization’, may lead to 
a better alignment of corporate objectives with the objectives of individual 
employees. 
 
 
ICMs High 
 
High 
 
Dependent 
upon 
context 
 
Medium-
High 
 
Concepts 
not 
theoreticall
y saturated 
 
Medium-
High 
 
No 
feedback 
from 
informants 
 
Construction Low – scale and scope 
of ICMs must apply 
PBOs 
High  – when scale 
and scope of ICMs 
applies 
MNCs High 
Organizations in 
general 
Scale and scope of 
ICMs must apply 
 
 
 
What is the relationship 
between the configuration 
that ICMs adopt and the 
effectiveness which they 
regulate their strategies? 
 
 
 
This research has found that divisionalized ICMs adapt quicker to market 
changes than more integrated ones. However, it was also found that horizontal 
links between BUs (such as formal and informal employee networks and 
knowledge management systems), combined with standardized processes to 
integrate and manage inter-BU project teams, could allow ICMs to leverage their 
‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘evaluative’ core competencies to select projects more 
effectively. This could lead to greater control of strategy execution, in line with 
objectives set. 
 
 
ICMs New Insight 
 
High 
 
Dependent 
upon 
context. 
Potentially 
ICM and 
multi-BU 
specific 
 
High 
 
 
Dependent 
upon 
context 
Potentially 
ICM and 
multi-BU 
specific 
 
Medium-
High 
 
Concepts 
not 
theoreticall
y saturated 
Construction Low 
PBOs High – when scale and 
scope of ICMs applies 
MNCs High 
Organizations in 
general 
Scale and scope of 
ICMs must apply 
 
 
 
What is the relationship 
between the configuration 
that ICMs adopt and the 
effectiveness with which 
they stretch and leverage 
their resources and core 
competencies? 
 
 
 
 
This research found evidence to suggest that sharing of functional resources by 
BUs leads to the formation of inter-BU employee networks and contributes to the 
development of organizational social capital. By designing these networks into 
the organizational structure, the tacit knowledge of employees could be 
harnessed across BUs more effectively.  Social capital, shared values and norms, 
could contribute to more effective inter-BU collaboration and allow ICMs to 
effectively stretch their resources and leverage their core competencies at 
projects. 
ICMs  New Insights 
 
Medium-
High 
 
May be 
‘role 
dependent’ 
 
Medium 
 
Concepts 
not 
theoreticall
y saturated 
 
Medium-
High 
 
No 
feedback 
from 
informants 
 
Construction Low 
PBOs High – when scale and 
scope of ICMs applies 
MNCs High 
Organizations in 
general 
Scale and scope of 
ICMs must apply 
 
 
302 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the relationship 
between the configuration 
that ICMs adopt and the 
effectiveness with which 
their organizational 
learning, may lead to the 
reconfiguration of their 
social practices, structural 
properties and the re-
negotiation of their 
organizational norms? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research has found that, when processes for capturing, analyzing, codifying 
and disseminating knowledge are standardized corporate-wide and integrated 
with ‘reporting’ routines, the outputs can become items of executive 
management discourse during executive meetings/routines for evaluating 
strategies executed. Through this, the potential for organizational learning can be 
actualized, and may lead to reconfiguration of social practices and structural 
properties, as well as re-negotiation of organizational norms. It was also found 
that ‘divisionalization’ and differences in organizational norms across BUs could 
inhibit the effective dissemination of new/improved routines across them. This 
seems to happen because the motivational disposition to both ‘transfer’ and 
‘receive’ knowledge created is diminished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ICMs  New Insights 
 
Medium 
 
 
Generalisa-
ble in 
‘project-
based’ 
contexts 
 
High 
 
 
Concepts 
theoreticall
y saturated 
 
Medium-
High 
 
No 
‘feedback’ 
from 
informants; 
 
Construction Low 
PBOs High – when scale and 
scope of ICMs applies 
MNCs New Insights 
Organizations in 
general 
Scale and scope of 
ICMs must apply   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the relationship 
between the configuration 
that ICMs adopt and the 
effectiveness with which 
they develop their 
managerial and leadership 
capacity? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social capital development was found to be important. It takes time to build up 
this asset. Whether leadership and succession planning can draw upon the social 
capital is path dependent. No empirical data was found to support/refute whether 
structured succession planning and leadership development programs actually 
contribute to the effective development of managerial and organizational 
leadership capacity. It was observed however that they could have a positive 
contribution, when they are implemented in an organizational context where 
strong inter-BU employee networks exist and a culture of inter-BU collaboration 
prevails. 
 
 
 
 
 
ICMs High 
 
 
    Medium 
 
May not 
apply to 
non-
diversified 
firms 
 
 
Medium-
High 
 
Concepts 
not 
theoreticall
y saturated 
 
 
Medium-
High 
 
No 
feedback 
from 
interviewee
s 
Construction Low 
PBOs High – when scale and 
scope of ICMs applies 
MNCs High 
Organizations in 
general 
Scale and scope of 
ICMs must apply 
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Which are the structural 
and functioning 
characteristics of ICMs 
that ‘empower’ 
organizational agents to 
effectively develop their 
organization’s core 
competences? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings, supported by the theory, show that what has been embedded in the 
ICMs’ configuration will affect their functioning at times and for any one key 
decision/event or activity. Empowerment was therefore found to not necessarily 
be a result of agency, but ‘historical’ agency as collective organizational 
experience embedded in structural and functioning characteristics. Within that 
context, the organizational characteristics empowering effective core competence 
development could be summarized as follows: 
� Ownership of human resources by local/regional centres, coupled with 
organization-wide standardization of ‘functional’ skills and ‘practices’; 
� Sharing of human resources by BUs, leading to the development of informal 
and formal inter-BU employee networks; 
� Formalization of those networks and their incorporation into the organizational 
structure (e.g. through communities of practice); 
� ICT systems for inter-BU communication and the ‘transfer’ and ‘management’ 
of knowledge; 
� Standardization of processes regarding ‘how’ inter-BU relationships are 
managed, including processes for inter-BU project team integration/formation 
and management; 
� Organizational learning mechanisms, integrated by strategy design with 
‘regulating strategic architecture implementation’ routines, to enable the 
organization to effectively exercise corporate-wide: 
o ‘Reflexive’ monitoring of conduct and context of interaction; 
o ‘Self-reflective’ organizational learning.  
� HR strategy developing and monitoring the implementation of ‘individual 
development plans’ being part of BU and corporate strategy and integrated 
with ‘exhibiting SI and crafting SA’ routines; 
ICMs New Insights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium-
High 
 
Maybe role 
dependent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium-
High 
 
Concepts 
not 
theoreticall
y saturated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
No 
empirical 
data 
triangulatio
n 
 
Construction N/A 
PBOs 
New Insights – when 
scale and scope of 
ICMs applies 
MNCs New Insights 
Organizations in 
general 
New Insights – when 
scale and scope of 
ICMs applies 
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Evaluation criteria: 
- Generalizability (low - medium - high): Data from different cases is underpinning the 
concepts; the findings are consistent with experience or confirm results appearing in the 
literature but applied in different contexts; the outcome is generic enough to be applied in 
different settings. 
- Reliability (low - medium - high): The research questions are clear; concepts are theoretically 
saturated; adherence to the research method; the use of a case study protocol; replicable in other 
settings. 
- Validity (low-medium-high): Type of data used (empirical, from the literature or from 
researcher’s experience); data source (primary - secondary); empirical data triangulation; 
literature enfolded; analysis of rival explanations; “thick” case description; replication logic; 
feed-back from informants. 
- Theory goodness (low - medium - high - new insights): Relevant; interesting; fit with data; 
operationalizable and applicable to new situations, it raises debates. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusions, Contributions to Knowledge and 
                      Recommendations for Further Research 
 
 
‘Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination 
encircles the world.’ 
 
                                                                                           Albert Einstein 
 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
In this concluding chapter, the extent to which this research has met its 
objectives is first discussed. Then, conclusions are drawn regarding the research 
question (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.7). Subsequently, the contributions of this research 
to knowledge with respect to academia and practice are summarized. It is explained how 
these contributions have multiple applications outside the context of construction, 
particularly for general core competence theory and the contexts of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and project-based organizations (PBOs). Finally, the extent to 
which this research has met its objectives is addressed and topics for future research are 
proposed. 
 
11.2 Revisiting the Research Aims and Objectives  
 
 In Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.9), the objectives of this research were brought 
forward. In this section, they are reproduced and whether they have been met is 
reviewed. 
� Objective 1: Describe in theory the ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics 
of international construction majors (ICMs), drawing from mainstream strategic 
management literature, organization theory and project-based management 
concepts; 
 
 This objective was met in Chapter 2, where ICMs were described in theory and 
their similarities PBOs and MNCs were discussed (viz. Section 2.6-2.8). Their 
description contributed to developing a better understanding of the complexity that 
characterises them and assisted in being able to contextually apply core competence 
theory principles for their investigation at later stages of the study. 
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� Objective 2: Develop a model to explain the relationship between resources, 
capabilities, competencies and core competencies, distinguishing between those 
referring to individuals and those referring to organizations while positioning 
them within an organizational context, such as the one of the ICMs studied in this 
research; 
 
This objective was met in Chapter 3. Literature and concepts from mainstream strategic 
management, the resource-based view of the firm, evolutionary economics, organization 
theory, core competence theory and project-based management were critically reviewed 
and integrated to develop a theoretical framework that deconstructs and describes core 
competencies within multi-BU organizations (viz. Chapter 3, Figures 3.8 and 3.9) 
 
� Objective 3: Integrate aspects of ‘cybernetics’ and ‘management control’ theories 
under the umbrella of core competence theory, to propose a number of generic, 
corporate-level activities that would enable to identify for the case of ICMs, which 
organizational routines effectively shape group strategy;  
 
This objective was met in Chapter 4. An integrative theoretical model was developed, 
the ‘Triple Control Loop’ (viz. Figure 4.5), which identified a number of generic, 
corporate-level activities that effectively shape group strategy. These activities provided 
the basis for investigating the effectiveness with which ICMs develop their core 
competencies. 
 
� Objective 4: Compare and contrast findings across individual case studies to 
identify similarities and differences between them, to better explain the causal 
links between company activities and their results in effectively developing their 
core competencies; 
 
This objective was met through Chapters 6 to 9, where the individual case studies were 
presented, and Chapter 10, where they were compared and contrasted, while 
simultaneously discussing emerging findings in the light of the extant literature. The 
individual case studies were descriptive and explanatory, in order to clearly demonstrate 
how the theoretical concepts developed in earlier parts of the thesis are applied in 
organizational contexts. The cross-case comparison had a more theory-building nature, 
through generalizations across contexts. 
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11.3 Addressing the Research Question 
 
 This research was undertaken to address the following research question: 
 
‘How do the configurations that ICMs adopt influence the effectiveness with which they 
execute a core competence development strategy?’ 
 
 The case studies and their comparison identified potential causal links between 
the configurations of the ICMs studied on the one hand and the effectiveness with 
which they can execute a core competence development strategy on the other. These 
findings and potential causal links were summarized and evaluated in the previous 
chapter (viz. Table 10.6). From these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
 First, the degree of ‘divisionalization’ inherent in the ICMs’ configuration may 
influence the relationship between configuration and core competence development. 
The more divisionalized the ICM, the more responsive it could be in addressing market 
changes. However, divisionalization was also found to be related with: i) weaker inter-
BU relations and employee networks, ii) different norms and procedures followed by 
different BUs and iii) unwillingness of BU managers to commit to sharing resources 
and knowledge across BUs. Consequently, divisionalization may influence negatively 
the effectiveness with which ICMs could: 
� Develop corporate strategies (i.e. exhibit strategic intent (SI) and craft strategic 
architecture (SA)) with optimal potential for effective implementation; 
� Stretch and leverage their resources and core competencies across BUs; 
� Re-configure their structure, practices and re-negotiate their organizational 
norms (i.e. improve their business practices) as a function of their learning; 
� Develop social capital between their management and leadership. 
 
In short, divisionalization was found to influence negatively the ability of the ICMs 
studied to ‘execute a core competence development strategy’, by influencing the 
effectiveness with which they could conduct individual core competence development 
activities.  
 Second, when ‘links’ exist between BUs, standardization of processes regarding 
project-team integration may influence positively the effectiveness with which the 
knowledge of individual members is leveraged across BUs, increasing the effectiveness 
with which the ICMs: 
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� Deploy their entrepreneurial and evaluative core competencies when selecting 
projects (as part of ‘regulating SA implementation’ - viz. Section 10.3.2); 
� Stretch and leverage their resources and core competencies during project 
execution. 
 
 Consequently, it could be argued that on such occasions, standardization of 
processes regarding inter-BU resource integration positively influences the ability of 
ICMs to conduct corporate-level activities through which they could develop their core 
competencies. 
 Third, the relationship between ‘configuration’ and ‘core competence 
development’ was found to be influenced by the existence of institutionalized 
‘organizational learning mechanisms’, integrated with processes for monitoring strategy 
execution (i.e. ‘reporting’ routines). This empowered organizational agents to re-
configure their organization’s structures and practices and to re-negotiate their 
organization’s norms during strategy execution. Consequently, this configuration 
characteristic is responsible for allowing the ‘integration’ and the management of 
‘interrelationships’ existing between the following activities: 
� Stretching and leveraging resources and core competencies; 
� Regulating SA implementation’; 
� Improving business practices. 
 
In other words, it influences the effectiveness with which ICMs conduct core 
competence development activities and manage their interrelationships.  
 The ultimate potential of this mechanism however, could not be fully realized 
when ‘divisionalization’ was present, as knowledge created and improvements in 
routines/practices could not be easily disseminated across BUs. Finally, it was observed 
that corporate-wide standardization of norms can positively influence inter-BU 
collaboration and therefore influence the effectiveness with which ICMs could: 
� Stretch and leverage their resources and core competencies; 
� Disseminate (across BUs) improvements in routines and practices. 
 
 Through this, standardization of norms is also responsible for effective ‘core 
competence development strategy execution’. 
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 The findings of this research also point to the conclusion that the application of 
core competence theory principles in practice is fraught with difficulties in the case of 
ICMs, due to the complexity and unpredictability of demand in the construction 
industry and the international construction market. In the spirit of ‘critical realism’, a 
number of configuration characteristics were identified (viz. Chapter 10, Figure 10.5), 
that positively influence effective core competence development. For example, shared 
‘functional’ human resources between market-focused BUs could contribute to the 
development of inter-BU employee networks, which contributes to the development of 
organizational social capital and an inter-BU collaborative spirit in the organization - 
while at the same time retaining the benefits of market-based divisionalization. 
 
11.4 Contributions to Knowledge 
 
As noted in Chapter 1 (viz. Section 1.6.1), the dominant theme of this research 
was that of ‘exploring the relationship between the configurations ICMs adopt and the 
effectiveness with which they develop their core competencies’. Due to the similarities 
between ICMs, multinational corporations (MNCs) studied in mainstream strategic 
management and project-based organizations (PBOs)1 it was argued that any findings 
from the context of ICMs could be comparable and applicable to the context of the latter 
two organizational types. Contributions to theory, practice and methods are presented in 
the following sections. 
 
11.4.1 Theoretical Contributions from Conceptual Models 
 
During this research undertaking, a number of obstacles stemming from 
underdeveloped theoretical models in core competence theory had to be overcome. This 
led to the following theoretical developments in relation to core competencies and their 
development: 
� A clear definition and distinction between the concepts of ‘capability’ and 
‘competence’ (viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.1); 
�  The development of a theoretical framework, the New Competencies Hierarchy 
(viz. Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1, Figure 3.8) that deconstructs and positions core 
competencies within the context of  multi-BU organizations;  
                                                             
1
 Viz. Chapter 2, Sections 2.6 and 2.8. 
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� The development of a ‘Triple Control Loop’ strategy process (viz. Chapter 4, 
Figure 4.4) consisting of five, interrelated corporate-level activities, which 
provides a description/conceptualization of core competence development 
within the context of multi-BU organizations in general and ICMs in particular. 
 
11.4.2 Contributions to Theory  
 
 As explained in Chapter 1 (viz. Sections 1.5-1.6.1 and 1.9) this research intended 
to explore current gaps in core competence theory, through the study of ICMs. Building 
on the similarities between ICMs, MNCs and PBOs, this research also intended to 
contribute to our knowledge in the fields of mainstream strategic management and the 
management of project-based firms. At its completion, the following contributions to 
theory have been achieved: 
� First, the applicability of core competence theory in practice has been 
demonstrated for the case of large, multi-BU construction organizations. This 
contributes to the strength of the theory in itself, by demonstrating its 
applicability outside the production-oriented industries within which it has been 
traditionally examined.  Hence, its breadth of application can now include 
construction and, by extension, the project-based management contexts; 
� Second, this research has contributed to our knowledge regarding the ‘process’ 
of core competence development. Through a combination of theoretical 
constructs from literature and findings from the context of ICMs, structures, 
processes and organizational mechanisms through which the development of 
core competencies can be effectively controlled were identified (viz. Chapter 10, 
Section 10.6). Due to the multi-BU and project-based nature of ICMs, the 
findings also contribute to our knowledge regarding core competence 
development in the context of MNCs, as well as PBOs from industries outside 
construction (for the latter, provided scale and scope is similar to that of ICMs’).  
� Third, specific ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ characteristics have been identified 
from the context of ICMs, which enable the effective execution of corporate-
level activities linked with effective core competence development. Due to the 
multi-BU and project-based nature of ICMs, the influence of these 
organizational characteristics may be present in the context of MNCs and PBOs 
with similar scale and scope as ICMs. In particular, the contributions to our 
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knowledge relate to the identification of ‘structural’ and ‘functioning’ 
characteristics: 
- Enabling organizational learning that may lead to the reconfiguration of 
organizational social practices, structural properties and organizational 
norms (viz. Chapter 10, Section 10.3.4); 
- Enabling better integration of emerging with intended strategies by 
facilitating organizational transformation throughout the strategy 
process; 
- Fostering the effective intra-organizational stretching and leveraging of 
resources and core competencies in a multi-BU context (viz. Chapter 10, 
Section 10.3.3); 
- Fostering the development of organizational leadership with multi-BU 
organizations (viz. Chapter 10, Section 10.3.3). 
 
11.4.3 Methodological Contributions 
 
 The most significant methodological contributions of this research were: 
� The development of an evolutionary profiling method (viz. Chapter 5, Section 
5.7) accompanied by a workable theoretical framework that is supplementary to 
existing core competence identification methods (viz. Chapter 4, Section 4.1), by 
accounting for ‘path-dependency’ and ‘company-specificity’. The model (viz. 
Figure 5.3) and methodology developed in Chapter 5 to construct the ICMs’ 10-
year evolutionary profiles, was developed in order to identify (not as a result of 
extensive analysis, but rather as a series of multiple ‘insights’ derived from 
intensive research and developed during the analysis of documentary data) the 
path-dependent core competencies of the ICMs studied, while simultaneously 
mapping the evolution of their organizational context. The evolutionary profiling 
method is therefore both ‘dynamic’ and ‘unconstrained by organization-specific 
processes’ as opposed to existing core competence identification methods. 
Moreover, it is located within the specific conceptual stream of evolutionary 
management and economics that the literature review has posited as aligned with 
core competence theory and critical realist epistemology. The benefits of this 
evolutionary profiling method is that it is not sector specific, but can be applied 
across market and industry contexts. 
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� A successful implementation of a research undertaking from a ‘critical realism’ 
epistemological point of view, which up to now has not been widely applied, 
even more so for the case of project-based and construction organizations. This 
epistemological approach allowed conducting a novel, exploratory and 
qualitative-based multiple case study in the context of ICMs, while 
simultaneously facilitated a research methodology through which ‘structures’ 
and ‘functions’ that enable core competencies to emerge in ICMs were 
identified. Hence, this research has contributed to our knowledge regarding the 
application of critical realism in practice. 
 
11.4.4 Practical Contributions 
 
As noted in Chapter 10 (viz. Section 10.3), this research is based upon four case 
studies so, generalizing from these case studies to highlight practical contributions is 
made with the caveat that adoption of suggestions brought forward and any 
recommendations made has to be undertaken with contextual sensitivity, as the cases 
show variations in context that also forms part of the dynamic content of evolution. 
Within that context, the following constitute contributions to the knowledge of 
practitioners in the field of strategic management as this applies to ICMs, MNCs and 
multi-BU PBOs.  
First, core competence development can be more effectively achieved, by:  
� Creating links between BUs that can: 
- Facilitate knowledge and skills transfer; 
- Facilitate and maintain corporate-wide, discipline-oriented formal and 
informal networks of employees; 
- Be used as a starting point to standardize processes and norms across 
individual organizational units; 
� Developing and standardizing mechanisms, through which knowledge created at 
projects can be captured, stored, analyzed and disseminated corporate-wide. For 
example, mechanisms to capture lessons learned could be integrated with 
‘reporting processes’ and their outputs could become agendas discussed by 
executive management during operational and strategic reviews; 
� Standardizing work processes throughout the project’s life-cycle, in order to 
mobilize, integrate and better control on a project-basis, human resources - 
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within which the intangible, people-dependent elements of core competencies 
are embedded - across market-focused BUs.  
 
What is being argued here, is that the multi-BU organizations that use these 
recommendations to develop their configuration will be able to overcome obstacles 
created not only by their internal limitations, but also by their industry’s complexity and 
dynamic nature and successfully apply the ‘proactive organizational development’ 
principles of core competence theory (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.2) in practice. 
 
11.5 Directions for Further Research 
 
 The objectives set at the beginning of this research (viz. Chapter 1, Section 1.9) 
and reviewed in Section 11.2 of this Chapter have been met. Nevertheless, this research 
has been subject to certain limitations, as these were discussed when the research and its 
findings were evaluated (viz. Chapter 10, Table 10.7).  
Both the exploratory nature of this research and the methodology applied as the 
means to conduct inquiry brought about results that need to be explored in further 
breadth and depth. It cannot be claimed that the research has been proven or refuted, yet 
a discussion has commenced and developed from the discussion and discourse of others 
(Bettis and Prahalad, 1986; Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; 1994; Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990; Very, 1993; Male, 1991; Flanagan, 1994; Langford and Male, 2001; Artto and 
Dietrich, 2002; 2004). Therefore, the concepts, propositions and frameworks developed 
here should be tested empirically, e.g. via surveys or by implementing them in the field. 
At the same time, the limitations of this research point towards the direction that future 
research on the subject could take. Of immediate relevance would be: 
� Improving the generalizability of this research’s findings by conducting more case 
studies of ICMs; 
� Examining deeper the causal relationship between the ‘role’ that ICMs adopt in the 
production of the built environment and the type of ‘market-focus’ strategies they 
pursue, with how effectively they develop their core competencies; 
� Focusing on the identification of desirable core competencies in the international 
construction industry by developing a methodology that would account for 
continuous market change, by: 
- Gathering data through interviews with different types of ICM clients (private, 
government/public and ‘institutional investors); 
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- Using the ‘new competencies hierarchy’ developed in this research to break 
these down to competencies, capabilities, skills, individual level core 
competencies and processes. 
� Replicating this study’s methodology in other project-based industries (e.g. the 
legal profession, accounting, film production, advertising and investment banking), 
to examine whether conclusions drawn here can be generalized for organizations 
operating in project-based industries in general;  
� Conducting this study’s methodology in the production-oriented industries where 
core competence theory is traditionally applied, to investigate similarities and 
differences regarding core competence development across industry contexts; 
� Considering the non-project-based nature of production-oriented industries, and use 
the ‘triple control loop’ strategy as a starting point to investigate mechanisms of 
organizational learning that may lead to transformations of organizational practices 
and culture in such industry contexts; 
� Finally, considering the similarities between ICMs and MNCs on the one hand and 
ICMs and PBOs on the other, a comparative study between MNCs and PBOs could 
be developed to investigate the problems each faces in effectively executing their 
strategies - potentially core competence development -  and the issues that, in each 
case, determine relative success over failure in pursuing corporate objectives. 
 
11.6 Concluding Section 
  
         This research has been an exploratory study on the relationship between the 
configurations ICMs adopt and the effectiveness with which they develop their core 
competencies. Four ICMs were studied and causal links between the combination of 
organizational configuration they have adopted and the effectiveness with which they 
pursue the development of their core competencies have been identified. The findings 
articulate the paths and choices ICMs make in order to most effectively develop their 
core competencies and consequently attain competitive advantage. It is hoped that the 
work undertaken here, combined with the work of others, will assist practitioners in 
better dealing with the practical issues that core competence development might give 
rise to, apply management control principles in the development of core competencies 
in organizations and study their ‘structuration’ and development. It is therefore hoped 
the work will also contribute to improving the value offered and delivered by ICMs to 
clients. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 5.1: Case Study Protocol 
 
Section A. Overview 
 
A.1 Purpose 
 
 This protocol issued to guide the investigator in carrying out the case study and cross-case 
comparison. 
 
A.2 Background 
 
Research Goal: To conduct an exploratory study aimed at understanding the relationship between 
the configurations that ICMs adopt and the effectiveness with which they develop their core 
competencies. 
 
Research Process: 
� Development of theoretical constructs; 
� Development of the case studies; 
� Cross-case study comparison. 
 
Case study goal: Primary ‘explanatory’ and ‘descriptive’ of the organization-specific routines and 
context through which ICMs conduct core competence development activities. 
 
The Setting and the Unit of Analysis: 
� The setting will be the ICMs studied; 
� The unit of analysis is the ‘activities’ ICMs conduct, which constitute ‘core competence 
development strategy execution’. 
 
Case Study Process: 
� Desk study evolutionary profiling; 
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� Initial communication with the ‘contact’ person of the ICM to set-up meetings with 
appropriate interviewees; 
� Interviews with executives who have an overview of how their organization operates as a 
whole; 
� Further document review and interviews if needed; 
� Case-study write-up. 
 
A.3 Organization of this Protocol 
 
� An overview of the case-study project; 
� Field procedures; 
� Case-study questions (the generic issues that have to be addressed, not the actual questions 
addressed to interviewees, which were company=specific and derived from these generic 
issues); 
� A guide for the case-study report and cross-case comparison. 
 
Section B. Field Procedures 
 
B1. Preparing the visit 
 
Preparing preliminary information: 
� Date and time; 
� Addresses and people to visit, how to arrive; 
� Agenda; 
� Reviewing the company and the findings of the desk study’s evolutionary profiling; 
 
Other aids: 
� Checking laptop, AC adapter, files, internet card and cable; 
� Notepad, paper clips, post-its; 
� Tape recorder, cassettes and batteries. 
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B2. Interview Visit 
 
Agenda: 
� Personal presentation; 
� Presenting interview overview; 
� Discussion of questions/topics; 
� Asking for additional documentary information that can be provided and is not available 
publicly. 
 
Section C. Questions1 
 
� What is the ICM’s ‘role’ in the production of the built environment? 
� Which are the ICM’s structural characteristics (those representing the ‘structural’ element of 
its configuration), i.e. those that can describe: 
- Its structure? 
- Type of market-focused strategy adopted? 
- Horizontal organization between different BUs and the degree of decentralization? 
� Which are the mechanisms used for inter-BU coordination? How and why do they differ 
from those used for intra-BU coordination? 
� Which are the activities related with ‘setting and communicating strategic intent and 
strategic architecture’ at the ICM? 
- Which are the organizational routines through which they are being conducted? 
- Who are the key people and organizational bodies involved in those?  
� Which are the activities related with ‘regulating strategic architecture implementation’ takes 
place at the ICM? 
- Which are the organizational routines through which they are being conducted? 
- Who are the key people and organizational bodies involved in those?  
� Which are the activities related with ‘stretching and leveraging resources and core 
competencies’ at the ICM?  
 
Regarding ‘organizational level competence’ integration and leverage: 
- Which are the organizational routines through which this being conducted? 
- Who are the key people and organizational bodies involved in those?  
 Regarding individual level core competence leverage (both  
           employee mobilization and knowledge transfer): 
                                                             
1
 The question may arise as to how the researchers understood the terminology used. The reader is reminded that these 
questions are in the form of a generic, theory-based format. In the beginning of each interview, an introduction was 
made to the interviewee as to the topic that was been examined and as to the nature of core competencies as social 
constructs. The questions and issues were discussed after interviewees explicitly acknowledged they understood what 
they were being asked. 
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- Which are the organizational routines through which they are being conducted? 
- Who are the key people and organizational bodies involved in those? 
 Regarding process replication: 
- Which are the organizational routines through which they are being conducted? 
- Who are the key people and organizational bodies involved in those?  
 
� Which are the activities related with ‘succession planning and leadership development’ at 
the ICM? 
- Which are the organizational routines through which they are being conducted? 
- Who are the key people and organizational bodies involved in those? 
� Which are the activities related with ‘improving business practices’ at the ICM? 
- In terms of capturing knowledge at projects? 
- In terms of this knowledge being used to update/improve practices? 
- In terms of this leading to evaluations of strategies? 
- In terms of this leading to re-negotiation of norms? 
- Which are the organizational routines through which they are being conducted? 
- Who are the key people and organizational bodies involved in those?  
 
Section D. Guide for the case study report and cross-case comparison 
 
� Conduct the Desk Study and the Evolutionary Profiling: 
- Gather as many as possible company-related documentary data (annual reports, 
company archives, press releases - academia as well as industry-based) for a period 
of ten years prior to the commencement of the research. 
- Read and ‘code’ the texts annually, using the following terms as codes: 
- Strategic Intents Set; 
- Strategic Architectures Set; 
- Investments Made and Resources Allocated. 
- Summarize the coded texts to their key-points; 
- Create 10-year threads of each code; 
- Display those in the form of an ‘Event Listing Network’ as the ICM’s Evolutionary 
Profiling. 
� Conduct the Semi-Structured Interviews: 
- Use the insights of the Evolutionary Profiling to transform the list of generic, theory-
based company activities into company-specific semi-structured interviews: 
� Analyze the Semi-Structured Interviews: 
� Transcride the Interviews. 
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� Read and ‘cluster’ the extended texts of the transcribed interviews under the 
following codes (and their sub-categories wherever this applies): 
- Role in the Production of the Built Environment 
- Configuration - Structural Characteristics 
o Structure 
o Type of Market-Focused Strategy Pursued 
o Horizontal Organization/Degree of Decentralization 
- Configuration - Functional Characteristics 
- Configuration - Agency Characteristics 
- Setting and Communicating Strategic Intent and Strategic Architecture 
- Regulating Strategic Architecture Implementation 
- Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies 
- Organizational Level Competence (OLC) Integration and Leverage 
- Individual Level Core Competence (ILCC) Leverage 
- Employee Mobilization 
- Knowledge Transfer 
- Process Replication 
- Leadership Development 
- Business Process Improvement 
� Group ‘coded’ text passages under the thematic categories, read them and identify 
key-points referring to the ‘organizational routines’ through which they are 
conducted, as well as the key-people/organizational bodies that are involved in the 
implementation of those routines. 
� Create displays per thematic category, the ones referring the role and the 
configuration displaying the role the ICM plays in the production of the built 
environment and the structural characteristics of its configuration; And the ones 
referring to activities displaying the company-specific organizational routines 
through which they are conducted and the key-people/organizational bodies 
involved. 
� Use the displays derived from the analysis to map on the same table all generic, 
theory-based company activities with respect to the organizational routines they are 
conducted and the key-people/organizational bodies involved.  Use this mapping to 
identify their interrelationships with respect to the organizational routines they share 
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and the most nodal people/organizational bodies when implementing those activities. 
Identifying those interrelationships will provide in addition the information necessary 
regarding the ‘procedural’ and ‘agency’ characteristics of the ICM’s configuration. 
� Construct a display that described the complete configuration of the ICMs. 
� Write the Case Study positioning sequentially the displays created and accompanying them 
with explanatory texts. 
� Compare individual case study findings and discuss in light of extant literature. 
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Appendix 5.2: Indicative Letter of Introduction       
 
 
Dear Mr. Holbrook, 
 
 The School of Construction and Project Management at University College London is 
currently undertaking a research program supervised by Professor Peter Morris, whose purpose is to 
examine core competencies and their development in the construction industry. Core competence 
theory was introduced by Hamel and Prahalad (1994), proposing that diversified companies could 
achieve cost effective growth paths with a higher probability of success than their competitors 
through the effective deployment of their core competencies on a corporate wide basis.  
 Bechtel is a leading international construction group whose evolutionary path positions it 
amongst the most desirable companies to be examined here. For that reason, we are writing this 
letter to discuss with you the possibility of collecting data through interviews with some key 
Bechtel employees. 
The objective of the program is to assess the effectiveness with which core competencies are 
being deployed internationally and on a corporate wide basis.  
 For Bechtel to benefit from its involvement, we intend to share our findings with the 
company. These would include among others: 
� An assessment of the company’s core competencies against those desirable in the 
construction industry, with insights from a comparative study of construction majors. 
� An assessment of the effectiveness with which core competencies are deployed in 
geographically dispersed, identifying any areas that might require improvement. 
 
We hope that you will find out research proposal interesting and will be willing to assist us 
in this effort. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you in person the practicalities of 
undertaking this research. Thank you in advance for your time. 
 
 
Sincerely Yours, 
 
 
Ioannis I. Zoiopoulos  
email: j.zoiopoulos@ucl.ac.uk, tel: +44 (0) 207 6791675, fax: +44 (0) 207 9161887 
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Appendix 5.3: Semi-Structured Interviews - Refined      
 
 
Albion’s Case Study led to refining the semi-structured interview design for the rest of the 
ICMs studied, without however altering the generic topics discussed (viz. Appendix 5.1). Most 
refinements were in the form of additions. Three more interviews were added per case study. One 
focused on the case of core competence development through acquisitions and the integration of 
acquired companies on the existing organizational body of the ICM studied (Interview 3), one 
focused on corporate HR practices and any ‘structured’ programs in place for succession planning 
and leadership development (Interview 11) and one focused on any structured programs in place for 
capturing knowledge created and improving business practices (Interview 12). The interview design 
was transformed to 12 semi-structured interviews, as enough was known to introduce greater 
structure - in line with critical realism - as the research moved from an ‘extensive’ to an 
increasingly ‘intensive’ nature. Despite the addition of sections, the interview questions were not 
changed. They were essentially re-organized. This slightly more ‘focused’ arrangement allowed, 
during the actual implementation of the interviews, more time to focus on the issues that this 
research wished to address The interviews can be grouped in three sections, as shown below.  
  
Section 1: Setting the Context 
 
Interview 1: The Company, its structure, core functions and mechanisms for intra- 
                   organizational coordination. 
Interview 2: Organic growth and development. 
Interview 3: Obtaining competencies through acquisitions. 
 
Section 2: Organizational Competencies across the Project-Life Cycle 
 
Interview 4: Project/Business Development 
Interview 5: Winning Work 
Interview 6: Engineering 
Interview 7: Procurement 
Interview 8: Construction 
Interview 9: Operations and Maintenance 
Interview 10: Project/Program Management & the Management of Interfaces. 
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Section 3: People and Processes 
 
Interview 11: Human Resource Planning, Succession Planning, Leadership and  
           Professional Development. 
Interview 12: Improving Business Practices/Process Re-Engineering 
 
 In section 1, the objective was to understand the basic structure and processes through which 
the company operates and the mechanisms through which it develops and grows. In interview 1, the 
objective is to map the company’s core functions, key interrelationships within the group, as well as 
the way those are managed. Focus was given on the communication channels existing between 
hierarchical levels, as well as communication channels and function between different units of the 
group. Interview 2 addressed growth through JVs and partnering/alliances. Interview 3 addressed 
processes of acquisitions and post-acquisition integration. 
 In section 2, there are 7 interviews, each of the topics of which corresponds to one stage of 
the project life-cycle that the company might be active in. In total, they represent the project life-
cycle management process.  The reason for this is that project life cycle activities are often reflected 
in core functions that organizations create (e.g. sales and bidding in ‘business development’, 
procurement in ‘procurement’, etc). The objective was to conduct each of these interviews with a 
senior executive who would have corporate-wide overview of  how the function ‘integrates’ with 
the rest of the organization and is interrelated with other functions, within and across BUs. There 
was a pattern repeating across all these interviews and this was the common sub-topics that were 
addressed in each: 
� The activity(ies) that each ICM undertakes within each project stage and how each ICM is 
structured to conduct them;  
� The core functions related to this stage and how are activities related to these structured 
within the organization; 
� The communication channels at the vertical hierarchy and inter-BU dimension; 
� Inter-BU implementation of the activity; 
� Leverage of organizational and individual level competencies across businesses and 
geographical locations; 
 
In section 3, the focus was on two fundamental issues related to the management of ‘people’ 
and ‘processes’. Interview 11 thus analyzes the responsibilities and positioning of the HRM 
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function within the group as well as any succession planning, leadership and professional 
development frameworks in an effort to provide an answer to the question of how ICMs develop 
their managerial and leadership capacity. Finally, interview 12 addresses company practices related 
to how knowledge captured in incorporated to the group’s existing practices.  
The new format of the interviews aimed to ensure that data gathered would be compatible 
with the nature of the construction business. In other words, across the various stages of the project 
life-cycle this examination did not take place in a vacuum but within the context of the company 
specific structural characteristics (interview 1), as well as the processes through which new 
organizational competencies related to those competence areas are obtained/acquired/developed 
(Interview 2 and 3). The intent was for one person to be interviewed per topic. However, this was 
not actualized, as in all firms, single employees could address multiple issues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.4: Evolutionary Profiling - Case Study Example: Albion       
    
 
 Initially, data from publicly available documents was read and clustered, annually, in the categories shown on the table below. The text in 
the table is not refined, as it is used here for demonstrating purposes and does not form part of the final thesis document. The name of the company 
has been changed where necessary, due to issues of confidentiality. Then, the clustered data was used (Part B) to create strategic intent-strategic 
architecture-stretch and leverage ‘threads’. Two ‘cycles’ were identified. 
 
Year Strategic Intent Strategic Architecture Stretch & Leverage  
1996 1) To build in their successful involvement in PFI by 
creating a clearer ‘market’ and ‘product’ focus in this 
market they perceive as strategic. 
2)  To be more active in the international construction 
market 
3) To achieve improvements in productivity and 
procurement. 
4) To grow profits in ‘Building, Building Management 
and Services’ 
- Selectively invest in PFI as opportunities appear. 
- Apply overseas the strategy of pursuing smaller and major 
projects, to successfully expand their regional operations. 
- Refine operations (cost control focus was promoted, as well as 
focus on improvement in productivity and procurement) 
1) Restructure Power Engineering to give a greater 
customer focus. 
2) To achieve cost and efficiency improvements and 
improve performance and productivity for Albion Rail. 
 
1997  1) Reorganizing & restructuring the business to create a market 
led organization with consolidation around the business sectors it 
is involved with. 
 
 
 
1) ‘Albion Capital Projects’ is created to manage its 
increasing PFI involvement around the world. 
2) ‘First Philippines Albion’ created to further pursue 
‘Internationalization’ objective. 
4) Program to reorganize the ‘Rail Infrastructure business 
acquired in 1996 from Network Rail, integrating them from 
other Rail activities in the group, to create a full service’, new 
build and renewal and maintenance serving portfolio (Market 
Focus). 
 
1998 5) To become a ‘market-led’ organization. 
To achieve more stable and secure earning streams 
6) To integrate the company’s services across the value 
chain. 
 
 
 Bidding and Executing Major Projects is combined in a 
new and single management unit. 
1999  
Further improve productivity to make profit progress 
through business process improvement. 
Successfully restructure the group 
 
Financial Objectives: 
 
1) Pursue a strategy focused on improving the quality of 
earnings and sustaining earnings growth, rather than 
seeking volumes growth. 
2)  Improve Business Processes specifically in SCM, site 
efficiency & quality & selectivity of bidding 
 
1) Investing in ‘Innovation and Technology Improvement at 
Rail Efficiency and Safety’. They introduced new and 
comprehensive asset management system. 
2) I&D created as a business stream to manage and 
refine the company’s existing skill in asset management, 
 
 
-improve long term shareholders value. 
-Increase EPS growth. 
           -Embed Risk Management further in operations 
           -Contain the company’s overheads 
3) Pursue opportunities of ‘alliancing’, partnering and repeat 
business’  
4) Investing in PFI infrastructure projects to enable other 
parts of the group to generate profits in construction, 
operations, maintenance, as well as equity returns. 
5) Acquisitions and investments to strengthen its position in 
growth markets, where it as proven expertise, particularly rail 
and PFI. 
6) Divesting under-performing businesses. 
7) Form links with universities to improve process 
improvement programs. 
 
  
increasing the service orientation of the group and 
facilitating beneficial and profitable integration. 
2000  
The group intends to increase long terms shareholder 
return by improving the quality of its earnings, 
sustaining earnings growth and creating sustainable 
forward momentum in its earnings. 
 
“We will continue to look only at opportunities which 
extend our existing core skills into new geographical 
and technological areas and in which we have already 
competent, largely self contained management teams” 
(CEO statement) 
 
- Undertake Initiatives that would implement the ‘Business 
Process Improvement’ objective. 
� Continue pursuing acquisitions and a number of 
small to medium sized opportunities in key areas, where 
continuing growth can be predicted and where the group has a 
sustainable competitive advantage.  
� Continue bidding for PFI concessions in a number 
of sectors (Healthcare, Education, Transportation) and pursuing 
its interest in the PPP for the London Underground. 
 
Initiatives underway to implement the ‘Business 
Process Improvement’ objectives, included: 
� Reduction of supplier numbers and the further 
development of a preferred supplier network (SCM). 
� Increasing use of the operations and site process 
blueprint “The Way we Work” introduced by the UK 
construction business in 1998. 
� The development of an e-commerce platform to 
reduce transaction costs. 
 The development of a Knowledge Management System. 
 The introduction of an enhanced business based risk 
identification, evaluation and management system.  
Strategic Acquisitions took place in the US and UK, for 
reasons explained in greater detail in the Appendix. 
2001       The strategy is to ‘Focus on what we know’ 
 
   An effort is made to build strong supply chain partnerships in 
Building, Building Management and Service 
 
     Strategy of growth through acquisitions, which offer 
geographical and sectoral expansion but rely on its established 
core competencies and are within its markets of focus. 
 
The programs that had been initiated last year in order to 
improve Internal Business Processes are on the following 
course: 
� A partner has been selected for the development 
of the e-commerce platform and growing number of our 
projects now use this market leading system (procurement). 
� The first year of operation of the company’s 
enhanced Risk Management System, covering commercial, 
safety, environmental and reputation risk issues). 
� The company has designed and is in the process 
of introducing a knowledge management system to better 
utilize the vast reservoir of expertise which exists amongst 
its staff and within its business worldwide. 
 
      Strategic Acquisitions took place the details of which or 
the reasons behind them are explained in greater detail in 
the Appendix. 
 
 
2002 To develop US business similar to the successful UK 
model. 
 
- Sustain Earnings Growth 
      To sustain earnings growth, the company will embrace the 
following Financial policies: 
� Manage working capital closely 
� Account prudently and conservatively. 
Continuing to work towards the objective of being 
“market focused”, the group will also: 
� Continue to develop the breadth and depths of its 
expertise in areas were it has existing knowledge and 
competitive strength. 
     Continuing to work towards the objective of increasing 
shareholder value: 
� Contracts and investments are to be pursued only when the 
long term interests of the company’s shareholders are 
pursued. 
In 2002, Albion first announced the desire to develop 
a US business, similar to its successful UK model. For that 
purpose, a US Senior manager was appointed to take 
responsibility for US business.  
 
Strategic Acquisitions took place the details of which or the 
reasons behind them are explained in greater detail in the 
Appendix. 
2003   The company continues selective investment in PFI and 
PPP concessions in the UK and elsewhere. 
 
Program initiated to introduce the International Financial 
Reporting Standards, from the Annual report of the 31st of 
December 2005. A project team was formed with Delloite 
and Touche LLP, identifying key issues and system 
changes needed to carry out the transition. The work of the 
project team is ongoing with particular focus on new 
standards issued in 2004 and in training staff across the 
group on the implementation issues. 
With respect to the US business goal that was set the 
previous year, a new US senior management team recruited 
over the last 12 months is charged with identifying, 
developing and executing opportunities to move Albion’s 
US business to the direction of the group’s successful UK 
business model. 
      Strategic Acquisitions took place the details of which or 
the reasons behind them are explained in greater detail in 
the Appendix. 
2004 12) To be a  ‘world class company’ 
13) Goals for the US business where set to deliver 
significant performance improvements in 2005 and 
2006 on which terms a larger presence can be built in 
the long term. 
Further embed “Internal Business Processes” improvements so 
that the group continues to adhere to its core principles of2: 
- careful bid selection 
- first class project management 
- sound engineering judgments 
- close attention to cash management 
  
 A strategy of looking to add new elements to its business mix. 
 
   A major program-project took place in the US division of 
Albion Rail. The downsized business is now being 
refocused on the growing “Rail Services Market” with key 
target areas: 
- rail replacement 
- vegetation control 
- Upgrading and operating rail spurs for industrial 
locations. 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
13) specific project selection criteria, set for I&D projects: 
 i) a real post tax IRR between 13% – 18%. 
ii) to trade on proven strengths of the group & provide design, 
construction and service contracts for the other parts of the 
group. 
 
In growing in overseas markets, the following four key 
criteria will be applied: i) The markets must be large enough to 
make sustained difference) offer an acceptable environment and 
one which does not punish foreign ownership, and have 
substantial numbers of sophisticated customers who will pay 
for superior levels of quality, safety and innovation. The goal is 
to grow in markets which offer us the opportunity to achieve 
the market leadership without undue risk.  
Our key markets will be the United States, Western 
Europe and South East Asia, the latter based on our strong 
presence in Hong Kong. 
 
To enforce the Internationalization objective the Group 
acquired 50% of Albion Hong Kong, to create a strong base 
for Asian Growth. 
 
   Projects will be targeted whose size and complexity offer 
advantages arising from the group’s range of skills and 
experience.  
   Strategic Acquisitions took place the details of which or 
the reasons behind them are explained in greater detail in 
the Appendix. 
2005  
      After a major strategic review , the board 
undertook and we restated and re-communicated our 
core principles and the commitments we made to all 
our stakeholders. We are committed to deliver the 
reliable, responsible growth which our shareholders 
have enjoyed in recent years. 
 
 
 
 
      Working in partnership with sophisticated customers who 
value the highest levels of quality, safety and technical 
expertise. Our skills are applied in appropriate combinations to 
meet individual customer needs.   
     We remain careful in our selection of what to bid and how to 
bid it. 
     In the short term, appropriate growth will be delivered from 
the momentum inherent from our current mix (focus & 
consolidation strategy). 
    The strategy to secure medium and long term growth at our 
target levels we will develop further in areas adjacent to our 
existing areas of core capability (strategy of related 
diversification). The way we will do so, is: 
 
1) We will expand further our presence in UK 
infrastructure markets, which already constitute the 
majority of our business and in which we make our best 
and more reliable margins. 
2) Growth in professional and technical services. The 
creation of Albion Management has been an excellent 
start in developing this process (objective: 
professionalize-service oriented). 
3) Extending our reach in Private Finance: The potentially 
rapid development of PPP markets outside the UK, 
particularly in the US and Germany, and the emergence 
of new UK investment opportunities outside PPP, offers 
further scope for growth. We will take our PPP skills 
Cost Reductions and Reorganizations in Germany. 
Strategic Acquisition took place 
 
 
 
beyond their current boundaries. 
4) Growing in overseas markets: The development of our 
engineering and construction business outside the UK is 
an important part of our strategy. But not an urgent 
priority. 
 
Albion will continue to pursue opportunities in those existing 
markets where it has clear competitive advantages and market 
leading positions. Projects will continue to be targeted whose 
size and complexity offer advantages arising from the group’s 
unique range of skills and experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part B: Table 1: Cycle 1, 1996-2004 
Strategic Intents (S.I.) Strategic Architecture (S.A.) Stretch & Leverage 
Resources 
 
1) To become a ‘market led’ organization (1999).  
2) To achieve more stable and secure earning streams (pre-
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004), 
 
(i) To improve the quality of earnings and sustaining 
earnings growth, rather than seeking volume growth 
(1999). 
(ii) To improve long term shareholder value (1999) 
(iii) To increase Earnings per Share (EPS) growth (1999 
Strategic Intent 1-     Strategic Architecture: 
 
i) Reorganizing and restructuring the business with 
consolidation around the business sectors already involved 
with (1997). 
a. Build strong supply chain partnerships in Building, 
Building Management and Services (2001). 
 
ii) Build in the group’s successful involvement in PFI, by 
creating a clear ‘market’ and ‘product’ focus in this market 
perceived as strategic. 
iii) Be more active in International Construction. 
a. To develop a US business similar to the UK model 
(2000). 
Strategic Intent 2 – Strategic Architecture: 
 
i) Integrate the company’s services across the Value Chain, 
ii) Establishing long term contracts with clients (1999) 
by adopting a ‘Customer oriented strategy’ to 
increasingly pursue opportunities of alliancing, 
partnering and repeat business. 
 
iii) Refine existing operations, focusing on: 
a) Continuous improvement in SCM (2000). 
1) Build strong supply chain partnerships in Building, 
Building Management and Services (2001). 
b) On site efficiencies (2000). 
 
iv) Apply professional business management to our resources 
(2000), by 
a. Managing working capital very closely. 
b. Accounting prudently and conservatively. 
c. Continue pursuing increased margins on all businesses, 
primarily by selectivity of bidding. 
d. Contain and reduce overhead costs (1999)  
 
S.I. 1-S.A. (i) 
 
a) Program integrating with other Rail activities of the group those acquired in 1996 
from Network Rail, to create a full service, new build and renewal and 
maintenance serving portfolio (1997-1998-market focus) 
b) Acquisitions to strengthen its position in growth markets with proven expertise, 
particularly in Rail (1999). 
c) Major reorganization program in the US division of Albion Rail (2000) 
d) Cost reductions and reorganizations in Germany (2004) 
 
S.I. 1- S.A. (ii) 
 
e) ‘Albion Projects created (1997-1998). 
f)  ‘Investments and Developments’ created to manage the groups PFI businesses 
(1999). 
g) Selectively investments in PFI projects as opportunities appear (1996). 
h) Continued investing in a number of sectors (Healthcare, education, and 
transportation) in PFI and PPP concessions in the UK and elsewhere, targeting 
projects whose size and complexity offer advantages arising from the group’s 
range of skills and experience (2004). 
 
S.I. 1 – S.A. (iii) 
 
i) Selectively pursuing overseas smaller and major projects, in order to carefully 
expand their regional operations (1996). 
j) ‘First Philippines Albion’ a joint venture company with a local contractor (1999) 
k) A US Senior manager was appointed to take responsibility for US business 
(2002).  
l) A new US senior management team recruited over the last 12 months, charged 
with identifying, developing and executing opportunities to move Albion’s US 
business to the direction of the group’s successful UK business model (Stretch & 
Leverage, 2003). 
m) The Group acquired 50% of Albion Hong Kong, to create a strong base for Asian 
Growth (Stretch & Leverage, 2004). 
 
Strategic Intent 2 
S.I. 2- S.A. (i) 
 
a) Investments and Developments’ created as a ‘Sector’ BU grouping’, to facilitate 
beneficial and profitable integration of the group’s skills and services (1999). 
b) Invest in PFI infrastructure projects that would enable other parts of the group 
too generate profits in design, construction, maintenance, operation as well as 
equity returns (1999, 2004). 
 
S.I. 2- S.A. (ii) 
 
Albion Management created to offer a range of professional and technical services. 
 
 
 
S.I. 2- S.A. (iii) 
1) Reduction of supplier numbers and the further development of preferred 
supplier network (SCM) 2000 and development of an e-commerce platform to 
reduce transaction costs. 
2) Increasing use of the operations and site process blueprint ‘The Way we Work’ 
introduced by the UK construction business in 1998 (2000). 
 
S.I. 2- S.A. (iv) 
 
i) Quality of bidding selectivity and cost control (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999). 
j) Introduction of an enhanced business based risk identification, evaluation and 
management system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Cycle 2, 2005-onwards 
 
Strategic Intents (S.I.) Strategic Architecture (S.A.) Stretch & Leverage 
Strategic Intent 3 
 
Further expansion in UK regional Infrastructure 
 
Strategic Intent 4 
 
Growth in Professional and Technical Services 
 
Strategic Intent 5 
 
Extending our reach in Private Finance, by the extension of 
our investment business in new markets 
 
Strategic Intent 6 
 
Establishing strong and domestic businesses in selected 
overseas markets 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Intent 3 
Strategic Intent 4 
Develop upstream capabilities in program management and 
technical consulting to be able to adopt a broader and more 
proactive role towards the services we offer our customers. 
 
Strategic Intent 5 
i) Continue to build on the group’s existing PPP portfolio and 
establish an appropriate concession base as PPP markets 
emerge, in territories where Albion already has a substantial 
local presence and existing market knowledge (2006). 
ii) Deploy the expertise in ‘Albion Capital’ team of over 200 
professionals built over 10 years as a leading participant in 
the UK PFI/PPP markets,  
iii) on the fast emerging market for non PPP infrastructure 
investment in the UK. The target asset classes will be those 
where Albion has established contracting expertise, such as 
airports and utilities (2006). 
iv) take advantage of refinancing opportunities and carefully 
targeted acquisitions and divestments in the secondary PPP 
market where appropriate (2006). 
 
Strategic Intent 6 
 
(The strategy is to focus on markets that (2006): 
 
i) are large enough to make a substantial difference. 
ii) offer an acceptable business environment which does not 
discriminate against foreign ownership. 
iii) are sufficiently endowed with sophisticated customers 
who will pay for superior levels of quality, safety and 
innovation 
iv) Offer us the opportunity to achieve a leading market 
position without undue risk. 
Strategic Intent 3 
In Rail Engineering and Services:  
 
i. Acquisition of Albion xyz completed in 2006 (manufacturer of Rail-Track 
products) 
ii. Albion Rail Track System –‘Plant Investment’ program 
iii. Investment in new high output plant to improve reliability & availability of the 
on-track fleet in Albion Rail Plant. 
iv. Albion Rail Germany: acquisition of  ZWX- a specialist signalling contractor) 
and a signalling cooperation with TWA  in project biding. 
 
In Civil Engineering 
 
v) The acquisition of ABCD plc 
 
Strategic Intent 4 
i) Progress of Albion Management accelerated in 2006. 
ii) ‘Albion Building US’ acquired a Texas based construction management 
business on March 2006. 
 
Strategic Intent 53 
 
Strategic Intent 6  
Poor performance in Albion Construction Inc central division is offsetting good 
performance in West Coast and Texas. Closer supervision from UK management 
and more rigorously applied control mechanisms to address the issue (2006). 
 
Significant progress has occurred for ‘Albion Building Management’. The company 
now has a very significant portfolio in support of the group’s PPP projects, with 4 
more major schemes at preferred bidder stage (2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.5: Semi-Structured Interview Analysis - Routine Identification - Case Example: Cyclone 
 
  The following table has isolated a passage from one interviewee’s responses, which has been ‘clustered’ during coding, under 
‘Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies’. While the ‘extended’ text was analyzed on that stage, notes were taken to 
identify the individuals/organizational bodies, processes and structures of the routines through which activities were implemented (stretch 
and leverage in the case of this example). Then, these contributed to being able, with data from multiple interviews, to focus on the routines 
themselves, and describe them within the context of the organization they were taking place in (Cyclone in this case). 
‘Stretching and Leveraging Resources and Core Competencies’ Routine Identification - Cyclone 
Source  
 
 
Extended Text 
Individuals/Organizational 
Bodies, Processes and 
structures 
(Researcher’s Notes) 
 
I6: PM 
 
 
YZ: So, how centralized/decentralized is engineering? 
 
PM: Well, we have this global communities network, which is people from within business units and within the 
engineering functions that get together to establish common practices and procedures around engineering. More at 
the high level, generic, basic fundamental work processes of how we do engineering. For example, something like 
electrical: running an electrical cable for Energy & Chemicals should be no different than running an electrical 
cable in our government group, right? I mean, you know. So, the purpose of this group is to identify technical 
similarities and develop consistent practices and procedures, tools and software, document those and transfer them. 
We leverage knowledge on-line to distribute those practices and procedures and I am sure Mr.________ went 
through that with you.  So, although the engineering functions reside in the business units, there is what we call ‘the 
global communities network’, represented by ‘global excellence leaders’ for all the functions related with 
engineering. They meet on a regular basis under this umbrella that we call ‘project execution services’. So, long 
story short, I am responsible for what we call our ‘roject execution services’. What this is, is not just the 
engineering functional groups, but all the functional groups that we have in the company. So, lets say the ‘materials 
management’ global excellence leader, does not only work directly for construction and procurement, she also has a 
global responsibility for all material management in the corporation and under that responsibility, she reports to me 
on a portfolio assignment which is part of the network that we have at Cyclone. So, we are a very Matrix 
organization. You have your business line responsibilities and then you have your broader responsibilities related to 
global communities network. 
 
Functions: Global community 
networks to establish common 
practices and procedures 
 
Knowledge ‘leverage’ through 
knowledge on-line 
Project execution services is a 
‘sub-group’ of global 
communities network’ 
Global excellence leaders also 
have executive responsibilities 
in  the organization, either BU 
or functional. 
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